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THE GROWTH  
OF  
BRITISH POLICY.

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THE GROWTH  
OF  
BRITISH POLICY

BY  
SIR J. R. SEELEY, LITT. D., K.C.M.G.

*VOLUME I*

CAMBRIDGE:  
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1911



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**DEDICATED**

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**TO**

**HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN**



## MEMOIR.

JOHN ROBERT SEELEY was born in London on September 10, 1834. He was the third son of Mr Robert Seeley, the publisher, a man of great mental and bodily energy, and of no mean literary skill. Mr Seeley was a contributor to Fraser's Magazine and a leader-writer for the Times. A strong churchman, and an evangelical, he published a volume of essays, which passed rapidly through several editions, in defence of the Establishment, and he was one of the founders of the Church Pastoral Aid Society. Late in life he wrote a work on Edward the First, entitled "The greatest of the Plantagenets," which has the merit of being among the first books to do adequate justice to that king. He was fond of good novels, and made his boys acquainted with Scott, Dickens and Thackeray at an early age.

From his father Seeley imbibed a love of books, a bias towards history, and a habit of thinking about religion. He learnt unusually young to read, and he read eagerly and widely. As a child he went to school under the Rev.

J. A. Barron, at Stanmore. No prizes were given at this school, but there was a master who infected his pupils with a taste for English poetry. Here Seeley acquired his first love for Milton and Pope.

After a while he was sent to the City of London School, then under Dr Mortimer. The school was already making a name for winning scholarships at the Universities. Seeley, being a precocious boy, was pushed on so fast that he entered the sixth form when little over thirteen. His two elder brothers were in the sixth at the same time, the eldest—afterwards a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge—being captain of the school. To keep up with the work of the form involved a great effort in so young a boy. The lessons had to be prepared at home. No attention was paid to games, and the only exercise which Seeley got, as a rule, was the daily walk between Bloomsbury and Cheapside.

This pressure told upon his health, and there can be little doubt that he never wholly recovered the strain. For a time he had to leave school and to give up all work. He passed a year in the family of the Rev. F. Fitch, Vicar of Cromer. Latin and Greek were prohibited, but he spent much time in reading English. In later life he delighted in recalling this year of enforced idleness, for he owed to it (he said) most of his knowledge of English literature.

In 1852 Seeley went up to Cambridge, entering as a scholar of Christ's College. Among his contemporaries at Christ's were several who were afterwards to attain distinction—Calverley, Skeat, Peile, Sendall, Besant. He was soon remarked as among the ablest of an able set. In conversation he already displayed great analytical skill and the power of epigrammatic expression. He had a faculty for pricking bubbles, and his quick perception and

dialectical subtlety made him a redoubtable opponent. But though he did not shrink from controversy, he had no fondness for it, nor did he seek to assert himself. He joined the Union, but appears to have been a silent member. Naturally somewhat shy and reserved, he nevertheless attached to himself during this time of life not a few warm and constant friends.

He read classics with Mr Robert Burn, and afterwards with Mr Shilleto. With a great admiration for accuracy and fine scholarship, he yet paid comparatively little attention to philology in the narrower sense, but rather set himself to grasp classical literature and history as a whole. Ill health still pursued him, and he was forced to defer his degree for a year. He graduated in 1857, when his name appeared in a bracket with three others, at the top of the Classical Tripos. His superiority was more marked in the competition for the Chancellor's Medals, in which he came out senior medallist. The prize was then given to the best classical scholar of his year, who had qualified by taking at least a second class in the Mathematical Tripos.

In the following year he was elected a fellow of his college, and appointed to a classical lectureship. This post he held for two years, when he gave it up to accept the position of chief classical assistant at his old school. It was during the years immediately following his degree that he began the serious study of German. He spent one of his Long Vacations at Dresden, living with a German family. French he had already learnt at school: a knowledge of Italian he acquired later.

In 1859, while still at Cambridge, he made his first literary venture—a volume of poetry, published by Messrs Seeley, Jackson and Halliday, under the title “David and

Samuel ; with other poems, original and translated. By John Robertson." This volume consists of a poem on the choosing of David ; the " psalms of Moses, David and others, versified " ; " historic sketches "—chiefly monologues by historical personages, Nero, William the Silent, the Prince of Orange in 1672, and others ; and " miscellaneous poems." The contents show that his mind was at this time busy on the two subjects which interested him most deeply through life—religion and history. But the religious subjects are all chosen from the Old Testament, and the aspect of history presented is more personal than that which attracted him in later years.

In 1863 Seeley was appointed Professor of Latin in University College, London, as successor to Mr Frank Newman. Here he remained for six years. In 1865 he published the best known and in some respects the most remarkable of his works—" *Ecce Homo*." The book at once attracted attention, perhaps not less through its crispness of style and limpidity of expression, than through the interest of the subject and the novelty of its treatment. Deliberately uncontroversial, it yet roused a storm of controversy. Its restriction of the view of Christ to the human side of his life and teaching was attacked by many as implying the non-existence of any other side. Avoidance was regarded, without warrant, as negation. In the preface to a later edition Seeley made a spirited answer to these attacks. They hardly touched the main gist of the book, and only distracted attention from the author's chief aim—to draw attention to a side of the subject which in the heat of controversy on other points had been unduly neglected. The book was published anonymously, but the authorship soon became an open secret.

It was expected that the author would publish a sequel

to "Ecce Homo," dealing with the questions which that work put aside. But the sequel—if so it may be called—when it did appear, disappointed these expectations. "Natural Religion," published in 1882, after a lapse of sixteen years, was not so popular a book as "Ecce Homo." It had the same charm of style as the earlier work, but its subject was abstract instead of personal, and the attitude adopted by the author was one which appealed to comparatively few minds. The attempt to reconcile religion and science by relegating them to entirely different spheres is not often satisfactory, and is perhaps least likely to satisfy when the religion advocated is as devoid of the supernatural as the science from which it is distinguished. It ought, however, to be said that here again, as in "Ecce Homo," the author expressly guards himself against the assumption that, because religion may exist without a supernatural element, the supernatural has no existence. And his chief object was probably, after all, not so much to advocate any particular form of religious belief, as to show that much should be regarded as religion which current conceptions exclude from it.

In 1869 Professor Seeley married Miss Mary Agnes Phillott. While on his wedding-tour he received Mr Gladstone's letter offering him the Professorship of Modern History at Cambridge, then vacant through the resignation of Charles Kingsley. The post was a congenial one, for his interest in history was greater than his interest in the classics, while the work of the chair was not such as to preclude his paying considerable attention to other, more or less cognate, subjects.

As a lecturer, he had already made a reputation. At Cambridge his lectures achieved great and immediate success. For many years—in fact, till illness began to



incapacitate him towards the close of his life—his classes were very large, and were recruited from many other departments besides his own. The lectures were carefully prepared, and were delivered at first from notes only: latterly they were written out in full. The originality of his treatment, the clearness of his views, the terseness and vigour of his language, the artistic form which he gave to each address, combined to make Professor Seeley one of the most impressive and stimulating of lecturers. To many of those who heard him when he began to teach at Cambridge, his views and methods were nothing short of an inspiration, and left a mark which time and experience have only deepened.

Before the introduction of the new statutes, the income of the Modern History chair was very small, and marriage had brought Seeley's fellowship to a close. He was therefore compelled to add to his income by lecturing in London and in the chief provincial towns. His subjects were mainly literary and historical. The lectures were sometimes published in magazines: some of them were collected in a volume of "Lectures and Essays" published in 1870. The most important of these are perhaps the essays on the fall of the Roman Empire and on Milton, and the Inaugural Lecture which he delivered at Cambridge.

In this lecture he laid down the lines which he consistently followed throughout the whole tenure of his professorship. Though he did not coin the phrase "History is past politics, and politics present history," it is perhaps more strictly applicable to his view of history than to that of its author. "The indispensable thing," he said, "for a politician is a knowledge of political economy and of history." And again, "our University must be a great seminary of politicians." History was, for him, not the

history of religion, or art, or society; still less was it a series of biographies; it was the history of the State. The statesman was to be taught his business by studying political history, not with a view to extracting arguments in favour of particular political theories, but in order to understand, by the comparative and historical method, political science, the science of the State.

These views he was never tired of promoting by his pen, and illustrating in his professorial lectures. When the Historical Tripos was established, a few years after he became professor, he gave it a strong political bias. Modern history being specially applicable to existing political problems, he lectured by preference on modern times. For the same reason he devoted his attention generally to international history—the history of the action and reaction of States on each other. He dwelt with especial fondness on the history of Great Britain as a member of the European system, a side of our national life which, he maintained, had been unaccountably neglected by most English historians.

The first product of his professorial life at Cambridge was not, it is true, connected with modern history. It was an edition of the first book of Livy, “with an Introduction, Historical Examination and Notes,” published in 1871. But this was a book which he had been requested by the Delegates of the Oxford University Press to undertake, and which he had partially completed while Professor of Latin at University College. The Introduction, while showing familiarity with German research and an admiration for German methods, is thoroughly original and suggestive in its views on the misty origins of the Roman state. But this kind of work was not congenial to him, for he had a certain aversion from what is ordinarily called

research, especially antiquarian research, and he never went farther than this one volume.

In 1878 he produced his most solid contribution to historical knowledge—"The Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age." This great work, to the composition of which he devoted much research both in England and Germany, made known to Englishmen a subject hitherto little studied in this country. But it is the period rather than the man that had a dominant interest for the author. It is not so much Stein himself, as Stein in relation to Prussia and Europe, that is the subject of the book. For biographical details Seeley had not much liking, and the personal character of Stein is unattractive. But the nature of the anti-Napoleonic revolution, the share of Prussia in that revolution, and the share of Stein in the revival of Prussia, are subjects on which he dwelt with predilection. They are nowhere treated with greater force or lucidity.

An arrangement with the Cambridge University Press, to which he alludes with gratitude in the preface to the "Life of Stein," had enabled Professor Seeley to devote the whole of his leisure for some time past to the preparation of that work. About the time of its publication, an anonymous benefactor requested permission to add to the endowment of his chair for some years, until the new statutes, then in contemplation, should come in. This welcome generosity freed him from the necessity of adding to his income by extraneous work, and from this time forward he rarely lectured away from Cambridge. On the introduction of the new statutes, in 1882, he was elected a professorial fellow of Caius College, and remained a member of that foundation until his death.

In the year 1883, Professor Seeley's lectures on

the foreign policy of Great Britain in the 18th century were published under the title "The Expansion of England." This book aroused as wide-spread an interest as "Ecce Homo," and its reception was more uniform. The applause which it met with was almost universal. So vigorous and thoughtful an apology for the British Empire, and for the way by which it had been founded, had never before appeared. It brought together in one concise survey and regarded from one point of view a number of occurrences which historians had previously treated in a disconnected manner. Its conclusions were easily grasped: they appealed to a large audience: they were immediately applicable to one of the greatest questions of the day. In its clear-cut, animated style, its deliberate omission of all superfluous detail, its concentration of illustrative facts on the main thesis, and the confidence with which that thesis is maintained, the book is a model of what an historical essay, with a practical end in view, should be.

These qualities are again to be seen, though perhaps not quite to such advantage, in the "Short Life of Napoleon the First," published in 1886. This little book was expanded from an article on Napoleon in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. It is a concise and rapid sketch—not so much a biography of the man as a survey of his work in relation to his time. Again, as in the case of Stein, it is rather the setting than the portrait which interests the author. Little is said about Napoleon as a commander or as a man. The thesis defended is that Napoleon as a statesman had no originality: his political ideas are all traced either to the Revolution or the *Ancien Régime*.

Soon after bringing out his "Napoleon," Professor Seeley began to work at the book which is here laid

before the public. His original intention was to write a history of British foreign policy from the Revolution of 1688. But it soon became evident to him that post-revolutionary policy could not be adequately presented without an examination of what went before. To place England in her proper setting among the states of Europe, and to display the effect of the Revolution on her relations with the European powers, it was necessary to mark the contrast between the years that preceded and those that followed 1688. He therefore determined on giving an introductory view, before entering on his main theme. But it was difficult to fix upon a starting-point. At first it seemed sufficient to go back to Cromwell. But Cromwell's policy was itself a revival. More and more impressed by the importance of religious differences on the one hand and commercial considerations on the other, as motors in international politics, he at length fixed on the accession of Elizabeth as the date when the main lines of British foreign policy were definitely laid down. It was the principles then adopted which, developed by Elizabeth herself, by Cromwell and William III, were eventually to lead up to the triumphs of the 18th century. The connexion between this book and a previous work is obvious. Had it been completed, it would have given a fuller presentation of the subject, one side of which was so brilliantly lit up in the "Expansion of England."

It was a heavy task which he had undertaken. The material was vast, and the bounds within which it was to be compressed were narrow. It was difficult to avoid letting it overflow the limits of an introduction. To present the subject in the only form which Seeley thought satisfactory—the form of an essay, bringing into high relief the main lines of development only—involved con-

tinuous thought and application. The exceeding complexity of the subject made the attempt to systematise and generalise it very difficult. It may safely be said to have been the hardest historical problem which Seeley ever set himself to solve. The labour which it involved was too much for his powers, weakened by long years of deficient health. He gave himself no holiday in the summer of 1891. In the October of that year a sudden seizure of an alarming kind showed that rest was imperatively required.

Nearly half his book was then in type; a great part of the remainder was written. But the work had perforce to be laid aside, and he was never able to take it up again except for short intervals. From this time forward his health gradually grew worse. Late in 1892 the disease which eventually proved fatal reappeared, after a long interval, and necessitated frequent operations. In the latter part of 1893 he was laid up for some months with a severe attack of phlebitis.

During these years of growing weakness, his courage and patience never faltered. He was never heard to complain; his temper remained as equable as before; he never even seemed to lose hope. Whenever not absolutely incapacitated by illness, he insisted on discharging his professorial duties. He continued to give his lectures and to attend the meetings of the University Boards with which he was connected.

In the intervals of comparative ease and vigour which he still enjoyed, he struggled on with his book, and gradually got all that is here printed into type. But he was never able to revise it as he wished, and death came upon him before he could bring it to a full end.

While laid up in the autumn of 1893 he employed himself in revising and amplifying some papers on Goethe,

originally published in the *Contemporary Review* for 1884. These were now reproduced in a little volume, entitled "Goethe Reviewed after Sixty Years." As in his essays on Milton, so with Goethe, his attention is rather fixed on the content than the form of the poet's works. It is Goethe the philosopher and teacher, the practical exponent of a noble theory of life, rather than Goethe the poet, who is under consideration. The author maps out his life, traces the broad outlines of his development and analyses the influences brought to bear upon his genius, but with Goethe the supreme artist he has little to do. It is thus, as it was with Napoleon, a somewhat one-sided view that is presented, but so far as it goes it is eminently keen-sighted, luminous and suggestive.

In the early part of 1894 Seeley had the satisfaction of receiving public acknowledgement of the services which by his writings and addresses he had rendered to the empire. When Lord Rosebery came into office as Premier on Mr Gladstone's resignation, one of his first acts was to suggest to Her Majesty that she should confer some honour on the Cambridge Professor. He was accordingly made Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George. This recognition gave Seeley no little pleasure, not on his own account, but because he regarded it as a sign that the principles which he so warmly advocated were at length making way in influential quarters.

His last publication was an article in the *Contemporary Review* for July 1894, designed to prepare the way for his forthcoming work on *British Policy*. His health during the year 1894 was not sensibly worse than it had been for some time, but it was known that the end could not be very long delayed. It came at last, somewhat suddenly, and almost painlessly, on January 13, 1895.

This is not the place for an estimate of Professor Seeley's position as an historian, or a detailed criticism of his views on politics, education and other subjects. But a few general remarks may be added. What was most remarkable in his teaching of history was its suggestive and stimulative character, and the constancy of its scientific aim. The facts which Seeley mentioned in his lectures were, as a rule, well known; it was the use he made of them that was new. Historical details were worth nothing to him but as a basis for generalisation; the idea to which they pointed was everything. In dealing with history he always kept a definite end in view—the solution of some problem, the establishment of some principle, which would arrest the attention of the student, and might be of use to the statesman. History pure and simple, that is narrative without generalisation, had no interest for him: it appeared trivial, unworthy of serious attention. With this habit of mind, it was inevitable that his conclusions should sometimes appear disputable, but in any case they were thoughtful, bold and original. Except perhaps in his *Life of Stein*, he added little to the sum of historical knowledge, if by that is meant the knowledge of historical events. But he pointed out a further aim, to which the mere acquisition of knowledge is subsidiary. Taking facts as established, he insisted on thinking about them, and on deducing from them the main lines of historical and political evolution. Such a method of study is not without its risks, but it is fertile and attractive; it has a vitalising tendency.

The same positive, creative impulse is visible in his treatment of Political Science, which he regarded as the outcome of historical generalisation. In his "Conversation Classes"—informal meetings of advanced students, held



at his own house—he discussed the origin and nature of the State, analysed its composition, and deduced its necessary functions and its behaviour under various circumstances. For him the State was an ever-present reality, an object of study and devotion, as for an ancient Greek. He was a good citizen, with a high sense of political responsibility. A Liberal so far as domestic progress was concerned, anxious for the wider spread of education, for the open career, he was ardently conservative of what he conceived to be the foundations of the state.

A little England, an England shorn of Empire, was to him synonymous not only with national degradation but national ruin. Thus he became a warm supporter of Federation—not of any specific form of federal union, but of the federal idea. To foster an enthusiasm for the British State, to convince the people that it is worth preserving, to eradicate the Turgot view of colonies, and to set men thinking how the existing union may be preserved—such were the aims of many lectures and addresses delivered during his later years. Out of a similar conviction he became a vigorous opponent of Irish Home Rule, regarding it as a first step towards a dissolution of the Empire.

On the subject of education he held strong views. He disliked the great public schools, and while regarding them as “wonderful institutions,” maintained that they failed in the weightier portion of their task. He would have substituted for them day-schools, abundantly supplemented by home-education. He conceived that too much attention was still paid to the classics, and far too little to modern languages and to the master-pieces of English literature. It was a maxim of his that one subject, or two at most, should be studied at one time. The great

variety of subjects simultaneously taught at ordinary schools seemed to him one of the chief reasons why four out of five pupils leave without mastering any.

He did not avoid society, but he was no great lover of it. Not a voluble talker, he yet conversed readily with intimate friends or on topics in which he took interest. On such occasions his conversation was infallibly brilliant and epigrammatic, and abounding in apt and humorous illustration. When deeply interested, whether in conversation or on the platform, there shone forth a fire of enthusiasm, generally kept under close restraint or concealed in later years by a somewhat lethargic exterior. In University affairs of the ordinary kind he took little part; the routine of academic business, of syndicates, examinations and college meetings, was distasteful to him. As a young man he used to play racquets and cricket, and in his vacations he sometimes went on walking tours, in the Welsh mountains and Switzerland. But he had no natural fondness for athletic exercises: in later life his only form of physical recreation was a walk, and a solitary walk, he complained, afforded but little rest, for his mind was working all the time. It was his misfortune that he never acquired the art of lying fallow.

It remains only to state the share that I have taken in bringing out this book. At the request of Lady Seeley I undertook to see it through the press. All that is here printed was already in type; most of it had been more or less carefully revised. Professor Seeley had submitted the first volume, or portions of it, to Mr S. R. Gardiner, Dr Henry Sidgwick, and Mr J. Bass Mullinger, and had had the benefit of their advice. I had also read through the whole during the autumn before his death, and we

had talked over a good many doubtful points. He would undoubtedly have made several minor alterations had his life and health been spared, and would probably have rewritten certain portions altogether.

I did not, however, conceive myself justified in making any changes beyond such as appeared absolutely necessary. I have excised some repetitions which appeared superfluous or unintentional, and which, when pointed out, the author expressed his intention to excise. Others I have left, for emphatic repetition is by no means alien from Professor Seeley's style. Such few errors of date or mis-statements of fact as attracted my notice, I have corrected; here and there I have amended a word or transposed a sentence; I have added nothing. The author had written a portion, some three pages, of a concluding chapter, apparently intended to sum up the whole work. The printed portion broke off in the middle of a sentence, and there was no manuscript beyond. This fragment added nothing new, and an attempt to complete it could hardly have been successful. I have therefore decided to suppress it. With these exceptions the book is exactly as it was left by Professor Seeley.

I have to thank Lady Seeley and her daughter for prompt and active assistance in verifying references and in other ways. The index is the work of Miss Mary Bateson and Miss Seeley.

G. W. PROTHERO.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE subject of this book is a particular aspect of our state, namely, that which it wears towards foreign states, during a certain period.

We have already ecclesiastical histories, parliamentary histories, economic histories. More especially we have constitutional histories. Correlative to the Constitutional History is the International History or History of Policy. Among the many aspects in which a state may be regarded these two are the most obviously distinguishable. A state may be contemplated in itself; its structure and development may be studied. This is Constitutional History. On the other hand a state may be considered in its relation to foreign states. This is International History or the History of Policy.

In general histories we may observe that one of these aspects is commonly sacrificed to the other. In other countries the temptation has been to sacrifice the internal aspect. In France, where for a long time constitutional development, if it existed, escaped notice, still more in Germany, where it was petty and uninteresting, history leaned towards foreign affairs. But in England, the home of constitutionalism, history leaned just as decidedly in the opposite direction. English eyes are always bent upon Parliament, English history always tends to shrink into

mere parliamentary history, and, as Parliament itself never shines less than in the discussion of foreign affairs, so there is scarcely a great English historian who does not sink somewhat below himself in the treatment of English foreign relations.

It was only natural therefore that, while we have entered early into the conception of constitutional history, and have seen in this department first a Hallam and then a Stubbs, we have scarcely yet perceived that Constitutional History requires the History of Policy as its correlative. Some writers indeed we have had whose natural tendencies have been in this direction, notably William Coxe. But I know no English history of Diplomacy such as that of Flassan, no book on English policy such as that of Droysen on Prussian policy. At the best we have lives of Marlborough or Wellington, Chatham, Canning or Palmerston, in which foreign affairs have a certain necessary prominence, though even here they are usually subordinated either to military or else to parliamentary affairs.

Nevertheless there has been of late years improvement in this respect. Since Ranke tried in his English History to supply those links between English and continental affairs which English historians had not troubled themselves to give, we have seen Mr S. R. Gardiner treating foreign relations with no less conscientious thoroughness than home affairs even in that seventeenth century in which Parliament has an exceptional right to be prominent. And Mr Kinglake has assuredly no trace of the national weakness of insularity. In his book England appears always as a Power. He sees her always in the company of other great states, walking by the side of France or Austria, supporting Turkey, withstanding

Russia. Her Parliament is in the background; in the front of the stage he puts the Ministers who act in the name, or the generals who wield the force, of England, the Great Power.

So much of the History of Policy in general. But this book deals with a special period, roughly the period between the accession of Elizabeth and the reign of William III. It will be asked why, since my object is to consider English history from a special point of view, I select this particular period. For it is somewhat distant if I wish to treat British Policy practically, and not distant enough if I wish to treat it completely. My answer is that I regard British Policy, that is, the policy of the modern Great Power, as beginning about the close of the seventeenth century, but that I see beyond that commencement a period of growth, during which British Policy may be said to have been in the making. This is a period during which the Three Kingdoms were drawing together and acquiring stable mutual relations, while the complex whole was taking up a secure position with respect to the Continental Powers. The history of the Great Power cannot be understood until the process of its growth has been studied.

This book then offers, in the form of an historical essay, such an outline or general view as may be a necessary introduction to the history of British Policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its subject is the growth of British Policy. By calling it not a history but an essay, I mean first that it deals not in narrative but in discussion, secondly that it does not aim at completeness. It is of the nature of an outline, undertaking to show the position our state occupied among other states, the changes which this position underwent, and



the causes both within our own state and in the relations of the Continental Great Powers by which these changes were produced.

We have immediately behind us three-quarters of a century more peaceful on the whole than any period of equal length in the history of England, a period in which England has had but one short war with a Great Power. Beyond this we see a long period which is not less strikingly warlike. It is marked by the perpetual recurrence of wars with France. The dividing line is at 1815. Beyond that year the National Debt is seen continually growing; on this side of it the Debt either stands still or diminishes.

But when did the period of war, the period which ended in 1815, begin?

The first great war of England and France, that can be held to belong to this series, is that which followed the Revolution of 1688. It was followed at the opening of the eighteenth century by a second and still greater war. There was then a pause of about thirty years; but from 1744 to 1815 war between England and France is almost chronic. It is natural then on the whole to consider the period of war as beginning, along with our army and our debt, at the Revolution.

Thus the long period of peace and the still longer period of war cover together the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. If now we look over these into the seventeenth, we see quite a different spectacle. There is as yet no chronic rivalry with France, Charles II and Cromwell are generally in alliance with France; Charles I marries a French princess. But also we see everything as yet immature and unshaped; England and Scotland are but loosely united. The King at times has an understanding with France against his own Parliament. Revolution

takes place more than once. Out of this confusion there emerges soon after 1688 the solid and stable Great Britain. But in what way, by what process of growth?

In the comparative confusion of the seventeenth century lies evidently the *genesis* of the Britannic Great Power. I attempt here to describe this genesis or growth.

Three great persons raised England to the great position she held among the nations when the eighteenth century opened. William III finished this work, and indeed established not only the greatness of England but also the international system of Europe for the greater part of the eighteenth century. Oliver Cromwell first indicated, by prematurely and temporarily realising, the great position which was definitely achieved for England by William. Elizabeth broke up the older medieval system, paved the way for the union with Scotland, and launched us on the career of colonisation and oceanic trade.

My essay will examine the work of Elizabeth with the reaction that followed, then that of Oliver, finally that of William.

For if we see at the beginning of the eighteenth century a great epoch dividing two ages, still more clearly marked is the great epoch of the sixteenth century, which may be said to divide in international policy modern from medieval England. I have found the accession of Queen Elizabeth to be the most convenient starting-point.

So far the periods I have distinguished have been purely English. But international history demands that attention be given not to one state only, but to all the states whose mutual relations are in question. Along with the Policy of England this book will exhibit that of France, the Spanish Monarchy, Austria and the United

Provinces. By the side of Elizabeth, Oliver and William it will delineate Philip II, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV. Now the period between the accession of Elizabeth and the reign of William III, which we find so sharply characterised in English history, stands out with equal distinctness in Continental history. It is the period in which the Spanish Monarchy under the House of Habsburg took distinct shape, flourished and fell. It is also the period of the Counter-reformation, which begins with the Council of Trent and may be said to reach its limit with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It also includes the complete developement of Bourbon France from its rise in the Religious Wars to its European ascendancy.

This period, while it transformed England in her foreign relations, also gave a new form to most of the Continental states. The student of the eighteenth century requires an explanation of these states. 'What is the House of Habsburg? How comes it to be divided into two branches, one of which governs a strange congeries of Slavonic and Teutonic territories which we call roughly Austria, the other a still stranger congeries of Spaniards, Flemings, Italians, and Americans? How comes the House of Bourbon, though Catholic, to be commonly in alliance with Protestant states?' These questions, and a hundred others, need to be answered, and for the answer a student must turn to the records of the sixteenth century. But he will seldom need to look further back than the reign of Elizabeth. Near the end of that reign the House of Bourbon was established, and just before the beginning of it the double House of Habsburg. At the beginning of that reign the disturbance in Germany produced by the Reformation subsided for a time, while

the Counter-reformation acquired a commanding power through the termination of the Council of Trent. The ecclesiastical settlement of Europe, which was to last in the main till the French Revolution, was arrived at in this period.

In short, we take our departure from a cluster of decisive events, which gave to international history the direction it has since taken. These events are partly British, partly continental. They are as follows :

Between 1558 and 1561 :

Death of Queen Mary without children.

Accession of Queen Elizabeth, in which is involved the victory of the Reformation in England.

Death of King Francis II of France without children by Mary Stuart.

Commencement of the Scottish Reformation, and intervention of England in Scottish affairs against France.

Abroad, between 1555 and 1567 :

Religious peace of Augsburg, or settlement of the religious question for Germany.

Abdication of Charles V and establishment of the double House of Habsburg.

Commencement of the Religious Wars of France and of the last generation of the Line of Valois.

Treaty of Cateau Cambresis, involving the establishment of Spain as the paramount Power in Italy.

Termination of the Council of Trent, or Regeneration of Catholicism.

Commencement of the Rebellion in the Low Countries.

Much will be said in the sequel about the significance of these events. But, considered most superficially, they will appear, when taken together, to have made Europe

what it has been since. Here is the commencement of modern England, isolated with respect to the Continent but tending to union with Scotland, and, along with Scotland, devoted to the cause of the Reformation. Here begins modern Germany, the country of *Parity*, where the two confessions are inextricably mixed together. Here begins that double House of Habsburg, against which the Coalitions of Europe were to be directed in the seventeenth century and the disappearance of which was to convulse Europe in the eighteenth. Here is the germ of Bourbon France. Here begins the servitude of Italy. Here begins that modern, or Jesuitic Catholicism, against which in the eighteenth century Europe under the leadership of France was to rebel. Here is the germ of the Dutch Republic.

Our plan requires us to treat England as one state among many, and to give it only a certain precedence. It will therefore require us occasionally to turn our attention altogether away from England, while we follow some important Continental development, destined after a time to react upon England. One of these occasions occurs at the opening of our narrative. We find it impossible to form a conception of the international position of England at the accession of Elizabeth, until we have noted the condition of Europe at the time when the aggregate of principalities which had been brought together under Charles V had lately given place to two Monarchies under his son and his brother.

## PART I.

### *ELIZABETH.*

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE GROWTH OF THE HOUSE OF HABSURG.

ELIZABETH succeeded to the throne on the morrow of the abdication of Charles V. She found a world in which a new arrangement of power had been recently established. The Habsburg Ascendency had just entered on its second period. The ascendancy of one man was at an end, but his power had not been dissolved, only divided between two of his relatives. The larger half of it had passed to his son Philip, the smaller to his brother Ferdinand, who however added to this moiety two kingdoms of his own, those of Hungary and Bohemia.

Such great aggregations of power were in the main a new feature in Europe, though something similar had been witnessed in the great times of the mediæval empire, especially when Frederick II was at the same time emperor and king of Naples and Sicily. In the middle of

the fifteenth century such aggregations were scarcely to be seen. At that time the Emperor was a needy and powerless prince, almost a stranger to Germany, and the Iberian peninsula was divided among several independent sovereignties. Nor was Italy at that time subject either to a Spanish King or, more than nominally, to an Emperor. Burgundy had but recently been united to the Low Countries, and it had as yet no sort of connexion with Spain or with Austria. But now with great rapidity a vast aggregation sprang into existence, similar to the great empires which have so often been founded by conquest. Yet no conquest took place, nor was the aggregation devised by any statesman. It was the result of natural circumstances which, at the outset at least, were certainly accidental. It was the result of a series of marriages.

Henceforward this aggregation is the principal feature of the European system. First a single aggregate, the dominion of Charles V, then two aggregates, one bearing the name of Spain, the other that of Austria. Of these the former, the complex Spanish Monarchy, is in the times of Elizabeth and James I the greatest Power in the world. This Habsburg Power therefore will accompany us to the end of our review, and we cannot too soon form a clear conception of it.

*Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube!* This verse, so invariably quoted when the Habsburg Ascendency is in question, may deceive us if we gather from it either that the method of aggrandisement was peculiar to the House of Austria or that it was employed by this House rather through luck and occasionally than systematically and for a long time. Accident did indeed reveal, in the case of Charles V, what immeasurable results might proceed from a method so simple, but when the discovery had been

made a system was speedily founded upon it, which was adopted by other royal Houses, and in some cases with scarcely less success. Since the system culminated early in Charles V, we may be led to fancy that it fell into disuse soon after. Now we cannot too early recognise that during the whole period we are to review this system of royal marriage reigns in international politics, that it continued to be employed by the House of Habsburg, so that a new Charles V might at any time have appeared in Europe, and we cannot too early remark that, as we begin with it, we shall have to end with it. The aggregate which had been brought together by Habsburg marriages in the sixteenth century was dissolved at the end of the seventeenth by the effect of a Bourbon marriage.

We shall have occasion over and over again to mark the vast consequences which flowed in many states, and often were intended to flow, from royal marriages, so that we shall cease to think of the system as Austrian, and shall regard it as almost the established system of foreign politics in the greater part of Europe. We shall accordingly recognise that England before and through Elizabeth's reign had to guard not merely against the armies and navies of foreign Powers, but against new marriages, by which either the Habsburg might be still further aggrandised or the Valois might emulate the Habsburg. Such marriages might swallow up England or Scotland or both, as the Low Countries had already been swallowed up, and as Portugal was absorbed a little later, in the Habsburg Empire or in a Valois Empire. Hence we shall see it as a natural consequence of the success of the Habsburg system that in England too in that age the great questions of foreign politics are marriage questions, the marriage of Mary Tudor, of Mary Stuart, the proposals



of marriage for Elizabeth and of remarriage for Mary Stuart.

So much of the Habsburg system in general. But the Habsburg Power itself must now be considered, and particularly in its bearing upon the interests of England. In 1588, we know, the Spanish Habsburg undertook an invasion of England, and Philip II at that time was an enemy to us more formidable than Louis XIV afterwards and not less formidable than Napoleon. This crisis however came on rather slowly, if we consider that the Habsburg Power was by that time some seventy years old; the later ascendancies have certainly been much more intense and also more short-lived. Charles V. himself played his part of universal monarch to the end without once coming into hostile collision with England, and even Philip had reigned more than thirty years before he equipped the Armada against us.

Let us recall very summarily the principal epochs of Habsburg history before 1558. It need not detain us for a moment to relate how in the thirteenth century Count Rudolph, possessor of the castle Habsburg, the ruins of which stand in the Swiss Canton of Aargau, became Roman Emperor, and as Emperor endowed his family with the Duchy of Austria, which had been held before by the house of Bamberg, a line much celebrated by the Minnesänger, and mentioned in English history for the detention of Richard Cœur de Lion. Since 1282 the two names Habsburg and Austria have been inseparably associated. But their first connexion with the Empire was short. Two Habsburg Emperors Rudolph and Albert (the *uom senza fede* of Dante) reigned in close succession, and then the Luxemburg dynasty supplanted that of Habsburg. For more than a century there was no third Habsburg Emperor,

but in 1438 a Duke of Austria was once more chosen by the Electors, and from that date till 1740, when male heirs failed in the family, through all revolutions and transformations of Germany and Europe it remained a fixed rule that the German King and Roman Emperor should be a Habsburg or Austrian prince. From 1438 to 1740 the three names Habsburg, Austria, and Roman Emperor, were inseparably associated. From 1745 till the Empire was wound up in 1806 the House of Lorraine takes the place of the House of Habsburg.

But the Habsburg line of Emperors had for a long time little distinction. It did not outshine the House of Luxemburg, much less emulate the Hohenstauffen. It marks in fact in the fifteenth century the lowest decline of the Holy Roman Empire. In more modern times, for instance in the eighteenth century, it was usual to speak of the Empire as a nullity, but the Emperors of the eighteenth century were in their own way, though not as Emperors, sovereigns of great power. Charles VI, Joseph II, Leopold II, were incomparably more important personages than the Habsburg of the fifteenth century, for example Frederick III. Even in the time of the last Luxemburg it had become usual to speak of Germany as actually governed by the Electors, and a historian writes, 'In the same year the Prince Electors with a great army made war upon the Bohemians'. Nor was the weakness of the Emperor in the fifteenth century compensated, as it was in the eighteenth, by a great hereditary Power (*Hausmacht*) possessed by him in other capacities. Frederick III and Maximilian I were not kings of Hungary and Bohemia as the later Habsburgs were. Their *Hausmacht*

<sup>1</sup> Matthias Döring ap. Mencken (Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 34).

was more purely German, but much less imposing : it was confined to the duchy of Austria and a few lordships in Switzerland and in Alsace.

This is the first phase we need recall of the Habsburg Power. Many small states have swelled into mighty dominions by some warlike energy in the people, or some genius in a ruler. The Habsburg Power also was to grow till it overshadowed Europe, but not through any similar cause.

The first Habsburg prince who foresaw and desired this result was assuredly not one of the commanding figures of history; Maximilian I was no Philip of Macedon, no Pepin, no Sultan Othman or Orchan. But he married Mary of Burgundy, heiress of Charles the Bold, and had by her a son, Philip the Handsome. By this marriage the hereditary dominion of the Habsburg was vastly increased and in such a way as to illustrate in a startling manner the potency of that simple political engine, royal marriage.

Charles the Bold himself had been a great European prince, and how? Because by an earlier marriage his Duchy and County of Burgundy had been united with the Netherlands. Maximilian then could not but perceive the law of aggregation that was at work. Burgundy had been added to the Netherlands on the one side; on the other Austria had already been added in a similar manner to Tirol. And now these two considerable aggregates were by the same simple process blended into one. If Philip himself should make no similar marriage he could not fail by mere inheritance to be the greatest potentate in Europe, and as he would probably acquire the imperial Crown, it was already evident that a vast change impended over Europe. The nullity of the Empire, already of long

standing, would now, it was likely, disappear<sup>1</sup>. Maximilian himself from his helpless impecuniosity was an object of contempt among crowned heads; as a sovereign out at elbows he is a character for a farce. But he could already see himself as an ancestor of mighty kings, for his son Philip, even before his marriage, was evidently destined to regenerate the Empire and to be such a Caesar as had scarcely been seen since the fall of the Hohenstauffen.

So far however what might be foreseen was much less great, and also much less strange and questionable, than what in the end took place. For the territory which Philip would inherit, Austria, Burgundy, the Netherlands, was in the main Germanic or at least continuous with Germany, territory in the main which had once formed part of the Holy Roman Empire.

But now Philip himself married. It is to be remarked that this marriage, the greatest of the whole long series, was not contracted with any view to the prodigious effects which flowed from it. It cannot be said that the heir of Austria and Burgundy married the heiress of Castille and Aragon, for Juana, when she married Philip, was not yet, and had little prospect of becoming, heiress of the crowns of Ferdinand and Isabella. They had a son and they had also a daughter older than Juana. But these disappeared, and a boundless prospect now opened. Aggregation was already far advanced in Southern Europe. The united

<sup>1</sup> As early as 1473 it was predicted by Charles the Bold in negotiating with Frederick III the marriage of Maximilian and Mary that through this alliance the Emperor would come to be more feared than any Emperor for three hundred years. It was also the best way to help Christianity and drive out the Turk. See M. I. Schmidt, *Geschichte der Deutschen* vi. 319.

Crowns of Castille and Aragon had not merely, as it were, created Spain by the conquest of the Moors, they had also obtained possession of Naples and Sicily. But in the persons of Philip and Juana Central and Southern Europe would now be aggregated together with Spain and Italy. Austria, Burgundy, and the Low Countries would be united. The same Power to which Columbus had so lately given a world beyond the Ocean would now rule the Mediterranean on the one side and the North Sea on the other. Barcelona and Antwerp would own the same allegiance.

It is strange indeed, it must be mortifying to those who would think nobly of human history, to see an almost universal dominion created neither by a reasonable view of the public good, nor even by an exertion of force which if irrational might be grand; and might involve displays of heroic valour, but by the mere operation of a legal usage originally intended to produce no such effect. Because a young man marries a young woman, and custom chooses to regard their regal office as heritable property, therefore Spain and Germany are to be united for all time! We shall see that this particular union was found after one reign too unnatural to be maintained, but the union of Spain and the Low Countries, not less irrational, lasted scarcely less than two centuries, and caused half the disputes and half the wars that will be considered in this book. When however politicians first perceived that such a transformation of Europe was at hand, we may be sure that after the alarm and anxiety which the new ascendancy would cause them their strongest feeling would be a desire to imitate the fortunate Habsburgs and to generalise what might be called the Habsburg system. Accordingly throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries inter-

national policy is found to turn in most of the great states of Europe upon royal marriage.

The consequences of the marriage of Philip and Juana developed themselves but slowly. About twenty years passed before the union of Central and Southern Europe actually took place, and even then it continued for some years doubtful whether any unity, any vital force, could be expected from an aggregate so artificial. At first Philip appeared as a Burgundian Prince, and when in 1500 there was born to him a son, 'and the government should be upon his shoulder,' the child was naturally called after Charles the Bold. This child, afterwards Carlos I of Spain and Charles V in the series of Roman Emperors, was only at home in Burgundy and Flanders. He grew up as a Fleming, his first great Minister Chièvres was a Fleming. In Spain, when he came to take possession, he appeared as an utter stranger, almost as an enemy. In Germany, when, as Roman Emperor, he came to take possession there, he was somewhat more at home. In comparison at least with his rival Francis he might pass for a German; and yet in the end he failed in Germany as he had failed in Spain at the beginning.

From 1503, when Isabella the great Queen of Castille died, to 1519, when Charles was elected Roman Emperor, is the period of the gradual formation of the Habsburg power. First occurs the temporary separation of Castille and Aragon and the discord between Philip and Ferdinand, which produces the effect that so long as Ferdinand lives the Habsburg cause is rather checked than advanced in Spain. Philip dies in 1506, Juana soon afterwards sinks into hopeless alienation of mind, and Charles grows up a Burgundian, regarded with jealousy by his Spanish grandfather. It was still doubtful whether an heir might

not be born to Ferdinand who would inherit Aragon and with Aragon Naples and Sicily. But in 1516 the whole of the Spanish inheritance falls in to Charles by the death of Ferdinand; then follows the Austrian inheritance. The legal principle of inheritance has received its greatest illustration. Election is now called in to complete the work, and Charles becomes German King and in all but crowning by the Pope (which took place in 1530 at Bologna) Roman Emperor.

A new chapter has opened in international history. The Habsburg Power has been created, which may be said to have three times oppressed Europe by its ascendancy, once under Charles V, a second time in the later years of Philip II, a third time in the earlier part of the Thirty Years' War. As it fills about a century with its greatness, the better part of a second century is occupied with its decay. The personal reign of Charles V was continued until Mary Tudor sat on the throne of England, and he lived (and as long as he lived he in some sense reigned) till within three months of the accession of Elizabeth.

This reign is the culmination of the dynastic principle. It shows what may result from royal marriage. It is the proof that the greatest aggregate of states, held together only by a ruling family, may yet be made to move together and show some signs of organic life.

For some time after 1519 it appeared doubtful whether the huge Habsburg aggregate would exert a power in any degree proportionate to its bulk. Would Charles ever be able to bring to bear upon an enemy at the same time the force of Spain, of the Low Countries, of Italy and of Germany? Would he even succeed in maintaining his authority in all those countries? For men saw already that his foreign rule had excited a violent rebellion in

Spain, and yet in Italy and in Germany his rule was equally foreign.

But these doubts were set speedily at rest by the battle of Pavia and the terrible sack of Rome. It could no longer after such events be questioned that not merely an extensive dominion but a mighty, if not an omnipotent, power had come into existence. About this time the Divorce began to be agitated in England, and already it could be perceived that the network of marriages had begun to entangle us too. Catharine of Aragon was an aunt, and the Lady Mary a cousin, of Charles V. It was one of the circumstances that made the difference of Henry with the Papal See so incapable of arrangement that Clement VII was intimidated by Charles. Thus the new Habsburg Power contributed to bring about the Reformation in England.

Charles however does not interfere in behalf of his relatives in England. Catharine retires and dies unavenged, and Mary is branded with illegitimacy, as though no Charles V reigned in Europe, and the Catholic Church, which half a century later was to display such relentless and irresistible might, sees an independent Anglicanism establish itself without striking a blow.

We may partly judge from the sequel that Charles did not consider the account closed. The time was to come, and in his lifetime, when vengeance for Catharine was to be taken at least on Cranmer and when the English Reformation was to be cancelled again. His cousin the half-Spanish Mary was to take the lead in this movement, and at that time the Habsburg was to come back with the Pope as they had been expelled together.

Meanwhile however for Charles to bring his whole power to bear, though it had been proved possible, was at



least a most ponderous task. And he was watched with the most bitter jealousy by his old rival Francis. Accordingly after his first triumphal moment at Bologna in 1530, he remains for sixteen years unable to develop his larger plans. He wages war after war with Francis, he resists the Turk, he makes two expeditions to the African coast. Indications may be found that during these years he had not forgotten England and the English Reformation, but with respect to them he does not as yet find leisure to act. And in this delay almost the whole reign of Henry VIII passes. Not till the Peace of Crespy does Charles feel himself in a position to quit his defensive attitude. In 1546 begins a new stage of his career, which introduces a new stage in the development of Habsburg power.

This phase of Charles V, full of daring enterprise and sudden vicissitude between success and failure, in fact the catastrophe of his reign, corresponds roughly with the reign of our Edward VI. In this period England still escapes him, not because Charles is embarrassed by difficulties, but because he is preoccupied with another enterprise, because he has undertaken to settle once for all the religious question in Germany. Several leading actors quit the scene at this point, Luther in 1546, Henry VIII and Francis I in 1547. In the religious evolution also a new phase begins. It may be said that the age proper of the Reformation is over, and the age of the Council of Trent begins. The initiative has passed over from the Protestants to the Catholic party, and the Emperor himself now unfolds his religious policy.

By this time we learn to regard Charles as an eminent and commanding statesman. We saw him called in early youth to solve a problem which might seem simply insoluble, the problem of giving some sort of vitality to a

fortuitous aggregate of inheritances. It is not surprising that he seemed for a long time confounded by the task which had been imposed upon him, so that observers were struck with his personal insignificance, with the nullity of his character, and he himself, as it were by way of apology, appeared at a tournament with the word *Nondum* inscribed upon his shield. Then came the time when it was shown that the monstrous aggregate could really be made to move and act. Henceforth the personality of Charles begins to display itself, and in the middle period of his reign, between 1530 and 1546, he gives many proofs of ability both in war and statesmanship. He appears to have a ruling idea, to which he gave expression at the Diet of 1521, when he deplored that 'the Empire had become a mere shadow, but hoped by means of the kingdoms, powerful territories and connexions which God had given him to restore it to its ancient glory.'

Now there had never been a time when Christendom was more evidently threatened with those very evils which in old days it had been the Emperor's special function to avert. The barbarian needed to be withstood, and a great Christian Council needed to be held. Charles would justify the position into which he had been brought in so accidental a manner, if he could quell the Ottoman Turks—win as it were the agnomen *Turcicus* as his ancient predecessors had borne the epithets *Germanicus*, *Britannicus*, *Dacicus*, *Gothicus*, etc.—and if by holding some august Council he could put down the heresy of Luther. It was such a task as this which Charles undertook in 1546. He seemed for a moment to accomplish it successfully when he defeated the Schmalkaldic League at Mühlberg and afterwards regulated the religious affairs of Germany by the Interim. For here he appeared vic-

toriously in his character of German King and Roman Emperor, whereas his earlier successes had been obtained in the character of King of Spain or Burgundian Prince.

From 1546 to 1552 Europe saw what she had not seen since the thirteenth century, what it had long seemed utterly impossible that she should ever see again, a true Roman Emperor. But in 1552 the vision suddenly faded away, the huge fabric which had risen like an exhalation disappeared as instantaneously. The rebellion of the Elector Moritz, planned in concert with France, did not indeed shatter the power of Charles, which in Spain, Flanders, Italy and the New World remained what it had been, but it dissipated the dream of a revival of the Empire. It threw Germany back into its earlier condition when the Empire had been almost a nullity. Not long after the abdication followed, and the next Roman Emperor, Ferdinand, was of the old modest type.

But between Charles' failure in 1552 and his abdication in 1555 he had entered upon a new policy most important to England. He continued to be favoured, as he had been since and before his birth, by the peculiar Habsburg star of marriage and inheritance. Just at the moment when he began to wash his hands in despair of German politics, a new marriage came in prospect, more important than any since the marriage of which he was himself sprung.

Sixty years earlier the male line of Castille and Aragon died out, and so the Habsburg ascended the throne of Spain. At this moment the male line of the House of Tudor failed by the death of Edward VI.

It is only when we have in our mind the whole history of the growth of Habsburg Power since the beginning of the sixteenth century that we can understand the full extent of the danger which threatened England by the

marriage of Mary Tudor to her cousin Philip, the heir of Charles V. Unsuccessful in war, the Habsburgs here fell back upon marriage. And they now struck a stroke which, had not fortune proved adverse, might have been the greatest among all similar strokes of policy. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the chief international events either are, or flow from, marriages. The marriage of Margaret Tudor to James IV laid the foundation of the union of England and Scotland, as the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella created Spain. Later the marriage of Louis XIV to the Infanta Maria Theresa laid the foundation of the European House of Bourbon and of the family alliance of France and Spain; the marriage of William and Mary made possible the Revolution of 1688 and the Alliance of the Sea Powers; the marriage of Elizabeth Stuart to the Elector Palatine founded the dynasty and the union with Hanover which were the basis of our policy in the eighteenth century.

These are royal marriages which may compare with the great Habsburg marriages we have considered in this chapter. And not one, either of these or those, could seem pregnant with more mighty consequences than the marriage which was celebrated in 1554. The marriage of Philip and Mary brings to mind in the most vivid manner the marriage of Philip and Juana. By that the Habsburg family conquered Spain; by this might it not seem that they conquered England? Nor let it be too hastily concluded that the sturdy English could not be caught in so flimsy a web. The Castillians too were a sturdy race, one of the masculine races of the world, turbulent, with a strongly marked character, not too patient of a foreign rule. They had done all that masculine vigour and turbulent valour could do to throw off the Habsburg yoke. They had

rebelled, and for a moment the ministers of Charles had been in despair. When at Tordesillas the rebels brought out the afflicted queen Juana,—for they had the advantage that not Charles but his mother had the rightful claim on their loyalty—and called on her to assume the government, it was said that had she been induced to sign one decree, the reign of the Habsburg in Spain would have come to an end. Fortunately for him she remained immovably passive. And the end was that the turbulent kingdoms passed under the Habsburg yoke.

If we consider the five years of Mary's reign as the period of a Habsburg invasion of England, we shall have to admit that the invasion was much more than half successful, and that one rampart after another of national defence was carried, so that in 1558 England was already from almost every point of view a Habsburg kingdom, standing on the same level as the Low Countries. Deliverance, it is true, then came suddenly, but it came, as it were, from heaven, and was due to no effort made by the nation itself.

Scarcely any transition in history is so abrupt as that from Edward to Mary. We are aware of course that it corresponded to a reaction in public feeling caused by the extravagances of Edwardian Protestantism; at the same time these very extravagances were caused in great part by the near prospect of so abrupt a change. At the moment when England seemed about to adopt in full the German Reformation, to become not merely Anglican but Protestant, and the leading state of the European opposition to the Habsburg, she suddenly abandoned everything that she had contended for since the Divorce was first agitated, and having, as it were, revived the early days of Wolsey, actually went further, passed over

in European politics to the side of the Habsburg who now held the title of King of England, furnished a contingent to his armies, and suffered a miserable defeat in his cause.

The progress made by the Habsburg in England in these years is indeed the conquest of England, as conquest was practised among Christian states at that time. It was not such conquest as the Ottoman practised in the East or the Conquistadores in the Far West, but it was not unlike that by which the Habsburg destroyed the liberties of Castille crushed Italy, and well-nigh crushed the Low Countries and Portugal. It was a process which began in royal marriage, and proceeded by religious persecution, supplemented at need by arms. In England the scheme was launched under the most favourable circumstances. For Mary Tudor, round whom the English firmly rallied, was herself half a Spaniard by blood, wholly a Spaniard by feeling, and scarcely was her throne secured to her than she rejected, with contempt the idea of an English marriage, and gave her hand to Philip himself, the heir-apparent to half the world. As Castille had rebelled when she felt herself passing under the Habsburg, so now did England, but Wyatt was crushed as Padilla had been. Our Villalar was fought and lost. We seemed to be caught in the same fatal current. In the summer of 1554 the Habsburg arrived. The loyal struggle in behalf of Mary's right had carried us into a repeal of all that had ever been done against her, and that involved a repeal of the Reformation itself. England restored the authority of the Pope and revived the laws against heresy. Charles was now slowly abdicating his many crowns. But how little reason had he to feel that his reign had been a failure or that fortune had

deserted him, when he thus lived to see England which in rebelling against the Pope had affronted his family, make submission to the Pope and to his family together! He had had to deal with two most dangerous adversaries, the Elector Moritz and Edward VI, and fortune had removed them both, the one at thirty-one, the other at eighteen. And now his own son bore the royal title that Edward had borne, and the queen was almost as much a Spaniard, in feeling almost as much a Habsburg, as Philip himself.

Everywhere the Church was used by the Habsburgs to confirm their authority. Their system took a theocratic tinge, because the strongest moral force at their command was the uncompromising militant orthodoxy of Spain. For their views therefore it was a coincidence incredibly fortunate that England at this moment was betrayed into a violent religious reaction. A religious Reign of Terror was about to set in for all Europe, and England entered into it somewhat sooner than the Continent, by the Marian persecution, which, as Ranke has said, though not the most cruel of persecutions is perhaps that which fell most heavily upon eminent men and leaders of thought. Here was an engine by which the Habsburg might hope to consolidate his conquest of England. For the Terror was twofold: it was religious and political at the same time. There was the scaffold for Northumberland, Wyatt, and the Lady Jane; there was the stake for Cranmer, Latimer, Ridley and Hooper. And so long as the succession remained doubtful, this political reign of terror seemed likely to continue; now the succession had become more doubtful than ever since the legitimacy of Mary had been reasserted by Parliament, for the legitimacy of Mary meant the illegitimacy of Elizabeth.

The conquest of England then seemed complete, and she was soon seen furnishing troops to the Habsburg armies and waging war with France in the Habsburg interest. It seemed likely also to be a durable conquest, for at least it would last as long as Mary lived, and Mary was not old. As a matter of fact the Catholic cause in Europe, soon after this, revived in a manner almost miraculous. The Counter-Reformation may be said to have been fairly launched in the year 1564, when the Council of Trent closed its sittings. This event was in a manner the settlement of the religious question of the age; it was a settlement which had the effect of giving to Catholicism a superiority in Europe which it retained throughout the seventeenth century. Had England been still under Catholic rulers in 1564, she would perhaps have remained Catholic always, and permanently subject to Habsburg influence.

But of course it was calculated in the scheme of Charles that fortune, which had given so much, would give one thing more, that, as Philip and Juana had had a son, himself, Charles V, so a son would be born to Philip and Mary. When we consider how much England had suffered from the want of royal heirs with an undisputed right, how in the fifteenth century this evil had well-nigh ruined the nation, how under Henry VIII it had broken out again, how it had caused all the terrible events of his reign, how it had broken out again at the death of Edward and had led to new horrors, and how the deep-seated evil was still there and might once more prove the bane of England,—when we consider all this, we may imagine what a relief the birth of a son to Philip and Mary might bring to the English mind. Such an heir would be infinitely preferable to Elizabeth, stained with illegitimacy.



And thus the whole happiness of England would be identified in the English mind with the permanence of Catholicism and of the Habsburg interest. A Habsburg dynasty would establish itself in England, as it had already done in Spain. And later, after the catastrophe of Don Carlos, the heir of England would perhaps become the heir of all the Habsburg territories, a new and greater Charles V.

To complete our estimate of the prostrate condition of England under Mary, we must also take account of the independent financial position of her Habsburg government. Other tyrants of England have had to draw their supplies from the country itself. Philip had other resources, he could draw on the funds of the Spanish Monarchy. We read much of his lavish bribery of the English nobility.

And thus the Habsburg in England had the command of all engines of tyranny at once, the scaffold of Henry VIII, the writ *de heretico comburendo*, and at the same time the long purse of Walpole.

Charles now retired to his monastery. About the same time he became aware that fortune would not grant him the crown of all the hopes of his family, a son to Philip and Mary. But even without this crowning happiness his conquest of England might seem at least good for a long time. When he closed his eyes in September, 1558, his son still bore the title of King of England.

That Mary should bear a son was not so absolutely vital to the Habsburg scheme, but that she should live long enough to see the new system take root and the Counter-reformation of England blend with the Counter-reformation of Europe, this was much more essential. The fortune of the Habsburg House had done much, but

at this point the fortune of England intervened. A few weeks after the death of Charles died Mary herself.

It was in the extreme hour of England that Elizabeth took her seat on the throne. Never since this country began to play a great part in Europe had its humiliation and its need been greater. Never has a greater interest depended upon the life and character of a single person than depended from the moment of her accession upon the life and character of Elizabeth. The strongly marked character which she displayed is rendered tenfold more striking, when it is contemplated in English history, by this supreme interest depending on it.

If we were about to write a biography of her, we should inquire, Was she good; if not blameless, at least noble and amiable? A daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn might be expected to have hereditary faults. Nor could we expect her nature to have been sweetened by the hard experience which had come to her so prematurely. Her mother had died on the scaffold, her father had pronounced her illegitimate, her brother had excluded her from the succession, her sister had held her in trembling subjection. She now assumed the government in times of great difficulty, and for thirty years the times grew ever wilder. She inherited a cruel and immoral tradition of government, and the tyrant's plea, necessity, was assuredly as valid in her day as it had been in that of her father. All this ought at least to be considered by those who accuse her of hardness, dishonesty, waywardness.

In this book we consider her only in relation to the growth of British policy. We inquire what she accomplished for her kingdom, and especially in its relation to other kingdoms. We have therefore begun by describing

the difficulties and dangers which surrounded the kingdom at the moment when she took the helm. We shall have to consider to what point she steered it, that is, to compare the position which England occupied before the world when she died in 1603 with the position described in this chapter. But already we can see that in this respect the highest hopes that could have been formed in 1558 were much more than fulfilled. Assuredly the work of Elizabeth yields to that of no other ruler in respect of magnitude or of difficulty.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE FIRST PHASE OF POLICY.

AT the moment of the accession of Elizabeth the Habsburg Power, which had so successfully invaded England, had suffered a remarkable transformation on the Continent. The vast monarchy of Charles V had disappeared, and had given place to two monarchies, each directed by a Habsburg prince. During a great part of his reign Charles had delegated to his brother Ferdinand the German part of his inheritance, and the Electors had given to Ferdinand the title of King of the Romans. Meanwhile the same Ferdinand had been elected to the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia after the death of Louis, his brother-in-law, at Mohacz. Accordingly in the midst of the great aggregate, but also stretching beyond it, a minor aggregate had formed itself. The Habsburg Power had extended beyond the dominions of Charles so as to include a great Slavonic and Magyar territory, and by the custom of many years this territory had been connected with the Habsburg estates in South Germany and to some extent also with the Imperial Dignity. This temporary arrangement was now at the abdication of Charles, made permanent, and thus

was formed an aggregate which under the name of Austria will henceforth often engage our attention. Through all storms of war and revolution the parts of it held together, as they hold together still. The kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia remain still attached to Austria proper, and until the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in the Napoleonic age the person who inherited the sovereignty over this aggregate held also the dignity of Roman Emperor, except during the age of Maria Theresa, when a complication was introduced by female succession.

Here then begins one of the Great Powers of modern Europe. Austria is, as it were, detached again from the dominion to which it had belonged since the death of Maximilian I in 1519. But, we are to observe, Austria since 1556 is by no means a mere revival of the Austria of Maximilian I. It has acquired a new limb in the Slavonic kingdoms. It also occupies a different position in the European system. For on the one side the responsibility of guarding the Christian frontier against the Ottoman now rests upon it; on the other side it is connected by a permanent family alliance with the great Habsburg Power of the West. It is thus much greater in many respects than the Austria of the fifteenth century. And it was to stand out in later times more than once with great prominence in Europe, for instance, in the days of Wallenstein, in the days of Eugene, in the days of Maria Theresa and Joseph. Nevertheless it commenced somewhat obscurely, and for the present we may almost bid farewell to it. For during the Elizabethan age it is completely overshadowed by its twin, the Spanish Monarchy. Philip, not Ferdinand, is the real heir of Charles; we may almost say, Philip, not Ferdinand, plays the part of Roman Emperor.

It is not so much on account of Austria as on account of Spain that we must attend just at this point to the division of the Habsburg Empire. Not merely a new person but also a new Power, confronts Elizabeth on her accession. Not only does Philip take the place of Charles, but a Spanish Monarchy stands henceforth in place of a Spanish-Austrian Monarchy. It is necessary therefore to form some clear conception of this new Power.

It was not by a deliberate stroke of judicious statesmanship on the part of Charles that his dominion was divided into two dominions. He had desired to make Philip his universal successor. But Ferdinand succeeded in establishing himself and his family in the Germanic region, where already with the title of Roman King he had made himself at home. He founded a separate throne, as it were, upon the Religious Peace of Augsburg, which was emphatically his own personal work. Such a religious compromise was the greatest triumph which the Reformation could boast at that time, when England had returned to the allegiance of the Pope. And we are to bear in mind that just at that date Southern as well as Northern Germany seemed hopelessly lost to the Roman Church.

Charles could not forbid the compromise, for without the Religious Peace it was impossible to unite Germany in resistance to the Turk. But he could wash his hands of it. And this would be done most simply by leaving Ferdinand where he was, in possession of the original Habsburg inheritance, and by allowing the Electors to confer on him the Imperial Dignity. It was no doubt a sort of profanation to Charles that his brother should become Roman Emperor by a religious compromise and in part by Protestant votes, but he found consolation elsewhere.

He gives to Philip all that he can give, the Burgundian inheritance, which perhaps would more naturally have been united with Austria and the Empire, and even, in defiance of all legality, the Duchy of Milan. Thus was furnished out a Power which in its greatness and its freedom from the taint of heresy answered the ideal of Charles V.

The sequel may seem to have shown that this arrangement was faulty, but before we absolutely condemn the statesmanship of Charles we should take account of one fact, which just at this point is all-important to us. He did not give to Philip the Low Countries watched by England, independent and Protestant, but the Low Countries and England together, both being Catholic alike. It was only because by an unexpected accident which occurred just after his own death, namely, the death of Mary, the position of England was entirely altered—it was only thus that his scheme failed. And we may easily imagine that if he could have foreseen this imminent revolution he might have made a wholly different disposition, for it rather appears that the Catholicism of England was the corner-stone of his new policy, and consoled him for the incorrigible devotion of Northern Germany to the Reformation.

The Low Countries and England had long been closely connected in trade. The Spanish Monarchy had already by much the largest share in the commerce of the New World, which had brought a great prosperity to the Flemish port of Antwerp. Could but England with its advantageous maritime position be added to the Low Countries as a province of this dominion, its control of the Ocean and the New World would be immensely strengthened, and indeed it would have nothing further to wish for but that crowning acquisition, which had long been meditated in the Habsburg counsels, Portugal.

Charles resigned all his many crowns, but not all from the same motive or with the same feelings. Germany, we have seen, he surrendered in disappointment and despair, but the much grander dominion which he transferred to his son and which was to be the monument of his statesmanship for several generations, this he may have resigned with proud satisfaction. If he resigned this too, it was to all appearance only because his health was rapidly failing. He left his son incomparably the greatest of Christian sovereigns, and with a power that went on increasing until after 1580 it was much greater than he had ever possessed himself. The Philippine Monarchy stood always in a closer relation to England than the Caroline had done. We have seen that Charles had intended this, but he had contemplated a relation of a very different kind. England broke through the meshes of the Habsburg net, but the dominion of which she was to have formed a principal part remained maritime, remained a neighbour of England, and therefore came into frequent collision with her. Charles wielded a power mainly continental, Philip a power mainly maritime, and which grew more and more maritime.

When Elizabeth entered upon her task she was confronted with this great Sovereign of the Seas, Philip II, who but yesterday had borne the title of King of England.

A great rent was made by Mary's death in the Habsburg net in which England had been enmeshed. Nor since that time has this particular danger from intermarriage with a predominant House presented itself in English history in a shape nearly so threatening, though serious danger arose from the marriage of Charles I with a Bourbon princess. But the danger did not disappear instantaneously with the death of Mary Tudor, and



dangers of a similar kind threatened us through a great part of Elizabeth's reign. It was indeed like a fatality that in an age when so many conquests were made by Habsburg bridegrooms, the monarchy of England should for the first time in its history fall to the distaff.

The first thought of Philip when he lost Mary was that all was not lost with her, since she, the first queen regnant that England had ever seen, was now to be succeeded by a second queen regnant, who would be equally open to the Habsburg attack.

That attack was made at once. Mary's death took place on Nov. 27th, 1558, and on Jan. 10th, 1559, Philip wrote from Brussels directing his ambassador to offer marriage to Elizabeth.

The negotiation which followed was indeed very short. Parliament met on Jan. 25th, and such proposals about religion were at once laid before it as made Philip resolve to draw back, though his suit had been at first well received and though he writes hopefully on Jan. 28th. In the course of February, England breaks with Rome, and the Queen declares in Parliament her resolution to remain single. So rapidly did events march that when the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis was concluded at the beginning of April the remarriage of Philip is indeed announced, but the bride is Isabel of Valois, not Isabel (as the Spaniards call her) of England.

This commencement strikes the keynote, as it were, of Elizabethan policy. For in this marriage negotiation, we are to observe, it is not the personal happiness of Philip and Elizabeth, but the whole future course of England and the Spanish Monarchy, that is in question. It was followed by many similar negotiations which had a similar significance, though not one was of equal importance.

And we are thus instructed at the very commencement, that international relations in that particular age appear and are discussed under the symbolic form of courtship and marriage. Courtship is negotiation, rejection of the proposal often means war, marriage means alliance, the birth of a son often means federation, and his accession may even mean incorporating union. In earlier times and in later, no doubt, the same system may be traced, but it was at its height in the sixteenth century, that is, when the impression of the great world-conquering marriages of the House of Habsburg was still fresh.

We read of those Habsburg marriages with impatience, with a feeling of mortification at the pettiness of the causes which have at times governed the march of history. A similar mortification arises when we read Elizabethan history. It is half ludicrous, half tedious, it is a kind of dull comedy, the history of the courting of Elizabeth, how she was courted almost from her cradle to her old age and was never married after all. Let us remark that these two passages of history, which excite such similar feelings, are closely connected together. Elizabeth was courted partly by the House of Habsburg and mainly in pursuance of the Habsburg system. As those marriages involved conquest, so might resistance to marriage mean resistance to conquest. As the marriage of Mary Tudor humbled, and might have enslaved, England, so were the freedom and greatness of England founded upon Elizabeth's refusal to marry; so that there was indeed a justification for those Britomarts and Belphœbes of Elizabethan poetry. As marriage in that age so often meant conquest, virginity naturally became a symbol of national independence, and a poet might feel that the virginity of Elizabeth was the virginity of England.

Let us consider the abrupt failure of Philip's proposal first from his point of view, next from that of Elizabeth. It may seem strange that he should acquiesce so passively in a failure so disastrous to his House, in the total loss of England both to himself and to Catholicism. Let us recollect that he did not probably recognise the loss as total or as final, that he may have regarded the reign of Anne Boleyn's daughter as merely a transient reaction to be followed by a second restoration of Catholicism. But we are also to bear in mind the continental crisis which occupied him at the moment. He was bringing to a close the greatest of all the wars which had hitherto been waged between the Habsburg and the Valois. It had lasted seven years, and had commenced with those great reverses which had well-nigh broken the heart of Charles V, the loss of the Three Bishoprics, the disaster before Metz. Fortune had since changed. He had won the battles of St Quentin and Gravelines, and at this very moment he was negotiating a great European Peace, the settlement, it may be said, upon which the new Spanish Monarchy would be founded. He was making the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, perhaps the greatest European settlement before that of Westphalia. It was to give him a new and solid position. In particular it was to settle the Italian question so solidly, and so decidedly in favour of Spain, that France remained from this time almost excluded from Italy till the time of Richelieu. This triumph may have consoled Philip for a reverse in England, which probably he regarded as but temporary. The more so because the peculiar Habsburg system found a new application at Cateau-Cambresis. He made a marriage which might satisfy him. He obtained a Valois princess, and with her he acquired new claims and relations amply equiva-

lent, as he might think, for those which he lost in England. It is true that four young Valois princes stood between the child he might have by Elizabeth of Valois and the French throne. But let us look at the result! Thirty years later those princes are dead and have left no heirs. The Habsburg lays claim to the throne of France, and by the help of the League he has for a time every prospect of success. We have watched England in the reign of Mary passing under the Habsburg yoke; thirty years later it will be the turn of France, and France will be brought lower than ever was England. It was at the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis that the Habsburg net first entangled her, that is at the very moment when England shook herself free of it.

And now let us put ourselves at the point of view of Elizabeth. She found herself in the perilous position of a queen regnant of England, unprecedented but for that sister who in five years had shown how near to ruin England might be brought by a female reign. She had a questionable title, and in the midst of a people which had returned into the bosom of Catholicism she represented Anne Boleyn! Her position was not much unlike that of Lady Jane Grey. And yet she was still nominally a Catholic, and even at heart she was scarcely a Protestant. At this moment she was offered the greatest marriage, involving the greatest alliance, in the world. Philip was now a much greater man than he had been when he married her sister, for Charles was gone and had left him ruler of half the world, and in this position he had had military triumphs. Moreover England was at war with France, and had recently lost Calais. It was not difficult to see that to reject Philip at this moment was to throw him into the arms of France; the hand that

she might refuse would be given to a Valois princess. She might find herself confronted by a great combination of the Habsburg and the Valois, and with the Valois went Scotland, and the claims of the House of Stuart upon England.

Thus at the opening of Elizabeth's reign we see not only the peculiar nature of the dangers with which she had to contend but also the appalling magnitude of those dangers. By acceptance of Philip's offer all such dangers would pass away, dangers which in fact continued to threaten her and only grew more appalling, for thirty years. On the other hand the same acceptance had dangers of its own, and if a refusal could not but cause her an effort and a sacrifice, the same might certainly be said of an acceptance. The inconveniences of the match were at least equally serious, and they were fully as evident as its advantages. If on the one hand it might be a means of recovering Calais, if it gave her the Habsburg alliance and the prospect of a son who might become universal monarch, and at least would establish her throne in England, on the other hand it would be a cruel disappointment to her people, who saw in her the angel of deliverance sent to break the Habsburg yoke and extinguish the fires of Smithfield. There were other considerations. That she should marry her sister's widower under a Papal dispensation was a proposal which reopened in a most ominous manner the debate which had embittered the life of Catharine of Aragon; no wonder she told the Ambassador that she had a serious scruple about the Papal dispensation (*tenia mucho escrupulo en lo de la dispensa del Papa*). We also hear even at this early date of her determination to remain unmarried, a purpose which she might indeed well have formed by reflecting

on the disastrous result of her sister's marriage, but which she always describes as having arisen in her mind very early, even in her childhood. On the whole, however, she would feel that the question lay between a power based upon the wishes of the nation and a power supported by foreign help, between an independent national throne and a kind of viceroyalty, such as Margaret of Parma held in the Netherlands, over a province of the Habsburg Realm.

Elizabeth made the great choice. We cannot at this distance of time appreciate the weight which each consideration had for her judgement. It scarcely perhaps struck her that she was asked by Philip to change her religion, nor perhaps did the horrors of Smithfield produce much impression on her mind. Her father's mode of governing (*la manera de proceder del Rey su Padre*) was her model; apparently she desired to restore the peculiarly English system which had been on the whole successful before the violent oscillation of the reigns of Edward and Mary; but the system of Henry had not been decidedly Protestant, and still less had it been humanitarian. We must beware too of crediting her with modern ideas of popular government, and when she said to De Feria that the people had put her where she was (*el pueblo la ha puesto en el estado que esta*) we are not to attribute to the proud Tudor any acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the people.

But she took a course visibly full of danger, a course in which success was only possible by courage and heroic endurance, but in which success, if it came, might be splendid and might raise the nation itself to greatness. The course she declined had also its dangers, though at the moment it might have relieved her of much trouble;

but it was a course in which success could only be success for herself alone, success gained at the expense of her people.

In Mary's reign Philip's influence had been favourable to Elizabeth; he had reasons for wishing well to her. Nor did these reasons cease to have weight when she declined his hand, nor even when she led the nation back into the path of the Reformation. We have now to consider what the position of England among the European Powers became when the brief Habsburg episode, as it were, came to an end, and when Elizabeth tried to revive the age of Henry.

Hitherto we have considered only the relation of England to the Habsburg Power. It is now time to turn our attention to other states, especially that state which both in earlier times and in later has been the most important state for England, namely, France.

The relations of England and France had lately become closer and more anxious than they had been in the first half of the sixteenth century. The Valois had begun to enter into English politics by the same approach as the Habsburg. While the latter had been applying the system of royal marriage to England, the former had applied it to Scotland. The Dauphin had married Mary Stuart as the Prince of Spain had married Mary Tudor. There was a probability therefore that Scotland would in due time enter into a personal, and ultimately perhaps into an incorporating, union with France. And this contingency did not concern Scotland alone but England, and that not merely because they were contiguous countries, parts of the same island, but in a far more serious way. In the miserable uncertainty of the English succession, one claim stood out as

superior to all others, the claim of the Scots House derived from the marriage of Margaret Tudor to King James IV. This claim was now, as it were, acquired by the House of Valois. Already the Dauphin was consort to the Queen of Scotland; the time was at hand when France and Scotland would be united by Francis and Mary, as Castille and Aragon had been united by Ferdinand and Isabella, and beyond this a time might be foreseen when they would be united yet more closely in the person of a son of Francis and Mary. This son of Francis and Mary would have a claim on the English throne more clear of painful objections than that of the daughter of Anne Boleyn. Here was a danger to England not less formidable than that from which she had newly escaped by the death of Mary Tudor. England was between Scylla and Charybdis, in danger of absorption on the one side by the Habsburg, on the other side by the Valois.

Fortunately however the two dangers in some degree neutralised each other. The Habsburg did not desire to see England absorbed by the Valois, and accordingly the Habsburg, even after he had been rebuffed by Elizabeth, could not afford to become hostile to her. It was easy to attack her title, and there was a Pretender at hand who, so far as she was a Catholic, would suit Philip perfectly, but this Pretender was Dauphiness of France, the Power which all along and at that moment especially was the great antagonist of the House of Habsburg.

But France, which we thus introduce into our narrative, will become the most prominent figure in it, will be seen eclipsing the House of Habsburg, almost absorbing that Spanish Monarchy which at our actual stage is the



greatest Power in the world, and becoming the most formidable among the enemies of England. It is therefore of great importance that we should form at the outset a clear conception of this Power.

It was already a state of ancient renown, which had more than once played a leading part in Europe. It took the lead in the first Crusade, it was glorious under St Louis, and masterful under Philippe le Bel. Its two languages, the *langue d'oc* and the *langue d'oïl*, had taken the lead in literature up to the time of Dante. But those ages of French history are divided from the age which concerns us here by a great cataclysm created by the Hundred Years' War with England. France in 1558 may be said to be in the penultimate phase of its Valois period. It had been led into the disasters of the English war by the first two Valois kings, Philip and John, and it had been brought lower still by Charles VI. But a much brighter period was introduced by Charles VII, who in many respects may be regarded as the original founder of the France of Richelieu and Louis XIV. He also introduced the happier period of his own dynasty, which from this time produces capable rulers, Louis XI, Louis XII, Francis I, and Henry II. In 1558 France stood at a high point, though it was about to close in disappointment a war which, seven years earlier, it had opened with much success. But it was unconsciously approaching another cataclysm, when the Valois dynasty was to perish amidst the horrors of a religious war, which for a moment threatened the state with absolute destruction. In this extremity France was to find a deliverer in the Bourbon prince, Henry of Navarre, and the Bourbon dynasty, more splendid than the Valois at its best, was to begin.

In an international point of view, the most important

point about the House of Valois at this time is its relation to the House of Habsburg. These great Houses do not correspond to nationalities, and the House of Habsburg especially belongs to all nations at once. Philip II himself was in some degree a Valois, in some degree a Frenchman. It is a peculiarity of the Valois dynasty that it created, as it were, two Frances. King John (the prisoner of Poitiers) conferred the Duchy of Burgundy upon a younger son, and in the general disintegration which followed the younger branch of the House became an independent rival of the elder. The main cause of the second downfall of France before the English arms is that France at the time of the invasion of Henry V had become double. England wins by the help of Burgundy, and loses ground again when Burgundy changes sides. But when the English are at last repelled and France is reestablished on a new and secure basis, Burgundy remains as great and as independent as ever. She has by this time gained possession by marriage of almost all the Low Countries, for not only the wealth of Ghent and Bruges and the harbour of Antwerp, but also that remote amphibious region protected by dykes from the sea, which was to have its day in the seventeenth century, was now included under the name Burgundy, so that Cordelia in King Lear can speak of 'waterish Burgundy'.

The story of Charles the Bold, of his greatness and his sudden fall, need not detain us here. What we have to remark is that though after his fall the name Burgundy drops out of historical narrative and though Louis XI was able to seize and hold the duchy proper of Burgundy, yet the rest of Charles' possessions, an extremely considerable residue, passed to his heiress. Neither the House of Burgundy, nor the rivalry of it with the elder branch

which was called from France, came to an end with the death of Charles the Bold. The successors of Charles the Bold are Mary, then Philip the Handsome, then Charles (Emperor and King of Spain), then Philip II (also King of Spain). The very names of these princes are the traditional names of the House of Valois.

Charles V himself, as we have remarked, grew up as a Burgundian prince. His rivalry with Francis I is distinctly in its earlier phase a continuation of the old rivalry of France and Burgundy. In his first war he has England for an ally, as in the days of Agincourt, and his object is to recover the duchy of Burgundy seized by Louis XI. But the battle of Pavia, the sack of Rome, and the coronation at Bologna raised Charles to a European elevation, in which England no longer cares to be his ally. The Burgundian prince is lost henceforth in the Emperor and universal Monarch. But towards the close of his reign, when his grand imperial scheme had failed, and still more when he arranges a dominion for his son from which Germany is excluded, the rivalry of France and Burgundy becomes prominent again. Philip II is not Emperor and not Duke of Austria; he is successor of Charles the Bold and at the same time King of Spain. In the former character he is especially bound to England, for Burgundy had always rested on the English alliance. And thus when Philip was married to Mary Tudor and their combined force defeated France at St Quentin, the old combination of the days of Agincourt reappeared, though this time certainly not England but Burgundy took the lead.

The rivalry of Habsburg and Valois has already lasted a long time; it is to be succeeded by the rivalry of Habsburg and Bourbon, which after lasting more than

a century is to end by the blending through intermarriage of the Bourbon with the Spanish Habsburg. We now see that it began, as it ended, in a single family, for the rivalry of Valois and Habsburg is but a later form of the rivalry between the elder and younger branches of the House of Valois, or between the House of France and the House of Burgundy. And in the main throughout the whole long period before us, we shall be aware of a struggle which is always proceeding between France and Burgundy. From Henry IV to Louis XIV, France fights for territory which was in a great degree French by language and nationality, Artois, Brabant, Franche Comté, and some of which had formerly owned the suzerainty of the French king. And in the earlier stage of the struggle, when the House of Habsburg had the offensive, it has something of the character of a civil war. In the War of the League, half France looks up to Philip as its leader, and Philip himself, as a member of the House of Valois, lays claim to the throne of France.

But so long as Burgundy consciously existed, it would instinctively seek the English alliance. Accordingly when Elizabeth resolutely threw off the Habsburg yoke there could not immediately follow hostility between her and Philip, for there remained the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, just then particularly close on account of the war which was not yet ended. There were indeed signs of an international revolution, for at Cateau-Cambresis Philip treated England with little ceremony and entered into a new relation by marriage with France. Nevertheless a serious combination between France and Burgundy against England was an international innovation not to be made in a day.

The House of Valois, as we said, is in its penultimate,

which is its highest phase. Very speedily it was to receive a sudden and mortal blow. Henry II was to be cut off in the vigour of his life, and then the House, which seemed to rest securely upon four sons, of whom the eldest was married to the brilliant Queen of Scotland, decayed and perished. The princes died early and left no children. The shadow of the coming catastrophe fell upon the whole period. But so long as Henry II lived, the House stood at the height to which it had been raised by Francis I. For about a hundred and twenty years, since France had emancipated herself from the English yoke, her royal House had been great and prosperous. But Francis I had given the monarchy a peculiar character, more brilliant, but perhaps less solid, than it had worn under Charles VII, Louis XI, Charles VIII and Louis XII, and Henry II had maintained what Francis I had founded. From 1515 to 1559 the House of Valois enjoys what may be called in some respects its age of Louis XIV. The happy popular time of Louis XII, best beloved of French kings, is over. It already begins to appear that France can find no lasting refuge from feudal anarchy but in a brilliant despotism. And the arts by which Louis XIV afterwards united France so firmly were first discovered and practised by Francis I. Francis is the inventor of the splendid French court in which the turbulent noble is tamed into the courtier; he too founds by the Concordat of 1516 that ascendancy of the Monarchy over the Church which was to be reasserted after the wars of religion by Henry IV, Richelieu and Louis XIV. He too gives the monarchy its military character, but here he has not the good fortune of Louis XIV. While the latter, destitute personally of military talents, is able to figure as a conqueror, Francis, devoted to war, is condemned throughout his life

to fight a losing battle against Charles V. One of those brilliant persons who seem especially to need the sunshine of good fortune, he was decidedly an unfortunate man. After his splendid opening, his victory at Marignano and his Concordat, when he stood forth as a new Caesar, conqueror of the Helvetii and master of Gaul, when he had a prospect of leading Europe against the Turk with the title of Roman Emperor, he suddenly saw the huge Habsburg aggregate form itself, blocking his path and thwarting all his efforts. His son, Henry II, comparatively an ordinary character, had some of those smiles of fortune which had been denied to Francis. He had defeated the grand scheme of Charles, taken the three Bishoprics from Germany and Calais from England. He had married the Dauphin to the queen regnant of Scotland. And thus at the moment of Elizabeth's accession, the Valois, though the fortune of war had latterly deserted him again, was a more equal rival of the Habsburg than he had ever been since the great days of the Habsburg family began.

We have seen the House of Habsburg involving England in its net. It was a curious fatality that the House of Valois should try at the same time to do the same thing by Scotland. The early career of Mary Stuart runs strangely parallel to the career of Mary Tudor. Thus:

Mary Tudor was a Spaniard by her mother Catharine of Aragon.

Mary Stuart was a Frenchwoman by her mother Mary of Guise.

Accordingly it seemed to each agreeable and natural to be married to the chief prince of the maternal house.

Mary Tudor was married to the Prince of Spain.

Mary Stuart was married to the Prince of France, the Dauphin.

Mary Tudor was the first queen regnant that had ever been seen in England.

Mary Stuart was the first queen regnant that had ever been seen in Scotland.

Soon after the marriage of Mary Tudor to Philip, he became, by the retirement of his father, King of Spain and the Indies and ruler of the Low Countries.

Soon after the marriage of Mary Stuart to the Dauphin, he became, by the accident which carried off his father, King of France.

Thus England became united in personal union with Spain and the Low Countries.

And Scotland was united in personal union with France.

A son born to Philip and Mary would have made the union of England and Spain permanent by establishing a Habsburg dynasty in England.

A son born to Francis and Mary would have made the union of Scotland and France permanent by establishing a Valois dynasty in Scotland.

To make up the parallel, fortune intervened in the same manner in both countries. Mary Tudor died childless; Francis died childless.

Thus England and Scotland were exposed to precisely the same danger at almost the same time, but the danger to Scotland was a danger to England too, on account of the claim to the English succession possessed at this time by the royal house of Scotland.

Scarcely any English sovereign has been exposed at the moment of accession to such dangers as was Elizabeth, and they were heightened by her weak title and by her sex.

We have as yet remarked but one countervailing.

advantage, namely, the mutual rivalry of the two threatening Powers, the Habsburg and the Valois. But Elizabeth had another advantage which soon came to light. As the English nation had since the first year of Mary been uneasily conscious that they were passing under the Habsburg yoke, so the Scots nation could not but perceive that they were becoming a province of France. The national feeling was in Scotland as in England closely connected with the religious movement of the time. What is commonly called the Reformation is in both countries only half a religious movement; the other half of it is a movement of national independence.

But that a grand movement partly national, partly religious, should arise in England and Scotland simultaneously, that the two countries should be animated by a common impulse, and especially that they, so long rivals, upon whose secular discord France had so long traded, should now unite in resistance to this very France, this was a most pregnant novelty. The union of England and Scotland was brought about directly, as we know, by the mere operation of a law of succession, but the thoroughness and durableness of the union has been the effect of the common devotion of both countries to the Reformation, and it was in the First Phase of Elizabeth that this solid ground of union was first laid.

Substantially the first achievement of Elizabethan policy lay in this, that she called out a great Reformation Party in England and Scotland at once and thus laid the foundation, first of the union of England and Scotland, secondly of the resistance which in the seventeenth century was offered to the Stuarts. But we must pay some attention to the special circumstances under which this was done, as they arose in 1559.



Though Spain had recently been, and was before long to become again, the most threatening enemy of England, yet just at this moment she falls quite into the background, and France suddenly takes her place. For a short time the situation is like that of the later years of Louis XIV or of the Napoleonic age. England is threatened by France as she has never been before, but as she is to be threatened several times in the future.

And it is in this year 1559 that the name Stuart begins to be prominent in English politics.

We are familiar with the fact that when the line of Stuart kings had come to an end we had to deal for something like half a century with Stuart Pretenders. Let us now remark that a Stuart Pretender also preceded the Stuart Kings. The Pretender Mary sets up her claim in 1559, but a few months after the death of Mary Tudor. For the best part of thirty years she maintains, though intermittently, this position, and resembles those later Pretenders not merely in her claim but also to a great extent in the means she takes to support it. Those later Pretenders, and even the later Stuart Kings, Charles II and James II, were clients of France and closely connected with the House of France. In like manner Mary Stuart first assumes the character of Pretender in the position of Dauphiness of France, and immediately afterwards becomes Queen of France.

For now occurs the last of the many great events which were crowded into those few months. Charles V and Mary Tudor had quitted the stage. Elizabeth had mounted the throne. The great European Peace of Cateau-Cambresis had been concluded. Elizabeth Tudor had repelled Philip and he had been accepted by Elizabeth Valois. And now on July 26th, 1559, King Henry II died

suddenly from the effect of a wound received in a tournament.

The result was another of those startling changes of which the sixteenth century had seen so many. France and Scotland were united together in personal union, as Castille and Aragon had been. Mary Stuart, whose pretensions to the Crown of England had already been freely put forward, now stood forth before the world, Queen Consort of France and Queen Regnant of Scotland. Both she and her husband were young, and it might be expected that they would have a long reign and many children. Opposed to them was only the daughter of Anne Boleyn, of doubtful title and legitimacy, without prospect of an heir and having newly refused the hand of the greatest monarch in the world.

Never has a Stuart Pretender stood in so commanding a position as Mary Stuart in 1559. Other Pretenders have had a strong party in Scotland to back their claim on England, or even for a moment military possession of Scotland. Other Pretenders have obtained aid from France. But Mary was Queen of Scotland by undisputed right, and also she was in a position to command the whole force of France. And England was scarcely yet free from a war with France, in which Scotland, governed now for many years by a French Queen Regent, had co-operated with France.

If under Mary Tudor the danger of England from Spain seemed extreme, and if it seemed perhaps only adjourned, not really lightened, by her death, so that Elizabeth's rejection of Philip might seem an audacious step, the danger from France now seems equally extreme and equally pressing. For to all that has just been said we are to add that Elizabeth had to commence her reign

by signing a humiliating peace with France. In the settlement of Europe, while Philip appeared on the whole victorious, England, which had submitted to be his humble ally, had to acknowledge herself defeated. When Elizabeth broke with Philip she parted with a chance of recovering Calais. And so she began by descending to a lower position with respect to the Continent than any of her predecessors for centuries past had occupied. And immediately after this confession of inferiority to France, the Queen of France, also Queen of Scotland, stood forth as Pretender to her throne.

But now the new forces make themselves felt, those forces which have created the modern England, or rather Great Britain. For even before Mary Stuart could call herself Queen of France the Scottish Reformation had broken forth with violence, in the form of a rebellion against her mother's regency in Scotland. Between May and July, 1559, there had sprung up the mighty national party, which has ever since remained the national party, of Scotland. Utterly unlike the Protestant party of England, it began in rebellion against the Government. This fact by itself created a new difficulty for Elizabeth; but the government in Scotland was a *French* government. Elizabeth had already at home taken up the position of a national sovereign. She was English on both sides, whereas Mary was French on one side. She had refused a foreign husband, whereas Mary had a French husband. And thus the new national party in Scotland, however she might feel bound to hold it at some distance, could not but look up to her as its head, both as the champion of Reformation and the champion of national independence.

We cannot but see how instantaneously in this year 1559 the outline of modern Great Britain springs to

light. Hitherto England and Scotland had confronted each other like two barbaric tribes at eternal blood-feud, and the inclinations of Scotland had been towards France. But from this time forward they stand together on the basis, which in political union is almost alone solid, of religion, and they are both alike opposed to France. But though the ground of union is solid, there are marked differences between them even in religion. The Scottish Reformation is not quite similar to the English; in particular it regards the government differently. And throughout the period which lies before us, alike when we study Oliver or William as while we study Elizabeth, we shall find that the firm indestructible basis of British policy is this alliance, founded on likeness in difference, of the English and the Scottish Reformation.

In the autumn of 1559 there was actually war in Scotland between the Regent and the rebels, but it was scarcely civil war, so French was the government and the military force on which it depended. What is called the Reformation of Scotland is almost in an equal degree a national movement. It is an expulsion of the French, who fortify Leith and expect reinforcements and ships from France. But the rebels find themselves unable to effect this expulsion unaided. They are even in danger of being worsted in the war.

At this point is taken the first active step of Elizabethan policy. Her fleet appears off the shore of Fife. She enters at Berwick into an engagement with the rebels. The siege of Leith is resumed and carried on by land and sea. Commissioners from France arrive, by whom is signed the Treaty of Edinburgh, a settlement which brings to an end the government of Scotland by the French.

The step was one which could not but change for all time the position of England with respect to Scotland, and could not but immeasurably strengthen England. But it might seem to be attended with great risk, and to involve a new war with France. This was the moment of the first ascendancy of the Guise Family. The Queen Regent of Scotland herself (who died in the course of these troubles) had been a Guise, and thus Mary Stuart was a Guise by the mother's side. Her husband Francis (not technically a minor, but only sixteen years old) had put the government of France in the hands of his wife's uncle, the Cardinal of Lorraine, and at the same time Francis, Duke of Guise, the conqueror of Calais, was the most famous commander of whom France at that time could boast. This family then, which peculiarly represented the union of France and Scotland, wielded the whole power of France, and was not likely to submit to the defeat that had been suffered in Scotland. Francis refused to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh, and a great war of England and France seemed necessarily to be at hand.

But France herself was in a critical state. All over Europe there were now signs, which proved delusive, that the Reformation was on the eve of a final triumph. Shortly before it had appeared to be almost confined to Germany, and the Religious Peace of Augsburg had been its only trophy, which had been almost counterbalanced by the recantation of England. But England had now turned round again, and the outbreak of Reformation in Scotland had been more sudden and overpowering than in almost any country. The time was come at last when France too must speak her mind, must take a side, in the great religious question. And thus the Guise government found its hands full at home. The age of the Religious

Wars of France opened in March, 1560, with the Conspiracy of Amboise.

La Renaudie and his accomplices were overpowered, and his head was exposed with seventeen other heads outside the castle of Amboise. The Guises were resolved to make no concessions in religion; nevertheless foreign policy had to wait for a season. The States-General were to meet, nay, it was even proposed to summon a national Church Council. In such deliberations passed the year 1560, and at the end of it came another overwhelming intervention of fortune.

Almost everything indeed depended on fortune in that strange international system which the Habsburgs had brought into vogue. For it turned on births, deaths, and marriages, of which three classes of events only one depends much on human will. We have considered the revolutions that were caused by the deaths of the Tudors, Edward and Mary, the immense consequences that followed from the fact that no child was born to Mary Tudor. And now the whole splendid bubble of a union of France and Scotland, leading to a conquest of England, burst in a moment, when the young Francis II died suddenly on Dec. 5th, 1560, leaving no child and no prospect of a child.

The French Government might indeed have resolved, even after this event, to maintain its hold on Scotland. But with Francis fell the influence of the Guise family, since a strict technical minority began with the accession of Charles IX in his eleventh year, and in a minority the government fell into the hands of the Queen-Mother and the princes of the blood royal. A shock was given to France by this casualty, which drove her speedily into a terrible series of civil wars. And thus it was that the

danger to Elizabeth from the combination of France and Scotland, so threatening in the summer of 1559, vanished at the close of 1560.

This event closed a chapter of English history, which though not long, is unique. Between the accession of Mary Tudor and the death of Francis II of France England was exposed to the greatest danger from the Habsburg system, owing to the fact that what Knox called 'the regiment of women' began both in England and Scotland just at the time when the system of conquest by marriage, as practised by the Habsburg family, prevailed in international affairs. During this short period the danger, as we have seen, was extreme, but only during this short period. That it had passed away for ever with Francis II was perhaps not immediately apparent, for England and Scotland alike remained after 1560 under the rule of women. It might seem certain that both Elizabeth and the widowed Mary Stuart would at some time marry, and likely that they would marry into the Habsburg or the Valois family; in which case England would be exposed again to the old dangers. Apprehensions of this kind tortured Englishmen through a great part of the Elizabethan age. In fact however the danger did not revive. Not that the Habsburg system was about to become obsolete. On the contrary it prevailed throughout the seventeenth century. Nor did it cease to affect England with some of the minor evils it was calculated to produce. The Spanish match which was planned for Charles I excited just alarms and threatened great calamities. The French marriage of Charles I had the effect of making the House of Stuart in the next generation a sort of branch of the House of Bourbon, and contributed in a great degree to the fall of the Stuart dynasty. Such evils

however fell far short of those which threatened us under Mary Tudor and in the first days of Elizabeth, absorption into the Habsburg Aggregate or into a similar Aggregate to be founded by the Valois. And there was another side to this Habsburg system, which in certain cases worked beneficially; we had the benefit of this better side. The union of kingdoms through royal marriage, fantastic as it is theoretically and disastrous as it may be in practice, is sometimes beneficial, because it may accidentally unite two kingdoms naturally seeking union. Thus the union of Castille and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabe'la was as happy as the union of Spain and Burgundy under Charles V was unfortunate. Two great marriages determined the course of England in the seventeenth century, and they were of this better kind. The first united in 1603 England and Scotland; this was the marriage, then already ancient, of Margaret Tudor and James IV. The second was the marriage of William and Mary. By the former one of the foundation-stones of British greatness was laid. The latter did not indeed found a dynasty, but its indirect effects were immeasurable; we owe to it almost everything.

Though at the end of 1560 it was not yet apparent that the ship had weathered the storm, yet it was soon visible that at least for the present we were out of danger. The daughter of Anne Boleyn had made her position sure, though she had offended Philip and had suffered a direct attack from France, and that though at the moment of her accession her position and circumstances had seemed in every respect disadvantageous. It had indeed come to light in the moment of trial that her position itself offered one advantage. When she made her intervention in Scotland she had had the eager encouragement of Spain;



she, the heretic, had been exhorted by Philip to support the cause of heresy against a Catholic government! Thus it was plain that the Habsburg could not bear to see her overpowered by the Valois; and there was equal reason to conclude that the Valois would wish her well in her resistance to the Habsburg. But at the moment the Valois was the more dangerous enemy. And now Francis was gone, and Elizabeth might feel daily more hopeful. She had found an unexpected and most redoubtable ally in the party of Reformation in Scotland. Now she might already perceive that the internal condition of France closely resembled that of Scotland. In France too Reformation was on the point of bursting forth. Let but a year or two pass, and France would find that Elizabeth's ships might appear in the Seine to aid a Huguenot party (the name was just coming into vogue) and to exact another Treaty of Edinburgh from Charles IX's own government. In short for the present Elizabeth might feel secure. We are at the end of her first phase.

Hitherto it has been possible to consider her simply as struggling against the Habsburg system then prevalent in Europe, which was the same system in the hands either of the House of Habsburg or the House of Valois. Into the complicated politics of Europe it has not been necessary for us to enter further than simply to take note of the workings of this system. This system begins now to be with respect to England less aggressive. But another enemy appears. No long time of security was to be allowed to Elizabeth. New clouds were gathering in the sky. A time was coming upon Europe darker and more intense than that which had come to an end, and which for England at least had been dark enough. England was yet to undergo greater trials, greater anxieties than ever,

though—for her happy period is after all beginning—not greater evils, and though her trials are to be compensated by greater triumphs.

Hitherto we have had little occasion to speak of the religious question. The Reformation was indeed almost a twin of the Habsburg system, as Luther appeared in 1517 and Charles was elected Emperor in 1519. For forty years already the religious question has been an important factor in international affairs, yet in fact always subordinate to that system of marriage and succession which we name from the House of Habsburg. But a change occurs at this point. The Counter-Reformation is about to take place, and the period on which we now enter receives its character from this event. It is an event which deserves to be precisely conceived, an event far more positive and sudden than is understood by those who imagine it as a mere gradual necessary reaction from the Reformation. Up to this point we have remarked nothing in our casual glances at the affairs of religion which could prepare us to expect even such a reaction. Perhaps Catholicism has never experienced a more disastrous period than the four years which followed the death of Mary Tudor. England and Scotland were lost for ever in those years, and in France there sprang up a Protestant Party which in 1562 extorted a most comprehensive Edict of Toleration, similar to that Religious Peace which had been concluded seven years earlier for Germany. Such a crowd of occurrences might lead the observer who believes in drifts or irresistible currents of thought to suppose that the universal triumph of the Reformation was already certain and on the point of being accomplished.

And yet as we advance into and through the seventeenth century no reflexion will oftener occur to us than

this: How powerful and victorious is Catholicism! How feeble for the most part is Protestantism and how precarious its existence!

We must pause a moment to inquire what is the Counter-Reformation?

## CHAPTER III.

### THE COUNTER-REFORMATION.

FOR some years after 1560 Elizabeth apprehends no immediate or definite danger from abroad, though the prospect is full of dangers that are approaching or possible. She is no longer directly assailed either by the Valois or the Habsburg. Rather she looks on while attacks are made upon them, while the Valois struggles with a rising Huguenot party and the Habsburg with a disaffected party in the Low Countries. It was open to her at this time, if she had been so inclined, to pass in her foreign policy from the defensive to the offensive. And indeed we see her, when the first civil war of France breaks out in 1562, meditating the recovery of Calais by help of the Huguenots. To recover what she had so recently lost, and from a Power which had scarcely ever since ceased to be at war with her, could hardly strike her as an aggressive policy, and beyond this we remark that she has no ambition to acquire anything.

It might easily have been otherwise at a time when the Habsburg system was in its heyday. A most effective method of conquering foreign countries had been invented; it was a method of which the Habsburgs could claim no monopoly; and it was now considered the sum of kingcraft to apply or to resist it. The House of Valois had but

recently followed with great skill the example set by the House of Habsburg. England hitherto had suffered, not profited, by such experiments, but England was now at leisure. Could not the House of Tudor in its turn now play the part of a House of Habsburg? The question, as soon as it is asked, brings to light a peculiarity of this House which proved highly important to England.

The Tudor Monarchy had been passive hitherto because it had fallen to the distaff. Elizabeth was unmarried, and any marriage she might make would create claims only against, not for, England. But it is to be observed that the House furnished also no princes of secondary rank who might play the part of Habsburg bridegrooms. This was an effect of the scarcity and frailty of children in the Tudor dynasty. Their children for the most part died in infancy or too early to be married. Old age in a Tudor was scarcely seen but in Elizabeth herself. We are also to remember that the marriages of this House seldom had an international character. Henry VII's queen and four out of six of Henry VIII's queens were English. Accordingly Elizabeth stood in a singular degree disconnected from the royal caste. Never have we seen a sovereign so completely English. Not only was she English by birth on both sides, but her relatives were all English, and no foreign prince or princess anywhere existed who could count kinship with her. That a sovereign so isolated should reign over England for forty-five years was a fact of great importance in English history. It concurred with that other fact, the new solidarity of the English and Scotch created by the Reformation, to heighten our insularity. The English state in former times had not been properly insular, since on the one hand the royal House was French and had possessions in France and

foreign affinities, and on the other hand Scotland was foreign and had foreign alliances. It was not insular, since its frontier was not maritime but continental. But now the Continent had moved away from us and Scotland had drawn nearer. Elizabeth already rested on a party which was partly Scotch, partly English. An insular Power began henceforth to grow up, and nothing could be more favourable to the growth of it than that it should be ruled for well-nigh half a century by a sovereign so absolutely free from foreign entanglements.

We are now to watch the gradual growth of a new danger, which in thirty years grew to such a point that we were exposed to a great invasion on a scale hitherto unparalleled, and found our policy drawn permanently into a different course.

A new age is introduced by two new movements, by the Huguenot movement in France, and by the disaffection in the Low Countries against the government of Philip. Both these movements are religious, and in both of them the Reformation appears in resolute opposition not only to the Church but also to the established Government.

This was the most striking novel feature of the new religious movement now beginning, which may be called the Second or Calvinistic Reformation. Hitherto the Reformation had been opposed indeed to the hierarchy, but had been loyal to Government, as on the other hand Government had been the agent of the Reformation. Luther's inclination to the side of the State had been from the outset very decided, and had been avowed by him with characteristic energy at the time of the Peasant Revolt. And almost universally, down to the time now before us, the new religious system had been introduced

under the authority of the State. In England this was perhaps most manifestly the case, where the author of the Reformation was the King himself, and where the accession of a new sovereign changed the aspect of the national religion three times successively. But it was also the case substantially abroad throughout the Germanic and Scandinavian world. In the North the leader of reform was Gustav Wasa, the first King of Sweden, so that the Reformation was a principal factor in the original composition of the Swedish Monarchy. In the German Empire and the Swiss Confederation local government was strongly developed and central government was weak. In Switzerland the Reformation was adopted, where it was adopted, by the councils of the great towns. In the Empire it was adopted under the authority of Princes, such as the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse, within their own territories; and at first actually with the permission of the Diet, though this permission was afterwards withdrawn. Scarcely anywhere in the Lutheran Reformation had religion been made a ground or justification of rebellion.

But now in Scotland a different precedent was set, where Reformation and Rebellion went hand in hand, where a disaffected party openly attacked the mass as idolatrous and established a new religious system by open resistance to authority. And only in this way would it be possible for the Reformation to find an entrance either into France or into any part of the dominion of Philip. For in both those regions the central government was strong and Catholic. There were here no principalities, bishoprics or municipalities so independent as to be practically sovereign, and linked together only by a federal diet, whose decrees could easily be resisted. And yet at

this time the Reformation as an influence was in some respects more irresistible than ever. Calvin, who from Geneva still directed the whirlwind, had given it a systematised doctrine, and it had by this time the prestige of many triumphs. Accordingly the Reformation begins once more to be powerfully aggressive, and its aggressions now necessarily take the character of rebellions against the State.

This is the innovation which gives its character to the new age. It transferred controversy into another region. The last generation had arraigned the Church, accusing it of a departure from primitive Christianity; this generation called in question the authority of the State, inquiring whether rebellion might not in certain circumstances be lawful. The question was first raised in behalf of the Reformation, but it may be doubted whether the Reformation profited by it and whether it ought not to be reckoned among the principal causes of the Counter-reformation. For it was a weapon which could easily be turned against the Reformation. If Calvin's followers might claim, in certain circumstances, the right to rebel against a Catholic sovereign, might not *a fortiori* a Catholic people rebel against a Protestant, a heretical sovereign? It was an ancient pretension of the Papacy, a pretension which had often been allowed, to dictate to kings and in case of contumacy to punish or depose them; and such a claim was not only less novel, but might seem less presumptuous, when urged in the name of the Catholic Church than when advanced by a modern sect. Now in the Lutheran period, when the Reformation and Government went together, several monarchies had attached themselves to the Reformation. Such monarchies then were henceforth exposed to the rebellion of their Catholic subjects.



The two chief occurrences of the age we are now to deal with illustrate this.

They are: (1) the Pope's excommunication of Elizabeth and appeal to her Catholic subjects against her authority; (2) the denial of the right of Henry of Navarre, as being a heretic, to succeed to the throne of France. This latter occurrence is especially memorable, because it led to the first profound political speculations of modern Europe. Those questions about the origin of civil government and the ground of its claim to obedience which agitated the English mind so much in the days of Filmer, Hobbes and Locke, had been raised earlier in France in the times of the League. Henry IV had given a grand illustration of divine right when, resting simply on his legitimacy, he won his way to the throne of France in spite of the Church and the League and Paris and Philip of Spain united against him.

The age upon which we now enter is one of the most intense and terrible that Europe has ever experienced. It may be said to be the last of the theocratic ages, for it is an age in which ecclesiastical influences take the lead<sup>1</sup> as they had done in the days of Innocent or Hildebrand and as they have never done since the close of the sixteenth century, not even, as we shall find, in the Thirty Years' War. But the superiority is most signally on the Catholic side. The tendency, the irresistible drift, of the time is towards the Counter-reformation, not towards the Reformation. It is the more necessary for us to recognise this

<sup>1</sup> As Mr Armstrong remarks (*French Wars of Religion*, p. 85): The Chancellor L'Hôpital opened his speech to the Estates-General of Orleans by saying that there was now more love between an Englishman and Frenchman of the same religion than between two Frenchmen of different forms of faith.

because at this very time England asserted her insular character in the most emphatic manner by deciding irrevocably in favour of the Reformation. Let us look then at the broad result of the struggle.

At the very beginning of the period all germs favourable to the Reformation were utterly extinguished in Spain and Italy.

In France, the principal arena of the contest and where at the outset the Huguenot party showed all the eager zeal which we are apt to consider a sure sign of victory, the Catholic cause nevertheless came out signally and decisively victorious. All that zeal could not save the Huguenots from being deserted by their heroic leader, and the toleration they ultimately secured was but the commencement of a long decline, but a half-way house between the St Bartholomew and the Dragonnades.

In the Low Countries ten out of seventeen provinces were won back to Catholicism, and have remained faithful to it ever since.

Poland and, somewhat later, Bohemia were won back to Catholicism.

In Germany, the home of the Reformation, which Charles V had probably regarded as irretrievably given over to the Reformation, an immense reaction took place, so that the whole southern part of the country was recovered to Catholicism.

For all these losses the Reformation had on the Continent only one compensation, the Seven Provinces of the United Netherlands. These were successfully torn from the very hands of Philip. No very considerable acquisition territorially! But in the seventeenth century this reformed community showed an astonishing vigour and attained a prodigious prosperity.

This on the Continent was the only new acquisition. But the Reformation retained what it had acquired in the days of Luther, the Scandinavian kingdoms, three great Electorates, and the richest of the Swiss Cantons.

It is a surprising proof of the insularity which was beginning to characterise us that we remained undisturbed by this irresistible drift, and settled down, both England and Scotland, to the Reformation in this very period. Probably nothing short of this could have saved the cause of the Reformation in the world.

As we were so little influenced by the movement of the Counter-reformation the question arises how we became involved in the wars that accompanied it. We enjoyed for a time the security that resulted from the fact that Philip had his hands full in the Low Countries and that the French Government was occupied with the Huguenots, while neither of those Powers wished the other to acquire influence over England. How happened it that after a time this security was lost, and that in the end we drifted into a great war with Spain?

That First Phase of Elizabethan Policy which we have sketched is merely the necessary effort by which at the outset she secured her throne. Her reign itself now begins, and we may already make a general reflexion on the character which English Policy must necessarily have had in the Elizabethan age. The position of our state among states and the dangers to which it was exposed were wholly unlike those to which we have since been accustomed. Policy could not then be determined by considerations of trade or colonial empire, as in the eighteenth century; nor had we yet begun to look wistfully towards the Low Countries or to apprehend the encroachments of France. We had indeed our keen

anxieties, but they were of another kind, of a kind which passed away with the Elizabethan age. In foreign as in domestic policy, everything turned on the questions of succession and of religion and these two questions were intimately connected together.

Would it be possible for Elizabeth, a heretic and the daughter of Anne Boleyn, to support herself long upon the throne? Was she not likely, like her brother and sister, to die early, and if so, who would succeed her? Could a heretic be permitted a second time to mount a throne? Reformation was giving place to Counter-reformation, and this was about to strike a great blow for universal dominion. The visible claimant to the succession, Mary of Scotland, adhered to it. It appeared therefore as if the country were approaching a new revolution, which would arrive either with the death of Elizabeth or with her fall through some attack made upon her by the Powers of the Counter-reformation.

The great problem of Policy then was how to avert such a catastrophe. In general there seemed but one way of doing this, a way characteristic of the Habsburg age. New heirs must be provided, that is, marriages must be made. Elizabeth must take a husband; Mary Stuart must take a husband. In this way events might be brought about within Britain similar to those which had already transformed the Continent. England and Scotland might be united as Castille and Aragon had been; at the same time it would be decided whether this insular state should belong to the Reformation or to the Counter-reformation. Such is the problem of the Elizabethan age stated in its most general form. When now we survey the age itself as a whole, it is seen to consist, first, of a long period of drifting into war with Spain, secondly, of the war itself,

which did not actually come to an end, though it was practically decided, before Elizabeth's death. On the threshold then we meet the question, what caused the drift towards war, since Elizabeth could in no case desire war with the greatest Power in the world, nor could Philip desire war with England for its own sake, being already overburdened? And the answer which presents itself is this, that the religious crisis was just then so intense as to take the initiative out of the hands of Governments and to hurry them against their will into war. In short, the solution lies in the word Counter-reformation. But what precisely does this word convey? That it does not mean merely that inevitable reaction which follows a great movement of opinion, not merely a certain disappointment in the result of the great undertaking of Luther, or a certain fatigue and sense of failure, follows from what has just been said. As we have seen, the religious parties, Catholic and Protestant alike, had begun to defy the civil government. This innovation could not but give an immense advantage to Catholicism, not only because it exposed the Reformation Governments, which were mostly somewhat imperfectly established, to the rebellion of their Catholic subjects, but also because it provoked to deadly hostility against the Reformation the Catholic Governments, among which were the greatest in the world. And thus we see that Philip never for a moment negotiates or offers to bargain with heresy, as Charles V had repeatedly done.

But we also perceive that the Catholic party must have acquired in the sixties of the century some new resource of immense importance, so suddenly and overwhelmingly does the tide turn in their favour. About 1560 Catholicism seems to be falling into its final dissolu-

tion, England and Scotland having been lost, and France seeming likely to follow them, while Philip has but recently waged open war with the Papacy. Twenty years later all is changed, and throughout the Continent the impression prevails that the struggle is well-nigh over and that the Reformation is defeated. And the change was lasting. Never since has the Reformation recovered the ground it lost so unexpectedly in those years. Such is the Counter-reformation, one of the greatest events in the history of Europe, and as a matter of historical curiosity more interesting, because more difficult to understand, than the Reformation itself.

For this very reason however we must resist the temptation of discussing it further than as it concerns English policy. We have to inquire not into its remote causes or successive phases, but merely into the cause which at this particular moment imparted to it such an overwhelming practical force. The Counter-reformation first enters into history properly so called with the election of Caraffa to the Papal chair in 1555. This was indeed a startling event. It removed that grievance which for something like two centuries had driven pious minds almost to madness, the grievance that the Vicar of Christ was not Christian at all but either heathen or something worse. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the Vicar of Christ had been convicted of piracy and sodomy, and at the end of it he had been a notorious poisoner and murderer. Except one or two urbane humanists such as Nicholas V or Pius II scarcely any Pope since the fourteenth century could seriously pretend to the Christian character, though several had shown remarkable heathen qualities. With Paul IV the Papacy became religious again, and on the whole it has retained that character ever since.

But it seemed for a while that this purgation of the Papacy was likely rather to destroy it at once than to rejuvenate it. Paul IV stands with Clement VII as the most unfortunate of Popes. The devout fanatic inflicted on Catholicism a wound almost more serious than that which was inflicted by the hardened worldling. His headstrong zeal threw away England and Scotland, alienated France and broke with Philip. Under his successor Pius IV new measures were adopted expressly on account of the desperate extremity to which the Church was reduced.

It was soon however shown that the ill fortune of Paul IV had not been caused by the daring courage with which he had asserted the religious character of the Papacy and its independence of secular interests, but by an eccentricity quite peculiar to himself. Caraffa was not simply a devoted Catholic, but also an enraged Neapolitan politician, a leader of opposition to the Habsburg interest. His mortal enemy along with the Reformation was Philip of Spain, and he had two ends in view at the same time, the one to crush heresy, the other to drive the Spaniards out of Italy. Now if anything was certain it was this, that in that age Spain and Catholicism must advance or retreat together, that the Spanish Power was the only weapon with which the Church could fight the Reformation, and that Philip was the true nursing-father to whom the Church must look, and truly though not nominally the Christian Emperor of the time. To measure forces was not the talent of the fanatical Neapolitan, and he had no conception that his hatred for Philip undid whatever his devotion to Catholicism was able to achieve. He stands out in history as the man who severed for ever the tie between Britain and the Roman Church, and he did this, it would appear, not simply by want of tact or patience in

dealing with Elizabeth, but from his animosity against Philip, which led him to regard the whole Marian movement with disfavour because the Habsburg interest was promoted by it.

The reconversion to Christianity of the Papal See, though it was effected rapidly, yet went through certain gradations. The Caraffa himself was religious to the heart's core (though his type of religion may not suit our taste), but his Minister or Nepote was a ruffian worthy of the Farnese or almost of the Borgia. When Paul died in 1559 a Pope succeeded him who personally perhaps was a worldling of the old school, Pius IV, but then he had for Nepote not only a religious man but an actual saint, Carlo Borromeo. The conditions were reversed, but the result was that the Papacy remained religious. The eccentricity of Caraffa however died with him, and the Papacy recollected something of its political finesse. Pius IV openly avowed that the Church was no longer powerful enough to dispense with the aid of great monarchs, but this maxim, if it has by itself a Medicean or Macchiavellian ring, is not to be understood in a purely irreligious sense. Nevertheless it allowed the Counter-reformation to make a second effort with a better prospect of success.

Accordingly it was Pius IV who reassembled the Council of Trent, and now at last brought its sittings to a satisfactory conclusion. In the year 1564 this was accomplished. And this is the great occurrence which launched the Counter-reformation upon its triumphant career.

That the Council, which had failed under Paul III and again under Julius III, did not fail a third time, was due in the first place to the fact that Charles V was gone. So long as there was an omnipotent Emperor the discord of Pope and Emperor was as incurable as in the days of the



Hohenstauffen. But Ferdinand with his modest pretensions and character excited no similar jealousy. Moreover the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis had not only terminated the wars which had disturbed the Council in its earlier period, but had actually united the Habsburg and the Valois by a marriage tie. Further the Papacy saw no hope but in a successful termination of the Council, and was content with such a termination as would give unity and a fixed programme to the Catholic Church as it stood, renouncing the hope of suppressing heresy in those countries where it was established. That the Papacy now at last wished the Council to succeed was the greatest cause of its success. Still the obstacles for a time seemed insurmountable. For the Papal See had all along held and continued to hold the Council firmly in its grasp through its Legates, who retained the right of initiative, and through the superior number of Italian bishops. But how could the Papacy in its weakened state succeed in overcoming the opposition of the bishops who claimed an independent authority, especially as a third failure seemed likely to have fatal consequences?

It appealed from the bishops to the Sovereigns. Neither the Habsburgs nor the Valois, any more than the Pope, desired to see their own bishops invested with an independent spiritual power. Philip in particular was well aware that his internal authority depended mainly upon the control he exercised upon the Church by patronage and through the Inquisition. Accordingly by informal Concordats, as it were, negotiated by Cardinal Morone with Ferdinand, Philip, and the Cardinal of Lorraine (Guise) for Charles IX, a settlement was reached, and what we may call modern Catholicism was called into existence.

Up to this time the Counter-reformation had consisted of the following elements: (1) The new form of religion represented by Caraffa. This was a spirit of relentless orthodoxy, which was indigenous in Spain but through Caraffa and Michel Ghislieri had spread to Italy, and had now taken possession of the Papal See itself. Its main instrument was the Inquisition, and it had created a religious Reign of Terror in Spain and Italy such as Mary Tudor had introduced in England. (2) The influence of the Order of Jesuits, which just at this time began to be widely diffused—Loyola died in 1558—and which, we are to observe, had also its origin in Spain. (3) Local movements in favour of Catholicism, especially in Spain and France. The unquestioning crusading orthodoxy of Spain was the greatest of all the forces which made up the Counter-reformation, but it was beginning to appear that the French mind also was radically adverse to the Reformation. The principal cause of this seems to lie in the influence of the University of Paris, the original home of the scholastic theology. (4) As a consequence of this, the authority of the two greatest Governments in the world, that of Philip and that of the French King, the latter being seconded by the influence of the Guise family, to which Mary Stuart belonged.

These influences made up a formidable aggregate, when once the disturbance created by the eccentricity of Caraffa was removed. But they became formidable indeed, nay, almost overwhelming, when they were all, as it were, bound together, and when the principles involved in them were codified by the Council of Trent in 1564.

It was easy for the Reformers to make out a case against the Council, and to urge that when the Papal authority itself was the question to be tried by the

Council it was an absurdity that the conduct of the Council should be put in the hands of the Pope. But such reasonings could not prevent the decisions of the Council, when they had once been arrived at, when they had become a matter of history, from exercising a prodigious and durable influence. All the world remembered that twelve hundred years before, when the Arian heresy had threatened the Church, a Council had been held, and that its decisions, though long contested, had prevailed at last and still formed the foundation of Christian orthodoxy. It was natural to think that Luther would share the fate of Arius, and that the Spaniard Philip would now establish orthodoxy as the Spaniard Theodosius had done then. And together with the memory of the Council of Nicaea the memory of the great Councils of the fifteenth century could not but exert its influence. The word Reformation was not invented in Luther's time; a century before 'Reformation in head and members' had been the watch-word of a great ecclesiastical party. And at that time the principle had been laid down that the final appeal lay to a General Council. A General Council, it was said, was superior to the Pope. And this principle had so far prevailed that Pope John XXIII had actually been deposed by the Council of Constance. The movement had indeed proved in the end abortive, but it had left behind it a fixed opinion that the legal method of Reformation in the Church was by a General Council. It might indeed be questioned whether infallibility resided in the Pope, but, if even a General Council could err, what prospect remained for the unity of the Church? And so there were many to whom Luther first appeared a revolutionary when he was heard to say at Leipzig that General Councils have erred.

Might it not then reasonably be held, when in 1564 the Council of Trent separated, its work being done, that the religious question was now at last settled, that the Reformation in head and members, for which two centuries had prayed, was now at last complete? The Papacy was once more religious, the taint of heathenism and secularity was really in a great degree purged away, and the Council had really decreed some useful reforms. What more could be desired? What excuse for heresy still remained? Might it not be fairly conjectured that Luther himself, who had been driven into a revolutionary course by the monstrous wickedness of Medicean Rome and the impudence of Tetzels, would never have raised a protest if he had seen Rome under the pious influence of Carlo Borromeo?

In short, the Counter-reformation was itself undeniably a great and real reformation, and this fact materially altered the position of those states which had followed Luther or Calvin. The Medicean or Farnesian Papacy was so notoriously heathenised that the cry, Come out of her! might fairly be raised by earnest Christian teachers, as indeed the appalling sack of Rome under Clement VII had been felt throughout Italy as a just judgment of the Most High. But that judgment had done its work. Gradually but completely the Papacy had become once more a religious institution. And under its control a General Council had decreed a reform of the whole ecclesiastical system which was undeniably serious and considerable. On what ground then could Lutherans and Calvinists still justify their secession? On the ground that they disapproved the decisions, dogmatic or other, arrived at by the Council? This was at least a new ground, different from that which Luther had taken at

the outset. Was it not a ground which might have been taken by any of the heretical sects of the times between Constantine and Heraclius?

What they might and did answer to arguments like these, of course we know. But we may admit that Catholicism had now assumed a position in which if it chose to call itself exclusively the Christian Church it would have all tradition on its side. The malecontents had appealed to a General Council; a General Council had now spoken. Reformation had been clamorously demanded; Reformation had been granted. Objections might perhaps be urged to the procedure of the Council; but on the whole which party had followed precedent more faithfully, that which reformed the Church all together by means of a Council, or that which reformed it piece by piece through the agency of a Town Council excited by the eloquence of a preacher?

Catholicism then became after 1564 the Conservatism of Christendom, and we use Conservatism here in its better sense. It was neither the Conservatism of indifference nor that of dulness and sloth, but a Conservatism such as pious and modest minds might embrace and a Conservatism favourable to practical reform. Such it was on the Continent; but we in Britain, as I have said, were unaffected by the movement which called it into existence.

It rested in the first place upon this broad basis of Conservative feeling. In the second place it rested upon a most powerful coalition between the great sovereigns and the Papacy. That Guelf-Ghibelline discord which had paralysed the Church in the time of Charles V had disappeared. Philip, Ferdinand and Charles IX were now substantially at one, and united with the Pope in

favour of the dogmatic part of the work of the Council. Pius IV had deliberately invoked and purchased the aid of these secular princes.

But we are now further to note that the spiritual power had by no means made itself purely subservient to the temporal. It is the peculiar feature of this age that within the Catholic party the religious influence is once more supreme. The new-born religious zeal of the Papacy did not soon pass away. Caraffa was the first of a long line of Popes who all alike were either themselves inspired by it or found themselves hurried along by the current. The model Pope of this school is the Ghislieri, Pius V, who died in 1572. His zeal was purely religious, nor could any man hold himself more superior to those worldly considerations or those intrigues which had made the whole policy of the Medicean Papacy.

The result is that after 1564 international politics begin to be controlled by a new influence. Hitherto we have seen them determined by the family interests of the great European Houses, the Habsburg and the Valois. But now for a time the religious influence is supreme. The regenerated Catholic Church is for a while the mistress of the world, as in the time of the Crusades. It is felt that the Council of Trent ought to be followed by the suppression of heresy everywhere, as of a thing no longer excusable.

What has been called here the reconversion to Christianity of the Papal See is one of the most remarkable passages in the whole history of the Church. It has been however obscured from the view of Protestants by the fact that the Christianity of a Caraffa or a Ghislieri seems to them no Christianity. Assuredly it was not the Evangelical religion that we find in the New Testament. It

had little of 'sweet reasonableness' or of 'sweetness and light.' It was in one word not the Christianity of Jesus but the Christianity of Hildebrand and Innocent. It was a religion of Crusades and of the Inquisition. Its principal achievements were the St Bartholomew and the *autos da fe* of Philip II, and it may no doubt be argued with much plausibility that a Medici surrounded by artists and humanists did more real good at the Vatican than a Ghislieri among his inquisitors. Indeed the decline of Italian genius both in art and literature went hand in hand with this revival of religion. But though it may have been a dark type of religion, yet the new spirit which began at this time to animate the Papacy has all the characteristics of religion, as the old spirit with all its amiability and urbanity was consciously and frankly irreligious. A Luther would not have regarded Pius V with the feeling of horror with which Leo X affected him. Luther, full of religious feeling, seemed to see in Leo Antichrist in person, and none the less because of the pictures and the poems. But perhaps there never lived a man who conveyed a more pure impression of religiousness than Pius V. He, who brought Carnesecchi to the stake, who charged his soldiers, when they parted for France, to give no quarter to Huguenots, he of whom no one doubted that had he lived four months longer so as to see the Saint Bartholomew, he would have yielded up his breath with a most exultant *Nunc dimittis*, was nevertheless a saint, if devotion, singlemindedness, unworldly sincerity, can make a saint.

It has often been remarked that Christianity has taken several great typical forms. We see in Cyprian and Augustine the gradual growth of a Latin Christianity, the characteristics of which Milman has so luminously dis-

criminated. Luther may be said to have created Teutonic Christianity. The new developement we have now before us resembles these in being the result of a blending of Christianity with the spirit of a particular nation. It is *Spanish Christianity*. Its precursors in past time had been Dominic in the distant thirteenth century, and more recently Queen Isabella, whose image may be traced among ourselves in her grand-daughter, Mary Tudor. Caraffa himself had passed many years in Spain. Philip and Alva, both Spaniards, were the statesmen of the movement. The Spaniard Ignatius Loyola was its apostle. In Spain alone it seems a natural growth, and thus, while in Italy we find it fatal to genius, it exerts a less withering influence there, and in its great literary representative, Calderon, can boast of one of the great poets of the world. The circumstances of Spanish history explain the peculiarity of it. Its merciless rigour towards heterodoxy is not only in accordance with the Spanish character, but it was the natural result of a historic developement which had been wholly determined by wars of religion.

These general remarks prepare us to regard the year 1564 as introducing a new age. A final attempt was now to be made to restore the unity of Christendom in accordance with the decrees of the Council of Trent, by putting down the heretical sects which in nearly half a century since the first appearance of Luther had been allowed to acquire such influence. Thus a great trial is preparing for England. Nevertheless we may calculate that a certain respite will be allowed to her. For before the English question can be taken in hand it is urgent to deal with two other questions, that of France and that of the Low Countries.

The period of French history which we commonly



describe as that of the Religious Wars, had already commenced. In 1562 the Huguenot party for the first time stood out organised, and made the pretension which was to convulse the state for nearly forty years. It did not demand that the religion of France should be altered, but that two religions should be authorised to subsist side by side, as in Germany, owing to the laxity of central and the solidity of local government in that country, two religions already did. The proposal gave a profound shock to the French mind, and no sooner had it been allowed in 1562 by an Edict than civil war broke forth uncontrollably. This first civil war, which carried off François de Guise and Antoine, king of Navarre, was brought to an end in 1563. A modified toleration was again allowed to the new religion; it is observable that this was no longer extended to Paris, so early and so decidedly did Paris dissociate herself from the Reformation. But it was evident that this settlement too would before long be disturbed by such a reanimation as Catholicism now gained from the Counter-reformation.

Meanwhile the evil of the age was spreading into the Burgundian part of Philip's empire. In tracing the growth of the Habsburg aggregate we remarked the difficulty that was felt of infusing into it the slightest degree of moral unity. In particular we noticed the difficulty of uniting Burgundy and Spain. It was overcome under Charles V, but under Philip it breaks out again in a reversed form. Charles had been himself a Burgundian prince, and had introduced a foreign rule into Spain. Hence the violent disturbances which followed his arrival in the Peninsula. This particular difficulty, however, had been gradually overcome. The Habsburgs had made themselves at home in Spain,

though Charles himself remained always a Burgundian. But his son Philip destroyed the balance again by leaning too much to the other side. His mother was Portuguese, that is, at least Iberian, and he had the character and the manners of a Spaniard. More and more the Habsburg monarchy had taken a Castillian tinge, and if the Counter-reformation is rightly described as the triumph of Spanish Christianity, we may expect to find that in the sixties Burgundy suffered from the oppression of a Spanish government as much as in the tens Spain had suffered from the oppression of Burgundy. In England, religious persecution had raged while Philip was king, and everywhere the main instrument of the Counter-reformation was the Inquisition. Up to the commencement of the year 1559 Philip had carried on war with France from the Belgian frontier. Accordingly the Low Countries were full of Spanish troops, and now Philip resolved to introduce into the Low Countries the Spanish Inquisition.

Thus over the whole French-speaking world, in France and Burgundy alike, and also in Flanders and the Dutch provinces, the religious struggle had arrived at a critical stage, and everywhere assumed the same form. The government was everywhere Catholic, and the Reformation everywhere took the character of rebellion against the government, in France because it was ardent and sanguine, in the Low Countries because it suffered novel and intolerable oppression. As the Reformation party in the two countries was closely united, so at this time were the two Catholic governments, for it was the period when Philip's queen was Elizabeth of Valois.

And thus in 1564 the great European question was the suppression of Protestantism in France and the Low

Countries by the Tridentine Coalition. This question came first in order, even if it should be admitted that the suppression of heresy in England and Scotland was first in importance. And so for Elizabeth two things were clear: first, that she might expect a certain respite before the extreme peril should come upon her; secondly, that this respite would be long in proportion to the success which the French Huguenots and the Flemish Gueux might have in resistance to the Catholic Governments. From these two principles she could deduce a policy. It would consist in lending help to the two rebellions, but in a manner as cautious and secret as possible.

We arrive then at the final struggle between Catholicism and the Reformation, the struggle in which Catholicism, itself reformed, is the assailant. Upon the attitude assumed by the Powers in this struggle has depended the subsequent history of several of them, and certainly that of England.

Up to this time, and again since this time, the rival, and, as we used to express it, the natural enemy, of England has been France. And since in the age of the Reformation England leaned decidedly towards, and France decidedly against the new opinions, the ancient rivalry might naturally have been revived by the religious struggle. It might have fallen to France to wield the sword of the Council of Trent against England.

Again in earlier times England had had occasional dealings with Burgundy or with the Empire, but very rarely with Spain. Still less had she been in the habit of regarding Spain with fear or standing on the defensive against her. In later times too, when she has dealt with Spain, it has been for the most part as a superior, sometimes even as a protector. Only in the period of the

Counter-reformation was all this different, England fearing Spain and eventually driven to ally herself with France against her. But this international phase lasted so long as to produce a tradition of amity between England and France and of hostility between England and Spain, which continued through the larger part of the seventeenth century and long after Spain had ceased to be formidable.

The effects of this in English history have been incalculable, but one effect in particular cannot be recognised too early. Had England had to fight for her faith against France, her wars might have been of the old kind, and her battles fought either on the soil of England or France, or on the narrow seas between them. It was because she had to defend herself against Spain, the monopolist of the New World, that she was tempted out into the Atlantic, and from that to the Pacific. Thus she took the maritime bias, which has held her ever since.

And thus we must look once more upon the House of Habsburg as it enters upon another phase. All along we find this ruling House, while it rests mainly upon its policy of marriage, striving, as if conscious of the meanness of that system, to supplement it with something more ideal. Thus we saw Charles V trying to animate the brute mass of his inheritance with the traditional idea of the Christian Empire. That plan has met with failure. His successor in the Empire, Ferdinand, is not powerful; his successor in Spain, Philip, is not emperor. And so for a time the House has fallen back upon its trade of marriage, in which it continues to be as successful as ever. But now that the Council of Trent has run its course and achieved its work, now that a new age of united Christianity has opened, Philip again perceives a chance of raising the Habsburg

policy into a higher sphere. Heresy is now to be trampled under foot. In this work no doubt the emperor his uncle, and the king of France, his brother-in-law, are bound to take their part, but the principal share is likely to fall to himself. It is open to him to render the greatest conceivable service to the Church, and by doing so perhaps to find the way back, either for himself or for his heir, to the imperial dignity.

Nor will this dignity be, as in the fifteenth century, a mere title, but the outward symbol of a really universal power, such as ancient Roman emperors had wielded, such as his father had revived. For if heresy is to be suppressed, England and Scotland must be conquered, and the Huguenot party must be put down in France. Elizabeth must be deposed, Henry of Bourbon must not be allowed to reign in France and must be deposed in Navarre and Béarn. By armies and by bridegrooms it is likely that most of this territory will come under Habsburg rule, and analogous measures may be taken in Poland and Scandinavia. The rest of Europe belongs already to the House. Of the New World too, more than half belongs already to Philip; and to whom does the rest belong? To the king of Portugal. But Philip claimed already the succession in Portugal, and he was actually able in no long time to annex it and with it the boundless colonies it had founded. A Christendom thus reunited, regenerated and augmented might be expected to be more than a match for Turk, Tartar, Sophy and Czar.

For Philip was not an ordinary conqueror, who, because he loves war and possesses a good army, overruns as much territory as he can. Philip has in his mind a mystic dream of the universal authority of the Church, and tradition has taught him that the Church ought to be directed by a

great sovereign, an Otto, or Charles, or Constantine, whose empire therefore ought to be literally boundless and to comprehend literally the whole human race.

Over his brother sovereigns Ferdinand and Charles IX he has this grand advantage, that the Reformation has little, or, as he himself thinks, absolutely no hold within his dominions. Although not emperor, he is truly Catholic king. Ferdinand can achieve little against heresy, for his own dominions are inundated with it. The king of France too will not be available outside his own dominions until he has put down his Huguenots at home. But Philip enjoys a perfect Catholic peace, at least in Spain and Italy, nor even in the Low Countries does he begin till about 1572, that is, till eight years after the Counter-reformation, to consider the rebellion serious. It is he therefore whom Providence has manifestly elected to be the champion of the Church.

And thus it happened that, in consequence of the Counter-reformation, within about twenty years the world was threatened with a Universal Empire. About 1590 the ascendancy of Philip was more alarming than that of his father had ever been, in some respects more alarming than any ascendancy, even that of Napoleon, has been since. It was gradual in its growth, and somewhat gradual also in its decline. It won few great victories, and suffered no great disaster, except the loss of the Armada.

When Philip died in 1598 it was indeed evident that he had not founded his universal empire, but he remained the greatest sovereign in the world. And twenty years later the same Habsburg ascendancy in a somewhat modified form threatened the world again. No special epoch can be distinguished at which the danger to Europe passed away, but about the middle of the seventeenth

century it was perceived that the huge fabric which had been designed by Charles and built by Philip had become a ruin.

Meanwhile the European system had been transformed by the pressure of it, and had taken a shape which lasted long after the pressure had been removed. Thus it is that the reign of Elizabeth is transitional in English history, as the same period is transitional in France and in the Low Countries.

Meanwhile the Counter-reformation, as it introduced a period of religious war for the Continent, complicated the problem for Elizabeth in England. The succession-question was itself sufficiently thorny. To establish the daughter of Anne Boleyn on the throne and to find a successor for her, was a problem which seemed almost insoluble. But it was closely involved with the question of religion and that question was made more difficult than at any other time by the Counter-reformation. The transition from Philip and Mary to Elizabeth was in itself abrupt enough, but to secure the English nation and the English throne for the Reformation precisely at that crisis might seem impossible. The Counter-reformation had been achieved expressly to prevent kingdoms and governments from departing from the unity of the Church. An age had opened in which it seemed likely that Spain and France would combine to forbid the establishment of a heretical kingdom in England. A diplomatist writes in April, 1565<sup>1</sup>: 'The Catholic princes must not in this age proceed as formerly. At other times friends and enemies followed the distinction of frontiers and countries, and were called Italians, Germans, French, Spaniards, English,

<sup>1</sup> See Erich Marcks, 'Die Zusammenkunft von Bayonne', p. 13.

and the like; now we are called Catholics and heretics, and the Catholic prince must have all Catholics of all countries for his friends, as the heretics have all heretics, whether their own subjects or not, for friends and subjects.'



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE BRITISH QUESTION.

WHEN Elizabeth's reign is surveyed as a whole from the international point of view its first phase is easily comprehended, and so is that later phase which consists in a duel between England and the Spanish Monarchy.

In the first phase a basis is laid for union between England and Scotland, and then the religious struggle of the age is brought to an end in 1564 by the conclusion of the Council of Trent. The duel with Spain can scarcely be said to begin before 1585. The interval between these two years 1564 and 1585 is in many respects not less interesting and important, but it is by no means so easy to comprehend and to describe.

We must bear steadfastly in mind the great conditions of the Elizabethan problem, conditions which had been made clear in the first phase of the reign. The question was, first, who should reign after Elizabeth if she should reign long or instead of Elizabeth if she should die or be dethroned, and secondly, whether this successor should be Catholic or Protestant? In this was involved everything and principally the relations to be established between England and Scotland. Or again, if the problem were to

be stated in a practical form, the question in this age, as in the age before, was of a royal marriage. In the former reign the whole fortune of the country had seemed to depend on the marriage of Mary Tudor with the head of the Spanish Monarchy. Now everything seemed to depend on the marriage which Elizabeth and, after the death of Francis II of France, which Mary Stuart might make. By royal marriages, especially the marriages of the House of Habsburg, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the condition of Europe had been mainly determined. Was the history of Britain to be shaped in the same way? It was difficult at the time to imagine that Elizabeth, after declining the hand of Philip, would adopt and abide by a new system quite opposite to that of the Habsburgs, and would not marry at all. But we shall see as we advance that it was not in the matter of marriage only but universally that Elizabeth favoured inaction, and that almost all that she achieved in her long reign was achieved by the same kind of negative statesmanship. But all did not depend upon Elizabeth. Almost as much might chance to depend upon Mary Stuart, and she, whatever we may think of her, did not share her cousin's repugnance to action, Mary made three marriages. In the year which followed what we have called the Counter-reformation, in 1565, she married Henry Darnley, and thus entered upon a course which might well have frustrated all that Britain has actually gained from the virginity of Elizabeth.

With the beginning of Mary Stuart's public career, at least with her arrival in Scotland, it may be said that British policy becomes double-headed. Henceforth it depends as much on Mary as on Elizabeth. A drama begins which lasted a long time and became gradually very

intricate. Mary Stuart had so many and so various relations that from the outset she threatened to eclipse Elizabeth. In Scotland she was queen; in England she had claims on the succession; in France she was for a time queen and belonged always through her connexion with the Guise family to the most influential circle. Further as a Catholic she necessarily held a leading position in the Counter-reformation, and this at a moment when the Counter-reformation began to dominate the age. And lastly after the death of Francis II her hand was free. In an age of Habsburg marriages she was able to confer on the husband she might choose her own unique influence both in Britain and on the Continent.

The drama which thus began lasted through the whole middle period of Elizabeth's reign. It is much too large and complex to be fully treated in an essay like this, which will take note only of some of its more salient passages. We may remark however that the plot of this drama was not at all times equally intricate; it acquired intricacy when Mary began to form a party in England and to enter into relations with the Catholic Powers of the Continent. Mary's career falls into very distinct periods. After her arrival in Britain there is first the time when she lived in Scotland, that is from 1561 to 1568, and then the long period when she lived in England. Again if we fix our attention upon the first of these periods we may distinguish an element which is biographical from the element which concerns policy. In Mary Stuart more than in any other historical character biography has overwhelmed history. Her name brings to mind Riccio, Darnley, Bothwell, that is, a series of tragedies and romances; meanwhile the historical significance of her reign is little regarded. Yet Martin

Philippson writes<sup>1</sup>, 'Never would the Anglo-Saxon race have spread itself over the whole surface of the globe, or covered the seas with its ships and the lands with its colonies, if the Cecils and Lethingtons had not, in the middle of the sixteenth century, defeated the designs of Mary of Lorraine and her daughter Mary Stuart. Torn and enfeebled by civil war, France allowed Scotland, her ancient ally, to be torn from her, and permitted England by joining Scotland to her to become a Power of the first order and a dangerous rival to the most Christian kingdom.'

Mary's principal resources were first her party in England and the preference for Catholicism that might be latent in England, secondly the favour of the Counter-reformation and of the Spanish and French Monarchies. But without drawing on these resources she might do something. For the question, let us always remember, was one of succession. And unsuccessful as Mary was on the whole, she did considerably modify the aspect of this question. In her Scotch period between 1561 and 1568 she did this, so that we may recognise here a second phase of Elizabeth. The first phase had consisted in drawing Scotland towards England and dividing her from France; the second phase equally concerns the relations of England and Scotland. It is very ominous. In 1568 as in 1558 Elizabeth is still unmarried. But Mary Stuart, the descendant of Margaret Tudor, has been married; she has been married to another descendant of Margaret Tudor; and, what is more, they have a son. Thus the problem which both to England and Scotland is fundamental has advanced into a new stage. And this may be called the second phase of Elizabeth.

Mary Stuart lands in Scotland in August 1561. Already

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire du règne de Marie Stuart*, i. viii.

for two years there had been a Stuart Pretender; henceforth this Pretender inhabits the same island as Queen Elizabeth.

Again Elizabeth's position becomes extremely difficult. A struggle begins which, as we know, lasted a quarter of a century and caused endless embarrassment to her government. But perhaps at the outset it may have seemed much more dangerous even than it proved.

We have seen Elizabeth forming a great Anglo-Scotch party which was to be the basis of the United Kingdom. She was able to do this because in 1559 Scotland was in danger of subjugation by France. Scotland however had now escaped this danger, and had a queen who lived at Holyrood and was no longer connected with France by the ties of marriage. But by her very arrival in Scotland this queen retaliated upon Elizabeth, for there came at once into existence another Anglo-Scotch party of which Mary Stuart became the leader, and which also promised a union of the kingdoms, but at the expense of Elizabeth. That Catholic party, which had been at the head of affairs in England but three years before and in Scotland even later, had now a leader who was undisputed queen of one kingdom and had a fair claim at least to the succession of the other. She had indeed lost the active support of France, but the death of her husband, if it averted from us one danger, exposed us to another. Her hand was now free for a Habsburg bridegroom, and Philip, who so long as Francis II lived, had been perforce a supporter of Elizabeth, could now frankly side with Mary against Elizabeth. The whole of Catholic Europe wished well to Mary's claims, and, as we have seen, the Counter-reformation was at hand. What chance would remain for Elizabeth when the religious question should be settled and it should become,

as it were, a fundamental law of Christendom that no heretic could wear a crown?

How much the advent of Mary alarmed Elizabeth may be seen by her refusal to permit Mary to travel through England into her own kingdom. Mary Stuart, the Catholic, the Tudor by descent from Henry VII, but yesterday Queen of France and not unlikely soon to be married to a Habsburg, must have seemed to the daughter of Anne Boleyn like Mary Tudor risen from the dead. Nor could Elizabeth at this time help regarding Mary as equally adverse to her in intention and in position. Francis and Mary had assumed the title of king and queen of England, and on her marriage to Francis, Mary had made a solemn donation to Henry II of France or his successors not only of her own kingdom of Scotland, but also of her claims to the throne of England in the case that she should die without children. The stipulation afterwards made in the Treaty of Edinburgh that Francis and Mary should abandon the title of king and queen of England, Francis had refused to ratify, and Mary still, after Francis' death, refused to ratify it.

All this was most alarming, and became more so when the Counter-reformation turned the balance of the confessions suddenly in favour of Catholicism. Of the two great rivals in Britain, one of whom aspired to rule Scotland from England and the other to rule England from Scotland, Mary might seem at first to hold by far the better hand.

At the same time she was a stranger in Scotland, which she had quitted when she was but six years old. She had lived at the French Court through almost the whole reign of Henry II. She had imbibed there the most

unbending Catholicism from her uncle the Cardinal Guise, and when she left France the Huguenot party had barely made its appearance on the public stage. She returned to a country where the fiercest zeal of Protestantism reigned, and was strangely blended with barbaric manners in the aristocracy. She found the Mass forbidden, and it was allowed to herself only by exceptional indulgence. In this religious alienation of her people lay a disadvantage which might counterbalance all her advantages.

But in this respect, as in many others, she only resembled Mary Tudor at her accession. Yet Mary Tudor had attained her objects. There was room perhaps for a reaction against Knox in Scotland as there had been against Edward's system in England. And when once she had established herself upon the throne she might give her hand, as Mary Tudor had done, to some powerful Habsburg prince. If Elizabeth's ships should then appear again, at least they would be supported by no such national movement against the French garrison as they had found in 1559, and moreover Mary might retaliate by rousing a Catholic rebellion against Elizabeth in England.

It was a question, however, whether Mary Stuart had either inherited or acquired the relentless firmness, the knowledge of public opinion, or the familiarity with dangerous crises and revolutions which had prepared the daughters of Henry VIII to overcome difficulties. Nor had she as yet any fixed policy. For the attitude of hostile rivalry towards Elizabeth which she had maintained hitherto had been merely imposed upon her by her French connexions. It was the policy not of Mary herself but of Henry II and Francis II. If she did not at once abandon it when her connexion with France was

severed, yet she began gradually to feel the necessity of forming a policy of her own. She might reconcile herself with Elizabeth. Almost all her life she had been familiar with the idea that through her the union of England and Scotland might be established amicably, and not, as had recently been intended, by war and French invasion. The first scheme had been that she should be married to Edward VI, and it still kindles the imagination to dream out the course of English history, on the assumption that this scheme had taken effect and that Edward had not died prematurely. For then there might have been an absolute union of the Churches, and Tudor statesmanship instead of Stuart perversity would have presided over the consolidation of Great Britain! That prospect was closed now, and the problem had become much more difficult. Elizabeth was on the throne, and how was it possible for Mary to adjust her own claims to those of Elizabeth? Evidently only one amicable arrangement could be made, namely, that Mary should be recognised as heiress after Elizabeth. She could not of course expect to succeed before the children of Elizabeth, but Elizabeth at this time uniformly professed her intention to remain unmarried.

We find Mary as early as 1561 meditating a new policy of close concert with Elizabeth, and even pleasing her mind with the dream of a romantic friendship with that other queen, somewhat older and somewhat greater than herself, with whom she divided the admiration of the world. It is worth while to decipher the quaint Scotch which shows how she imagined as a noble idyll that relation which was to prove a terrible tragedy—'quhilk mater being anys (once) in this sort knyt up betwix us, and be (by) the meanes thair of the



haill sede of dissentioun taken up by the rute, we doubt nocht but herefter oure behaviour togidder in all respectis sall represent to the warld als grite and firm amytie, as be (by) storyis is expressit to have beene at any tyme, betwix quhatsamever cupple of dearest frendis mentionat in thame (them),—lat be to surpasse the present examplis of oure awin age—to the greit confort of oure subjects, and perpetual quietness of baith the realmes, quhilkis we ar bund in the sicht of God be al gude meanys to procure.' (Jan. 5, 1561–2.) Labanoff, i. 126.

The first period of the relations of Elizabeth and Mary extends to Mary's marriage with Darnley, which was celebrated on July 29th, 1565. As usual in that age the foreign policy of Mary was summed up in a marriage. The question she had to decide was whether she should assert her right to the English succession in the hostile or the amicable manner. If she decided for the former, she must marry into the Habsburg or the Valois family; if for the latter, she must choose a husband in England. We have remarked how ill-provided the House of Tudor always was with the instruments of a marriage policy. Elizabeth could offer no bridegroom of royal blood, who might compete with Don Carlos or the Archduke Charles or the Prince of Condé. She could but offer Lord Robert Dudley.

It happened however that the candidates put forward by the Continental Powers, though of much greater rank, were not satisfactory. Don Carlos already displayed that perverseness which was to bring him to a tragic end; it was not thought safe, though it might have been appropriate, that he should be united to Mary Stuart, one great tragic character to another. As to the archduke, he belonged to the wrong branch of the House of Habsburg,

and Mary holds that a marriage with him would afford her little protection, as he was 'a foreigner, poor and very distant, the youngest of the brothers, disagreeable to her subjects and without any apparent means or power to help her to the right which she asserts to the succession of this island.' It is useless, she concludes, to accept a foreigner unless he should be powerful enough to protect her against her subjects, amongst whom she pathetically describes how helpless she feels herself. And so she resolves to take a husband 'from this island.'

Shall she then take Leicester? Yes, perhaps, if by complying with Elizabeth's wish she could obtain a recognition as presumptive heiress. But just this recognition Elizabeth, reluctant herself to marry, conscious of her own doubtful title, and alarmed at the prospect of seeing a brilliant rival court set up, which should draw away all popularity from herself, could never be induced to give. In these circumstances we cannot wonder that Mary shrank instinctively, as from a trap, from this marriage, which, even if she could consent to abandon her religion, offered her no definite worldly compensation.

Out of all these embarrassments the marriage with Darnley seemed to offer an escape. It was not a mere marriage of preference, though preference may have existed. Mary defends it on political grounds. Darnley was 'of the blood of England and Scotland, next to myself in the succession, a Stewart by name, so as to keep still the surname so pleasing to the Scotch, of the same religion as myself, and who would respect me as he would be obliged by the honour I did him.' She resolves to marry him and so to gratify, 'if not all, at least the respectable party, the Catholics and those of my own surname.'

And thus Mary Stuart acquired a policy of her own.

She neither submits to Elizabeth, nor allies herself with the Catholic Powers, but strives to consolidate the Stuart and Catholic interest in Scotland.

And now follows the second period of Mary's personal reign in Scotland. Beginning in July 1565 with her marriage to Darnley, it extends to her flight into England in May 1568. Into a period of somewhat less than three years is crowded that drama which later generations are never tired of contemplating. Never has history furnished better materials to poetry. Nor can we find any more fascinating chapter of biography.

In this place we regard neither Elizabeth nor Mary biographically, still less poetically. What we have in view is solely to trace the development of English and Scotch policy until they are merged in a British policy.

Mary's one stroke of deliberate policy as Queen of Scotland is her marriage with Darnley. Up to this point she had been in leading-strings, first to the French court, afterwards to her natural brother, Lord James Stuart, later the regent Murray; and soon afterwards she was whirled away in the eddy of barbarism. But her marriage was a resolute and startling act. The first judgment of it formed by Elizabeth's advisers apparently was that it was a most skilful and effective move, which must be parried by some move equally well considered. Scotland, like England, was for the first time in its history ruled by a woman. In both countries therefore all policy was summed up in marriage; both north and south of the Tweed the one question was, When will the Queen marry and whom? The English were impatient that after seven years Elizabeth had taken no step, and now her rival in the North, as it were, outstripped her in the race. While the English and in fact the whole Reformation

party both in England and Scotland asked themselves 'What would become of us if Elizabeth should die as her brother Edward died?' the Catholic party in both countries were now sanguine that *their* royal house, already so strong in title, would soon have heirs. For it was as a Catholic that Mary chose Darnley, and he soon declared himself such. She assumed therefore a position wholly independent of Elizabeth, and excluded for ever the possibility to which the English government had clung, that she might marry Leicester and allow the religious difference to drop. As by the treaty of Berwick Elizabeth had put herself at the head of the national religious movement in Scotland, so Mary by her marriage put herself definitively at the head of the Catholic party in England. Nevertheless she refrains from assuming any attitude of hostility towards Elizabeth, claiming credit for having forborne, in compliance with her wish, to 'deal with the houses of France, Hispanzie and Austriche in marriage' and for having matched with 'one of this isle, her own subject and near cousin.' And indeed we see Mary after her tragic fall throwing herself for protection upon Elizabeth, as though she had no reason to regard her but as a friend.

Here then was a new crisis in Elizabeth's reign, and the only advice that could be given her was that which she so much disliked, yet which her subjects could scarcely believe that she really never meant to take, namely, that she should marry.

Had Darnley proved to Mary either an able adviser or, like so many royal consorts, a mere 'Est-il-possible,' we can imagine that from this time she would have risen to a proud position of superiority to Elizabeth, supposing Elizabeth to remain obstinate in the matter of marriage.

On the other side should both the queens marry and both have children, what would become of that grand ideal, which all parties alike had in view, the union of the kingdoms?

But Mary, if she knew anything of the history of her predecessors or even of her own minority, might have known how much she risked in raising one of the wild Scottish aristocracy to her throne, and at a moment when the chronic civil war of the country was yet further embittered by a religious war.

Meanwhile we are to remark that this marriage falls in 1565, that is, in the year after the Counter-reformation. Mary raises boldly the banner of Catholicism in Britain at the moment when the great continental kings in concert with the Pope were preparing to put down heresy all over the world. As Mary Tudor had taken the lead at the beginning of the Counter-Reformation, so in this its decisive stage Mary Stuart is somewhat in advance of Philip or Charles IX. This was not surprising, for it was in Mary's kingdom that the Reformation was most frankly rebellious and intolerable to a sovereign. Everywhere in this age, we have seen, the Calvinistic Reformation defied the civil government, but nowhere was its defiance so insolent or so triumphant as in Scotland. If in France the Huguenot aristocracy took the field they had no great success, but the Scotch nobles in 1559 had carried with Elizabeth's help everything before them. They had done everything short of deposing Mary. In open Parliament they had changed the religion of the nation, and made the celebration of the Mass penal. Thus for four years after her return Mary had felt herself like a sovereign fettered and imprisoned. And meanwhile in the world at large the tide was turning. The Reformation, as it now began

to appear, had had its day ; and the new age was to be ruled by the Counter-Reformation. Already there were considerable signs of reaction even in Scotland, and in England, over which Mary never forgot her claims, the people were disappointed and anxious because Elizabeth did not marry.

In these circumstances Mary's marriage and her open declaration against the Protestant lords, her bold assertion of her sovereign rights, followed by a great military success, may be regarded as the outbreak of the Counter-Reformation in Britain. It raised Mary Stuart to the height of power, from which for a moment she could look down on the humbled and embarrassed government of Elizabeth. The connexion of Mary's new policy with the Counter-Reformation of the Continent was visibly marked by the presence and influence at her court of the Italian Riccio, who from the position of a valet rose to be a kind of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. But this prosperous period lasted only from July 25th, 1565, to March 9th, 1566, from the day of the Queen's marriage to that of the murder of Riccio.

Mary proved as little able as most of her predecessors, as James I or James III, to withstand the fierceness of the Scottish nobles, which at this time was reinforced by the Judaic fanaticism of Knox and by the hostility, inspired by fear, of Elizabeth. I need not tell again the tale of the murder of Riccio. But to show that the conspirators knew that they were struggling with the Counter-Reformation let us remark that when the provost of Edinburgh and his burgesses, aroused by the disturbance, appeared at the door of Holyrood, they were informed that 'it was only the killing of the Italian secretary, who had conspired with the Pope and the King of Spain to bring

in foreign troops for the purpose of subjugating the nation and restoring the ancient religion.' (Labanoff, VII. 94.)

This catastrophe arrested the triumphant course of Mary's policy, even before it was crowned by the birth of an heir, who was to be, and who actually became, King of England as well as of Scotland. The Catholic cause ceases to make progress, and we enter upon a cycle of tragedies in which the historical interest is utterly lost in the personal. First there is the tragedy of February 1567, which may be called from Darnley, then that which may be named from Bothwell and which ended in June of the same year. The Queen runs through all high tragedy parts in succession, before she arrives many years later at the tragedy, of which her own death is the catastrophe. Shakspeare's great Scotch play might have been suggested by these events of 1567, when a king is murdered by treachery and then the murderer and the instigatress rule Scotland together, no man's life being safe, and the nobles taking flight to England. Then follows the tragedy of Lochleven and Langside, closing with the flight to England.

Through its whole subsequent course the Stuart dynasty was to furnish materials for high tragedy, many of its kings and pretenders displaying that mental bewilderment which leads to misfortune with qualities and a pose that makes misfortune interesting. But Mary Stuart in an age of wilder characters and intenser crises far surpasses in this respect all her descendants.

But what was the total effect upon international relations of all this tragedy? We are to fix our attention on the abdication of Mary, July 25th, 1567, and the coronation of James at Stirling which immediately followed. At this date ends the Counter-Reformation within Great Britain,

for as the infant king was put in Protestant hands, and Knox himself preached at his coronation, the change corresponds in Scotland to that which took place in England at the death of Mary Tudor. From this moment, the very moment when the Counter-Reformation was proclaiming all over Europe that no heretic could wear a crown, both the crowns of Britain were taken away definitively from the Catholic Church.

Secondly, at this date the way was cleared for the union of the kingdoms. We have remarked how it had hitherto been closed by one obstacle after another. The marriage of Edward VI and Mary had been hindered. Then a new prospect had opened when the French garrison was expelled from Scotland and at the same time the Reformation established there under the shield of Elizabeth's power. In 1560 for a time modern Britain seemed to appear and Elizabeth seemed to rule England and Scotland together as Queen Victoria does now. Even Mary on her return had been tempted for a time to accommodate herself to this new condition. But a new estrangement of the kingdoms had begun with her marriage and her decided choice of Catholicism. Henceforth there seemed but two alternatives, either the union of the kingdoms on a Catholic basis, or else a marriage of Elizabeth and no union at all.

By the accession of James in Scotland it is true that many new difficulties were introduced, it is true that Elizabeth heard with indignation of a sovereign forced to abdication by her own subjects. Nevertheless if this new settlement could be maintained it would lead naturally to the union of the kingdoms. In those days, as we have remarked, the established mode of uniting kingdoms was by royal marriage, but this was a miserable method indeed unless some natural sympathy between the nations con-



curred with it. And what are the natural influences by which nations, as distinguished from governments, may be united? The greatest of these is religion. Between England and Scotland the royal marriage was not wanting, though it would have been better if more than one such marriage could have been arranged; it was the old marriage of Margaret Tudor with James IV. But so long as Mary reigned and held aloft the flag of Catholicism, how was it possible that this royal union could be supplemented by a truly national union founded on religion? This grave difficulty was removed at once by the fact that the new king was an infant, whose religion would depend upon his teachers, and that he was in the hands of those who would rear him as a Protestant.

Those obvious occurrences of the first ten years of Elizabeth to which we have called attention, namely her intervention in Scotland and the Treaty of Edinburgh, with the second marriage of Mary and the birth of her son—those occurrences considered by themselves and without regard to the other occurrences so tragic and so obscure with which they are connected, represent one of the greatest and most memorable transitions in English policy. The confusion that had prevailed at the moment of Elizabeth's accession began to diminish; a possible solution of the fatal double problem of succession and religion came in sight. A new day began to dawn from Scotland

Before Elizabeth's age indeed England had struggled not merely with that problem but at the same time with another difficulty, the standing hostile alliance of France and Scotland. During a certain time, says Philipppson, Scotland and France formed, so to speak, one and the same nation. Of the reign of Henry II of France, Teulet

in his great collection of the documents which concern this subject (*Relations Politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse au seizième siècle*) says, "All the efforts of Henry II aimed at a sort of incorporation of Scotland with France<sup>1</sup>." The Treaty between France and Scotland concluded at Rouen in 1517 is entitled 'A Treaty of alliance offensive and defensive against England' and contemplates war with England in every clause. By this permanent hostile league England was, as it were, held in check; she remained incapable, while it lasted, of rising into the position of a Great Power. But, great as the question was, it was still secondary at the accession of Elizabeth to the question of succession and religion.

But this latter question and the question of royal marriage which was involved with it concerned Scotland as well as England. For Scotland had been united by marriage with England as well as with France. If James V had made two French marriages, James IV had married Margaret Tudor. Accordingly Mary Stuart could lay claim to succeed or to supplant Elizabeth, and a different combination might take the place of the standing alliance of France and Scotland against England. It was possible to imagine a union of the whole island of Britain under one king, a union which would be an event no less great than the union of Castille and Aragon. In the first ten years of Elizabeth the course of events, as it slowly developed the question of succession, developed at the same time the Scotch question. The queen of England did not marry, but the queen of Scotland did, and then the queen of Scotland had a son. Difficulties indeed accumulated, but the Britannic idea certainly made progress. There was now another, a sixth, James Stuart.

<sup>1</sup> Teulet, Vol. I., p. vi.i. ed. 1862.

He began his life indeed in the same atmosphere of tragedy which had been the element of his predecessors. James I and James III had been murdered. James II was killed by an accident in the prime of life. James IV perished in a disastrous battle. James V died in despair. And now James VI saw his father murdered, and, long after, his mother die by the executioner. Nor had he admirable personal qualities. But he had a great destiny of the Habsburg type. He was an Iulus. In him, as it were, Britain was embodied. In his person lay the solution of all those thorny questions, the question of succession, which was involved with the question of religion, and at the same time the Britannic question. But before he should become Protestant King of the whole island of Britain he was to wait thirty-six years.

He had the advantage that he was not only a Stuart but also a Tudor, being connected with the Tudors both by the mother and the father. If he should abide by the Reformation, and if at the same time the party of the Reformation should continue to gain ground both in England and Scotland, the time might come when he would be welcomed as king both in England and Scotland. In that case he might fulfil the dream which in that age haunted our race; he might unite England and Scotland, and make the whole island of Britain the basis of a great Insular State. Such were the possibilities which came to light as soon as James was born. But they were only possibilities. Things might too easily take another course. In particular the Reformation might lose instead of gaining ground. For the Counter-Reformation was in full career; even in England and Scotland it was a power of unknown magnitude, and on the Continent Philip could devote to it the whole resources of the Spanish Monarchy,

while France too was declaring in its favour. These Great Powers were in a manner pledged to prevent the establishment of the Insular State. And before the problem of the Elizabethan age could receive the happy solution which now came in sight there must be a settlement of accounts with the Great Continental Powers.

It thus became apparent that the great law of aggregation by means of royal marriage and birth might possibly be applied in these islands. As Castille and Aragon had been made the basis of Spain, as Spain and Portugal were soon to be made the basis of a great Iberian union, so with the appearance of a sixth James Stuart the possibility of a British Union began to appear. It was conceivable that in such a Union the standing difficulties of the English state would vanish—that stubborn succession problem which from the Wars of the Roses to the accession of Elizabeth had so frequently broken out afresh, the religious question which had been opened by Henry VIII and was not yet closed, the border question which had led to so many barbarous internal wars and the standing league of France and Scotland which lay like an incubus upon our foreign policy. Such a union seemed natural, and yet in the Scandinavian countries a similar union failed, and the union of Spain and Portugal was dissolved again after sixty years. In any case it could be accomplished but slowly and in many stages, but it was the great event of the early years of Elizabeth to have raised for the first time in a promising form the *Britannic Question*.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE MIDDLE PERIOD OF ELIZABETH.

THE first years of Elizabeth witnessed the beginning of many new things in our history. Under the head of policy they are chiefly memorable for having brought into prominence the Britannic idea. It was at this time that the hostile union of France and Scotland against England was broken. But to this negative there was soon added a still greater positive developement. In place of the union of Scotland and France the foundation was speedily laid for a union of Scotland and England, for a Britain, which might ultimately stand out as a political aggregate in rivalry with the Spanish Monarchy. With the birth of James there appeared a British dynasty similar to that Habsburg dynasty which at the beginning of the sixteenth century had sprung from the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.

Thus the first period of Elizabeth, which at the time was often called her 'halcyon days,' has a Scottish tinge. When we survey her whole reign we see another period which is just as decidedly Spanish, when she makes war with the Spanish Monarchy, has to withstand a great Spanish invasion, and having done this successfully retaliates by assailing Spain. But the Spanish period

cannot be said to begin before 1585. And thus between this and the Scottish period there is a long interval, an interval of not less than eighteen years. It is an interval on the whole of remarkable prosperity for England, as we shall recognise when we consider how intense and terrible those years were in other countries. In France that was the time of the St Bartholomew and of a long series of atrocious religious wars; it was a period of horror in the Low Countries; in Scotland it saw three Regents in succession, Murray, Lennox and Morton, die violent deaths. And the causes which wrapped the age in a mantle of such appalling darkness were just as much at work, let us reflect, in England. It would have been by no means surprising if England too had spent those years in religious war and had closed them, as France did, by attaching herself to the Counter-Reformation. Nay, England too might have seen a St Bartholomew, for it has been remarked that Catharine de Medici 'challenged Elizabeth to do to the Catholics of England what she herself had done to the Protestants of France, promising that if they were destroyed there would be no loss of her good-will'.<sup>1</sup> Yet this middle period of Elizabeth is on the whole a tranquil time. The tremendous influences that were working in secret do indeed once or twice come to light; about the year 1570 there was serious cause for alarm. The class of occurrences of which this essay takes note is represented in this middle period by the Rising of the North, the Pope's Bull of Excommunication and the treason and execution of the Duke of Norfolk. In this crisis the influence of foreign Powers is particularly visible. It is first by the Pope,

<sup>1</sup> Catharine to La Mothe, September 13th, 1572, cited in the article on the Massacre of St Bartholomew, *North British Review*, New Series, Vol. xii., p. 47.

but also by the concert of the great Continental Powers with Mary Stuart, that Elizabeth is threatened. We may say indeed that these disturbances constitute the decisive attack of the Counter-Reformation upon England, and that the repulse of it settled finally for us the religious question. In order to understand the middle period it is most necessary to consider what might have happened and to what precise danger the country was just then exposed. A little later we had to resist the Spanish Monarchy, the greatest Power in the world, but a greater danger still threatened Elizabeth about 1570.

The great rally of Catholicism marked by the conclusion of the Council of Trent might be expected to be followed by a grand concert of the European Powers for putting down heresy all over the world. Not Spain alone, therefore, but at least Spain and France together might be expected to strike at England. This would be the Counter-Reformation realised in action. It would be not merely a Spanish Armada but this supported by the force of France, which by attacking England might regain that control over Scotland which she had so recently lost. And the Insular State had at that time not only no army, but scarcely even that rudiment of naval power which, when the hour of trial actually came twenty years later, had had time to grow up. Had it even a government which could resist hostile pressure? had it even a religion? The Continental assailants would be supported in England by all the party which secretly favoured the old religion and by all those who wished to see religion settled somehow as it might now be settled through the Counter-Reformation. They would be supported by all who favoured Mary Stuart and who saw a prospect through Mary Stuart of settling the succession question. For what

alternative prospect could Elizabeth offer? The Reformation seemed about to disappear, and Elizabeth had no heir. Was it reasonable any longer to think that the Reformation could form the basis of a national settlement? At this very time the Emperor Maximilian II, who had long been regarded as almost a heretic, seemed returning to the Catholic fold, influenced partly by the growing bitterness that reigned between Lutherans and Calvinists. And in England too it began to be seen that Reformation would end in irreconcilable religious division, for a Puritan party began to disengage itself in the bosom of Anglicanism.

All these difficulties taken together constituted a national danger such as has rarely threatened us. In the disturbances which actually arose they are distinctly visible. In the Pope's Bull of Excommunication we may hear the authorised voice of the Counter-Reformation. The Rising of the North shows us the old Catholicism of the country in motion. In the proceedings of the Duke of Norfolk we see plainly the hand of Mary Stuart. And we may be surprised that the crisis after all proved so slight and that the disturbances of this middle period left so faint a mark on our history.

How did it happen that the great Continental Powers, at the very moment when they were united in the Counter-Reformation, could suffer the Counter-Reformation to fail so disastrously in Scotland? Why did not her French connexions, or why did not Philip, interfere to save Mary from deposition, and to prevent Scotland from passing for ever under the control of the Reformation? The principal cause was that great fact which contributed as much to save the Reformation in England as in Scotland, namely that in 1567 the Huguenots in France and the



Gueux in the Low Countries screened Britain in the most effectual way. In that year the religious war of France broke out again with startling suddenness; in that year too Philip found it necessary to take the rebellion of the Low Countries seriously in hand. The Counter-Reformation was indeed overwhelmingly powerful, but at the critical moment it was not in a condition to interfere in Britain.

The Counter-Reformation from within the country, initiated by Mary Stuart in 1565, comes to an end with her flight to England. Nevertheless her influence remains formidable, and about the same time the Counter-Reformation on the Continent acquires a decided superiority. Now therefore a period begins in which Elizabeth apprehends invasion from abroad and expects to see it strongly supported by disaffection at home.

Mary Stuart had for the moment ruined her own cause. Nevertheless Elizabeth did not altogether recover from the blows which Mary had struck in 1565. The Catholic party had been considerably roused by her successes of that year, and meanwhile Elizabeth had done nothing to settle the question of the succession. Hitherto the Catholics had been reconciled to Elizabeth's government partly by the moderation of her Anglicanism, partly by the prospect of a Catholic succession. But the new prospect which now opened of a Protestant successor naturally disturbed their minds, which the rising tide of the Counter-Reformation disturbed still more. In 1567 the Huguenot party appeared strong in France and the Protestants were strong in the Low Countries. But the fortune of war went decidedly against them. In France they suffered the great defeats of Jarnac and Moncontour, and they were deprived of their leader Condé. Alva

took in hand the Low Countries, where also the leaders Egmont and Hoorn fell, and in about two years this region too appeared to be almost pacified and purged of the Reformation.

It was still but ten years since Philip had been king of England, and Francis II had borne the title even later and had been pretty effectively king at least of Scotland. Was it not likely, now that both Philip and the French government were on the point of putting down internal rebellion, and were united in the Counter-Reformation, that they would cross the Channel once more and reestablish their influence in the island of Britain? If so, their intervention would be welcomed by the whole Catholic party both in England and Scotland, which had but lately been supreme, and by all those who, whatever they might think of Mary, disliked rebellion, the deposition of kings by their subjects, and Calvinism.

At the outset Mary had had to choose between urging her rights on England in a hostile manner, which meant marrying a Continental Prince, and in an amicable manner, which meant marrying within the island. She had chosen a middle course in marrying the Scotsman Darnley, when the husband Elizabeth offered her was Leicester. But Mary's policy had now exhausted itself. Darnley was dead, and Bothwell, the ruffian, was buried in a Danish prison. Accordingly the discussion among those who still preferred Mary to James began again where it had been dropped in 1565. It was thought possible for Mary to be divorced from Bothwell, and then to adopt a new policy, that is, enter upon a new marriage negociation. And thus naturally grew up the scheme of a marriage between Mary and the first of English nobles, Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk.

Such a scheme could not but suggest itself, while the succession remained utterly uncertain, while Elizabeth did not marry, and at the same time the marriage of Elizabeth would probably make impossible the union of the kingdoms, and while the succession of a purely Scottish dynasty in England could not be quite agreeable to the English nobility.

And yet such a scheme involved the total downfall of Elizabeth, and retrogression to the disturbed times which she had brought to an end. A Catholic heiress, married to a great English noble and leaning on the powerful Counter-Reformation of Europe, on the Guise family and on Philip II, would have pushed Elizabeth on one side and revived the times of Mary Tudor. The Counter-Reformation however could not but pass through this second phase in England when the fall of Mary Stuart from her throne in 1567 had brought the first phase to an end. The plot which cost Norfolk his life was that final rally of the Catholic party in England which was inevitable considering how large the party was and how overwhelmingly powerful Catholicism became just at this moment on the Continent.

Ten years of Elizabeth had by no means placed England out of danger. Had the two great Catholic Powers, the Habsburg and the Valois, acted with energy and full mutual understanding about 1570, they might probably, by the help of the Catholic party in England and the party of Mary, have overthrown the Elizabethan settlement. If we ask what saved this country from the Counter-Reformation the answer which we obtain is in one word this, that the rally of English Catholicism in Norfolk's rebellion was but feebly supported from the Continent, and that after this time the forces of the Counter-Reformation were

ever more and more divided by a new outbreak of the old rivalry between France and the House of Habsburg.

The failure of Norfolk's rebellion thus marks the decisive transition in England and the close of the movement begun by Henry VIII forty years before. After the oscillations of Edward and Mary, Elizabeth had returned to the policy of her father, and now this policy prevailed, even though the whole aspect of Catholicism had been altered by the Counter-Reformation. The Rising of the North is the last of those reactionary movements which began with the Pilgrimage of Grace. Here for the last time Catholic England appears in the field, able still fairly to claim that the future as well as the past belongs to her cause. Hers is the successor, while the other side can name no successor, and hers too is the great overwhelming movement of the age, which is the Counter-Reformation. And yet her failure is complete. The Catholic party in England makes its venture and fails, and then the Continental party, of whom Ridolfi is the agent, makes an equally unsuccessful attempt, of which Norfolk pays the penalty. For want of correspondence and unity of plan the resources of the Counter-Reformation were dissipated at the decisive moment.

In all this evolution, which is the starting point of all subsequent history both for England and the Continent, by far the most important feature is to be found in the inability of France and Philip to act resolutely together. It was the theory of the Counter-Reformation that the great Powers should act together to put down heresy, and had this been resolutely done about 1570, the two kingdoms of Britain might have been united under Mary Stuart by the intervention of France and Spain, and the great Insular State might have come into existence as

a Catholic state. This result would have had a decisive reaction upon the struggle in the Low Countries, which hitherto had been fomented by Protestant England, and perhaps also upon the struggle in France. Thus heresy would perhaps have been put down all over the world.

Let us then examine the fatal flaw in the system of the Counter-Reformation, which, not only at this critical moment but much more clearly in the next age and throughout the seventeenth century, caused the final failure of Catholicism. It lies in the fact that the grand religious division now so sharply defined by the Council of Trent was crossed by the division between France and the House of Habsburg.

We are to remember that a whole long age had passed during which this latter division had ruled the politics of Europe, while the religious division had either not commenced or remained secondary. There had been an old discord between France and Burgundy since Charles the Bold; there had also been a discord between France and Spain since the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. Charles V therefore had inherited, as it were, two distinct wars with France, the one from Charles the Bold, the other from Ferdinand of Aragon. These wars he had prosecuted throughout his reign against Francis I and Henry II, with success in the main but with one disastrous failure. But this whole cycle of European wars seemed to have been closed in 1559 by the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis, just at the time when the Catholic kingdom of Philip, substituted for the universal dominion of Charles V, was consolidating itself. That treaty had been cemented by the last grand Habsburg marriage, that of Philip II with Elizabeth of Valois. Since that the Counter-Reformation had been consummated at Trent in 1564, and it had

begun to be evident in the course of the religious dispute in France that that country intended to side with Philip in religion.

It seemed therefore by no means unlikely that a firm alliance of Spain and France on the basis of the Counter-Reformation might now successfully undertake the restoration of Catholicism all over the world. On this possibility hung the destinies of mankind. The meeting of Catharine de Medici and Charles IX with the Spanish Queen, who was accompanied by the Duke of Alva, at Bayonne in June 1565, gave the world notice of such a policy, and in the years next following, when the Huguenots suffered terrible defeats and the rebellion of the Low Countries seemed for a moment to be suppressed by Alva, the policy seemed to be triumphantly realised. It only remained to take in hand the two island kingdoms. And here too, considering the state of the succession and the use that might be made of Mary Stuart, the prospect seemed good, the task easy.

The momentous alliance however that had been represented by Philip and Elizabeth of Valois proved little more solid than that which it replaced, the alliance of Philip and Mary, as indeed Elizabeth of Valois herself died in 1568. The union of the Habsburg and the Valois in the Counter-Reformation was a dream which held Europe for about ten years. At the end of that time the spell was snapped, the rivalry of Habsburg and Valois took its place again, and was soon succeeded by a rivalry still more memorable, that of Habsburg and Bourbon. And thus the Reformation was saved. Thus also Elizabeth found herself in the latter half of her reign engaged indeed in a dangerous conflict, but a conflict with Philip only, France being either passive or a useful ally.

From about 1565 to 1569 the alliance was at its height. After the Conference at Bayonne, where, if not much was settled, much was discussed between Alva and Catharine de Medici, we see in 1567 the alarming entrance of Alva upon his government of the Low Countries. This is the first decisive act of the Counter-Reformation. It is felt throughout the Protestant world as the Pope's Day of Judgment. The Huguenots in France feel their fate involved with that of the rebels of the Low Countries. They rise on Sept. 27th in all parts of France with a skilful suddenness which was the astonishment of the next generation, and endeavour to seize the person of the King near Meaux.

There had been already more than one short religious war in France. But perhaps this occurrence of 1567 may be regarded as the commencement of the serious struggle by which the religious position of France was to be decided for future ages. And it corresponds with the commencement of the struggle which established the Republic of the Netherlands.

But in both countries Catholicism has the upper hand. The Belgian rebels lose their leaders, and seem deprived of the means of resistance. The Huguenots have indeed a momentary success, for they extort a peace and a toleration (March 28th, 1568). But it appears that their conduct has left a deep resentment in the mind of the Catholic population of France. And the Counter-Reformation proclaims with a hundred voices that the treaty is null. So speaks the Pope, the saintly inquisitor, Ghislieri. Alva too would rather see a kingdom ruined but preserved for God and the king, than unimpaired but devoted to the demon 'and his sect, the heretics.' French public opinion displays strange features. It appears to be much more wedded

to its orthodoxy than to its nationality. It does not engage to stand by the House of Valois if the king should make concessions to the Huguenots. There are also symptoms, which afterwards became more clearly visible, of a decided preference for Philip, the truly Catholic, though foreign, prince over the native House of Valois.

Such is the age of the Counter-Reformation! National feeling, which for centuries past had been gaining ground at the expense of the Papal Church, seems now again to fall into abeyance. The Pope is once more supreme, and wide populations are prepared to put their orthodoxy above their patriotism.

Thus after a few months civil war broke out again in France, war more than civil, fratricidal, leading straight to the St Bartholomew. At the same time the Low Countries continued to be trampled down by the Spanish and Italian troops of Alva. The years 1568, 1569 saw at last the combined effort of the Counter-Reformation to put down heresy. In 1568 the scene of war was chiefly the Low Countries, in 1569 it was chiefly France. And great success attended the arms of the Counter-Reformation.

Meanwhile 1567 had witnessed the downfall of Mary Stuart and the beginning of her captivity. Had a Catholic government, firm and efficient, been ready in Scotland to act in concert with Alva in his hour of success and with the French government after Jarnac and Moncontour, the Counter-Reformation might have been as victorious in Britain as on the Continent, and its whole plan might have been carried into effect. But in 1569 Mary was in prison, and the Rising of the North was not a sufficient basis for Alva to build upon. Accordingly the opportunity was lost of crowning the edifice of the Counter-Reformation.



And it did not return. In 1570 division began to appear in the commanding Catholic Alliance, and henceforward France drifts into that middle position, Catholic in religion, yet allied with Protestant states, upon which all subsequent history has depended.

The French government began to be aware that the plan of the Counter-Reformation, successfully carried into effect, would make Philip universal monarch and would depress, if not dissolve, France. For the religious war occupied France entirely, while it raged only in one corner of Philip's dominion. It seemed likely at this moment permanently to divide France, as it afterwards did the Low Countries, into a Catholic half, Continental and leaning on the Habsburg, and a Protestant half, maritime and leaning on England. For as a year or two later Protestantism, beaten in Flanders and Brabant, gained a firm footing in Holland and Zealand, so did the Huguenots now, retreating from the interior, establish themselves in Rochelle and along the western coast, where they might be in close connexion with Navarre and might also look for aid to England. Such a rudiment of maritime power might perhaps be crushed by the French government, but only after an exhausting struggle and by the help of Philip, who with his claims on Navarre and his naval superiority would perhaps acquire a principal share in the spoils. Meanwhile he would prosecute other schemes, with which France would not have leisure to interfere. For instance Mary Stuart had originally belonged to France, but she became useless as an instrument of French policy while France was absorbed in civil war. Philip however was in a condition to help her, and at the same time to appropriate her. The new scheme was that she should marry Don John of Austria, who in 1571 defeated the Turks at

Lepanto, winning the greatest naval battle of the age. Then by the help of Spain she was to mount the thrones of Scotland and England, making Britain a province of Spain, as she had before endeavoured to make it a province of France! But the Counter-Reformation, which would lead to such results, could be no system for France.

That intense national consciousness of France which showed itself in later times and since the Revolution, was strangely wanting in the sixteenth century. As a few years later than this a great party with its head-quarters in Paris proposed to hand over the country to Philip, so now in 1570 the prospect of a dissolution of France was not viewed with the patriotic horror we might expect. Nevertheless it created misgivings, out of which sprang a desire for some arrangement with the Huguenots and some new experiment in policy.

A new policy at that period was almost always a new proposal of marriage. This great European transition was indicated to the world by two great marriage negotiations, that of the Duke of Anjou for Elizabeth, and that of Henry of Navarre for Margaret of Valois.

Such proposals involve an almost complete secession of France from the Counter-Reformation. Elizabeth was under the excommunication of Pope Pius V, Henry of Navarre was the leader of the Huguenot party. And the grand principle of the Counter-Reformation was precisely this, that heretic princes, and chiefly these two, lost by their heresy the right of reigning or the right of succession.

In the view here taken of the Elizabethan age the greatest occurrence in it is that struggle with the Spanish Monarchy which reached its height in 1588, and therefore the greatest transition in it is the growth of the hostile feeling which led to that struggle. We are now con-

cerned with a middle period when this struggle has not yet been reached. Politicians did not yet prophesy that Elizabeth would wage a great war with Philip, still less that an Armada would sail against England. It appeared indeed always a possibility. Angry negotiations with Spain went on with little intermission, and on one occasion Elizabeth expelled the Spanish Ambassador, Guernan de Espes. But in the middle period with which we deal, not a war of England and Spain but a war of the Catholic Powers in concert with Mary Stuart against heretic England seemed for a good while to be the catastrophe which was approaching. And as during this period, that is, throughout the sixties and a great part of the seventies, the religious wars of France principally occupied the attention of the world, and the final victory of Catholicism seemed to depend on its success in France, the middle period of Elizabeth has mainly a French tinge as the period before it had a Scottish and that which succeeded it a Spanish tinge. We have to consider mainly the bearing of Elizabeth towards the religious wars of France and towards the massacre of St Bartholomew. Then we have to consider how, while in France Catholicism actually prevailed, the grand scheme of the universal victory of Catholicism contemplated by the Counter-Reformation nevertheless did not take place, and Elizabeth had in the end to struggle not with united Catholicism but with the Spanish Monarchy alone.

But we are reminded once more in this period that the problem for England was by no means purely political but also personal. The struggle was not simply of religions or of great principles, but also of succession and therefore of royal marriage. This is true of other countries as well as of England. The measures of the Counter-Reformation

were considerably affected by Philip's fourth marriage to one of the daughters of the Emperor Maximilian II and Charles IX's marriage to another, and the St Bartholomew itself is inseparably connected with the marriage of Henry of Navarre to Charles IX's sister, Margaret of Valois. But it is in the case of Elizabeth herself that foreign policy is always merged in marriage negotiations, and in this period, as France comes into the foreground of policy, so we find that French princes are candidates for her hand. First it is Charles IX himself that would marry her, then his brother Anjou, afterwards King Henry III, and then again Alençon.

We find then a period predominantly French followed in Elizabeth's reign by a period predominantly Spanish. The two periods cannot indeed be held altogether distinct; nevertheless it will suit our plan to put on one side for the present Elizabeth's relations with Philip and to consider first her relations with France, while France under the three brothers of Valois went through her terrible ordeal of religious war. In more recent times we have been accustomed to see on the Continent almost exclusively France, but in the period before us France is wholly unlike the France with which we are familiar. It is France not yet transformed by Richelieu, not yet ruled by the House of Bourbon, not yet secularised by philosophy or free thought, France possessed by religious ideas and adhering fanatically to Catholicism. Towards England she is not in this age a rival, as she had been in the fourteenth century and was to be again in the eighteenth; so that Elizabeth is able to steer us through this her middle period without a war with France. And yet it is a critical period in the relations between the two countries. There was great danger of a hostile coalition between

France and Mary Stuart; great danger also of a universal Catholic Coalition in which Philip of Spain and the Pope should be joined with the Valois in crushing the heretic state. But this middle period, which opens with the Counter-Reformation, ends in a revival of the old secular system of politics. Instead of a union of the Catholic Powers there is seen a revival of the old hostility between the Habsburg and the Valois. By the troubles in the Low Countries a new chapter of international history is opened; France begins to take up a position hostile to Spain, Elizabeth is able to hold her own against the Pope's Bull, and before long a constellation is seen which had not been anticipated by the Counter-Reformation. England finds herself opposed by Philip alone, and has France on her side. A Balance of Power shapes itself, in which England and France assisting the insurgent Low Countries hold in check the ascendant power of the Catholic Ring. And for some time there is a prospect of a closer union between France and England: Elizabeth may marry a Valois prince, and from the marriage there may spring one who shall inherit the thrones of France and England.

French history reckons seven civil wars of religion between 1562 and 1580, and civil war did not cease in France till almost the close of the sixteenth century. These convulsions remind us in many details of the great French Revolution, and there is also a broad resemblance between the failure of the French to reform religion or to introduce religious toleration in the sixteenth century and their failure at the end of the eighteenth to sweep away a whole world of abuses and raise human nature at once to a higher level by a simple appeal to reason. In both cases the darker side of human nature revealed itself in

the same unexpected manner. As the Reign of Terror took by surprise people who were expecting a final regeneration of humanity, so when Chancellor L'Hôpital dreamed of religious toleration there arrived seven wars of religion and in the course of them the St Bartholomew. But when we consider the attitude which England maintained towards the religious wars of France we must particularly take note of the prevalence of the Counter-Reformation near the commencement of those religious wars, and then of its decline and of the revival of national policy which took place just before the St Bartholomew. For England the all-important question was whether she would have to fight all the Catholic powers at once or the Spanish Monarchy alone.

The principal occurrences which mark the advance of the Counter-Reformation in the time of Elizabeth were the accession of Pius IV to the Papal Chair, the reassembling and successful termination of the Council of Trent, then the meeting at Bayonne, then the commencement of the troubles in the Low Countries, and finally the promulgation of the Bull of Pope Pius against Elizabeth. These occurrences embrace the sixties of the century, since the Bull is dated February 25th, 1570; and the same period embraces the first three of the seven religious wars of France. The first of these wars, for we may overlook here the disturbance called the Tumult of Amboise, which falls in the reign of Francis II, began in April 1562 and was ended in March 1563 by the Peace of Amboise. The second war began in September 1567 and was ended by the Peace of Longjumeau in March 1568. The third war began in the same year 1568 and was brought to an end in August 1570 by the Peace of St Germain.

So far it may be said that Catholicism or the Counter-

Reformation made steady progress. 'The first war,' it has been said (Armstrong, p. 27), 'decided, once and for all, that France should not be a Protestant nation.' If there was some reaction in the second, in the third Catholicism won the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour. It was in the year after these Catholic victories that Pius V issued his Bull against Elizabeth. But now sets in that new development which by reviving secular policy definitely checked the Counter-Reformation. Charles IX of France begins to threaten the king of Spain with war; he begins to hold out a hand to the rebels in the Low Countries; he begins to listen to the counsels of Coligny. A turning-point in French policy is reached which led immediately to the St Bartholomew, but which in the end gave France that position between the two confessions which, when it had been consolidated by Henry IV, was to raise her to a European ascendancy in the seventeenth century.

The correspondence in time between the Bull of Pius V against Elizabeth and the victories of Catholicism at Jarnac and Moncontour may be held to mark the year 1569-'70 as the culminating point of the Counter-Reformation. The reaction in favour of a more secular policy sets in speedily. The occasion for it was supplied by the commencement of the troubles in the Low Countries. Charles IX could not but consider how closely France was interested in the fortunes of Flanders, which we already find spoken of as naturally a part of France, '*partie naturelle de la France*.' He could not but be jealous of the glory his brother Anjou had won at Jarnac. He fell back into the train of thought natural to a French king, and began to dream of campaigns and victories, which would most naturally be found by aiding Philip's rebels, that is, by war with Spain; in other words, by retiring

from the purely religious system of the Counter-Reformation. The prospect began to open of a war between Spain and France, and in such a war on behalf of the Flemish insurgents England would be inclined by her interests to go with France. On July 11th, 1571, Louis of Nassau said to Charles IX, 'My brother the prince of Orange has been raised up by God to deliver us from this yoke. It only remains for us to lay ourselves at your Majesty's feet and to beg you to take us under your protection. All the cities will open their gates to us; the king of Spain has but 4000 men to oppose to us. We are masters of the sea and the princes of Germany are ready to assist us; to you, Sire, will fall Flanders and Artois, possessions of France in former times; to the Empire Brabant, Guelders and Luxemburg, to the queen of England Zealand and the rest of the States, that is, if she gives us her aid.' Here is the first glimpse into a future which would not be the Counter-Reformation. The partition of the Low Countries anticipated by Louis of Nassau did not indeed take place, and yet he here roughly sketches what was really to be the course of international policy for nearly a century after this time. Not a general union of the Catholic Powers against heresy; he sees something different and more secular, a resistance offered by Catholic and Protestant Powers in concert to the burdensome ascendancy of Philip II as displayed in the Low Countries.

This is the great transition of the middle period of Elizabeth. Those insular occurrences which mark that period, the flight of Mary Stuart to England, the Rising of the North, the Bull of Pius V, the trial and execution of Norfolk, and Ridolfi's plot, are to be considered in close connexion with other continental occurrences, the first three religious wars of France, the commencement of the



troubles in the Low Countries, and the change of Charles IX's policy, when he began to prepare for war with Spain and came under the influence of Coligny. Along with these occurrences insular and continental we are to consider the marriage negotiations between Elizabeth and three princes of the House of Valois in succession, which belong to the same period.

All these things taken together form a sort of prelude to the later or Spanish period of Elizabethan policy. The troubles of the Low Countries and Charles IX's change of policy have the effect of making the Spanish Monarchy stand out isolated. Hitherto Spain has been a member along with France of a great Catholic Coalition. Elizabeth, who in her Scottish period has feared France almost more than Spain on account partly of the connexion of France with Mary Stuart, partly of the ancient alliance of France and Scotland, and who might expect France to unite with Spain in enforcing against her the Pope's Bull, now sees France separate herself from Spain. Philip begins to assume a new position. The Low Countries question exhibits him as dangerous to all states alike, and especially as dangerous to France and England, who are neighbours to the Low Countries, at the same time. We see here the beginning of one of the greatest of all international controversies, the commencement of Spanish Ascendency. There is a record of a conversation between Coligny and a certain agent of Elizabeth, Middlemore. It took place on June 10th, 1572. Coligny enlarged on the danger both to France and England which would arise from the success of Philip's policy in Flanders, his design being nothing less than to make himself supreme monarch of Christendom. His ambition must absolutely be checked, occasion must be taken from the troubles in Flanders. Middlemore

answered that he was by no means qualified to discuss such matters, and that he did not know the intentions of the queen his mistress. The Admiral pressed at least for a confidential expression of opinion; whereupon Middlemore remarked that in England the ruling opinion was a desire that France and Spain should keep what they possessed, that the aggrandisement of either might be a real danger for England, and that what was principally feared was that France should get possession of Flanders; this could not on any terms be endured by England<sup>1</sup>.

Our middle period, if it be taken to extend as far as the commencement of the proper Spanish period, will reach far into the eighties. But it falls naturally into two halves. The St Bartholomew (August 24th, 1572) falls between the third and fourth of the seven religious wars of France. It was closely connected with Charles IX's change of policy, which brought Coligny, the great victim of the St Bartholomew, into the foreground. It nearly corresponds in time with those occurrences at Brille and Flushing, which for the first time gave European importance to the movement in the Low Countries. It was in other respects so unprecedented and so pregnant with consequences that we may fairly regard it as a turning-point.

Elizabeth has now reached the fourteenth year of her reign and has begun to take up a definite position among the great European sovereigns. We have seen with what immeasurable difficulties she had had from the outset to contend, wanting a clear title, wanting a recognised successor, ruling a country which had not made up its mind about religion, yet on the whole adhering to the

<sup>1</sup> La Ferrière, *Le xvi<sup>e</sup> Siècle et les Valois*, p. 315.

Reformation in an age which seemed to belong to the Counter-Reformation, in the age of Pope Pius V and King Philip II, and when France too rejected the Reformation with a strange decisiveness.

In these circumstances Elizabeth had seemed at first to have a position almost as precarious as Lady Jane Grey, and it would seem that her safety required her first as soon as possible to marry and have heirs, secondly, as soon as the Counter-Reformation would allow her, to put her throne under the protection of some great alliance. And now that fourteen years have passed what progress has she made?

She is not married, and as she is thirty-nine years old marriage has become difficult to her. The world has grown far more hostile to her in the course of these years since the Counter-Reformation has prevailed beyond all anticipation. The Reformation has failed in France, and reviving Catholicism has had rare good luck in finding such a Pope as the Ghislieri. Jarnac, Moncontour and the Pope's Bull have fallen like successive blows upon Elizabeth.

As against the European Counter-Reformation she has accomplished nothing. But within the island she has presided over a memorable development. The British Question has ripened more than in many ages before. Scotland has followed England in adhering to the Reformation; the control of France over Scotland has ceased; in Scotland a child is growing up who may one day claim to rule over the whole of Britain. Elizabeth's rival is now acknowledged only by a party in Scotland and she is a prisoner in the hands of Elizabeth. The Catholic Reaction too has struck its blow and failed. The Rising of the North has been suppressed.

And now at last a rift becomes visible in the storm-cloud. The Counter-Reformation begins to break up. It appears that Europe will not after all adopt the fixed idea of Pius V. Secular politics revive. The question of the Low Countries breaks out. France at the moment when she declares herself Catholic declares also that she cannot see Spanish ambition swallow up Flanders. She appeals to England, and Elizabeth too begins in a secular spirit to re-enter Continental politics.

Now that it is once more possible to think of resisting Catholicism the question arises in what way shall resistance be offered. What shall be Elizabeth's attitude towards the rebellion in the Low Countries and towards the wars of religion in France? Shall she stand forward as the patroness of the Reformation and throw down the gauntlet at once to Philip and to Catharine de Medici; shall she send aid to the Prince of Orange and to Coligny? This would be a violent change when we consider that she had lately been dreading an irresistible attack, and that she had but just suppressed a Catholic Reaction in England. The Counter-Reformation was not dead, though it had received a check; Catholicism was not weak, though it had ceased to be all-powerful. The new fact was simply this, that France and Spain were no longer united. Accordingly the natural course for Elizabeth was not to defy them both at once, but simply to take advantage of their division by making advances to one or the other. Accordingly a principal feature of this middle period is that friendly relations arise between England and France.

Spain, as representing the ancient Burgundy, had hitherto been England's ally, and in the last great European war Spain and England had stood together against

France. Elizabeth's reign had opened with the cession of Calais, and in her Scottish period France had been her most dangerous enemy. The question of Calais had perplexed her first years until it was settled in 1564 by the treaty of Troyes. Mary Stuart had been connected with France by her mother and by her first husband and by the ancient French alliance with Scotland. But when the middle period begins and the incubus of the Counter-Reformation is lightened it becomes possible for Elizabeth to form an alliance with France. On April 29th of the memorable year 1572, the year of the St Bartholomew, there was concluded at Blois a treaty of confederation and alliance between Charles IX, King of France, and Elizabeth, Queen of England, in which the parties promised aid to each other against any attack made on any pretext or colour or for any cause without exception. The Queen shall be bound to furnish six thousand infantry; the most Christian king shall be bound to furnish eight ships of reasonable size. A considerable security for Elizabeth in her tedious struggle with Mary Stuart!

It is also a feature of this period that French princes are now the most prominent candidates for Elizabeth's hand. In 1563 Condé proposed that she should marry Charles IX himself, and this negotiation dragged on till the year 1565. In 1570, after the Peace of St Germain had brought to an end the third war of religion, Anjou, afterwards king Henry III, was put forward as a candidate, and this negotiation brings us to 1572, when the third Valois prince, Alençon, takes Anjou's place.

All these facts taken together point to the year 1572 as a memorable turning-point. England is not indeed yet placed in direct mortal opposition to the Spanish Monarchy. The Spanish period of Elizabethan policy does

not yet begin, but the great international question in which the struggle with Spain is but an incident is already open. In 1572 the full seriousness of it was first understood; in 1572 both England and France began to take up a decided attitude towards it. It was the beginning of a new international period, when both these Powers began to speak of holding the ambition of Spain in check. But in the same year occurred the death of Pius V and an event so unprecedented as the St Bartholomew. France plunged again into religious war.

Elizabeth having for the time surmounted her insular difficulties begins to enter into the politics of Europe. She forms relations with France which extend beyond the Low Countries Question. Altogether her position, though still difficult, is considerably improved. When compared with other countries, it begins to appear that England is passing prosperously through one of the darkest periods of European history. It has been a time of horror in France, convulsed with atrocious wars, in Scotland which has seen the tragedies of Riccio and Darnley, and in the Low Countries. Meanwhile in England, where the political difficulties had been as great as elsewhere, there had been little disturbance and little bloodshed.

The great European event of these years has been the decisive declaration of France in favour of Catholicism. But France is not yet the first of European Powers. The first Power is the Spanish Monarchy, which in this year 1572 begins to feel the difficulty of the great problem of the day, the suppression of rebellion in the Low Countries. But fourteen years earlier Philip had borne the title of king in England, and it was still apparent that the question of the Low Countries could scarcely be

separated from the question of England. Philip's mind was still possessed with the ideas of the Counter-Reformation: to him Elizabeth was as the Prince of Orange, a heretic who could have no right to sit on a throne. A duel therefore between England and the Spanish Monarchy began now to be foreseen.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE SPANISH MONARCHY.

THE Spanish Monarchy, which begins by degrees to confront Elizabethan England as a rival and then as an enemy, was the greatest of Christian Powers. In certain respects it differed widely from the other great Continental Power, France. It was not an ancient Power, but in its actual form was of yesterday. It had been formed out of the dominion of Charles V; his son and successor, Philip II, was the first sovereign who had ruled precisely the complex of territories which we call the Spanish Monarchy. He too, unlike his father, was a genuine Spaniard by temperament and habits, and in his administration he leaned much more than his father had done upon the Castillian element, so that a dominion which extended over so many different populations might henceforth justly be called from its ruling population, the Spanish Monarchy.

The first characteristic which this new Power displayed had been its absolute devotion to the Counter-Reformation. Neither in Spain nor Italy nor in the New World was there any such rebellion as was seen in Scotland and



France, and as might be feared in England. And throughout the whole period, nay, throughout the whole seventeenth century, this Catholic Monarchy, founded by Charles V, remained in all these regions exempt from the disturbance of the Reformation.

But one region of Philip's empire formed, as we know, an exception. The rebellion of the Low Countries became after a time highly important. We shall soon observe it gathering to itself all the international politics of the west of Europe, and we shall see that in the last quarter of the sixteenth, and in the first quarter of the seventeenth century it determines the foreign policy of all the western Powers. Nevertheless in the period now before us this is not yet the case. The disturbances began indeed about 1567, but the government interfered with ruthless decision, and as at that moment the Counter-Reformation was at its height, there was every reason to suppose that heresy would be stamped out in the Low Countries, as it had already been in Spain and in Italy. Not till about 1572, that is, almost at the end of the period before us, did this prospect begin to fade away: not till then did observers begin to surmise that the rebellion might succeed.

And just at the same time the Counter-Reformation in its first form began to disappear. It began to be perceived that France and Spain could not act together for the suppression of heresy all over the world. From this time forward then the cause of Catholicism falls more exclusively upon Philip. Henceforth he is more than Catholic King; he is Christian Emperor almost as his father had been before him. He is a kind of second Spanish Theodosius, whose sword is at the service of orthodoxy.

In its foreign relations this Spanish Power had another

very marked characteristic. As it possessed Sicily, Sardinia, Naples and the Duchy of Milan and had some hold on northern Africa, it might be called the mistress of the western or Christian Mediterranean. In this maritime region it was neighbour to the Porte, and we are to bear in mind that in the period now before us the House of Othman had not yet even decidedly entered upon its decline. Soliman, the victor of Mohacz, lived till 1566; that is, the series of invincible sultans, who had overthrown the Greek Empire, had not yet ceased to reign, Islam had not yet ceased to conquer, and it was reasonable to expect that Christendom would suffer new blows and perhaps have to surrender yet new kingdoms to the enemy of the Cross.

If the Turk was to make new conquests must they not be made at the expense of the Spanish Monarchy? In the sixteenth century his advance had been chiefly in the Mediterranean; he had become more and more a naval Power. In the Mediterranean he would now speedily meet the Spaniard. It would fall to the successors of Soliman, if they would follow the tradition of the House of Othman, to make their way into the western basin of the Mediterranean; they had already been withstood by Charles V on the African coast; it was to be expected that the new Spanish Monarchy would have to withstand them in Sicily.

Fortunately at this conjuncture decline began for the first time to show itself in the Ottoman State. Had this not happened, had the irresistible march of the Turkish conquests continued through another generation, the Spanish Monarchy would perhaps have suffered even more than this. A sultan of the great race succeeding Soliman would not have rested content with the con-

quest of Sicily; he would have remembered the kingdom of Granada, which had been torn from Islam in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella; it would have been his ambition to send his fleets to the Spanish coast and to revive any embers of Islam that might still be discoverable in the neighbourhood of the Alhambra or of the Mosque of Cordova.

We shall have in this view of Elizabeth's reign to think principally of the Spanish Monarchy in its relations to the Low Countries, until we come to speak of its direct attack upon England. But it had a foreign danger in the South more pressing than any which threatened it in the North. It had to look to its own southern coasts and to its Mediterranean relations as well as to its relations in the North Sea. This reflexion prepares us for the phase through which Philip's affairs are passing in our middle period. About 1570 the discord with England is not yet ripe; what we see is first a rebellion of the old Moriscoes, who set up a prince of the old Ommyad line and look to the sea, where they hope to see Turkish fleets arriving to their aid; and next we see the campaign of Lepanto, naval strategy on an unheard-of scale, Philip's rehearsal of his invincible armada.

The secession of France from the Counter-Reformation, and her secret adhesion along with England to the rebellion of the Low Countries, seem to have been immediately caused by the campaign of Lepanto. That campaign was in fact the crown of the Counter-Reformation; the reunion of Christendom could not be accounted complete without a great triumph over the Infidels. But Lepanto was almost as much a victory of the House of Austria over France as it was a victory of the Cross over the Crescent. All through Charles V's time France had sought the aid

of the Infidel against the Emperor. For against the Turk the Habsburg was so placed that he could not but take the lead of Christendom, and reap the chief glory of any Christian victories. It seemed indeed to be the principal providential calling of the House of Habsburg in the grand form which it assumed under Charles V to resist the House of Othman on something like equal terms. And now that the Reformation seemed to recede into the past and Christendom seemed to be reunited, only one wish remained, namely, that the progress of the Turk, so long favoured by Christian divisions, should now be arrested by the common action of Christendom. The Pope was no longer, after the abdication of Charles, afraid of the Emperor; he could call in the aid of a Christian sovereign who was sufficiently strong and yet would not urge those imperial claims of which the Holy See had been so jealous in the reign of Charles V. Philip was to be the champion of Christendom in this age, as a hundred years later another Habsburg, the Emperor Leopold.

The progress of the Turk had been uninterrupted since the fourteenth century, nor was there yet any clear reason to suppose that it had arrived at its limit. The centenary of the conquest of Constantinople was past, and the Turk had developed a great naval power, besides annexing Egypt and Syria. The Sultan and the Catholic King now confronted each other in the Mediterranean, the former being lord of the eastern, and the latter of the western, basin. Philip ruled Naples and Sicily and was a kind of paramount Power in the rest of Italy. A Christian Power, the Knights of St John, had been put by Charles V in possession of the great strategical position of Malta, and when Selim II succeeded Soliman in 1566, Cyprus was still a province of the Venetian Republic. There was

thus a great Christian confederacy in the Mediterranean, consisting of Philip, the Venetians and the Knights, which by a little diplomacy could be set in motion, whether for offence or for defence, against the Turk. There were the materials of a great crusade, which it was open to the Pope to call into existence and to nourish with the funds of the Ecclesiastical State and of the Catholic Church.

And thus while the great religious war of Charles IX was ripening in France, and the insurrection in the Netherlands, while Mary Stuart's short reign in Scotland was hurrying to its tragic end, and the last Catholic rebellion was approaching in England, a grander European crisis arrived in the Mediterranean. The Power of the western basin was to grapple with the Power of the eastern, as Octavius and Antony at Actium. In this case all probabilities seemed in favour of the eastern Power. For the Turk was as yet almost invincible by Christian forces. He had been steadily victorious for two centuries, and was still to all appearance at the height of his energy and valour. Moreover the Christian Power presented one most vulnerable point. Spain itself, in which Moslem Powers had reigned for centuries, had still a Moslem population, which at this very moment was provoked to violent rebellion by the bigotry of Philip's government. As then forty years earlier Soliman had struck down the King of Hungary at Mohacz, the time seemed now to have arrived when the Turkish fleet would break into the western basin of the Mediterranean, and perhaps by aiding the rebellion of the Moriscos revive the reign of Islam within Spain itself.

France could hardly be expected to wish any other consummation. The Turk had been her ally in her last war with Spain, and after her disaster at St Quentin a

diversion of Soliman's fleet, which swept the coasts of Italy and the Balearic Isles, had been of the greatest service to her. The war which still raged between Philip and the Porte was but a continuation of that from which France had retired at Cateau-Cambresis. It had been for a long time disastrous to Philip. In 1559 he had lost an armament which he had sent from Oran and Merz-el-Kebir against Algiers, the most western province in possession of Islam; he lost another still more disastrously near Tripoli in 1560. In 1563 a Spanish fleet was destroyed near Malaga by a storm in which 3000 men perished. The Turks now began to take a decided offensive, and threatened to tear from Philip the few African ports that still remained to Spain from the conquests of Cardinal Ximenes. But Oran and Merz-el-Kebir were successfully defended in 1563, and in 1564 Peñon de Velez was actually taken from the Moslem corsairs by the Spanish Admiral, Garcia de Toledo. The decisive struggle now approached. Soliman, still on the throne, began to fix his thoughts on the conquest of Sicily. In 1565 he formed the siege of Malta. But Lavalette and his knights successfully defended it until 6000 Spaniards arrived from Sicily to its relief. A heroic deed of this simple kind, ending in a victory of the Cross over the Crescent, shone with a peculiar splendour in the dark age of religious war, religious murder, religious massacre, which was then commencing in France, the Low Countries and Scotland.

In 1566 a new Sultan came to the throne, Selim II. In the great days of the House of Othman he would have held himself bound to undertake some mighty conquest, and there could be no question what task lay ready to his hand. He had to plant Islam firmly in the western basin by the conquest of Sicily, and then by holding out his

hand to the Moriscoes now rising in rebellion to restore Islam in Spain itself. He might depend for success upon his own mighty military power, but he had another resource in the divisions of Christendom. France was an old ally of the Porte, and though just at this moment she was disposed to join with Philip and with Austria in a crusade against the Infidel, yet in a short time she recollected her old national quarrel. The diplomacy of one of the great sultans, a Soliman or a Mohammed II, might have played successfully upon the jealousy of Philip that was felt by the French government and the jealousy of the Counter-Reformation that was felt by the Protestants.

But the decline of Turkey began visibly at this point. It began not in her army or her navy, but in her Padishah. Selim II was not a sultan of the great race. He must however undertake something, and something, it must be allowed, he accomplished. He attacked the Venetians in Cyprus. He took Nicosia and Famagusta, and in 1570 a Turkish Admiral, setting sail from Cyprus, took possession of the greatest position that still remained to Philip in Africa, Tunis.

Here was enough to alarm and rouse Christendom, but by no means enough to disable it. It gave an opportunity to the great Pope of the Counter-Reformation, Pius V, to appear in that character which the Papacy always affected. In May 1571 there was established a Holy League of which Philip was the chief member and undertook three-sixths of the expenses, while Venice undertook two-sixths, and the Pope himself the rest. The fleet assembled at Messina, Don John arriving on August 23rd, and the battle of Lepanto was fought on October 7th.

It is not to be supposed that the Turkish Power, then the greatest in the world, could be seriously shaken by a

single defeat even on a large scale. The victory of Lepanto was by no means an equivalent to Christendom for the loss of Cyprus, nor did it lead to further successes, for Don John could not succeed in permanently recovering Tunis. It is chiefly important in European history as having given a position of preeminence to the Spanish Monarchy. It was achieved not only by a Catholic League of which Philip was the leading member, but by a fleet commanded by a prince of the House of Habsburg, a son of the great Emperor, a half-brother of the Catholic King, if not the Augustus, yet as it were the Caesar of the day. It was a great triumph of reunited Christendom; for when had Christendom before won a great victory over the Ottoman Turk? But it was most of all a triumph for Philip, and a triumph almost as much over France as over the Porte, her old ally. And to what an eminence did it raise him, when we consider that this was the second resounding victory that had been won by his arms! The last great European battle of that age had been the battle of St Quentin, won by Philip over the French, and now the greatest naval battle of many ages had been won by the same Philip against the ally of France.

Thus then does Philip rise, early in the seventies, into a preeminence similar to that of his father. England and France, enemies and rivals only ten years before, begin to make common cause against an ascendancy so insupportable. The vulnerable heel of the giant lies very near to them; almost without being perceived, almost without being conscious, they are able to wound it. How did it happen that in the year after the battle of Lepanto, when Alva seemed to have made himself completely master of the Low Countries, when Egmont and Hoorn were dead, and Orange had gone into exile, there suddenly occurred



a decisive turn of fortune, so that the great state of Protestantism, the Dutch Republic, appeared in germ in this very year? At the height of his triumph we are told how startled was Alva by the message which told him that Brill in the island of Woorn had been occupied by the followers of Orange, and we may see that this occurrence proved the beginning of the Dutch Revolution. We are to remember that in these regions the Powers of England and France are very close at hand. Ranke writes: 'The jealousy of the two Powers against Spain was sharpened by the league which Philip II concluded with the Venetians and the Pope against the Ottoman and the great victory of Lepanto, won by the confederates. European history will always dwell on the situation and feeling of those years, since they produced an event of the greatest importance. There was need of such men and such circumstances that the Republic of the United Netherlands might come into existence. For undoubtedly but for the united opposition of the English and French to Spain the ships of the Prince of Orange would have been destroyed; and when the Gueux had succeeded in occupying Brill and Flushing they were only able to maintain themselves there because the taking of Mons, which was achieved chiefly by a force of French Huguenots under Count Louis of Nassau, forced the Spaniards to divide their forces.'

And thus we pass out of the age of the Counter-Reformation proper, when all Catholic Powers are united under the guidance of the Pope to put down heresy, into an age of the ascendancy of Philip, when heretical England and Catholic France begin to act in concert for the purpose of fomenting and maintaining the insurrection of the Low Countries.

One of the periods of European resistance to ascend-

ency begins. Philip II is henceforth to Europe what Louis XIV was a hundred years later and revolutionary and Napoleonic France at the end of the eighteenth century. .

But for a long time the resistance of England and France is more or less underhand. It was an age of great disorder in international affairs. As France at home was divided into hostile camps, so on her Belgian frontier she could act at pleasure, either against Philip through the Huguenots or officially on his side. England in like manner by keeping intentionally a lax police on her seas was able without avowed war to prey upon Spanish trade year after year, and year after year to lend help to the Flemish and Dutch insurgents. This disguised condition of things lasted till about 1584, when it suddenly passed away both for England and France. Then began the intense crisis of the long struggle, under the shocks of which both English and French policy assumed their permanent shape.

The kind of provisional period that preceded this, the period in which we see some anticipation of the seventeenth century, might be labelled with the name Alençon. France, England and Holland are already in the general relation they are to maintain later, but the relation is as yet indistinct and insecure. It does not yet appear that the Dutch are to form an independent state, and that neither France nor England is to acquire what Spain is to lose. France too is in a half-liquid condition. The Valois dynasty is sinking, and with it apparently the unity of the state. There is as yet no victorious and august House of Bourbon. In England the succession remains as unsettled as ever. The Duke of Alençon represents this unsatisfactory interval. For he represents on one side the feebleness into

which the Valois Monarchy had fallen, being a kind of rival or anti-king to his brother Henri III; on another side he aspires to rule the Netherlands as Duke of Brabant and Count of Flanders, and also to marry Queen Elizabeth. His sudden death without an heir in 1584 introduces in a moment the House of Bourbon to Europe. Immediately afterwards begins the intense crisis.

In this stormy period famous men have a brief and meteoric career. Only Philip and Elizabeth hold a steadfast course, presiding over the vast developement and accompanying the sixteenth century to its close. But for the most part the great personages of the sixties disappear early in the seventies, and a new group takes their place, which in like manner disappears before the crisis of the eighties arrives. To the sixties belong those heroes of tragedy, Egmont, Don Carlos, Mary of Scotland, and others whose fate was not less tragic, Coligny, Murray. But all these with John Knox are passed away when the transition we now take note of occurs. They are succeeded by another group not less short-lived. The great men of the seventies are Don John of Austria, William of Orange, and that French Duke who may be taken to represent the period, Alençon.

Of the Spanish Monarchy the representative man is for a certain time Don John. He stands by the side of Philip like the true successor of Charles V. The legitimate son may resemble his father in painstaking diligence, as in rigid orthodoxy. And he has had, and is still to have, not less good fortune. But the illegitimate son alone has inherited the comprehensive views and the military talent of Charles V, so that we may surmise that in the seventies the unwieldy dominion might, under his sole direction, have been raised to a prosperity of which the battle of

Lepanto only furnished a delusive prospect. That victory had however but little fruit. About the year 1575 Spain appeared to be on the whole worsted in the grand maritime struggle with the Porte, and the Holy League had been long since dissolved. For Philip had no large views corresponding to the greatness of his position. But such large views, at least where the subject was military, Don John appears to have had. In his short life he dealt in turn with all the great military questions of the Spanish Monarchy, first with the threatening rebellion of the Moriscos. From this he passed to the grand Turkish or Mediterranean question. This he had handled not only brilliantly but comprehensively, so that we can imagine him, had he enjoyed fuller freedom of action, commencing a work, which actually was deferred almost to the advent of Eugene, and reducing the Porte to the defensive.

But thirdly he dealt also with the great question of the Low Countries. Four years after those first successes of the Prince of Orange at Brill and Flushing, on March 5th, 1576, Requesens, Governor of the Netherlands, died suddenly, leaving the country in the utmost confusion from the advance of the insurrection. In the autumn of 1576 Don John set out from Spain to take his place. At every stage of Don John's career we may observe that he regards himself by no means as a mere officer in the service of Philip II, but as a born prince, who aspires to an independent crown. At one time he had begged his brother to make him king of Tunis. After the death of Don Carlos we find Don John spoken of as the natural successor of Philip; at other times he is suspected of planning a violent usurpation of his brother's place. And so when he comes to the Low Countries he brings the ideas not of a provincial governor but of a king and

conqueror. He grasps at once the connexion, so fundamental in Spanish policy, between the question of the Low Countries and the questions of England and Scotland. He writes to Philip on May 27th, 1576 :

‘The true remedy for the evil condition of the Netherlands in the judgment of all men is that England should be in the power of a person devoted and well-affectioned to your Majesty’s service; and it is the general opinion that the ruin of these countries and the impossibility of preserving them to your Majesty’s crown, will result from the contrary position of English affairs. At Rome and elsewhere the rumour prevails that in this belief your Majesty and His Holiness have thought of me as the best instrument you could choose for the execution of your designs, offended as you both are by the evil proceedings of the Queen of England, and by the wrongs which she has done to the Queen of Scotland, especially in sustaining against her will heresy in that kingdom.’

This passage will help us to pass from those more general relations of the Spanish Monarchy which have been considered in this chapter to its particular relations to England and Elizabeth. We have to consider out of what root the great mortal struggle of the two nations sprang. In the first and middle period of Elizabeth there were two principal points of contact between England and Spain. In the first place England had passed over to heresy, and this necessarily seemed intolerable to a Philip II at the crisis of the Counter-Reformation and in the Papacy of Pius V. The question at that moment was of restoring absolutely the unity of religion. France already was visibly lost to heresy; the infidel received a serious blow at Lepanto; for a year or two the prospect of suppressing the rebellion of the Low Countries was good; in

these circumstances what remained but to strike a decisive blow in England where Philip himself had recently been king?

Then set in the transition by which the Counter-Reformation was paralysed. France and England alike began to grow jealous of the ascendancy of Philip; division appeared in the Catholic camp; the rebels of the Low Countries began to receive help underhand from France and England alike. If the Muse is asked to say what first caused the discord which brought the Spanish Armada to our shores, she must answer that it was the conviction which the Spaniards formed that they could not deal with the rebellion in the Low Countries without dealing at the same time with the English question.

Nor had Spain yet learned to think of Elizabeth's government as strong, nor of the Elizabethan settlement in England as stable. The rights of Mary of Scotland, the total uncertainty of the succession and the unsettled condition of the religious question in England made it seem for the time as easy as it seemed desirable for the Spanish Monarchy to bring about a new revolution and to overthrow the government of Elizabeth. And so she passed through the crisis of her middle period, the Rising of the North, the Pope's Bull, the Ridolfi plot and the rebellion of Norfolk. During this crisis there was a sort of anticipation of the Armada, for the question of an invasion was much considered in the Spanish Councils. In 1571 Alva had formed a very decided opinion, which we find expressed in his letter from Brussels, May 7th<sup>1</sup>. It is that the English enterprise would be very hazardous except in one of three contingencies. These are that the

<sup>1</sup> Given in Mignet, *Histoire de Marie Stuart*, App. K.

queen should die either by a natural death or in some other manner, or that she should fall into the hands of the rebels. In any one of these cases he insists that the enterprise presents no difficulty, so that if any of them should be realised, he holds that he ought to attempt it at once without waiting for any further instructions from His Majesty.

So critical were the relations of Elizabeth with Spain seventeen years before the Armada and while Pius V was still in the Papal chair. Philip II was not disposed by character to strong and decisive measures, though he showed himself capable of them in one part of his reign by the Armada and in another by the mission of Alva to the Low Countries. But when he gave Elizabeth a respite of seventeen years, which she knew how to employ in consolidating her government, he seems indeed to have neglected an opportunity which never returned.

Imperceptibly a great international change has been advancing between the accession of Elizabeth and that transitional year of her middle period, 1572. The ancient alliance of England and Burgundy has been breaking up and signs are already observable that it may soon be replaced by a mortal enmity. Philip had been King of England; Philip and Mary had not only shared the English throne, they had also fought in alliance against France. To Elizabeth when she came to the throne the friendship of Philip had seemed the most indispensable support. As late as April 1566 Cecil writes in a paper entitled 'Reasons to move the Queen to accept the Archduke Charles': 'By marriage with him the Queen shall have the friendship of King Philip, which is necessary considering the likelihood of falling out with France.' He adds: 'No Prince of England ever remained without good

amity with the House of Burgundy, and no Prince had ever less alliance than the Queen of England hath, nor any Prince ever had more cause to have friendship and power to assist her estate.'

It is one of the greatest international events that, so soon after these words were written, the Spanish Monarchy and England began to be regarded as belonging to opposite systems in Europe. First there grew up a general opposition from the fact that England attached herself decidedly to the Reformation at the very moment when the Counter-Reformation reached its height in Europe and Philip assumed the lead of it. Then the rebellion of the Low Countries furnished a more particular cause of quarrel, giving Elizabeth a strong motive for aiding Philip's rebels, and at the same time almost forcing Philip to interfere in those controversies about Elizabeth's title and her succession, which led to the Rising of the North and the treason of Norfolk.

Now began the concert of English and French policy with respect to the Low Countries, the treaty between England and France and that recommencement of the rebellion of the Low Countries in the year 1572 which may be considered to mark the first step towards the foundation of the Dutch republic. These occurrences made the growing hostility of England and the Spanish Monarchy considerably more marked. Hitherto France had continued to be, as in old times, England's rival, and England's next war seemed more likely to be waged with France, or with France and Spain together, than with the Spanish Monarchy alone. France too through her connexion with Scotland and with Mary Stuart could always find a ground of war against Elizabeth. It was not yet therefore clearly discernible that an age was opening in



which the old rivalry of England and France should be suspended, and should make way for a rivalry destined to have the most far-reaching consequences between England and the Spanish Monarchy. And yet it was early perceived by some persons. In 1570 there was published by a certain Dr Wylson a translation of some of the orations of Demosthenes, the moral of which is that the English of Elizabeth's time resemble the Athenians whom Demosthenes addressed in this that they have to maintain an arduous conflict against a certain King Philip. 'Therefore,' says Wylson, 'he that desireth to serve his country abroad let him read Demosthenes day and night, for never did glass so clearly represent a man's face as Demosthenes doth show the world to us.'

When we have noted how and when a national rivalry sprang up between England and the Spanish Monarchy we may return to Don John, who in the last phase of his career, between 1576 and 1578, is the statesman who represents this rivalry. France has ceased to be subservient to Spain and has made a treaty with England, yet if a Spanish attack upon England should be contrived from the Low Countries, Don John may hope for much assistance even from France. His chief ally is to be Mary Stuart, who will bring with her not only her party in Scotland and England, but also a great and rising party from France. New developements are already appearing there, and the germ of the League is already visible. The Guise family leads this party, and to the Guise family Mary of Scotland belongs.

We may see then what the attack on England was which Don John meditated. The party, composed of Philip, Mary and Guise with their respective adherents, has now a leader, the hero of Christendom, the victor of

Lepanto, the great Bastard of Austria, Don John. Such royal Bastards in those ages seemed the natural leaders of every bold adventure in which a kingdom changed hands; but they expected a great reward. Don John set out for the Low Countries resolved to strike for Mary of Scotland herself, if not also for the throne of Britain and the Low Countries.

Little indeed came of this enterprise, nor need we linger on it long. Don John found in the Low Countries mainly disappointment, which wore him out in two years, so that he died on October 1st, 1578. But in the correspondence of Mary Stuart herself we find a curious passage in which she seems to refer to Don John. It occurs in a form of testament which she drew up in February 1577 and runs thus: 'That I may not contravene the glory, honour, and safety of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church in which I would live and die—if the prince of Scotland, my son, can be brought back in spite of the evil training in the heresy of Calvin which he has received to my great regret among my rebels, I leave him sole and only heir of my kingdom of Scotland and of the just right which I assert to the crown of England and the countries depending on it; but if not, and my said son continues to live in the said heresy, I cede and transfer and make donation of all my rights in England and elsewhere...to the Catholic King, *or others of his family at his pleasure*, with the advice and consent of his Holiness, both because I see him at the present day the only sure support of the Catholic religion, and from gratitude for the undeserved favours which I and mine, at my recommendation, have received from him in my greatest necessity, and also in consideration of the right which he may himself assert to the said kingdoms and countries. I

entreat that in return he will form alliance with the House of Lorraine and, if he can, with that of Guise, in memory of the race of which I descend on the mother's side.'

Here is expressed the principle of the Counter-Reformation, that heresy disqualifies for succession to a throne. Here at the same time is sketched the combination which was to dominate western Europe in the period of the League. But at the same time the two British kingdoms are handed over, with the consent of Philip, apparently to Don John.

Had Don John arrived in the Low Countries about seven years earlier, at that crisis when the Counter-Reformation seemed to want nothing but a prompt and daring leader, such a plan might have succeeded. But the face of affairs had since been entirely transformed by Alva. New events were deciding the course of the rebellion when Don John arrived at Luxemburg near the close of 1576, for he arrived on the day before the Fury of Antwerp and four days before the promulgation of the Pacification of Ghent. A crisis had been produced not altogether favourable to a romantic crusade against England, yet naturally suggesting enterprises of the kind. The Fury of Antwerp, following other violences scarcely less enormous, possessed all minds in the Low Countries with the single thought of expelling from the territory the foreign army. In the Union of Brussels signed early in January 1577 this point was gained. The foreign army under Don John was to leave the Low Countries. But this measure had two faces. For whither was the army to go? What was possible and what was in the mind of Don John appeared from his proposal to withdraw the army not by land but by sea. It might cross the Northern Sea to the land where a heretic queen reigned, and held imprisoned a

Catholic princess who would give to any husband she might choose, rights over both insular kingdoms. So near to the domain of practical politics did the romantic scheme arrive; so near but no nearer. It was debated for a while whether the Spanish army should retire by sea or by land, but the debate was over by the end of February, and by the end of April 1577 the troops had actually withdrawn by land, and for the time at least the danger of Don John appearing in England at the head of a Spanish army and claiming the throne of Elizabeth had vanished. It did not reappear. Don John's scheme seems to have received some support at Rome in the shape of promises, perhaps even payments, of money. It bore indeed the stamp of the Counter-Reformation, which had its centre at Rome, and which had entered upon a somewhat new phase when Pius V was succeeded by Gregory XIII. Gregory XIII fixes his mind particularly upon the reconquest of England. But how would Philip himself regard Don John's enterprise? Philip understood clearly the nature of Don John's ideas, and could discern in him not a loyal subject but an adventurer of vast and dangerous ambition, who was running a course not unlike that of Don Carlos. Accordingly he does not support the English scheme of Don John unless, it may be, by one or two vague and casual expressions. It becomes identified in Philip's mind with high treason and passes out of the domain of politics into that of court-mystery and tragedy, where we cannot follow it. We cannot tell here the story of the death of Escovedo.

We are concerned simply with the Spanish Monarchy and its attitude towards Elizabeth in the earlier part of her reign. Don John represents one phase which might have proved memorable. But it was very transient. Don

John did not strike in the Northern Seas any such blow as he had struck in the Mediterranean. He won indeed in Brabant the battle of Gemblours, in which the superiority of the Spanish soldiery was wonderfully displayed. Then he fell ill and died, distrusted by his brother and leaving his vast designs unaccomplished.

When Don John died in 1578, the last Valois, Henry III, was reigning in France. Since the St Bartholomew religious war had begun again in that country, but a considerable intermission set in with the Treaty of Bergerac in 1577. The Scottish question had also developed considerably. Europe was approaching a period when it would unite against Philip, as later against Louis XIV or Revolutionary France. But this simpler international arrangement was not arrived at immediately, not before 1585. In the meanwhile a great event took place in Spain, an event so great as to alter materially the character of that Spanish Monarchy which was so rapidly assuming the character of an ascendant Power. Spain had in those years enough to do in the Low Countries, where Alexander of Parma began his great career almost before Don John so prematurely ended his. She was spared however those terrible and intricate religious conflicts which tormented France. Nevertheless at this time she added to her Low Countries Question a Portuguese Question, which was not less momentous though it occupied her a shorter time.

In order to arrive at the crisis of 1585 it will be necessary to glance at intricate changes in several countries. It may however be most conducive to clearness to begin by carrying the view that has been attempted in this chapter of the Spanish Monarchy past the great event, which may be called transformation, that befel it in 1580. That event, the annexation of Portugal, the substitution

for Spain of a great united Iberia, though one of the greatest events in Spanish history, was at the same time an event of simple nature, and may be described, so far as it affected England, briefly, for which reason we may give it precedence over some other events which we must also consider and which precede it chronologically.

The dream of a contest on equal terms between France and Spain for the Low Countries was soon to pass away. Already the renown of Spain stood far higher than that of France or any other Power. To the historical student now Philip II is an embodiment of ignorant statesmanship, narrowness and dulness of mind, perverted morality, every quality which brings a state to ruin, and we trace to him the ruin of Spain. But we are wise after the event. In the period before us Philip's realm was the only state in the world which could be called glorious. Germany was passing through a period of strange obscurity; Elizabeth had won no battles, the French king only the dismal victories of Jarnac and Moncontour. Only Spain had earned such laurels as those of St Quentin and Lepanto, and she had now in her service the great military genius of the sixteenth century, Alexander of Parma.

And now Spain was suddenly to rise higher than ever, and at the same time France was to sink as suddenly lower.

These changes took place between 1580 and 1584, so that in 1585 Europe assumed a wholly new aspect. No transition so abrupt occurs at any other point in the second half of the sixteenth century.

The occurrences which produced this great alteration in the relative position of France and Spain are

- (1) the annexation of Portugal by Philip II.
- (2) the recommencement of religious war in France,

when by the death of Alençon the Huguenot Henri of Navarre became presumptive heir to the throne of France.

Hitherto we have seen Philip availing himself principally of his character as the champion of Catholicism and of the Counter-reformation. But we are to remember also that he is the head of the House of Habsburg, the heir of that Charles V, who had founded an unlimited dominion upon the basis of royal marriage. His house has never abandoned this method, and now in 1580 a demise occurs which is to Philip II something like what the death of Ferdinand of Aragon had been to Charles V. Don Sebastian of Portugal falls 'with all his peerage' in battle against the Moors at Alcazarkebir. He leaves no heir, and the Cardinal Henry, his successor at sixty-seven years of age, dies in 1580. A very brief war of succession was decided in favour of Philip II by a land-battle won by Alva and a naval battle won by Santa Cruz. In 1581 Philip II was solemnly proclaimed king of Portugal at Lisbon, while his rival, the national representative, Don Antonio, Prior of Crato, was driven into exile and a price set upon his head.

It is hardly usual to think of the annexation of the Portuguese Monarchy by Philip II of Spain which took place in 1580 as an event in English history. Nevertheless if we would trace the rise of the Britannic Great Power among the Great Powers of Modern Europe we shall find that among the greatest steps in that developement, in which the Spanish Monarchy was throughout the antagonist, were two Portuguese events counterbalancing each other, that of 1580, by which Portugal was merged in Spain, and that which began in 1640, the War of Acclamation, by which Portugal recovered her independence under the House of Bragança. In 1580 when

the rivalry of England and the Spanish Monarchy was so rapidly growing up, a new complexion, highly important for our history, was suddenly given to it by the Portuguese occurrence. Hitherto it has come under the general category of the Counter-Reformation. Elizabeth has been the heretic queen, Philip the champion of reviving Catholicism. But a new aspect of the Spanish Monarchy is brought into prominence when the Portuguese is merged in it. Those Monarchies were twin not merely in geographical position but more strikingly still in their foreign and international relations. They had precisely the same relation to the maritime and extra-European world. The two peninsular states had hitherto divided between them the dominion of the sea as they had divided the discovery of the New World. The fusion of them therefore produced a single state of unlimited maritime dominion. This at the moment when its rivalry with England was springing up. The rivalry then was henceforth between the two united peninsular states and the great insular state of Europe. It became therefore no mere rivalry of religions, but a rivalry of maritime dominion. The maritime and oceanic aspect of the English state is pushed more into the foreground.

The greatness of the catastrophe by which Portugal was annexed to Spain seems at first difficult to reconcile with the facility and rapidity with which it was accomplished. The Portuguese Monarchy was not much less than five centuries old. For so long a time Portuguese monarchs distinct and independent had reigned. The sixteenth century had seen the brilliant reign of Manoel the Fortunate, then that of John III, then that of Sebastian. Now suddenly there begins in Portuguese history the age of the Philips, in which for sixty years the



King of Portugal is also King of Spain, Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV in succession. The Portuguese territory in Europe had not indeed been large, but the distinction of the Monarchy had been altogether out of proportion to it and indeed quite unique. In the great achievement of laying open the extra-European world no state had done nearly so much, first in circumnavigating Africa, then in laying open the Indian Ocean and India itself and the Spice Islands. It is to be added that the very greatest of all the achievements of that age of exploration, not excluding that of Columbus, had been achieved not indeed in the service of Portugal but by a man known now as Ferdinand Magellan, and known at the time when he achieved it as Fernando Magelhaens, but a Portuguese by birth and education, and named originally Fernao Magalhaes. It may seem strange that a monarchy so ancient and so illustrious should be so easily subverted and should disappear after so little resistance in the state of Philip II, at a time too when Philip was so hard pressed in the Low Countries and was making enemies of France and England.

This great European change was effected at very little expense of war. If it was a conquest, we are to remember that it was a conquest of the Habsburg type. It turned upon a marriage. The Portuguese Monarchy was merged in the Spanish because Philip II's mother had been Isabella, daughter of Manoel the Fortunate, that king of Portugal who represents the highest greatness of the old house of Avis, and because in 1578 king Sebastian died childless. Thus there befel Portugal what might at any time have befallen England had Elizabeth died leaving the succession unregulated. The Portuguese succession became in a moment what the Spanish succession became

at the end of the seventeenth century, and might have shaken a whole generation with war had France and England been prepared to check Philip by a warlike Coalition. But the Habsburg marriage was there, and it was supported, if not by any overwhelming military or naval power, yet by a greater power in the hand of Philip than any which could be brought against him.

Thus the cause of the calamity of Portugal was twofold. There was first the fall of king Sebastian with all his peerage at Alcazar in 1578, by which Portugal was left without army, without nobility, and without king, or child of the king. This Flodden Field of Portugal might by itself have thrown the country open to Philip's occupation. But for the moment Portugal found a king in the Cardinal Infant Henrique, the uncle of Sebastian, who averted the full calamity of an open succession till he died in 1580. This second event, as I have said, is to Portugal what the death of queen Elizabeth about the same time might have been to England. The circumstances indeed were in some respects strikingly parallel. Elizabeth was a virgin queen, who however was courted up to the threshold of old age. Henrique had cherished through life a clerical aversion to marriage, but in his old age after the death of Sebastian, when his people began to see that their very independence required that he should leave heirs, we find the authorities of Lisbon requiring that he, 67 years old, should marry. His Alençon is at one time the widow of Charles IX, but he himself inclines rather to Maria, eldest daughter of the Duke of Bragança, a girl of 14 years. Negotiations with the Papal Court for a dispensation were actually opened. And as in England, so in Portugal it was held, and truly held, that the whole interest of the nation depended

absolutely upon this personal question, and because two years later no heir to the Portuguese House was forthcoming Portugal fell at once from her place among European states.

On the death of Henrique in January 1580 there appeared two Portuguese pretenders to the crown, descended, like Philip II himself, from Manoel the Fortunate. One was the Duchess of Bragança, of a family whose day was to come when the Spanish tyranny was overpast. The other was Antonio, Prior of Crato, who however was stained by illegitimate birth. There were also foreign pretenders, among whom Catherine de Medici put herself forward. Her claims were so slight that her object in urging them appeared plainly to be to put a hindrance in the way of those of Philip. A rivalry had for some time been growing up between France and Spain. It is one of the most important incidents of the great event which now occurred to ripen this rivalry into actual war. Philip had no great difficulty in annexing Portugal, but when the war reached the Azores the Prior of Crato was aided by 7000 French troops and a French fleet of 70 sail, and open war began between the Spanish Habsburg and the Valois.

The annexation of Portugal is not only important in English history, it is also one of the greatest European events of that age, and the greatness of it is seldom sufficiently perceived. If the union of England and Scotland to form Great Britain is one of the leading events of our own history, is it not evident that Philip must have risen at once to a higher level of power when from being king of Spain he became king of a united Iberia? For Portugal was not a mere isolated acquisition, as Sicily or the duchy of Milan might have been; it was continuous with Spain,

and by being united with Spain created a kingdom with a peninsular frontier. There could be no greater strategical and commercial acquisition than Lisbon with the mouth of the Tagus and a long Atlantic sea-board; and the acquisition must be reckoned twice over, since it was not only acquired by Philip but taken away from a possible enemy of Philip. The entrance by which in the War of the Spanish Succession and again in the Peninsular War the English made their way to Madrid was closed to England or any other naval Power so long as Portugal and Spain were under the same Government. So long Spain was secure against invasion except through the Pyrenees.

And yet this is but the smaller half of the event. What was conquered was not merely a small European kingdom, however favourably situated. What was conquered was the greatest maritime and colonising Power in the world except Spain, the only great maritime and colonising Power beside Spain. In 1580 no European Powers except Spain and Portugal had colonies of the slightest importance. What was conquered was not only Portugal but Brazil, the Azores, Guinea, Angola and Benguela, the Cape, Zanzibar, Quiloa, Mozambique, Socotora, Ormuz, Cambai, Ceylon, Malacca, Macao. And this again was doubly conquered. From the whole Oceanic world every second Power was henceforth excluded, and henceforth the whole New World belonged exclusively to Spain. So mighty a revolution has never since taken place in a moment in the extra-European region with which Europeans are concerned.

If Spain had been by much the greatest European Power before 1580, how far must it have surpassed all others after that year! And shortly afterwards France, the only possible rival of Spain, saw its old wound reopen,

as grisly, as incurable, as ever. The religious wars of France began again. The circumstances of this event will engage our attention later. It was caused immediately by the death of Alençon-Anjou in 1584.

And to Elizabeth, brooding on all these things, there came a month later the tidings that William of Orange, who divided with herself the active leadership of the Reformation in the world, upon whose Atlantean shoulders the whole insurrection of the Low Countries rested, had been murdered by one of those fanatics, who as she well knew had been in pursuit of her own life for a dozen years past.

It was evident that events were hurrying to a crisis, that the respite which had been first granted to her and to her England about 1562, and had been prolonged again about 1570, was now running out. The daughter of Anne Boleyn, who had been called in early womanhood to the most dangerous position in the world, and had maintained herself there in a kind of miraculous security for more than twenty years, would soon find the danger more pressing than ever and refusing to be held aloof by delays and temporising measures. But it was a remarkable feature of the great crisis which was brought on by the two deaths just mentioned that it affected France as much as England, and in a similar way. The Spanish Monarchy now raised by the annexation of Portugal to the pinnacle of power placed itself in opposition to France as well as to England. We have seen two phases of the international relations of Spain, the Counter-Reformation phase, when she threatened in union with France to put down heresy all over the world, and the phase when France threatened war against Spain in the cause of the Low Countries. A third phase is now commencing, when

Spain, more powerful now than ever, began to stand out as an ascendant Power. A great war of England and the Spanish Monarchy is at hand, but at the same time France and the Spanish Monarchy are entangled in war. Already in 1581 we see a naval battle between France and Spain off the Azores. And the death of Anjou in 1584 opens at once a new age for France, an age not less troubled than that age of religious wars from which she had just emerged.

Both in England and France it was the age of the religious question, yet great as that question was it was in neither country the greatest. In England, as we have seen, the really formidable problem was the succession, the danger of the failure of the House of Tudor, and the uncertainty what House would take its place. So long as Mary Stuart lived and Elizabeth remained unmarried the country could have no assured prospect. And now in France, where all struggles were more intense, the religious question in like manner gave place to the question of succession. The death of Anjou warned the country that the House of Valois was about to be extinguished. It was an event similar to that which had happened in Portugal in 1578 and had led to a national catastrophe. Spain had reaped the benefit of that; Spain seemed also about to interfere in England, and Spain too might be expected to undertake the solution of the French succession problem. From the beginning of the century the Habsburgs had been on the watch for such crises; they had provided claimants for thrones left without heirs and bridegrooms for virgin queens. And now the Counter-Reformation had complicated the succession-problem by laying it down that no heretic could sit on a throne. And the legitimate heir to the House of Valois now failing was

a heretic, as the Queen of England was a heretic. Thus the events of 1584 seemed to bring to a final crisis the whole struggle of the age, and threatened to consummate the whole century of the Reformation by handing over France and England to the great representative of the Counter-Reformation, who would exclude Henry of Navarre in France and settle the succession of Elizabeth in a manner agreeable to the Papacy.

If we look at the period of war now opening from the English or insular point of view, we see the expedition of the Armada and a succession of naval operations filling all that remains of the reign of Elizabeth. But if we take the international point of view we see the same Spanish Monarchy, now near the height of its power, intervening with equal energy in French as in English affairs. If the Spanish war with England lasts till 1604 the Spanish war with France lasts till the Treaty of Vervins concluded in 1598. It was in this double struggle that the Spanish Monarchy and at the same time the Counter-Reformation came nearest to complete success. The war in France is not strictly one of the religious wars, but more properly the war of the establishment of the House of Bourbon, and by it was asserted for France at least the principle that a heretic cannot reign. The religious wars had already given France definitively to Catholicism; this war gave to it the rising House of Bourbon, which was to fill two centuries with its glory.

The French war was in itself as intense and as striking as the English. It included a startling rehearsal of the great French Revolution. The House of Valois disappeared amid scenes of terror and in an upheaval of subversive theories just such as attended the downfall of its successor the House of Bourbon. All this corresponded

closely in time to the great events of the English war. The day of Barricades immediately preceded the sailing of the Armada, and the murder of the Guises followed hard upon its failure. The murder of the last Valois king took place in the following year. Meanwhile in the Low Countries the rebellion has lost Orange, and Spain has gained Alexander of Parma. Thus over the whole of western Europe at once Spain appears on the eve of acquiring a universal dominion. She possesses Portugal, she is recovering the Low Countries; in France the House of Valois is disappearing and a revolutionary fanaticism has sprung up which may well throw the country into the hands of Philip. In England the temporising policy of Elizabeth, which has hitherto supported her throne in defiance of the Counter-Reformation, seems exhausted. The Spanish history of the Invincible Armada takes as its starting-point a letter<sup>1</sup> written to Philip II on August 9th, 1583, from the island Terceira in the Azores, the scene of the great Spanish victory in the war of Portugal. It was written by the victor himself, Santa Cruz, and it solemnly exhorted Philip to follow up his victory over Portugal by a direct attack upon England and assumption of the Monarchy of England. It was written before the two great deaths occurred, and plainly announced the approach of the great crisis of the sixteenth century.

<sup>1</sup> Duro, *La Armada Invincible*, i. p. 241.



## CHAPTER VI.

### FROM PEACE TO WAR.

THE transition of 1585 brings the Counter-Reformation once more into the foreground, but in a limited form. Under the leadership of Spain the question is now to be tried, for England and France at once, whether a heretic may wear a crown. The period between 1572 and 1584 was embraced by the Papacy of Gregory XIII, who falls between the great Popes Pius V and Sixtus V. Gregory devoted himself especially to the English Question, which his predecessor's Bull had thrown open, but he laboured under the disadvantage that in his time the great Powers, as we have seen, were not prepared for war against Elizabeth. Accordingly he is driven back upon his own resources and scarcely any Pope has assumed more purely the attitude of a belligerent against England than Pope Gregory XIII. He does not confine himself to spiritual weapons, nor does he content himself with invoking the aid of temporal sovereigns, but actually levies war with his own resources and in his own name against the heretic queen. The spiritual weapons are not indeed neglected. A seminary is established at Rome, from which the thirteenth Gregory hopes to send out missionaries who may restore the ruined work of the first Gregory. Parsons and Campion arrive in 1580; the Counter-Reformation begins to blow up

a rebellion in England, as it is doing at the same time in France, against the monarchy of a heretic. At the very same time we hear of a league between Philip, the Pope, and the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, being concluded at Rome against the Queen of England. It is believed that the Grand-Duke hopes to further designs upon Urbino by thus ingratiating himself with Philip and the Pope, and here are some of the articles of the League from a copy which the English Ambassador gave to the Venetian Ambassador in December 1580: (1) that his Holiness will furnish ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry, the Catholic King fifteen thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, and the Grand-duke eight thousand infantry and one hundred cavalry; and to these forces are to be added the Germans who have gone to Spain and who are to be paid *pro rata* by the above-named princes. (2) Should it please our Lord God to give good speed and success to the expedition, the populations are in the first place and above all things to be admonished, on the part of his Holiness, to return to their obedience and devotion to the Roman Catholic Church in the same manner as their predecessors have done. (3) That his Holiness, as sovereign lord of the Island, will grant power to the Catholic nobles of the kingdom to elect a Catholic Lord of the Island, who under the authority of the Apostolic See will be declared King, and who will render obedience and fealty to the Apostolic See as the other Catholic Kings have done before the time of the last Henry. (4) That Queen Elizabeth be declared a usurper, and incapable to reign, because she was born of an illegitimate marriage, and because she is a heretic.... (7) That the Queen of Scotland is to be set at liberty and to be aided to return to her kingdom should she desire to

do so. (8) That his Holiness will use his best influence with the King of France, in order that neither his Majesty nor Monsieur his brother shall give assistance either to the Queen or to the Flemings against Spain<sup>1</sup>.

We may see from this last article with what main difficulty the Pope and the Counter-reformation had now to contend. France in its double aspect, the France of Henry III and at the same time the France of Alençon, stood in the path of the Counter-reformation.

Throughout this period, as almost from the beginning of her reign, Elizabeth has owed her security to the fact that her turn to be swallowed up cannot come till the rebels of the Low Countries and the French Huguenots have been devoured and digested by the Cyclops, Counter-reformation. She does not depend much upon her own efforts, but upon the efforts of others. She does not come forward herself to help Orange with the whole force of her kingdom, but she is content to see this done by Anjou with the countenance of the King of France.

We picture Elizabeth as a Britomart or Amazon Queen surrounded by heroes and men of war, and then we wonder at the selfishness with which she watched the sufferings and the well-nigh desperate struggles of those Netherlanders whose cause was after all her own. It is true that from the outset they had received much English help. In their sieges and battles Englishmen had taken part sometimes by the hundred. English sea-rovers had plundered the Spanish marine. Elizabeth herself had seized Spanish ships in the Channel and had at times even rendered open help to the insurgents. Such in that age was the confusion of international relations, that not only France and England but even the Austrian House of

<sup>1</sup> Calendar of State-Papers (Venetian), ed. Cavendish-Bentinck, No. 826.

Habsburg interferes between Philip and his rebels in a manner most damaging and practically hostile to Philip. But we expect to find Elizabeth assuming a much franker and more generous tone and openly telling Philip that if he would maintain his oppressive rule in the Low Countries he would have to reckon with the strongest fleets and armies that England could bring against him.

Here then is the place to remark—for we are approaching the grand turning-point of Elizabeth's reign—that it is only in her later years and under the pressure of necessity that she appears in any degree as an Amazon or thunderbolt of war. She had indeed always shown a high courage. That fear of assassination which, as Macaulay says, 'shook the iron nerves of Cromwell' did not shake her nerves, though in her time assassination seemed the inevitable end of all leaders, though Guise and Murray and Coligny and Orange had already fallen, though other Guises and Henry III and Henry IV were still to fall by this doom. But she had never shown the slightest inclination for war. Nay it may be said that never sovereign was more recklessly devoted to peace than Elizabeth. If not 'peace at any price' yet, 'peace at any price short of throne and life' was her maxim. She had indeed sent war-ships to the Forth in 1561, but that was a case where intervention might be called absolutely necessary. And since 1561 she remained at peace till 1585, though war raged in France, in the Netherlands, and in the Mediterranean. Nor did she even seem to look forward to war. She made no preparations on a great scale, she allowed the country to remain almost unarmed, although nothing might seem more certain than that the exemption of England from the terrible struggle of the age was only temporary, and that the final and most cherished object of

the Counter-reformation was the destruction of Elizabeth of England.

When we have remarked this, her behaviour towards the Netherlanders assumes a different appearance. Any other monarch in her position would have intervened eagerly, under pretence perhaps of humanity, but really in order to make a conquest. Here was an opportunity for Elizabeth to wipe out the cession of Calais, with which she had had to commence her reign. As we shall soon see, the Netherlanders would have gladly made Elizabeth their sovereign in return for substantial aid. She would have stood out in English history as the conqueror of the Low Countries. Such a prospect would have tempted almost any other sovereign; it did not tempt Elizabeth. She preferred to see France play this part.

But though France and England had lately been drawn into the same system, the two nations continued to regard each other as in old time with animosity and jealousy. Elizabeth could scarcely be prepared to leave the defence and the sovereignty of the Low Countries entirely to the French prince; public opinion would not allow her to do so. It is on account of this competition between the two countries for precedence in the patronage of the Low Countries that the Alençon marriage negotiation is taken up so seriously at this late stage in the life of the Virgin Queen and when the transition was at hand which brought on the duel between England and Spain. She was approaching her fiftieth year; her marriage had been a matter of discussion at almost any time since the days of Henry VIII, and now when her youth was utterly gone she seemed really to lose her heart to a prince who had the appearance of a frog and who was the worthy son of her whom Sir Philip Sidney called the Jezebel of the

age. Elizabeth did not use marriage, after the fashion of the House of Austria, as an instrument of empire, and in the end she founded the greatness of England upon her persistent abstinence from marriage. And yet this question of the queen's marriage is thrown like a mantle over the whole diplomacy of her reign. Especially now when the struggle in the Netherlands seemed daily approaching a crisis, when decency required that she should intervene in an energetic manner, while she clung to the hope of avoiding war with Spain as she had succeeded in doing for more than twenty years, this idyll of Elizabeth and Alençon serves a definite political purpose. It enables her to play at once a passive and a very prominent and impressive part in the affairs of the Netherlands. While Alençon stood forward, supported by the whole influence of Orange, and assumed the sovereignty, with all its attendant risk of war with Philip, Elizabeth, doing nothing and running no risk, presented herself as taking an equal part and advancing an equal claim to their loyalty in the character of his affianced bride.

And so the rings were exchanged, and when Alençon, on his way to assume the sovereignty, left England, Elizabeth accompanied him as far as Canterbury, March 1st, 1582. So much was forced from her by the French Government, which would not undertake the war against Philip without a security for English aid.

But if the match might seem necessary, or in some aspects politically judicious, it had been manifest two years earlier that it did not please the English public. Sidney's invective against the brood of the Medici and Stubbs' pamphlet on the ruin of England by a French marriage had appeared in 1579. And indeed, whatever political purpose the marriage-negotiation might serve,

the marriage itself would have formed indeed a strange climax in Elizabeth's life. When we think of the monstrous behaviour of this very frog-prince at Antwerp in 1584, when we think of the deeds of his brother and of his mother in 1572, and then when we consider that there was a Guise in England too, viz., Mary of Scotland, that in England too there was a vast Catholic party ready to respond to an appeal from the leaders of the Counter-Reformation, a vision shapes itself of what might have followed! Elizabeth herself taken off in some violent way, Mary liberated and then married to Alençon, a rising of the Catholic party in concert with an invasion from France,—part of this had been already foreseen by Sir Nicolas Bacon, and it is impossible not to assume that Elizabeth, to whose thoughts assassination must have been only too familiar, foresaw it too.

When in the twenty-sixth year of her reign a new chapter opened by the deaths of Alençon and Orange, how did the reign of Elizabeth, then more than half expired, look in English history?

She could boast that for twenty-six years she had so picked her way that in the very age of the Counter-Reformation England itself, that is, the state which, more than any other, kept the Reformation alive, not only held her own, but had enjoyed a halcyon calm, such as no other country knew, such as England herself had never known before. The result was almost miraculous, but it is assuredly not the result which has given Elizabeth her fame in history. Elizabeth had saved herself, but she had done little for the cause she represented, and meanwhile it might be feared that Englishmen had forgotten how to fight. Such sluggish periods are often followed by a great catastrophe. Elizabeth however was not to give her name

to any such catastrophe. We think of heroism, adventure, victory and glory when we name the Elizabethan age. But in that sense the Elizabethan age begins in 1585.

Transition is observable throughout the reign of Elizabeth, but the moment of transition, abrupt, decisive, is in the year 1585, when open war began between England and Spain.

This is visible on the very surface of the history. From 1585 to the death of Elizabeth we were at war uninterruptedly; before 1585, excepting one or two slight military operations in Scotland and in the Northern Rebellion, there had been since her accession uninterrupted peace.

The peace of Elizabeth is not less remarkable than the war of Elizabeth, and it lasted somewhat longer. It is most important to note the sharp contrast between them. The war, in which England for the first time displayed her greatness, does not stand out as more unique in our history than the peace, which we enjoyed for a quarter of a century amid the wildest religious discord that Europe has ever known.

But the transition is the more notable because the war of Elizabeth is strikingly unlike our earlier wars and strikingly similar to the great wars which we have waged since. We see a great naval war, waged on the open ocean; to this is attached a land-war in the Low Countries. Such has been the general form of most of our later wars. The long wars of William and Anne, the war of 1744, the war of the French Revolution, are composed in like manner of a widely-scattered naval war and a war in the Low Countries. Our mediæval wars are of quite another type; the oceanic side is wanting, and on land the commonest feature is an invasion of France.



Thus it appears that during the long peace the position of England in the world has altered. After that quiet incubation the modern great Power comes to light.

But this will explain itself as we advance. Standing at the point of transition, we find the question forced upon us, What is to be thought of the two contrasted policies of Elizabeth, and why was one so suddenly exchanged, just at this moment, for the other?

Mr Froude has written the history of the Peace of Elizabeth and of the first years of her War. He has given a minute and damaging description of Elizabeth's vacillations, frauds, and frivolities, and seems to draw the conclusion that she had really no policy at all. He despairs however of convincing people of this, because of the undeniable success which she met with, although he himself attributes this success only to her 'singular fortune.' However unsatisfactory this conclusion may appear, it is certainly difficult to understand how mere irresolution, mere abstinence from decided action, can be called a policy. And yet Mr Froude seems always to hesitate when he tries to state what decided action Elizabeth should have taken during this period.

There are emergencies, in which a persistent abstinence from action, a kind of resolute irresolution, is the only sound policy. When a man finds himself on a narrow ledge of rock with a precipice above and below, and sees the ledge narrowing till it almost disappears, he may think that though action might conceivably save him, absolute inaction is the only policy which can be called safe. And in the case of Elizabeth safety for herself meant also safety for her subjects.

Elizabeth had clearly an energetic nature; she was positively ambitious to show that a woman could wield

authority as effectively as a man. Quite early in her reign the Spanish Ambassador writes that she was 'more feared without any comparison than her sister,' more feared than Bloody Mary! It is therefore extremely remarkable that this ambition did not for a moment mislead her into the error which nine out of ten ambitious rulers commit, the error of doing too much. The talent of letting things alone, so rarely combined with energy, is perhaps the most indispensable talent of a statesman. It was displayed with a singular perseverance for twenty-six years together by Elizabeth.

Everything at her accession was in a sort of suspense. Whether the nation was Catholic or Protestant, by what title she herself reigned, who would be her own successor, and whom she should marry,—all was undecided. Twenty-six years later these questions remained undecided still. As every decision was dangerous, she took no decision at all. And yet her inactivity struck the world as masterly; she looked majestic in her repose.

Shall we say that this inaction was cowardly, or, with Mr Froude, that it was only because she was wholly indifferent in religion that she abstained from taking her proper position as the head of the Reformation in Europe? English history would certainly have run a different, can we think a better? course, if Elizabeth had imitated her brother instead of her father. The question was not what Elizabeth herself believed, but what her people believed. To our surprise we find that this haughty Tudor has grasped the principles of popular government which have prevailed in England in later times. She throws the reins on the neck of the horse. She will not act herself, but she lets the people act. Her people was perhaps at her accession mainly Catholic; twenty years

later it was not prepared to call itself Protestant. What right had Elizabeth on the ground of any private opinions to give England a position in the religious struggle of the age, which England did not like? But it was possible in the international confusion of that age for the people to outstrip the Government in international action. Had the Government declared itself Protestant, established a Protestant succession and openly defied the Powers of the Counter-Reformation there would probably have been a violent rebellion, but meanwhile Englishmen were able in large numbers to aid the rebels at Brill and Flushing in 1572 and again in 1578.

It is a familiar maxim of statesmanship that difficulties insoluble by action are often soluble by lapse of time. In such cases the hand-to-mouth policy is the wisest, because it is directed to gaining time. The disease of England in 1558 might well have seemed incurable. That it was actually cured is matter of astonishment. The medicine used was time, but an enormous dose of it was administered, and in circumstances where the application might have seemed impossible. Twenty-six years of peace were administered, and England lay quietly under the influence of this anæsthetic, while the Fury of religious war was let loose, as never before, on the Continent, in the age of Jarnac and Moncontour, and the St Bartholomew and the Fury of Antwerp. It is not disputed that Elizabeth meant this, and laboured for this, resisting opposition on the part of her council. It is not disputed that the plan was successful. When the crisis came, when the head of the Catholic party in Britain laid her head upon the block and when the Armada appeared, England stood firm. Such was the result of twenty-six years of peace, obtained for us by Elizabeth at the cost of many acts of meanness

and petty falsehood, but it is doubtful whether the result could have been obtained by six years or by sixteen years of peace.

This policy, like every other that could be suggested, was no doubt extremely hazardous. The risk lay in this, that Elizabeth not only did not make war, but did not even prepare for it. She did not suffer even the shadow of approaching war to dim the sunshine of her Peace. Why not? Along with what is called her parsimony it was part of a system of bribing her people with prosperity. She would not burden them with an army. She reduced the burden of government to a *minimum*. By the most extreme economy she avoided all those disputes about taxation which proved so disastrous to the Stuarts, and which her government, weak in title and hanging by a hair in religion, could not, at least in her earlier time, have sustained. Thus she gradually inspired a deep feeling of satisfaction, which lay deeper down than all discontents, and bore up her government.

But as she early acquired the conviction that her position just as it was might be maintained, but that every alteration of it, even the slightest, was fraught with danger, it is not wonderful that irresolution grew in her to be a mania. So did the other habit, which seemed always safe and right, that of saving money.

The result was that a person of proud and powerful nature and of indomitable courage, one too whose counsellors urged her to vigorous measures, adopted in spite of them a peddling cheeseparing policy which often degenerated into shameful and cruel dishonesty. But necessity, the urgent necessity of a whole nation, must be allowed to excuse much.

No doubt if, as Mr Froude thinks, a Protestant League

might have been formed in Europe which could have driven Catholicism across the Alps and Pyrenees, and it was open to Elizabeth to put herself at the head of such a league, then her actual policy was feeble and contemptible. The view presented here is that this was wholly impossible, that the Counter-Reformation was the overwhelming spiritual force of the time, that France was intensely Catholic and even England not Protestant, accordingly that such a rally of the forces of the Reformation would probably have ended within twenty years in the complete and final triumph of the Roman Church. Elizabeth herself could probably have given no distinct explanation of the manner in which with *her* plan she meant to win. But she *did* win. She maintained the forces of England fresh and vigorous till a time when Spain began to be exhausted and utterly bankrupt, and at the same time she maintained her authority in England in spite of the Counter-Reformation. When the tempest of war broke upon her she was indeed terribly unprepared. But though she had no good army, she had a good navy which had grown up almost unperceived through the lawless privateering which had long been connived at. England, Scotland and Seven Provinces in the Low Countries were saved to the Reformation, and France joined the Protestant Powers as an ally.

Such then was the Peace of Elizabeth. Through what causes after enduring so long did it come to an end in 1585? In one word, through the deaths of Alençon and Orange and the victorious advance of Parma towards Antwerp.

The Peace of Elizabeth could be maintained so long as the Rebellion of the Low Countries held out, and this could be ensured so long as the help of France was available. While the insurgents were moderately successful, a little

assistance rendered under hand from England and France was sufficient, and when they were unsuccessful, England might still remain at peace if only France was ready to take action instead. Since the Pacification of Ghent (1576) when the Rebellion attained its high-water mark, the insurgents had been generally unfortunate, and France, represented by Alençon, had been pushed into the foreground. Don John had defeated the rebels at Gemblours, and since his death a greater than he, like him descended from Charles V, Alexander of Parma, had taken the rebellion in hand. He had actually recovered to Spain the Walloon provinces. He had created a general impression that the designs of Orange were doomed to failure. He seemed a match for Orange in statesmanship, and in war the first man of the age. He was engaged in conquering Brabant and Flanders, he had formed the siege of Antwerp. If Antwerp should fall, the rebellion would be shut up in Holland and Zealand. Thus the crisis approached threateningly, and everything now depended on the action of France. No languid good will or assistance rendered under hand would any longer suffice. France must take the field openly against Spain, and must conquer the Low Countries for herself or for Alençon. Only in this way could the Low Countries be saved and also the Peace of Elizabeth be preserved. And of course the idea of a conquest of the Low Countries, including the maritime provinces, by France, of ports like Antwerp and Amsterdam passing for ever into the hands of 'our natural enemy,' the idea in short of France taking the lead of England for all time as a maritime Power, was most unwelcome to Elizabeth. But the only alternative was that England should take the field herself. And still more, if France should be unwilling or unable to act, if France

should suddenly be paralysed, so that the Rebellion in its last extremity should find no other friend left in the wide world but England, then would not England be absolutely forced to take the field?

In other words, the Peace of Elizabeth must at last come to an end. And indeed in the last scenes between Elizabeth and Alençon the system showed itself scarcely tenable any longer. And then fortune dealt the decisive strokes. Alençon died, whose peculiar middle position had enabled France to act with vigour and yet to avoid responsibility. Orange died, who had been the soul of the insurrection, and upon whom seemed especially to hang the resistance of the maritime provinces. Thus at the same time the Rebellion seemed at extremity and the chance of rescue appearing from France seemed very much reduced. Such were the determining circumstances which brought the Peace of Elizabeth to an end and led to the War of Elizabeth which was to consume the rest of her reign.

The reign of Elizabeth is one of the longest in our history; it is as long as the reigns of James I and Charles I put together, longer than the reigns of Charles II, James II and William III put together. Accordingly it does not form a single age, but two ages, if not more; just as the reign of Louis XIV, when examined, falls into not less than three ages. The year 1585 is therefore particularly useful as an epoch. When we speak of the reign of Elizabeth as a glorious period, which called out as no other period before or since, the genius of the English nation, we have in mind chiefly the period which began in 1585. To this belong almost all the great names, though Philip Sidney, a precursor, only just saw the commencement of it. To this belongs the great national awakening, the new

sense of power and self-confidence, the oceanic swell and thunder. The earlier age, which we have called the Peace of Elizabeth, is wholly different, and cannot be called glorious, but it is equally remarkable and interesting, and, if our view be correct, was a necessary introduction to the glorious Elizabethan age.

The death of Alençon was an event of much greater importance than we have indicated. With him disappeared not merely the most convenient instrument through which France could act on the Low Countries; no, with him disappeared also all the prospects of the House of Valois. Henry of Navarre now steps to the front of the stage. He is first of the new group of men who in the critical year 1585 take the place of Orange, Don John, Alençon, Gregory XIII. While Philip and Elizabeth still hold their supreme position, we now follow the movements of Parma, Henri de Guise, Francis Drake, Sixtus V, but principally of Henry of Navarre. He is the Bourbon and the ancestor of all the Bourbons; he introduces a grand chapter of French history. But even contemporaries, who did not see the unrolling of that grand chapter, could recognise how much henceforth he would stand out above all secondary personages of the drama. For he, the heretic, was now by the death of Alençon, next in succession to the French crown. Accordingly just at the moment when the Counter-Reformation seemed on the point of prevailing in the Low Countries, its grand opportunity arrived in France. 'That no heretic should be allowed to reign' was its watch-word. And we have seen how favourable a field France, with its intense Catholic feeling, offered to the Counter-Reformation. Now then at last the great day of decision would dawn. France instead of thwarting Philip in the Low Countries would turn inward upon herself and purge



her own bosom of heresy. Guise would overwhelm Navarre in France, while Parma, soon to be master of Antwerp, would pass triumphantly on into Holland and Zealand. And when so much was achieved and the Counter-Reformation was supreme on the Continent, there would remain to be conquered only the Island! And was it likely that a heretic would still keep her seat on the throne there, when it should have been demonstrated so signally that thrones were not for heretics? The daughter of Anne Boleyn would fall as her mother had fallen.

These were the extreme circumstances which forced Elizabeth at last to declare herself in favour of the Low Countries and openly to defy Spain. And so the inevitable transition was made from peace to war. But we must not for a moment suppose that Elizabeth felt what she was doing, or that she deliberately at this moment doffed her robe of peace and appeared as a Pallas armed with spear and shield. The habits she had formed in twenty-six years of such intense pressure as scarcely any human being ever underwent could not be put off, nor did she consciously wish to put them off. Her object was still as ever to abstain from action, to contrive delays, to mark time. But we have seen her all along outstripped, and not unwilling to be outstripped, by her people. From this time she had less control of them than ever. The mastiff escaped from her leash, and there began, especially on the sea, a duel between the English and Spanish nations.

There is no greater epoch than 1585 in the history either of England or of France, or consequently of the modern world. It marks the first appearance of England as an Oceanic Power, and also the first appearance of the House of Bourbon as claiming to be the royal House of France. Before the century was out these two events had

already visibly led to a complete revolution of all international relations. Hitherto Spain and Portugal had had exclusive dominion of the oceanic world, until in 1580 they had been merged in one. But in 1600 the sceptre of the sea was passing to England and Holland, which states in the seventeenth century come to be spoken of as the Sea Powers. Moreover at the same date France under the reign of the first Bourbon has recovered from Philip at Vervins much of what she lost at Cateau-Cambresis. But France has now settled her religious question, and is a decidedly Catholic Power. Consequently, when the seventeenth century began, the events of 1585 had produced this result, that two Protestant Powers had begun to control the sea, and that the two great Catholic Powers, stood, the religious question being settled, in fixed rivalry among themselves, contending for ascendancy on the Continent.

The crowded period before us lends itself very ill to the method of rapid delineation here adopted. Let us remark first that the policy of England in 1585 is most characteristically Elizabethan, that is, that in actual war not less than in peace it aims at accomplishing as little, and altering as little, as possible. This, once for all, is the statesmanship of Elizabeth, not probably from natural disposition, but from a habit formed in twenty-six years, during which she had maintained a position in which no action of any kind was safe. A very striking example of this appears on the threshold. When in 1585 the Netherlanders finally despaired of French aid, and when it appeared that Elizabeth was prepared to come to their help, the petition of the States-General to her took this form: 'Recognising that there is no prince or potentate to whom they are more obliged than they are to Your Majesty, we are about to request you very

humbly to accept the sovereignty of these Provinces and the people of the same for your very humble vassals and subjects.' There is much evidence to show that at this time and long after, the most earnest wish of the party which had till lately been led by the Prince of Orange was to become subjects of Queen Elizabeth. Yet Elizabeth steadfastly rejected their proposal.

There are positive events and there are negative events, and in the whole of English history there is no greater negative event than this. Acquisition of territory has been the business of most sovereigns, and their established road to glory. To Elizabeth especially it might have seemed necessary, for she had been forced to begin her reign with the humiliating cession of Calais. No compensation for this had been acquired since; nothing had been acquired, unless we reckon the rudiment of a colony which had been formed in Newfoundland. And now there was laid at her feet a new kingdom which desired nothing better than to be added to her dominion. It was in every respect such as statesmanship would pronounce a convenient and natural acquisition. In language, disposition, turn of mind, religion, the Dutch closely resembled the English. Elizabeth herself said that the English and Netherlanders had been in the olden time 'as close as man and wife.' They were rich and had the conditions of maritime power, so that at the time it was remarked that a union of England and the Low Countries would carry with it the empire of the sea. So strong was their sense of affinity that throughout the seventeenth century we may perceive that the relations of England and the Netherlands do not resemble those of distinct nations. Their intercourse, even their quarrels, have a family character. The House

of Orange allies itself twice with the House of Stuart, and interferes with strong party feeling in our civil war. The English Commonwealth actually proposes union to the Dutch Commonwealth. Finally the Dutch Stadtholder becomes King of England, and perhaps had William and Mary had a son, that union which Elizabeth disallowed would at last actually have taken place.

Let us imagine Elizabeth accepting the throne of the Low Countries; she would no doubt have found herself involved in war with Spain. But she did not escape this by declining it; three years after came the Armada. Meanwhile the two fleets of England and Holland would have been united, and the great colonial expansion which each state made separately in the seventeenth century, and which led to collisions and wars between them, would have been one expansion. The two polities would, to all appearance, have blended very easily, for both states had arrived at the same system, England having converted her feudal into a rational or political monarchy, and the Netherlands having created a similar political monarchy out of a republic.

We cannot therefore see how Elizabeth's refusal can be justified on the grounds of statesmanship. It is none the less characteristic on that account. Great and daring actions were done in abundance by Englishmen in this latter part of Elizabeth's reign, but they were not done by Elizabeth. It is difficult to grasp the fact that a ruler of so high spirit, of so much energy and courage, did not possess the talent of action but did possess in a unique degree the talent, in certain circumstances equally valuable, of refraining from action. Perhaps most great statesmen are somewhat sparing of adventurous action; nevertheless the great masterpieces of states-

manship are commonly sudden and rapid strokes of well-timed audacity. But though we trace almost all that makes modern England to Elizabeth, no such strokes were struck by her. Her statesmanship is almost purely negative; it consists solely in providing time and room and liberty for the energy of the nation to display itself. She does not lead her people, but in rare emergencies she—lets them go. We have as yet seen her taking action only once, when she came to the help of the Scotch against Mary of Guise, and then she acted in necessary self-defence. Now in 1585 comes a change of policy indeed of the utmost importance, but it scarcely appears that Elizabeth intended it seriously as a change of policy. She did indeed use brave words in her Declaration of 1585. But as she said in that document that her main object was peace, so it would appear from her subsequent conduct of the war that she rather intended to deter Philip from action than to take action herself. Peace and war were not in those days international conditions so sharply distinct as they are now. In 1585 there had been already many a sea-fight, and many a battle in the Netherlands, between Englishmen and Spaniards, and twice a Spanish Ambassador had been expelled from England by Elizabeth. Philip indeed had shown a long-suffering spirit, and it was therefore not unreasonable for Elizabeth to calculate that her threats and declaration of war might determine him to make peace.

And now when we look at the operations of war which followed we perceive that the naval and the military operations must be considered separately. The former are of immense historical importance, as showing that the English nation had found a new path to great-

ness. The latter are in themselves somewhat insignificant, but they throw light on the Queen's policy. She sends Leicester to the Low Countries with 6000 men to assist the insurgents, just as in 1559 she had sent her fleet to the Forth to aid the Scotch rebels. But we are led to think that she may have counted on a like result, on an easy success that would save her further trouble.

Had she consciously adopted at this moment a war-policy, we should have seen her devoting herself to military preparations, and she was assuredly not so blind as to imagine that war could be carried on with the greatest Power in the world without a large expenditure of money. The mania of parsimony which possessed her may be understood, so long as she remained at peace, as the instinct of sound finance in an uneducated form. During the long peace of Elizabeth her cheese-paring economy may well be supposed to have done much more good than harm. But what are we to think of the same propensity in time of war? We see that the campaign of 1586 in the Netherlands was ruined by the frenzied struggle of Elizabeth to carry on war without spending money. We see her starving her soldiers, reducing her servants to despair, and forfeiting her reputation among her allies by tricks of miserly economy unworthy of a great prince. Certainly if we should judge her by this campaign we should pronounce her one of the most incapable of War Ministers, or at least we should be driven to suppose that she had not mental elasticity enough to comprehend what is involved in a great change of policy. It rather appears that she intended no change of policy, and that she did not understand or admit that her period of peace was over and that her period of war

had begun. She intended in short to avert war by threatening war. As soon as she found that her measures had not produced this effect she conceived a disgust of the war in the Netherlands. Leicester returns in 1586, and this phase of the war comes to an end. Something of the old English valour has been displayed at Zutphen and Philip Sidney has died the death of a hero. But otherwise neither the reputation of England nor of Elizabeth has been greatly raised.

We understand both her prompt and firm refusal to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands, and her feeble conduct of the war, if we assume simply that a serious war with Philip had never entered into her calculations. She could not accept the sovereignty for herself, simply because she meant the sovereignty to remain with Philip. Artois and Hainault had already submitted to him, Brabant and Flanders were already half conquered; these successes had been due partly to concessions made by Parma in the name of Philip. It was still therefore natural for Elizabeth to expect that Holland and Zealand would in the end submit too, but on terms. The result which actually arrived was too unprecedented, the confused Dutch republic of the seventeenth century was a thing too shapeless, to be foreseen in 1585. No; Philip would win, but he might be forced to make considerable concessions to Holland and Zealand as he had done already to Artois and Hainault. Philip had all along recognised the extreme difficulty of suppressing the rebellion of the Low Countries so long as it received the support of England. Now therefore that new prospects, involving new efforts and expenses, opened before him in France, so that some settlement of the Dutch difficulty seemed doubly imperative, Philip might certainly be

brought to terms—so Elizabeth might calculate—if England should once more step decidedly forward and show that the decision of the question lay in her hands. In one word, what Elizabeth had in view was simply mediation. She proposed simply to draught a treaty which Philip on the one hand and the states of Holland and Zealand on the other should sign.

It was observable throughout that she contemplated applying force to the rebels as well as to Philip. As against Philip she almost seems to have no military plan, her calculation being that he will be brought to terms by the mere appearance of her troops; but she *has* a plan for reducing the States under her control. She is eager to get possession of Brill and Flushing, those positions in which the rebellion had first with the help of England maintained its ground in 1572.

She seems indeed to have regarded the Low Countries much as the English Government seventy years ago regarded Greece. Philip then, as the Sultan the other day, seemed to have legitimacy on his side; on the other hand the rebels had most real and substantial grounds of complaint. Meanwhile neighbouring Powers were inconvenienced and endangered by the interminable conflict. Accordingly England would interfere, as in the case of Greece the great Powers, and dictate a treaty by which justice should be done to the claims of either belligerent.

But her plan failed. The interminable war went on as before, and the only result of her interference was found to be that at last she was at open war with Philip. From this war she could not now withdraw, for while her delays and her economies had prevented her from inflicting much damage on Philip by land, it was



quite otherwise on sea. Sir Francis Drake was sweeping the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, and Santa Cruz was urging Philip that the safety of his empire required the suppression of the piratical and heretical Power.

And while Elizabeth at war was blundering so strangely by land and running so victorious a course by sea, there occurred another great event. This event brought to a decision some of the main questions which it had hitherto been her policy to keep undecided, it convulsed all the European Courts, and it provoked Philip, whose natural indecision had hitherto played into the hands of Elizabeth's system of delay, to take for once a decided step. This event is the catastrophe of the Queen of Scots.

The trial and execution of a queen regnant naturally startled the world. For the first time Scotland had fallen to a queen, and for the first time England had been for a long time under the government of a queen. Mary in one of her earlier letters, written when she pleased herself with the thought of a romantic friendship to Elizabeth, alludes to this when she says, 'for we are both queens,' i.e. queens regnant. What could strike the imagination more painfully than to see one of these august sovereigns put the other to an ignominious death! Even to the present day our conception of Elizabeth's character is perverted by the impression which this event produces on the imagination. We remember that she was the daughter of Henry VIII, and instinctively conclude that she gave way to an inherited impulse of his tyrannic cruelty and also of his imperious contempt for public opinion. There can be no greater mistake, for, as we have just remarked, it was not in Elizabeth's character to act with decision at all, nor, we may add, in any

case to despise public opinion. But besides this we do great injustice to Elizabeth if we fail to recognise that precisely she had brought to an end the cruel system of the earlier Tudors. Her accession had closed the long Reign of Terror that had overshadowed England for nearly thirty years, between the scaffolds of More and Fisher and the stake of Cranmer. It was the special pride of Elizabeth to have given England not only peace and prosperity but also on the whole mild government. In her whole reign of forty-five years there occur only four of those gloomy executions which had been of so frequent occurrence under her sister, brother and father. Norfolk and Northumberland had fallen in 1571, Mary was now to fall, and long after, Essex. And in all these cases Elizabeth made it plain, as her predecessors had never dreamed of doing, that she acted with reluctance, that she broke a rule which she had laid down for herself. Pitiless severity towards the great nobles had been the *arcanum* of the Tudor House, and this *arcanum* Elizabeth most consciously and deliberately renounces.

The truth is that in no act of her reign did Elizabeth display the irresolution which had become a habit with her and which concealed much statesmanlike wisdom so signally as in her conduct towards Mary in 1587. That she professed irresolution is of course not to be denied, but that she felt it as much as she professed to feel it is evident if we consider her whole reign together. The maxim of her reign was to settle nothing, but to gain time. She had applied this maxim to Mary Stuart for not less than nineteen years together, and doubtless desired nothing better than to abide by it always. Was Mary Queen of Scotland, or was her abdication valid? Was Mary to succeed in England or was she not? These questions

were studiously left unsettled, and so long as they remained open, neither the Catholic party in Britain were driven to despair, nor did the Great Powers feel themselves obliged to take decisive action against Elizabeth. This policy had sufficed for a quarter of a century. Mary Stuart had become almost necessary to Elizabeth. Should Mary disappear, the ship of English policy would be driven from its moorings.

In 1585 we have seen that she took an apparently decided course when she published her declaration against Philip. But we have also seen that her secret object in this was not really to undertake war but to guard peace. In like manner it appears that in the case of Mary Stuart she was as unwilling as possible to act, and that not merely on grounds of humanity and pity, but on grounds of policy. By acting she could not but convulse Europe, and her system throughout had been to soothe and reassure Europe.

Such an act may be considered and may be endlessly debated from several points of view. Was it morally justifiable, at least on the principle *Salus populi suprema lex*? Was it consistent with the principles of monarchy, which at that very moment were assuming a form more mystical and transcendental than ever before? Is it to be attributed mainly to Elizabeth herself, or ought the chief responsibility to be thrown on Parliament and the public opinion which clamoured for the death of Mary as necessary for the safety of the country and of Elizabeth? And when we consider the singular behaviour of Elizabeth herself in the whole affair, what light does it throw upon her character? But all these aspects of the tragic deed are wholly distinct from that which it presents to those who study the history of English policy. For it was the decisive act by which the Gordian knot of English history

in those times was cut. The problem was not simple, how to secure England for the Reformation, but threefold, namely, how to do this in such a manner as to establish a clear succession to the House of Tudor, now evidently about to be extinguished soon after the House of Valois and at the same time to lay a foundation for the union of England and Scotland. Hitherto but one step had been taken towards the solution of this threefold problem. A child had been born, who on the hereditary principle had a strong claim to the throne both of England and of Scotland; this child belonged to the Reformation and not to the Roman Church. In him, in James Stuart, seemed to be embodied the happier future of the island of Britain, the union of its two parts in one Monarchy, in the strict hereditary principle and in the Reformation. Here was a clear prospect. On the other hand what a chaotic gloom gathered round his mother's head? She represented the Counter-Reformation, foreign invasion and the party of Guise. Should her designs prove successful, nothing but confusion was reserved for England.

It is only as it affected international relations that we are concerned with the execution of Mary Stuart. It affected these in two principal ways. First it entirely altered the attitude of the Counter-Reformation towards England. So long as Mary lived the Counter-Reformation might indulge a tranquil hope, and had no need to make haste, for the recovery of England. Only the death of Elizabeth, now fifty years of age and believed by the Catholics to be of shattered constitution, at any rate almost certain speedily to go the way of Orange and Coligny,—only her death was needed for the triumph of the Counter-Reformation. On the morrow of Elizabeth's death Mary would stand before the English nation representing legitimacy, promising at

the same time to avert one of those terrible wars of title of which England had had so many, and bringing in her hand the union of the kingdoms. All the Catholic party in England and Scotland would rally round her, her son possibly would pass over to her religion, and the whole victorious Counter-Reformation of Europe would favour and bless the happy consummation. One stroke of an axe had shattered all this. It now appeared that the death of Elizabeth would have no such consequences. James was not a Catholic, and henceforth his way to the throne of England might seem to lie through the favour of Elizabeth. The union of the kingdoms seemed henceforth more likely to come about under Protestantism than under Romanism.

Accordingly to the Counter-Reformation the death of Mary Stuart was an occurrence similar to the death of Alençon three years before. As that made Henry of Navarre, the Huguenot, heir to the French throne, so this made James of Scotland, the Protestant, heir to the throne of England.

Now it was the grand principle of the Counter-Reformation that no heretic can succeed to a throne; hence the death of Alençon had been immediately followed by the formation in France of a League to exclude Henry. Something similar might be expected to follow the death of Mary Stuart. It would rouse Sixtus V. He would proclaim a crusade against England, since henceforth the Counter-Reformation could only hope to procure by vigorous action what hitherto it had expected to obtain by waiting.

But a similar effect would be produced on the mind of Philip not only through the same considerations, but also through other considerations peculiarly affecting himself.

So long as Mary lived, he had desired the fall of Elizabeth with but half a heart. That event would give England and Scotland not to him, but only to Mary, and she, as Queen of Britain, would be drawn, though Catholic, into a policy, more or less, of resistance to the Catholic king. For her affinities were not with Spain but with France, so that at an earlier period Philip had strongly favoured Elizabeth's resistance to her claims. Mary had tried to disarm this hostility, at one time by giving Don John a hope of her hand, at another time by disinheriting her son in favour of the king of Spain. Now that she was gone it was open to Philip to draw out of the Habsburg quiver one of those innumerable succession-claims. He had already laid claim to the French succession. He could now lay claim to the succession in England, for was he not descended from John of Gaunt? But this claim would need to be enforced by action. The title of James was like that of Elizabeth herself or Henry of Navarre; it was invalidated by heresy. It must be put aside, and Philip's own title must be supported by a Spanish fleet and army, the Counter-Reformation (represented mainly by the Pope) supplying funds.

It appears therefore that the execution of Mary Stuart in 1587 contributed in the greatest degree, along with the campaign of Leicester and the far more effective maritime operations of Drake since 1585, to bring on open and decisive war between Elizabeth and Philip. In 1585 probably Elizabeth had defied Philip in the hope of intimidating him, for at that time Philip, it may be, did not desire war with England. But Philip now desired war with England, partly because his maritime empire was seriously threatened, partly because it was now open to him, with the enthusiastic approval of the whole Catholic

world, to strike for the crown of England. And so Elizabeth, who as late as 1587 desired nothing so much as peace with Spain, found herself in 1588 collecting all the forces of her kingdom to withstand the Armada.

Thus the great period of Elizabeth's reign is introduced against her will and by the downfall of her system. Her own achievement is the long peace; the war is forced upon her partly by circumstances, partly by her people. In 1588 arrived that crisis which she had devoted her whole ingenuity to averting. At last Philip and other Powers of the Counter-Reformation gathered their whole strength to strike a direct blow at England. They were immensely powerful, but in losing Mary Stuart they had lost their most effective instrument. Philip had been king of England thirty years before; he intended now to become king of England again. At the same time he put forward similar claims in France. Could he only meet with as much success in France and England as he had lately had in Portugal, all the aspirations of the Counter-Reformation and all the plans of Philip would be realised together, and the collapse of the Dutch rebellion would be a mere incident in the establishment of a universal Catholic Monarchy.

But England is an island, and more than once in recent ages the whole destiny of Europe has been decided by the fact that one of its great Powers has an insular position. In repelling the advance of Spain, France no doubt achieved as much as England, and she was far harder pressed. Henry of Navarre is the most strenuous wrestler of this time, but he had to abandon the cause of the Reformation; he had to barter this against national independence. It may be said that the Reformation was saved in that extremity by England alone.

A long peace, such as Elizabeth had procured for England, furnishes to a nation which has energy the opportunity of incalculable new developments. Perhaps if the Armada had come thirty or twenty years earlier it might have effected a landing, and had Alexander of Parma or Don John once landed and issued his appeal to the old Catholic party in England and in Scotland, especially in the lifetime of Mary Stuart, I suppose there would have been but a poor chance for Elizabeth. Even without the help of Mary Stuart, even in 1588, Parma would have had a great military superiority in our unprepared, unfortified island. But during that long peace, under a government which had held such a loose rein over private enterprise, an unexpected development had taken place. We were already busy traders, and we saw the Flemish trade ruined by the war,—Antwerp, the great port for New World commerce, now sacked by brutal mutineers, now besieged and taken by Parma; Flemish refugees flocked into our own country, and brought with them commercial ideas and habits. We meanwhile had peace, we could take up the trade which was passing from Flanders. Beyond the Ocean lay a vast world of wealth, from which every year silver-fleets arrived in Spain. The vast extent of this New World had been known since the memorable voyage of Magellan, but when Elizabeth came to the throne no Englishman had seen the Pacific Ocean, and no one could yet form an estimate of the amount of wealth that New World contained. When however English adventurers explored these regions in their trading vessels, they found themselves treated as interlopers, for Spain, now united with Portugal, claimed everything as its own.

A monopoly of this kind, had it been reasonably limited



and protected by treaties, would assuredly have provoked smuggling on a great scale. But it was practically unlimited, it secluded from English commerce the larger half of the planet, and it was claimed by Spain not on the ground of any treaty concluded with England or any other country, but on the ground of a Papal Bull issued at the beginning of the sixteenth century. By heretical England such a title was not likely to be admitted. Accordingly our traders had to choose between tamely submitting to an enormous injury, if they renounced the New World trade, or carrying it on in spite of Spain, that is, by systematic violence, by merging trade in war. Government connived at this during the peace, as it connived at breaches of neutrality committed in the Low Countries by hundreds and thousands of English volunteers. But at the covert maritime war Elizabeth connived far more heartily and gladly than at the war on land. For she got nothing by the latter, but by the former enormous gains might be made, silver-ships might be brought in, and some considerable share of the plunder might be appropriated by Elizabeth herself.

\* We thus see that the war with Spain which was first openly declared in 1585 had a double character. The maritime part of it had an origin distinct from that of the land-war. In addition to a rebellion in the Low Countries, which England could not afford to see suppressed, a quarrel was springing up on the ocean between English traders and the Spanish monopolists which had already led to covert, and must in the end have led to open, war. It was the same difference which later under Oliver and again in the reign of George II led to war between England and Spain. The conduct of England in this matter may easily be misrepresented either by way of

blame or of praise. It may be represented as sordid and brutal piracy, and examples of cruelty may be produced. It may be represented again as a heroic policy of rescuing the New World from the Inquisition and giving it back to the free use of the sons of men of whatever race; and in favour of this view elevated sentiments may be quoted from Essex and Raleigh. But regarded as a whole it was neither above nor below the average of trade-wars. There was lawlessness, but all the customs of war were in that age ill-regulated, and this was especially the case upon the sea. On the other hand a few ardent imaginations saw beyond the immediate struggle the grand issue of the future of the Ocean. But the plain grievance itself of England against Spain was perfectly real and of enormous magnitude. It would in the most civilised age have led to war, that a single state should advance a general claim to the whole New World and all the riches of it. If the claim had been for a long time allowed, this was only because the spirit of commercial adventure was not fully aroused in England before the Peace of Elizabeth.

Hitherto we have had before our eyes mainly one person, Elizabeth herself. She had indeed able Ministers in Cecil and Walsingham, but it may be made a question whether these deserve to be called great men as well as able Ministers. It is quite otherwise with Francis Drake, who received knighthood from Elizabeth in 1580. He is one of the great men of his age; his name was bruited about Europe and pronounced with admiration by the Spaniards themselves. In our own history few men have originated so much. The British trade, the British Empire, the British navy—of all these colossal growths the root is in him. It was he who carried the English name over all those seas which hitherto had known only the

Spaniard and the Portuguese. He had accompanied John Hawkins in his expedition of 1567. In 1572 he had seized Nombre de Dios; soon after he gained his first glimpse of the South Sea. On December 3rd, 1577, he set sail again from Plymouth, passed the straits of Magellan, sailed northward in the Pacific as far perhaps as the Golden Gate, then struck across the Ocean, reaching Ternate in November 1579, Java in March 1580, the Cape of Good Hope on June 15th, Sierra Leone in July, finally Plymouth on September 26th. It is said that only the great Magellan himself before Drake had thus 'put a girdle round the earth' and Magellan died on his voyage. Such was Drake the explorer. But the earlier explorers had met with no enemies but the feeble aborigines of the New World; Drake fought the Spaniards wherever he met them, or wherever he could attack them with advantage. As yet they regarded him only as a daring pirate, but they were soon to give him an opportunity of enrolling his name at the head of the list in which stand the names of Blake, Hawke, Rodney and Nelson.

When Elizabeth in 1585 began to defy Spain, while she sent Leicester with an army to the Low Countries, she let loose also her knight of the Ocean, Sir Francis Drake. He seized St Domingo and Carthagena, in 1586 he forced his way into the harbour of Cadiz and burnt there a great number of ships.

If, as we suppose, Elizabeth intended not to provoke a war with Spain but to force Spain to make peace, this was one of those mistakes which brought about the great Elizabethan age. Drake struck far too hard. He created an alarm which convinced Spain not that she must make peace, but that in self-defence she must crush England. Hitherto England had been regarded by Philip merely as

the main support of the rebellion in the Low Countries. Drake displayed a new aspect of her. Henceforth the Spanish politicians could perceive that their vast New World dominion was, owing to its very vastness, utterly indefensible against any sudden attack, and that England was a nest of daring assailants.

And now by the death of Mary Stuart it was left open to Philip to lay claim to the throne of England. Everything therefore concurred in 1587 to induce him to put aside his long procrastination and to make a grand attack upon England. He had won the battle of Lepanto, and therefore even his inert imagination could rise, though rarely, to the conception of a grand naval enterprise. He had won still later in 1583 the battle of Terceira over a fleet, mainly French, commanded by Filippo Strozzi. It was asserted by the Spaniards that certain English ships, which formed part of Strozzi's fleet, had been the first to take flight, from which they drew the conclusion that English sailors were only brave against unarmed populations taken by surprise. Meanwhile these English sailors themselves had formed a contrary opinion, and while the rest of the world watched with awe the movements of the Armada, confidently asserted that 'twelve of her Majesty's ships were a match for all the galleys in the King of Spain's dominions.'

There was another consideration which impelled Philip just at this time to vigorous action. The maritime Balance of Power in that age lay between Spain on the one side and Turkey favoured by France on the other. Now Turkey was at this moment preoccupied with an ambitious war against Persia, and France was paralysed by the revival of her terrible civil dissensions.

We must consider England and France together if we

would understand the European crisis which is marked in English history by the Armada. That reign of Philip II, which from our modern point of view looks so deplorable, appeared to the contemporary world to grow more glorious year after year, and was now reaching its zenith. Beginning with St Quentin and the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis it had advanced in the seventies to Lepanto and in the eighties to the conquest of Portugal.

It had met indeed with some reverses in the Low Countries, but even that knotty problem seemed now on the point of solution. The rebellion had been sustained mainly through the firmness of the maritime provinces led by Orange, and through the assistance, most effective though concealed, of England and France. But how commanding was now the attitude which Philip was able to assume both against his rebels and against the Powers that favoured them! Orange was dead, and Parma after actually pacifying several of the provinces had taken Antwerp to the admiration of the world. And Philip had been able to take the offensive in the most overwhelming manner against France and England themselves. He laid claim to both thrones, he denied the right to reign both of Elizabeth and of Henry of Navarre. In France at least he was supported in this position by a most formidable Catholic League and even, so long as Henry remained a Huguenot, by the public opinion of the country. In England too he might count on a certain support, but besides this he had now an opportunity of bringing the whole force of his Monarchy, supported by the Counter-Reformation and the Pope, against the heretic queen. He enjoyed for a time at least this incalculable advantage that, though he waged a war of conquest against England and France at once, England

and France were nevertheless scarcely in a condition to help each other.

Let us note the principal occurrences which brought France to such an extremity.

The death of Alençon-Anjou in 1584 raised for France the great question of the age, whether a heretic could reign, by placing Henry of Navarre in the position of immediate heir to the reigning king. France entered upon the two last of its long series of religious convulsions. By the first of these the House of Valois was extinguished by assassination in the year after the Armada; by the second the House of Bourbon made its way through civil war to the crown. It is interesting to note the correspondence in time between one of the great crises in English and in French history. 1588 is for us the year of the Armada. For France it is the year of the Barricades and of the murder of Guise; the next year is the year of the fall of the House of Valois. If this phase of French history begins in 1584, we see in 1585 the organisation of the League and the establishment of its relations with Philip.

In 1586 falls the campaign so-called of the three Henries. France was so miserably divided that it saw a kind of triangular civil war. The Henry on the throne was at war with the Huguenot Henry, who now won the first Huguenot victory at Coutras; but the third Henry, Henry of Guise, headed a party not less independent of the Government and secretly paid by the king of Spain. This third party represented in fact the Counter-Reformation, whereas the Government inclined more to the Politicians.

In 1587 Paris enters the contest, declaring for the Counter-Reformation with all the fanaticism which two hundred years later it was to display in quite another

cause. It organises a sort of Committee of Public Safety, falls under the influence of fanatical preachers, and attaches itself to the Guise against the king. As in the last year the war had been mainly between the king and the Huguenots, it begins now to be mainly a war between the king and the League. On May 9th, 1588, Guise ventures with a slight following to enter Paris in defiance of the prohibition of the king. A crisis seems approaching which might resemble the St Bartholomew; but affairs take another turn, and the day of the Barricades resembles rather one of the brighter scenes of the French Revolution. Guise appears as a sort of Lafayette; the king's Swiss troops are disarmed; the king however himself is no Louis XVI, and instead of submitting makes his escape to Chartres. He summons a meeting of the States General to meet at Blois. In July he issues an edict, in which he promises to suppress heresy and accepts the principle that no heretic or favourer of heresy must reign.

Such was the condition of France at the very moment when the Armada sailed out of Corunna (July 28th). We know what bloody scenes occurred at Blois, and how the murder done there was avenged on Henry III soon after before Paris, and through what desperate campaigns the Bourbon made his way to the throne of France. The author of all the mischief, and the person who hoped to profit by it, was the same Philip II who at the same time sent the Armada against England.

No potentate has held a more formidable position than Philip II at this moment. He had approached much nearer to universal empire than his father had done before him, or than Louis XIV after him.

But his zenith was soon passed. He had indeed no

sudden complete catastrophe, but in ten years after the Armada he ceased to inspire alarm. When he died in 1598 he was still unquestionably ruler of the greatest Power in the world. But that Power was then effectually held in check, and from the moment that men ceased to fear it they began to take note that it was far advanced in internal decay.



## CHAPTER VII.

### THE WAR OF ELIZABETH.

Now then that the crisis arrives at last, we are prepared to understand in what way it will be handled by Elizabeth. She will be slow to believe that Philip means really to send a great Armada against her, and afterwards in resisting it she will cling convulsively to that parsimony, which indeed in a time of peace had been one of the best qualities of her government.

The victory itself then was won not by Elizabeth, but almost in spite of Elizabeth by her people. The maritime development of England had long been observable; naval power had grown with commerce, and had been favoured by Government because it brought in money. And now on the grandest scale the naval power of England was displayed before the eyes of Europe, saving England without aid from any army.

Much legend has perhaps gathered round the current tradition of the naval struggle in the Channel and the North Sea<sup>1</sup>. Professor Laughton holds that there was no

<sup>1</sup> On this subject see especially the volume on the Defeat of the Spanish Armada recently published by the Navy Records Society. It is edited and furnished with an elaborate introduction by Professor Laughton, who claims that it ought to be considered as complementary to the Spanish work of Duro.

great difference between the two fleets either in number of men or size of ships. He holds that not more than 24,000 men actually entered the Channel and that they were met by probably from 17,000 to 18,000 Englishmen; also that in point of tonnage Spanish and English ships were much the same, though the Spanish were higher-built and looked larger. He holds also that in guns the Spanish ships were very ill supplied. But there is no doubt that the English ships were better worked and that the English sailors proved themselves more skilful.

The current tradition, if in some respects exaggerated, is also somewhat less distinct than it might be. It remembers the slow advance of the Armada from the Lizard to Calais roads, with several exploits performed by English sailors during this time. It remembers the fire-ships sent among the Spanish ships on Sunday night as they lay at anchor, and how they cut their cables and drifted eastward. It remembers also their flight northward and the tempest which scattered them in the North Sea. But it seems to have forgotten the great sea-fight fought on Monday, August 8th, off Gravelines, the Battle of Gravelines, which as Professor Laughton says, shattered the Spanish prestige and established the basis of England's empire.

The Armada was not defeated by a storm, any more than Napoleon's Russian expedition by a frost. The Armada was defeated at Gravelines, and the enterprise was defeated when Parma failed to bring up his flotilla. Only the pursuit of the flying host was undertaken, and ruthlessly performed, by a tempest. This began on August 14th and raged with little intermission through the rest of the month, making it impossible for the Armada either to land at some northern point of Britain or to return and try once more to put itself into connexion with Parma.

The Armada failed so completely that it did not in any degree avenge the damage done in former years and especially since 1585 upon Spain by English sailors, nor did it for more than a moment put the English upon the defensive. It did not anywhere effect even a momentary landing nor obtain any partial success however petty, whereas the Spanish Monarchy and Spain itself had for years past suffered grievously from English attacks and plundering expeditions. The island that was to be subjugated was not even touched. It is less accurate to say that the attack of the Spaniards failed than to say that the Spaniards could not succeed in making an attack. And yet it is to be observed that the expedition actually enjoyed the advantages which had been calculated upon. France did not interfere, though the Armada cast anchor near Calais, and though the ambition of Philip threatened France not less than England. The government of Henry III was paralysed by the success of Guise at Paris, which was the fruit of Philip's subsidies.

It would be absurd to imagine that the catastrophe of the Armada was fatal to Spain. Spain continued yet for many years to be the greatest Power in the world. But her navy had received the same kind of blow that her army suffered half a century later at Rocroi. The age of Lepanto and Terceira came to an end. The battle of Gravelines deprived Spain of her maritime preeminence. And the English sailors were shown to be not mere pirates, but promising candidates for the empire of the sea.

After September a third phase of the war necessarily began. It could not but modify all views of the relation between England and Spain, to have ascertained that Spain had no real naval superiority over England, and that England was not, like France, internally divided to

such an extent that a large part of the population would prefer Philip to Elizabeth. Almost from this moment the moral weakness, the consciousness of being liable to conquest in some high tide of the Counter-Reformation, ceased to depress the English mind. The country acquired a self-confidence which it has never lost since.

But what course should now be pursued? On the one hand Spain might acknowledge herself beaten, or she might, as Philip at first hinted, fit out a new Armada at Emden and entrust the direction of it to Parma alone. For whatever unexpected superiority the English naval captains might have shown, nothing was clearer than that they had not beaten Parma, and that an expedition conducted by him might have had a very different fortune. England too, if Spain left the initiative to her, might adopt either of two wholly different courses. Her naval adventurers had had their way for once, and they had made the nation proud of them. England might now plunge into a course of naval adventure which need have no end. She might, on the ground of the war, plunder the Spanish Empire on all continents and oceans. It lay before her almost as unwieldy and undefended as it had lain, when yet unsettled, before the Conquistadores, so that it was open to some English Cortez now to avenge Montezuma or to some English Pizarro to punish the crimes of the Spanish Pizarro. Who could say that it was impossible, or even perhaps very difficult, to carve a new dominion for England out of the Spanish Monarchy, or at least to derive from it inestimable wealth?

On the other hand England might take a very different course. Those who, like Elizabeth herself, desired only peace, might regard the disaster of the Armada as leading directly to that result. The Spaniards had always held

that they could not put down the rebellion of the Low Countries so long as England supported it. Now that they had ascertained that England could not be coerced, they must needs draw the conclusion that they must make terms with the Low Countries. On this ground a settlement of the great dispute of the age might be anticipated.

But war and peace being so ill-regulated as in those days they were, it was more likely that no such definite decisions would be arrived at on either side—that on the one side Spain would be too proud to make peace, while on the other side England would not rouse herself to a continuous effort or form a strategical plan, but would carry on her old plundering system with more daring and on a larger scale. In general it may be said that after 1588 the war began again to be as before 1585, that is desultory. It could not indeed become again covert, a war under the mask of peace, but it was scarcely avowed war. It was unlike later wars that have been waged by England, in having no definite object, unless Philip's claim to the English throne were still the object. It could therefore hardly end while Philip lived, nor, unless Spain could learn to tolerate heresy on a throne, while Elizabeth lived.

But between 1588 and the death of Elizabeth there intervened fifteen years. So long the war lasted, which on the side of England was chiefly a series of plundering expeditions, in which the Government scarcely aimed at a single national object, but rather allowed naval adventurers to make reprisals for their exclusion from the New World. It is a peculiar and unique period of English history, in which war is waged, but freely, with a triumphant sense of power, with scarcely any sense of danger, with some lawlessness, yet on the whole with a good conscience, and

with a national pride which no earlier generation had known. The glory of 1588 tinged every succeeding year of the war; the sense of danger and the tension that had held the national mind for a whole generation was gone and a new generation grew up to revel in victory and discovery. The inextricable problem was solved, the gloomy dilemma which had made Elizabeth herself incurably irresolute presented itself no longer. It is now that we feel ourselves in the Elizabethan age proper.

Elizabeth's personal position is henceforth perhaps the strangest in history. That a queen regnant should rule England was almost unprecedented, so that language did not readily conform to it, and we often find Elizabeth called 'the king.' That she should remain unmarried was still stranger. A Virgin Queen was a personage who seemed to require a special etiquette to herself. When to this was at last added in 1588 a splendour of glory, a visible preeminence that made her stand out among an armed nation like Britannia herself, then indeed men's imaginations were almost disturbed. She had a plenty of faults and weaknesses, nay of basenesses, but yet a strong outline of greatness, many commanding features. And now in the victor of the Armada all human infirmities, visible enough before in the mere daughter of Anne Boleyn, who ruled, as many thought, by usurpation and was destined, as many thought, to a miserable ruin, passed for ever out of sight, and there remained only the embodied Britannia.

But meanwhile she was growing old and the form of worship that had been gradually devised for the Virgin Queen was fast becoming inappropriate, just when her claim to receive worship and the general inclination to render it became greater than ever. In monarchy, where

the monarchical power is effective, the want is often felt of a royal counsellor who shall be more intimate with the sovereign than any mere official can be. Both Elizabeth and James I had *favourites*, dependent upon themselves, whom they took a pleasure in preferring to men of greater merit. The Virgin Queen, who might not have a husband, had yet from the beginning of her reign one whom she regarded in a similar way, whom she preferred to others, by whom she chose to be represented, whom she took pleasure now in indulging, now in henpecking. Leicester died at the very moment of her grand apotheosis in September 1588. He had been her commander-in-chief, as in the Low Countries in 1586, so against the Armada, and the appointment has justly been compared to the appointment of the Duke of York to the army of Flanders in 1793. She appointed him that the military force might not pass out of her own control.

After his death we see that she abides by a similar system. She cannot govern by a purely rational method, listening simply to the wisest counsellors and appointing simply the fittest men. But new men are rising, who might have been her children, men who can remember no other sovereign but the Virgin Queen. Out of these she has to select her new favourite; out of these she must fill up Leicester's place. And here begins the fantastic absurdity that disfigures so much that is glorious in Elizabeth's later years. No one was better fitted than Elizabeth to play the part of Spartan mother or 'severe Sabellian mother' to a nation in training for greatness, but her part had been arranged, and she had grown accustomed to her pose, in an earlier time. The Virgin Queen could not be conceived as a mother, but as an object either of devoted human courtship or mystic transcendental courtship. In

the Alençon period this view already began to pall upon the taste of her subjects, and by the time of the Armada it would have been well that she should have ceased to be thought of as marriageable.

After 1588 Elizabeth is really another person. Her own proper work is done, and she has achieved a victory which raises her to a station above 'the warrior-kings of old.' Her old counsellors are dropping off. Leicester went in 1588, Walsingham in 1590, Nicolas Bacon also was no more. Burleigh indeed remains, and Buckhurst, but they almost alone survive to tell of the old gloomy times when the stake stood so often in Smithfield and the scaffold on Tower Hill. The Virgin Queen herself remembered, no one better, those horrors, but she is now surrounded by gladsome young heroes, the Argonauts of English history, to whose imaginations, thanks to her, all such things are strange.

Why, we ask, must she continue to be an object of courtship and to be praised for her beauty? Essex, we see, speedily succeeds to the position of Leicester, and since a favourite must be taken as indispensable, we can only say, Pity that, as the old favourite had been regarded as a husband, the new one, of a younger generation, and Leicester's stepson, could not be regarded as a son! Raleigh too might very becomingly have regarded Elizabeth as a mother, he might have dreamed of her as a Virgin mother! But such was not the etiquette, and a reform was not made. Hence those incredible love-letters of Essex and Raleigh, which make us wonder at the taste of a time otherwise so glorious. There was a real difficulty. Court-life has always something fantastic about it; and here it was especially difficult to restrain the fantastic element.

In order to deal properly with a thing we must be able



to classify it, and the same rule applies to persons. Now the Virgin Queen as she had grown to be since the Armada, as she had been made by a career so unprecedented, by her unhappy birth and childhood, by the trials of her early youth, by her unparalleled reign of thirty years in the midst of every kind of peril, finally by her grand victory and apotheosis, was a person who utterly defied classification.

This period of fifteen years has scarcely yet received the special treatment it deserves. Mr Froude leaves Elizabeth at the opening of it. Mr S. R. Gardiner begins his tale at the close. It is indeed a kind of summit, one of those short periods of fruition, which seem to pass like a dream because a great struggle is over and no other struggle has yet begun. Happiness and glory however, where they occur in history, ought to receive due attention. This is the period when the English genius unfolded itself with the greatest vigour, as though braced by the sea-breezes. It had conceived a great self-confidence, it gazed upon a boundless prospect. It was full of audacity and originality, and showed as yet none of the defects, of which at later periods it has been accused, no narrowness or frenzied party spirit, no conventionalism or pharisaism.

We confine ourselves always to foreign affairs, and we have now to remark that a new Policy, which henceforth is the national policy, begins to be consciously entertained. Sir Francis Drake passed lately over our stage, and led us to reflect how many of the characteristics of modern England seem to begin with him. Now comes another person, representing a phase slightly later, and we may observe that he is more conscious, that he expresses the new ideas by speech and writing. This is Sir Walter Raleigh. As Sir Francis reaches his zenith with the

Armada, Sir Walter culminates a little later, and in him everything is more developed. The plundering raid with him is the colony; while Sir Francis explores the Ocean, Sir Walter penetrates the newly discovered Continent; while Sir Francis 'singes the King of Spain's beard,' Sir Walter lays down a strategical plan for overthrowing his empire; finally, while Sir Francis is dumb, Sir Walter gives utterance to the new ideas in Discourses, Maxims, Speeches, even in Histories. On this side indeed, if he is unlike Sir Francis Drake, he resembles Sir Francis Bacon, and if Bacon expresses the thought of that generation turned inward upon itself, Raleigh utters its view of the world around it, especially the new maritime and oceanic world into which it was breaking way for the first time.

The following passage written by him long after, when James I was reigning and perhaps when Henry IV of France was dead, deserves to stand here as the best expression of the new policy:—

'For Spain, it is a proverb of their own that the lion is not so fierce as he is painted. His forces in all parts of the world (but the Low Countries) are far under the fame; and if the late queen would have believed her men of war, as she did her scribes, we had in her time beaten that great empire in pieces and made their kings kings of figs and oranges, as in old times. But her majesty did all by halves, and by petty invasions taught the Spaniard how to defend himself and to see his own weakness; which, till our attempts taught him, was hardly known to himself. Four thousand men would have taken from him all the ports of his Indies; I mean all his ports, by which his treasure doth or can pass. He is more hated in that part of the world by the sons of the conquered than the English

are by the Irish. We were too strong for him by sea, and had the Hollanders to help us, who are now strongest of all. Yea in eighty-eight, when he made his great and fearful fleet, if the queen would have hearkened to reason, we had burnt all his ships and preparations in his own ports, as we did afterwards upon the same intelligence and doubt in Cadiz.

‘He that knows him not, fears him, but, excepting his Low Country army, which hath been continued and disciplined since Charles V’s time, he is nowhere strong<sup>1</sup>.’

Here indeed is a large and simple view, and a view founded upon intimate knowledge. Raleigh might fairly have drawn from it a *prophecy*, but he attempts to deduce from it a *policy*. He sees, it is evident, the future British Empire as clearly as if it already existed; it is clear to him that the Spanish Power will disappear from the Oceanic world and that the British Power will take its place. But he also assumes, as if it required no proof, that Queen Elizabeth ought to have destroyed the Spanish Empire and to have set up an English Empire in its room, and that she would have done so but for her unhappy disposition to half measures.

It was perhaps almost inevitable that Raleigh’s generation should regard Elizabeth in this way. They saw her after the Armada stand before the world as a Semiramis, and they wondered that since she waged war with Spain and at so manifest an advantage she achieved so little. Certainly if her object was war, she is convicted of half-measures. But her object throughout was *peace*. That

<sup>1</sup> See Raleigh’s Works collected by Oldys and Birch; vol. viii. p. 246. The passage occurs in ‘A Discourse touching a Marriage between Prince Henry of England and a daughter of Savoy.’

object she had held before her for thirty years, and if she had sometimes used threats or connived at violent measures this was because at particular moments peace seemed more attainable by a warlike than by a peaceful attitude. But probably after the grand success of the Armada she was for a time half reconciled to war by the superiority of her sailors and by the plunder they brought in. If however her policy became in consequence unsteady it was scarcely, as Raleigh supposed, because she waged war with half a heart, but rather because she ceased for a time to labour for peace.

The policy which Raleigh would have substituted is avowedly one of boundless conquest. Elizabeth should have listened, he says, to her men of war, not to her scribes. She should have beaten the Spanish Empire in pieces. In other words, England should have transformed herself into a military state, and have burdened herself, as Holland could not avoid doing, with an interminable war. We should thus no doubt have acquired a great empire and a great trade more speedily than we did, but it is also evident that we should have incurred infinite risks and have embarked on a policy of unprincipled adventure such as we have always avoided.

Before the Armada the great question in Elizabeth's Council had been, Should England stand forth at great risk to herself against the Counter-Reformation in defence of the insurgents in the Low Countries and of the Huguenots, or should she remain officially neutral, and confine herself to rendering secret help? But after the Armada the party-division is altered. The question is now between the old school of politicians and those who have deduced from the event of 1588 a new system of policy. It is the question whether England ought to desire peace with

Spain, peace of course on good terms, or should endeavour by means of the naval superiority of which she is now conscious to destroy and tear to pieces the Spanish Empire. And the result of the new balance of parties was such as Raleigh so impatiently describes. England did indeed strike several heavy blows at the maritime power of Spain, by which the lesson first taught in 1588 was effectively inculcated and driven home, so that all the world might know that the events of 1588 had been by no means merely accidental. But England did not shake the colonial empire of Spain, nor make any conquest from her.

It is time however to recollect that the war of England and Spain is but a part of the general war. Even while the Armada was on its way Europe did not quite stand at gaze, and afterwards while the naval power of Spain went down before Drake, Howard and Raleigh, Spain was winning victories on land, which perhaps attracted greater attention, just as two hundred years later Trafalgar itself was almost hidden from the observation of Europe by Ulm. Along with her war with England, Spain continued to wage war in the Low Countries and, what was more important, she carried on a covert though most deadly war with France, and such was her success here that for several years longer the fortune of Philip seemed on the whole in spite of his naval disasters as bright as ever.

In 1588 Philip had been able for a moment to separate France from England. In that year the struggle had been between Spain on the one hand and England and the Dutch insurgents on the other. But soon afterwards this isolation of France ceased. The latent discord which in 1588 paralysed her broke out after a short delay into an open civil war. Henry III murdered Guise at Blois and threw

himself into the arms of Henry of Navarre. The League, having its head-quarters at Paris, broke into open rebellion. France, as it were, *lynched* the royal assassin. Catharine de Medici had died shortly before, and thus the Valois line disappeared in an abyss of infamy. The Bourbon stood forth as King of France, but his kingdom was still to conquer. Here then Elizabeth saw again a condition of France with which she was familiar. Since almost the beginning of her reign she had been in the habit of leaning on the French Huguenots on one side as much as on the Dutch insurgents on the other. Instead of waging war herself she had been in the habit of aiding the belligerents in France and the Low Countries who had the same enemy, namely, the Counter-Reformation. After 1589 she was able to resume this policy. She could employ Henry IV to fight in her cause as earlier she had employed Condé and Coligny.

And thus in outline the war of Elizabeth after the Armada appears very similar to the principal wars of England since. In the naval part England takes the lead and strikes with her whole force. On land she assists her continental allies with subsidies. These allies are, as they continued till past the middle of the seventeenth century except in 1627-9 to be, France and the United Netherlands.

The stroke for universal empire which Philip struck in 1588 is the last of the memorable acts of that strange politician, perhaps the least able man who ever went near to conquer the world. He himself lived to acknowledge that he had failed. Before his death in 1598 he deliberately sought and obtained peace with one of his three adversaries, with France (Treaty of Vervins, 1598). Under his successor Philip III the war with England still dragged

on until the death of Elizabeth, which occurred five years later than that of Philip, and finally in 1609 the war with the Low Countries was suspended by a truce, which might at the time have seemed likely to ripen into a definitive peace. Thus a complete pacification took place, which indeed did not last long, but marks nevertheless the final close of the struggle of which Elizabeth for forty-four years had borne the brunt. When a new European war broke out near the end of the reign of James I, the whole aspect of Europe, and in particular the position of England, had become entirely different.

We have noted the great advantages which Philip enjoyed in 1588. What then were the causes of his failure?

In 1588 Parma was at the height of his success in the Low Countries, and at the same time the League, Philip's instrument, seemed almost all-powerful in France. The Armada failed indeed, but there remained a reasonable prospect for Philip that by becoming supreme through the League in France he would speedily settle with the Dutch and then send a new Armada, not this time from Lisbon but from Antwerp, which would easily effect a landing in England. The events of 1588 had indeed shown that it might be difficult to land here, but they pointed also to the conclusion that, once on English ground, an army commanded by Parma would meet with little organised resistance.

But now the new disturbances in France, the deaths of Guise and Henry III and the outbreak of civil war, defeated this calculation. The party of Philip was not only no longer supreme in France, but it had not even the Government on its side. Henry of Navarre was now legitimate king. He was indeed confronted by a rebellion

of the most formidable kind, of which rebellion Philip was secretly the leader. Nevertheless Philip was not ruler in France but only leader of the opposition. Henry was indeed reduced to great straits, but the conservative feeling of the country, the public opinion of France, was on the whole on his side. The League by itself could not overpower him, if even it could withstand him. Consequently it was necessary for Parma with his army to leave the Low Countries and to take the field in France itself against Henry. Thus in 1590, after Ivry has been won by Henry and when Paris is besieged, Parma advances from the Low Countries to relieve it. Again in 1592 he advances from the Low Countries to relieve Rouen.

Had Parma disposed, like some Napoleon, of great military means, of a large army and an ample war-fund, he would have had a good opportunity at this time of conquering the Low Countries and France together for Philip. But Philip from the very beginning of his reign had been bankrupt. His armies had been small and ill-paid. They had subsisted on plunder, and only the perpetual presence of a great leader, such as Parma, was able to restrain them from mutiny. It had been Parma's masterpiece that with such an instrument he had wellnigh succeeded in reconquering the Low Countries: but with such an instrument he could not conquer France at the same time. The consequence was that at this juncture he lost in the Low Countries as much as he gained in France. It is just at this moment, in 1590 and 1591, that Maurice of Nassau begins his great military career and that the fortresses of North Brabant, of the Waal and of the Yssel, are won to the Republic. Thus for the sake of conquering France Philip at this critical time relaxes his



hold on the Low Countries. In 1592 Parma dies, and soon afterward (1593) Henry's acceptance of Catholicism gives a mortal blow to the League and with it to Philip's interest in France. By attempting too much Philip has lost his advantageous position in both the two continental countries at once.

Meanwhile England has been active at sea. Between the two opposite doctrines, that we should live at peace with Spain, and that we should undertake to destroy the Spanish Empire, there was a middle opinion which it was impossible not to admit, and which at this time recommended an active course. Spain had taken the offensive in 1588, and was likely from mere pride to take it again. A new Armada might be expected. Was it not better to meet this Armada, while it was preparing, on the coast of Spain than to wait for it in the British Channel? This had been preached for a long time by Drake. Before the Armada came he had written, 'Her Majesty and people are not to fear any invasion in her own country, but to seek God's enemies and her Majesty's where they may be found,...for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coast, than a great many more will do here at home' (March 30, 1588); and again, 'These vast preparations of the Spaniard may be speedily prevented, as much as in your Majesty lieth, by sending your forces to encounter them somewhat far off, and more near their own coast, which will be the better cheap for your Majesty and people and much the dearer for the enemy' (April 28th, 1588). This advice, by taking which, it is thought, the great peril of 1588 might have been altogether avoided, was equally good against any second Armada which Spain might contemplate, and recommended itself to the Queen as being 'better cheap.' Accordingly in 1589 England

sent, as we may say, an Armada against Spain. We made the attempt in which Richelieu was afterwards successful, to rouse the national feeling of Portugal, as Philip had so long counted on the party of Mary Stuart in England. A fleet of 150 sail, carrying not less than 23,000 men, first attacked Corunna and captured the lower town, but was repulsed from the upper. Then a force was landed at Peniche and pushed on to Lisbon, where Drake was to meet it with the fleet. But the weather proved unfavourable and Drake advanced no further than Cascaes. Meanwhile no rising of the Portuguese took place, and Philip held Lisbon securely. Tempest and disease made wild work with our fleet. On the whole our Armada, like that of Philip, failed, and our losses were so great that pains were taken to conceal them. It inflicted, however, considerable loss, brought home considerable booty, and confirmed the naval superiority of England.

Thus in the four years between the Armada and the death of Parma Philip has on the whole lost ground everywhere. Maurice is taking the place of Parma as the military genius of the age; Henry is holding his own against the League, aided by subsidies from England. And in the region where since the annexation of Portugal Philip had reigned without a rival, he sees with indignation a plundering piratical state establishing a kind of reign of terror, so that the harbours of his Atlantic coast are not safe and English privateers lie in wait near the Azores for his silver fleets.

But on July 23rd, 1593, an event took place which altered all his prospects and commenced a new age for the continent of Europe. Henry of Navarre was received on that day into the bosom of the Catholic Church by the Archbishop of Bourges at the Cathedral of St Denis.

The full effect of this act was not immediately visible, for it extended ultimately to Henry's international position. But that it destroyed the very root of civil war in France was not long doubtful. The decided adhesion of the French nation, especially of Paris, to Roman Catholicism had been apparent almost from the beginning of the wars of religion, but in adopting the maxim of the Counter-Reformation that no heretic should reign they had put a great constraint upon their feeling of nationality and their regard for ancient custom. In adhering to the Counter-Reformation the French did not desire to surrender their independence to Philip, nor even their old Gallican liberties to the Pope. Henry now gave ample satisfaction to all these feelings at once. He discovered, as it were, a new variety of religion, which differed from pure Popery as much as Anglicanism differed from pure Protestantism. It was a modified form of Gallicanism, and its secret resistance to Popery, which appeared more strikingly in the seventeenth century, was indicated at the outset, when Henry made his way back into Catholicism in spite, as it were, of the Pope, appealing to the authority of French bishops alone.

Neither the Pope nor Philip at first accepted the recantation as sufficient, nor did Philip withdraw his claim to the crown of France. But he could soon perceive that his position in the French party-war was materially lowered, and his chances greatly diminished. Nor could he prevent himself from regarding Henry after his recantation with different eyes. After all Henry was no longer a heretic. It was no longer a matter of principle to oppose him and to wage war with him. And Henry on his side was henceforth prepared for alliance with Spain, nay, for a marriage with the great Habsburg heiress of the

age, who seemed to be the Juana of the new time, Clara Isabella, daughter of Philip II. As his religion was changed, his sympathies began to change too. Hitherto he had taken English subsidies and made common cause with the Dutch. But he was not less open to conviction in politics than in religion. He had, as it were, restored France to her place among the Powers, and what alliances she should make, to what system she should attach herself, was a question which he considered with a mind perfectly unprejudiced.

Hitherto there has been concert and mutual aid between Henry, the Dutch, and England. But their concert has been most strictly limited. It cannot be said that either Henry or even Elizabeth herself wish success to the Dutch in their struggle against Spain. Both alike perhaps expect, and are contented to expect, that Philip will, on some terms or other, recover the Low Countries. Nor does France wish triumphant success to England nor England to France. But that any one of these three Powers should be utterly crushed by Philip is what the other two cannot allow, and so long as there is danger of this their concert continues. Now, however, that Henry has made his way back into the bosom of the Romish Church, and has acquired a prospect of Spanish alliance and Spanish marriages he begins to regard this concert as less indispensably necessary, and has at least passing glimpses of a wholly different system. It suits Philip to encourage this new way of thinking, the more so as he is quite able to admit the idea of alliance with Henry, now no longer a heretic.

And thus the war enters into a new phase, which extends to the year 1598. This is the year of a great settlement, which is immediately followed by the death of Philip II.

In this phase the concert of the three Powers against Philip which, though seldom avowed, has existed ever since the days of Coligny, takes a more articulate shape than before, for the very reason that it is threatened with dissolution. What had been secure because it was necessary now requires to be secured by forms. France in the fresh enthusiasm of restored religious unity seems likely to break away from the alliance of heretical Powers, and to go over to the side of Spain in politics as she has done in religion. England and the Low Countries fear to be deserted by their ally. And deserted in the end they are, when in 1598 Henry IV concludes the Treaty of Vervins. Meanwhile however, as Spain and the Pope still refuse to recognize the recantation, Henry must fight on, and accordingly he is forced to give his allies a new security. In January 1595 he issues a formal declaration of war against Spain. In 1596 a formal coalition against Philip is arranged by a Treaty of Alliance offensive and defensive between Henry and Elizabeth, to which alliance the States General accede in the same year.

This league had indeed little duration, and was cynically violated by Henry in the second year after it had been concluded, when he signed a separate peace with Spain at Vervins. In international history, however, it stands as an important landmark, partly as dating the admission of the United Netherlands into the number of independent States, partly as giving a precise picture of the European system of that age. It has long since passed away. Other ascendancies arose later, and other coalitions were formed to meet them, till it began to be almost forgotten that any European Power can be the object of universal dread except France. In the latter half of the sixteenth century however, as we see, the object of

dread is the Spanish Monarchy, and the coalition against it is composed of England, France and the Protestant Low Countries. This constellation, we shall find, did not pass away speedily. It is still visible in the age of Cromwell, and has not quite disappeared in the reign of Charles II.

Thus the whole Philippine war of Europe, as we might call the struggle against Philip's ascendancy that began in 1588, falls into three periods. In the first, which extends to 1596, the three Powers chiefly threatened fight either separately or with a concert which is secret. From 1596 to 1598 they are united in a formal coalition, which, be it observed, is a coalition between one Catholic Power and two Protestant Powers against the Counter-Reformation. After 1598 this coalition has been dissolved by the Treaty of Vervins. The war is henceforth between Spain, now ruled by Philip III, and England and the Netherlands only. This phase extends beyond the death of Elizabeth.

Only we must bear in mind the very exceptional character of Henry IV. If the character of Elizabeth has been to many a stumbling-block, so that they can scarcely believe that the modern greatness of England was really founded by a sovereign capable of so much fraud and meanness, much more bewildering must we find the character of Henry IV. He is the founder of Bourbon France. He established the Bourbon family, which for a century rivalled the House of Austria and for another century took the lead of it. Yet we must recognise that scarcely any obligations of any kind were able to restrain him. In particular he respected the faith of treaties as little as he regarded religion or private morality. Accordingly as he broke his engagements to Elizabeth and the States by making the Treaty of Vervins, so he disregarded just as cynically the Treaty of Vervins

itself. And therefore in the last of the three phases I have just distinguished it is not really true that France no longer aids the opponents of Spain. Henry continues to send help to the Dutch. He does so for his own sake, and simply because he is convinced that the interests of France require the weakening of Spain. Practically therefore the third phase is not very different from the first.

Such is the general character of the war between Philip and the Three Powers. It is to be remarked that France, which in no long time was to become so great, is in this period quite on the defensive. Until his recantation Henry controls but a small part of the country. His position is like that of Charles VII in the days of Jeanne d'Arc. When he begins to be recognised as the national sovereign and when he has entered Paris, he has still much of his own kingdom to reconquer. Then comes the phase of the formal war with Philip and the formal league with England and the Netherlands. In this phase too he still wages war within the limits of his own kingdom. While England takes the offensive by sea, and the Netherlands are beginning to do so too, France remains on the defensive. Thus in 1595 her campaign is in Picardy and in Burgundy. Dourlens is captured by the Spanish Fuentas; so is Cambrai. On the other hand Henry retakes Dijon. In 1596 the Spaniards take Calais, while Marseilles, still in possession of the League and about to be seized by Spain, is recovered for France. Early in 1597 again Amiens is surprised by Spanish and Walloon soldiers, and Henry is reduced to despair at the news of the disaster.

Meanwhile in 1596 a great naval expedition consisting of English and Dutch ships sailed for Spain. Howard,

Essex, Raleigh, and Lewis Gunther of Nassau presented themselves before Cadiz. The Spanish fleet, consisting of thirty-two ships with twelve hundred guns, was burnt, and the town itself was taken and set on fire. This achievement is described by Professor Laughton as the Trafalgar of the Elizabethan war. It is also the first appearance of that concert of the Sea Powers, as they were to be called in the seventeenth century, which dominated the politics of Europe in the days of William III.

In 1597 England undertook what is called the Island Voyage, pursuing still the same aggressive policy. The results however were in this case disappointing.

Henry however was able to retrieve some of his ill successes by the recapture of Amiens, in spite of an advance of the Archduke Albert from the Low Countries to relieve it, in September 1597. He was therefore in a favourable position to negotiate for peace, and he made it at Vervins with great honour to himself, so far as Philip was concerned, though with great dishonour in respect of his allies. In truth, if not Philip personally, yet the Counter-Reformation in general had now no further quarrel with Henry. In particular the Pope, whose subsidies were all-important to Philip, was now not only willing but actually eager to make peace with a king who was independent of Philip and able in some degree to control him. For we must always remember that the Popes were never led by their antagonism to heresy to forget the older feud which had so long raged between them and the emperors.

Philip, emperor in fact if not in name, was an object of secret animosity to the Papal See for which he professed to sacrifice so much. The Popes felt strangled by a Power which threatened them at once from Milan and from



Naples. In the old time they had been in the habit of looking to France for aid against the overwhelming power of the Emperor. Now that Henry had become a Catholic it became possible to return to this policy. Clement VIII (Aldobrandini) helped materially to make the Treaty of Vervins. It may be said of him, in the words which old Rome applied to C. Gracchus, that he made the Catholic Republic double-headed. For the Papal See his policy may have been prudent. But when we seek a solution of the great problem which the seventeenth century suggests, how it was that the Counter-Reformation, at the outset so overwhelmingly superior, nevertheless failed, so that in the eighteenth century Protestantism appears to have the upper hand, we seem to find the solution in that incurable discord which was introduced into the bosom of Catholicism by the steady rivalry of the two great Catholic Houses, that of Austria and that of Bourbon.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CLOSE OF THE ELIZABETHAN AGE.

THE year 1598 is a very considerable epoch both in European and in English history. It is the year in France of the Treaty of Vervins and of the signing of the Edict of Nantes. In the Spanish Monarchy it is the year of the Treaty of Vervins, of the transference of the Low Countries by Philip II to the Archduke Albert and his wife, Isabella, daughter of Philip, and of the death of Philip II. In England it is the year of the same treaty, by which England was betrayed, and also of the death of Lord Burleigh.

Elizabeth reigned for five years deprived of the help of her old minister, who had stood by her side ever since her accession, and relieved of that old enemy whom she had dreaded and watched ever since her accession. During these years her enemy was not Philip II but Philip III, and her minister was not William Cecil but Robert Cecil.

These five years offer no international event of great importance if we set aside the personal union of England and Scotland, of which they witnessed the silent approach. But the war dragged on, and the question for us is to

consider what was the obstacle to peace. For at the time when Henry made the Treaty of Vervins, everything tends to show that Elizabeth desired peace as she had done all along; while the utter exhaustion of Spain, which Philip II had acknowledged with singular frankness in the Treaty of Vervins and the transference of the Low Countries, leads us to wonder why Philip III should wish to continue a war for which he was not responsible.

Since 1596 Ireland had been in rebellion, and the task of pacifying the island was imposed upon Elizabeth. A military operation of such magnitude was almost beyond the resources of our state, such as it then was. It opened the redoubtable financial problem which involved, as the sequel showed, a constitutional revolution. In any case it demanded rest from foreign war. It admonished Elizabeth to make her way back at all hazards to the happy time when she had been able to secure her people from foreign complications. We learn that Burleigh, who in his earlier days had sometimes found Elizabeth too pacific, strongly opposed in his old age the party of irreconcilables. He denounced upon the Anti-Spanish faction the curse of the Psalmist which says that bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days.

And yet Elizabeth found as long as she lived that she could not make peace, though as soon as she was gone peace, as it were, made itself.

It is easy to understand that Philip III may not at the moment of his accession have admitted the necessity of bringing the war with England to an end. His father had bequeathed to him a new policy, which considerably diminished the burden of war, and it was only reasonable to allow this policy a fair trial. Philip II had made

peace handsomely with France, not only abandoning for his daughter the pretension he had made in her behalf to the French crown, but also ceding all the acquisitions he had lately made within the French frontier. It was not unlikely that this peace might be followed by alliance and intermarriage between the Spanish House and that of Bourbon, now that the Bourbon prince was a Catholic. Further Philip II had actually ceded his Flemish dominions to his daughter and her husband, the Archduke Albert. He had indeed made rigid conditions, nevertheless he had ceded that dominion, as his father had abdicated crown after crown to himself forty years before. Had the archduke had a son, he would have succeeded before Philip III or Philip IV to the Burgundian inheritance, though indeed it was pretty well understood that a son they would never have. But a considerable modification was thus made in the aspect of the Dutch War. It began again to appear probable that on some terms or other the rebellious provinces, which had not yielded to Philip II, would submit to Albert and Isabella, whose power seemed less crushing, and also less likely to excite the jealousy of France, than that of a king of half the world. And as for Elizabeth, was she not now embarrassed by an Irish rebellion? This rebellion opened for Spain quite new prospects, or at least revived the prospects that had been extinguished by the death of Mary of Scotland. It had begun to be clear that Ireland was won in the main to the Counter-Reformation. Here then was a basis of operations. Elizabeth had shown herself strong by sea, but she had acquired little reputation by land, and it was held that the British islands for want of fortified places could, if once invaded, make little resistance. Moreover Elizabeth had always acted as if she were in want of

money. There was therefore reason to think that the Irish rebellion would in any case paralyse her, and that if Spanish troops could make their way to the assistance of the rebels Ireland might be made a stepping-stone to England. It was true that Philip II had failed not only with his Armada of 1588, but also in later attempts to effect a landing in the British islands. But was Spain to resign without a struggle the empire of the sea? Philip II's old minister, Antonio Perez, who had himself spent some years in England, handed in a paper to Philip III on his accession, in which he argued that this was by no means necessary. He proposed in the first place that the maritime possessions of Spain should be guarded by six fleets, one of which should be stationed off Gibraltar. In the second place the arts of England should be turned against herself. She had acquired a certain ephemeral greatness by privateering. Let the king of Spain encourage his subjects in like manner to prey upon the English shipping. In Catalonia and in the Biscayan provinces were many who had long been eager to do this. By such a policy the piratical state would soon be brought upon its knees. And the same policy would be still more effective if applied to the Dutch provinces. For if England had some internal wealth, the Dutch subsisted almost entirely upon their foreign trade, which to the wonder of the world they had maintained throughout the war even with the Spaniards themselves. Without the help of armies, without any military operations on the part of the archdukes, the Dutch provinces might be starved out if only their foreign trade were destroyed by privateers from Corunna or Barcelona.

Surely a formidable scheme! But here we see that something depends on forms of government. The des-

potism which the Habsburgs had introduced into Spain could not tolerate such freedom of action on the part of its subjects. And the same despotism had by this time paralysed and stupefied the Government itself. Philip III was as much inferior in intelligence to Philip II as Philip II had been to Charles V. In the hands of Lerma, the Vizir of Philip III, the Spanish Government was for a while almost as inefficient as later under Charles II it was permanently. In the meantime, however, it appeared to this Government worth while to continue the war with England. And this being so, it was still as necessary for England as it had been in the days of Alva to see that the Dutch provinces were not conquered. Elizabeth threatened the States a great deal and drove a hard bargain with them, but she continued to lend them aid.

The last phase of her reign is in an international point of view not very different from that earlier phase when the Dutch rebellion was commencing. That she is now avowedly at war with Spain, whereas then she was not, is a less substantial difference than it might seem. For at that time she made covert war with Spain, by lending aid to the Dutch, and even now her war consists principally in lending such aid. Indeed throughout the whole period the reality of international relations is very different from the form. In spite of all treaties it remains true through the whole period that England, France, and the Dutch are in concert against Spain. As to Henry, whether he is in coalition with England and the Dutch, or whether he deserts that coalition at Vervins, in either case his forces help the Dutch. And in like manner England, whether she is not yet at war with Spain, or *is* at war with Spain, or after the death of Elizabeth makes peace with Spain,

under all circumstances alike, as we shall find, sends aid to the Dutch.

Almost the only occurrence of the war between Elizabeth and Philip III, which needs to be mentioned in a sketch like this, is the invasion of Ireland under Don Juan de Aguilar. He landed at Kinsale with 6000 men in January, 1602. But he was met by the able Deputy, Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, afterwards Earl of Devonshire, who had already half accomplished the pacification of Ireland. He was forced to a capitulation by which his army was carried back to Spain in English transports.

Elizabeth lived but one year after this, and in her last days she showed herself more hostile to Spain than at any earlier period. In 1600 she had actually commenced negotiations for peace at Boulogne, but now we find her actively striving to revive the coalition of 1596. In January, 1602, just at the moment of Don Juan de Aguilar's invasion, she proposes to Henry an offensive alliance against Spain. This is declined, but Elizabeth repeats it in July. In the interval the conspiracy of Biron had broken out, and Henry had been alarmed by a kind of revival of the combination which had caused the ruin of Henry III. As Guise had conspired with Philip II in 1588, so now Biron with Philip III, for the complicity of Spain was manifest. It was a combination not quite so dangerous as that of 1588, for the religious question had been settled in the interval, but there was danger enough in the feudal feeling of the great nobles and in that total want of patriotism or national feeling which was the old disease of France, which the religious wars had increased, and which was not to be healed till the time of Louis XIV. For a moment France and Spain seemed on the verge of another war, and Elizabeth seized

her opportunity. At first her offer was favourably received. But on reflexion Henry decided to wait a little longer before embarking on the new war with the House of Austria which was the dream of his later years. Elizabeth encountered a second refusal.

The more interesting occurrences of her last days do not concern us here. The deplorable story of Essex has no international bearing except so far as Essex had dealings with James of Scotland, and it is convenient here to hold Scotch affairs distinct from the affairs of the Continent.

Elizabeth died early on the morning of March 24th, 1603.

When we inquire how much had been accomplished for England during the time and by the means of her government we are astonished at the magnitude, as well as at the thoroughness and permanence, of the work.

At the date of her accession the country seemed to sway in a helpless manner between the two religions. There was in England no overwhelming drift towards Protestantism, as at that time there was in Germany, and no decided adhesion to the Counter-Reformation, as in France. The oscillations of the country in the last three reigns had been violent and always terrible. How could England ever come to know her own mind, and in the meantime how could she, being neither Catholic nor Protestant, face the religious storm which was about to sweep over Europe?

At the end of Elizabeth's reign the religious question was practically settled. England had taken up her religious position, and with such deliberation and confidence that she has never since substantially altered it. And this she had done calmly, without any religious war.



At the date of Elizabeth's accession the country laboured under another evil, scarcely less terrible, and of older standing. The succession was uncertain. In the fifteenth century this intestine disease had covered the country with blood for thirty years, had darkened the national character and stained the national history. In the sixteenth century, when it broke out again in the difficulty of fixing the succession to Henry VIII, in the wild rebellions that accompanied the accession of Mary, then in the dangerous abeyance of the question in the reign of Elizabeth, it showed itself as a deep-seated, almost incurable evil. In the daughter of Anne Boleyn it seemed visibly embodied. How was it possible that she of all persons should cure this chronic disease?

Yet at the end of her reign it was cured. Her successor took his seat on the throne with almost universal acclamation, and if in the seventeenth century and later England again knew Pretenders, the disease was now of a milder type and threatened no second War of the Roses.

As a result of these two great evils, at her accession the English temperament was troubled and gloomy. People had grown accustomed to the sight of bishops at the stake and queens at the block. Later they had to accustom themselves to the danger of foreign wars and Spanish Armadas.

During Elizabeth's reign this national melancholy went on healing itself. It gave place to a sanguine self-confidence, a robust and boisterous national pride, which first led to a loving study of English history and antiquities, and then broke out in a national poetry, which in Shakspeare overflows with jubilant patriotism. The Scotsman Drummond a little later finds that the English

school of literature errs principally by its extravagantly national character, and Sully passes the same judgment upon English statesmanship.

At her accession England was threatened by another great evil. Almost all countries of Europe were passing one after another by royal marriage into the Habsburg estate. It was desirable not only to escape this calamity, but also to reap the benefit which might accidentally flow from royal marriage. On the one hand England must not become a province of Spain; on the other hand England and Scotland ought to be united.

But it seemed almost impossible for Elizabeth either to avoid the evil or to secure the good. For Elizabeth was a woman, and must marry. If she married, it would be beneath her dignity to accept any husband that was not either a Habsburg or a Valois, and in either case England would run the risk of becoming a province in some continental Monarchy. But if by remaining a Virgin Queen she should avert this result, there still remained a difficulty in the way of the union of England and Scotland. For the Scotch queen was a Catholic and a Guise, and was almost certain to marry some leading Catholic prince. Thus if England and Scotland were at last united they would be united in the Counter-Reformation.

Nevertheless at the end of her reign England remained in the first place free from all foreign entanglements. No Habsburg or Bourbon prince had any dangerous claim upon the succession. Secondly, England and Scotland were prepared to unite themselves under one sceptre, and that sceptre was in the hand of a Protestant.

It was the work of Elizabeth to have created such a Monarchy of Britain. She laid the foundation of it in the Treaty of Edinburgh. It has been since developed much

further, but the solid foundation, which lies in the Reformation itself, remains where it was.

By abstaining from all foreign connexions and by strengthening the connexion with Scotland Elizabeth made our state for the first time truly insular. She gave us that frontier which has hitherto proved impassable. She thus raised us to a position of self-sufficing security which few other states enjoy, so that since her time Englishmen have seldom felt their country to be really in danger.

Insularity has its intellectual and moral disadvantages. And soon after Elizabeth's time we remark that English people begin to be careless and ignorant of the affairs, the interests and thoughts of the Continent. They become too much wrapped up in themselves. But Elizabeth's reign introduced another innovation which did much to counterbalance this evil. For as she withdrew us from the Continent she introduced us to the Ocean and to the New World. We by no means ceased to have interests outside our own island. Rather, we became for the first time explorers, colonisers. And whereas the Spaniards, while possessing half the globe, had contrived to keep their minds intensely narrow and to learn as little as possible from the new things they saw, we grasped the New World in a more curious and sympathetic way, acting as individuals and traders rather than as mere officials. In the first generation of our truly insular life we seem to have rather gained than lost in breadth of intelligence by the transition.

Such are the vast results of Elizabeth's reign. When we inquire how they were attained we certainly do not find either that they were accidental or that they grew up by natural development, so that no credit should be due

for them to the Government. They were due in the main to Elizabeth's policy, and would have been lost if she had acted otherwise; for example, if she had married Philip II or Leicester or Alençon, if she had stood out in the fashion of Edward VI as an aggressive champion of Protestantism, if she had squandered vast sums upon a policy of adventure, or if in other ways she had acted unwisely. But if we inquire further in what precisely the wisdom of Elizabeth consisted, we are struck by one most remarkable feature of her reign.

Never in the more recent centuries of English history, has a ruler held the reins of government nearly so long as Elizabeth. We have had since two great sovereigns and several great ministers, but Oliver ruled but five years and had a ruling influence not more than eleven, and William ruled not fully fourteen. Of the great ministers Pitt held office in all less than twenty years. But Elizabeth reigned with full vigour for more than forty-four years.

As a matter of course a long reign offers more opportunities for strokes of statesmanship, more room for the execution of large and complicated plans, than a short one. But the peculiar feature of Elizabeth's rule is that in dealing with foreign states she has no plans and no strokes of statesmanship. The time which was allowed to her in such ample measure is, as it were, not the room in which, but the material itself with which she achieves her results. We know how much time itself by its mere lapse, even though nothing is done, may accomplish of good. And so we call time the healer or the consoler. We know too that other statesmen have been aware of this important fact. 'Time and I against the world,' said Mazarin. Among all great rulers it is the distinction of Elizabeth to have shown how much may be achieved by simply allowing full play to the influence of time.

Such statesmanship is not possible in a state where no ruler can reasonably expect to retain power for more than a year or two. Elizabeth herself, though she reached the throne in youth, must before long have learnt the probability that her reign would be cut short by assassination. But with that defiance of probability which belongs to high courage she behaved as if she were to grow old on the throne. And her faith was rewarded. She did grow old on the throne. And if we ask what did she give to England during this long reign, the answer is, the reign itself. 'Now, Mr Speaker,' said Elizabeth once, 'what has passed in the Lower House?' Mr Speaker answered, 'May it please your Majesty, seven weeks.' In like manner what passed in Elizabeth's reign was chiefly forty-four years.

But when we speak thus of time we include in it the idea of rest. It was the business of Elizabeth during those forty-four years to give England rest. This was her one problem, difficult enough in one of the wildest half-centuries that have passed over Europe. We have seen how she preserved peace for twenty-six years, the very years when Alva raged in the Netherlands and the Guises in France. It is true that this long peace was followed by eighteen years of war. And yet it may be said that, except in Ireland, the war of Elizabeth was to her people almost like a peace. For the enemy could not reach us. Within the country there were few signs of a state of war. Nor were the pursuits of peace suspended. Her parsimony reduced the pressure of taxation. And the naval war, so far from checking the development of the nation was the very ferment which promoted it. The naval war with Spain was but a name for the exploration, discovery and colonisation in which England was feeling her way to greatness.

How Elizabeth came to have such a 'large faith in time,' or whether she actually had it, has been discussed above. Perhaps the extreme danger of her position, making all action unsafe, first threw her back upon delay. But for such deep-seated diseases as then racked England there is no remedy but time. From those sick religious doubts (*perpetua formidine*), those frenzies of religious discord, or again from those obstinate clannish feuds that arise out of a disputed title, there is but one escape. The generation that is tormented by them must die out, and a new generation spring up. But in the meantime what shall be done? The one thing is rest. Fresh action on the old lines, which would aggravate all the diseases, must be avoided. Civil war must not be allowed to break out, nor religious war. Hence those devices of Elizabeth. 'Are we Catholics? are we Protestants?' said the people. Elizabeth gave them a new variety of the Reformation which we now call Anglicanism from the country itself. She founded what may be called a nation-church. It was a solution that served the turn. 'Who is our rightful sovereign?' asked the people. 'You have me for the present,' was the answer, 'but I shall have no children; after me will come Mary or, it may be, a Grey, or James.' This too was an answer which served the turn. And as the years passed by, a new generation sprang up whose minds were agitated by other thoughts. It was a more cheerful generation. Some of them 'discovered islands far away';<sup>1</sup> some of them devised systems of philo-

<sup>1</sup> *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. III, where a list is given of the ways by which young men sought preferment:

Some to the wars to seek their fortune there,  
Some to discover islands far away,  
Some to the studious universities.

sophy; some of them wrote sonnets; some of them wrote plays.

This could not but happen, because among the various courses which Elizabeth could not safely take was the course of cramping the impulses of her people by harsh government. Some of the best sovereigns England has had have been those whose title was weak. Such was William III, such was Oliver, and, let us observe, such was Elizabeth, being to all her Catholic subjects both illegitimate and excommunicate. In this respect she differed from her father, whom for the most part she made her model. She was Henry VIII with a weaker title. Thus it is that in some respects she resembles Henry VII. Hence in spite of her haughty bearing towards Parliament, and of her studied mannishness, she is fully aware how much she depends on public opinion. Though she will not act herself, she will let her people act. As she said herself, she was married to her people.

All the modern life and greatness of England can be traced to those forty-four years in which so many old thoughts were forgotten and so many new thoughts were conceived. This is Elizabeth's work. We do not ask here what was her character. That too is a most interesting question. But when we consider her, not in herself but in relation to English history, we ask, what was her work? And we answer that the greatness of it can scarcely be exaggerated, so that if, in her own language, she was married to that generation of Englishmen we may add that she is the mother of all generations that have succeeded.

## PART II.

### *REACTION.*

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## CHAPTER I.

### OUTLINES.

AT the end of Elizabeth's reign begins one of the greater transitions of international history. Peace was speedily made between England and Spain, and five years later a truce suspended the war of Spain with the Netherlands. But though a new war did not begin immediately afterwards, it was visible enough that no happy period of peace was in store for Europe. The old differences were indeed dead. Both France and England had fairly escaped the Habsburg net. The House of Bourbon was firmly established, and had restored unity and greatness to France. The piratical state which had shaken the maritime dominion of Spain, maintained its position, and had been raised to a higher level of greatness and security by the personal union with Scotland and by the utter extinction of all disputes about the succession. Perhaps



too the truce with the Netherlands to which Philip III consented in 1609 appeared at the time, though it was not so really, but a disguise of a definitive peace, adopted to salve the pride of Spain. But it was soon visible to all, it was already clearly visible to Henry IV, that a new arrangement of the European Powers was taking place, out of which would arise new wars not less serious than those in which he had passed his youth and middle age.

We have marked two causes which had operated almost equally to produce those wars. First, royal marriage, so handled by the House of Austria as to become an instrument of conquest, had produced immense political aggregates in which already more than half of Europe had been, and the rest seemed likely to be, absorbed. Secondly, the Counter-Reformation, arising out of the Council of Trent and pressing with the most unscrupulous urgency the religious reunion of Europe, had played into the hands of the Habsburg family.

The Habsburg policy had been favoured by several fortunate coincidences, by that 'regiment of women' which had so unseasonably commenced in England and Scotland, and by the dying out of the House of Avis in Portugal and of the House of Valois in France. On these coincidences and on the Counter-Reformation the greatness of Philip II had been founded. Now after an obstinate struggle his aggressions had been checked. To the end however he had maintained a sort of military superiority at least on land, and when the truce was concluded in 1609, what the Spaniards felt most bitterly was that it would break up their army of the Low Countries, the finest army in the world. But now that the war was over there was no reason why the Habsburg Power, even if worsted on the whole, should begin forthwith to decline.

It could fall back upon its old methods. It could make new marriages. For what royal family would not be proud to furnish brides to Habsburg princes? And yet every such bride supplied the House with a new pretension. The resources of the House had as yet by no means been brought fully into play. Nor was the impulse of the Counter-Reformation yet on the decline; nay, it was at this time more lively and more victorious than ever.

It was likely enough then that Europe would witness a second aggression, perhaps a second ascendancy, of the House of Habsburg. It was not impossible that such a second aggression might be little more than a repetition of the first. That is, the House of Spain, now at peace, might weave a new web of royal alliances and conquer the world again by marriage. If we but cast a glance upon the period, we actually see this process beginning. There is a double marriage between the Houses of Habsburg and Bourbon. The Prince of Asturias marries Elizabeth of France, and Henry IV himself gives a great deal of thought to that marriage of the Dauphin to the Infanta Anne, from which (carried into effect after his death) sprang Louis XIV. Spanish marriages, completed or designed, make a great part of the history of the reign of our James I. There are plans of a Spanish marriage for Henry, Prince of Wales, and for Elizabeth Stuart, and finally there is a plan, which absorbs for a long time the attention of both nations, for marrying Charles, Prince of Wales, to a Spanish Infanta.

Such a second aggression, even such a second ascendancy, actually took place, but not in this way. For another way was open, as Henry IV early perceived. It may have already surprised us in tracing the fortunes of the House of Austria to find that after the great

bifurcation at the retirement of Charles V the Austrian branch, though in the division of spoils it carries off the imperial dignity itself, seems to drop out of sight. How completely does Philip II eclipse during his whole reign the three relatives who, as Emperors, took precedence of him in dignity, his uncle Ferdinand, his cousin Maximilian, his nephew Rudolph! He did not clearly surpass them in ability, but he surpassed them beyond comparison in power. It had been arranged by Charles V, as we remarked above, that Philip should be his true successor, and really, though not nominally, emperor. Even so, however, the obscurity of these emperors is not accounted for. If not equal to Philip, they were lords of a great territory, not merely of Austria proper with Tirol and the provinces of the Eastern Alps, but also of Hither Austria and of Bohemia, with which went Silesia. Austria has been a great Power since, even under weak rulers, and yet in the age of Philip II his Austrian cousins not only do not rival him, but do not much help him. Some members indeed of the Austrian House take part in his wars, as the Archduke Albert, but the Austrian state, as such, is not found lending aid to him.

This might conceivably be altered. If we only suppose some internal change to take place in the dominions of the Austrian Habsburg, so as to make him as powerful for international action as he is powerful in mere extent of territory, or further let us suppose that not only in his hereditary dominions, but in Germany itself the emperor recovers something of his old power--and then let us suppose that he coalesces in close alliance with his cousin the Spanish Habsburg, and we have the conditions of a new Habsburg Ascendency of the most formidable kind.

This then is what Henry IV foresaw, and what he was

already bestirring himself to prevent, when Ravallac so suddenly frustrated all his plans. Within a few years from that time nothing else was thought of in Europe but the concert of the two branches of the House of Habsburg. A new age was begun, a new series of wars was unrolling itself. Again the House of Habsburg was alarming Europe; Spain was again active; the struggle in the Low Countries began again, and the truce did *not* ripen into a peace. But this time Spain is scarcely so much spoken of as the emperor. This time the scene of war is not mainly the Low Countries, but Germany itself, from the Baltic to Bavaria and Hungary; it is the Thirty Years' War.

Before entering upon a narrative of English policy during this period, we may attend to some of the larger features of the period itself, and especially to the altered international position of England.

First let us observe that, though the Thirty Years' War has Germany for its scene, and draws into its vortex most of the states of Europe—England, France, Spain, Denmark, Sweden—yet another war of great importance goes on at the same time and in the neighbourhood of it. This is the second war of Spain with the Low Countries, which began in 1621, or three years later than the Thirty Years' War, and was brought to an end in 1648 at the same time as the Thirty Years' War. It is the old war recommencing after the expiration of the Truce. Philip IV of Spain renews the struggle which Philip II had carried on with such obstinacy, and which Philip III had suspended for twelve years.

In the main the new European contest is a repetition of the old. Again the Counter-Reformation threatens to overwhelm the states of the Reformation. This time

indeed its plan is more comprehensive, including Central as well as Western Europe, but within Western Europe the plan is the same as before. We have seen how in the Elizabethan age everything turned on the Dutch rebellion. By this England and France were irresistibly drawn into the struggle with Spain, since Elizabeth in self-defence could not allow the Dutch to be crushed and since the Protestants of the Low Countries were in the closest concert with the Huguenots of France. For twelve years this danger has been suspended, but it returns when the House of Habsburg and the Counter-Reformation open the new age of war by their combined advance. Perhaps then we might be led to conclude that England will be forced in self-defence to revive the policy of Elizabeth, and in like manner that France will return to the system of Henry IV.

And in fact France did feel herself obliged to do this. The great feature of the age before us is the activity of France, which draws her by degrees into a career of conquest. This age in France is the age of Richelieu and Mazarin, but we shall find that the warlike policy of Richelieu was not adopted at the outset from ambition, but in self-defence. He feels the pressure of the same necessity which made the last years of Henry IV restless, the necessity of breaking loose from the imprisonment in which France was held by the House of Habsburg, and we shall find that though he is led to take part in the German war against the Austrian Habsburg, yet the Spanish Habsburg, his neighbour in the Low Countries and Franche Comté, is the enemy he has principally in view.

But with England it is otherwise. For her the Elizabethan age is past, never to return; she not only

does not revive, but has no need to revive, the Elizabethan policy. Even in the Elizabethan age England, when she was most hard pressed, was in less extreme danger than France. The Armada could effect no landing in England, but France was twice invaded by the army of Parma, and Paris held out for Spain against Henry IV. There was still in Richelieu's time but a land-frontier between France and the seat of war in the Netherlands, and the religious division, which had been the weakness of France, still subsisted. Richelieu had still to remember that there was a Huguenot party in France, and that by aiding the Dutch against Spain he might provoke the frenzy of a second League. But Elizabeth's reign had raised England into a security she had never known before and has never lost since. We have had moments of anxiety since, as in the early years of William III, but the chronic anxiety which had weighed upon us for some thirty years together in Elizabeth's time—this was an incubus which had been removed once for all. Throughout the period of the 'Thirty Years' War the interest which England takes in Continental politics is of a different kind from what it had been in Elizabeth's time. The devastation of Germany, the danger of destruction under which the Protestantism of North Germany laboured, might affect the generous or the religious feelings of Englishmen, but they were evils comparatively remote. Holland indeed was near at hand, and Holland was now once more attacked by Spain; but the circumstances were wholly different from those which had made it so imperative for England to interfere in Elizabeth's time. Much is said of the littleness and half-heartedness of the Stuarts, who could not rise to the idea of protecting the interests of Protestantism abroad. In this respect, however, they did not differ from Elizabeth,

who had always steadfastly refused the part of a champion of Protestantism, and who had aided the Dutch grudgingly, reluctantly, and always barely as much as was needed, not for their deliverance, but for the safety of England. Only what seemed enough when it was still doubtful whether the English were a Catholic or a Protestant nation dissatisfied a later generation which was ardently Protestant. But in 1620 both England and Holland were incomparably stronger than they had been in 1580. Holland was now at the height of prosperity, the richest country in the world, possessing a great trade and important trading relations, and skilled from long practice in the art of growing richer and more prosperous by war with Spain. There was no fear then this time that Holland would be overwhelmed, and that England's turn would come next. But England too in 1620 was not the same state that she had been under the queen. England and Scotland were united in the person of the king and united in the Reformation. All those dangerous and terrible discords which in the queen's time had laid the island open to foreign invasion were extinguished. There were no longer two sovereigns in the island and two evenly balanced religions; no longer two systems of alliance and of royal affinity. The state ruled by James was as much greater than the state ruled by Elizabeth as James himself was less great than Elizabeth.

Hence a broad difference which for us is of capital importance between the age of the first Stuarts and that of Elizabeth. Elizabeth's reign is devoted to foreign affairs. In reviewing it we have been constrained to take notice of every great change that took place on the Continent, because every such change was of importance to England. The causes which determined English policy

lay in that reign outside England. How the rebellion might fare in the Low Countries, or the Huguenot movement in France, who might be elected Pope, who might be sent by Philip as governor to Brussels, these were the all-important questions upon which English policy depended. But after the accession of the Stuart and the peace with Spain the tension is in some sense relaxed in foreign affairs. It is true that in no long time another kind of tension begins to be perceptible. The country has become ardently Protestant, and is inclined to force a Protestant policy upon its Government.

This appears most evidently from the commencement early in the reign of James of the great constitutional debate. Powers which Elizabeth had been allowed to exercise are refused to James, and the parliamentary leaders who enter on this new path take some pains, and have some difficulty, in explaining their inconsistency. The true explanation is evident when we compare the two periods. Constitutional questions came into the foreground because the greatest foreign questions had been settled. Just as after the Napoleonic wars a period of reform set in, and the kind of stagnation into which legislation had fallen was broken up, so at the end of the long Spanish war Parliament was relieved from a pressure which had paralysed it.

We are not concerned here with the constitutional question, but our narrative cannot but be affected by the cause which led to the opening of it at this time. We can proceed henceforth more rapidly, we have henceforth less to tell, at least so far as English relations with the Continent are concerned. In the religious war of the seventeenth century England plays a less prominent part than in that of the sixteenth. While Germany was laid



waste and turned into a desert, England did not watch every campaign with feverish interest as she had watched the resistance of the Low Countries to Philip, but turned her eyes away and undertook radical changes in her domestic constitution.

It is however to be observed that in another direction England looks abroad far more than formerly, that she has acquired a new foreign interest which takes the place of that which she has lost. She has now become a maritime state. In Elizabeth's time the Ocean and the New World lay there as a vast, almost unknown region, controlled by the Catholic king. The task of her reign had been to throw it open to Englishmen. But this commencement once made, we became more and more familiar with it, and the New World became gradually an arena for policy, a scene of wars, a subject for treaties.

Under Elizabeth colonisation had been scarcely more than an idea, working in the brain of Gilbert and Raleigh. In the age now before us it takes the shape of a solid reality, and one of the most pregnant changes in English history takes place, when Englishmen, just after they have begun to feel themselves islanders, enter upon a new phase, and begin to be a double community, divided by the Atlantic Ocean, and inhabiting islands on the one side of it and a continent on the other. But since the latter years of Elizabeth's reign another new feature has appeared in the New World. The Dutch too have forced their way into it, and, outstripping England, have founded colonies and created a great trading power at the expense of Spain. The result is that where the Catholic Empire formerly reigned alone, and with a leaden sceptre, two active Protestant Powers have now made themselves a place, and these are not only hostile to Spain, but, as

rivals in trade, begin also to be, occasionally at least, hostile to each other. On the whole a complex maritime system has come into existence. By the side of the European group of States held together by royal marriages and royal successions and by a common religion, and torn at times by wars of succession and by religious schisms, we begin to see a maritime group of states, united and divided by quite other influences, and mainly by trade. England, in proportion as she is less urgently drawn towards the European group, attaches herself to the maritime group. And this new relation and the new field thrown open to her industry increase her security by rapidly increasing her wealth.

Nevertheless, though it is no longer needful for us to follow the course of Continental affairs so attentively as when we studied the reign of Elizabeth, it is equally necessary to have before us a clear outline of them. Once or twice at long intervals in the seventeenth century England came again into a close contact with the great Continental Powers, and in order to understand these collisions, all-important though now rare, we must inform ourselves of the history of those Powers. In order that we may understand Oliver's war with Spain, and still more the wars of William and Marlborough first with France and then with France and Spain in alliance, we must follow the phases of Spanish history under Philip III, Philip IV, Charles II and Philip V, and the phases of French history in the age of the Cardinals, and in the age of Louis XIV. Nor will it be possible for us to do this without also obtaining a satisfactory outline of the affairs of other states, particularly the Empire and the United Netherlands.

We have passed from the sixteenth to the seventeenth

century, from an age when England was deeply involved in the struggles of the Continent and barely at the starting-point of her maritime career to an age when she had begun to enjoy insular security, and also to found colonies and to grow rich by means of foreign trade. But in some large features the seventeenth century also resembles the sixteenth. As in the latter so in the former England has mainly to do with the House of Austria. Her rivalry with France does not begin till the seventeenth century is drawing to an end, and belongs mainly to the eighteenth. But further we are to observe that, as in Elizabeth's time, so in the seventeenth century England has comparatively little contact with the German branch of the House of Habsburg. It is still the Spanish Habsburg, the master of the Ocean and of the New World, upon whose decline her own rise depends. The great development of English maritime power which marks the age of Oliver corresponds, as we shall see, to a series of disasters befalling Spain, which taken together may fairly be called the Fall of the Monarchy of Philip II, and the next great development, which carried England to the height of greatness in the reign of Anne, was caused by the extinction of the Spanish Branch of the House of Habsburg.

England at the present time looks back upon a long period during which she had frequent and for the most part friendly relations with the Austrian House or, as we commonly say, with Austria. But this period coincides on the whole with that of our rivalry with France; it covers the eighteenth century, and only the closing years of the seventeenth. In the present part of this book we shall not reach it, and even in later parts we shall but deal with the commencement of it.

Such is the outline which we now proceed to fill up.

## CHAPTER II.

### EPOCHS IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I.

THE reign of James I answers to no distinct period of international history. His accession does indeed mark a new international departure, for it gave us peace with Spain. But Europe changes its aspect again in his later years, and his death is almost unnoticed and marks no epoch.

In his first years a work of pacification goes on. The attack has confessedly failed which the Spanish House of Habsburg, carrying the banner of the Counter-Reformation, had directed against the Low Countries, France and England at once. One peace has been made already in 1598, but in making this Spain might profess to have sacrificed no principle, since France had openly abandoned heresy. Now however Spain brings herself to make peace with heretical Powers, first with England, then with the Low Countries. The pacification is completed in 1609 by the conclusion of the Truce of Antwerp.

Age succeeds age in history after the manner of a dissolving view. An interval of confusion often occurs in which the new picture which is growing more distinct is blended with the old picture which is fading away. Such

a period of confusion is the middle period of the reign of James. No sooner is the pacification complete than the outlines of the coming war, the Thirty Years' War, become visible for a moment. In 1610 Henry IV is about to take the field against the House of Habsburg, not now, as before, in the Low Countries or in Artois or in Italy, but in Germany. Most significant is this change in the scene of war! But again the picture grows confused, Henry disappears, and a dim period, without form and void, sets in. In 1618 however Germany and Central Europe again become prominent, while Spain again begins to be active. The foresight of Henry is justified. A concert between the two branches of the House of Habsburg is visibly arranging itself. In 1620 all confusion is cleared away, and the new international age with distinct lineaments is recognisable. In the summer of that year the Spanish House openly aids the Austrian House. Spanish troops from the Low Countries invade a province of Germany, the Palatinate, in aid of the Austrian Habsburg, and in the autumn the Habsburg Emperor, thus reinforced, deals a blow at the Reformation such as it has hardly sustained before, by the battle of the White Mountain, which is followed by the overthrow of Protestantism in Bohemia and in the Palatinate.

Accordingly James during the remaining five years of his reign contemplates a new age, a new condition of Europe. But the forces now unchained will rage long after he has left the scene and will scarcely in his son's time submit to restraint or suffer peace to be restored.

We take up the story where we left it at Elizabeth's death, and consider first the pacification which James gave us, and on the strength of which he laid claim to the blessing promised to peace-makers. Elizabeth, as we saw,

had aimed at peace almost throughout her reign, nay at the very moment when the Armada was sailing out of Lisbon. Not till the very last years of her reign does she, as if in despair, seek offensive alliances. She was as great a peace-maker as James, and while she gave us peace she accompanied the gift with economical government, which James never knew how to do. If she was at last drawn into a war from which she could never disentangle herself, the fault lay not with her but with Spain. Accordingly when we inquire why her successor was able to make peace, it is natural again to look to Spain, and to ask why at last Spain consented to lay down her arms, first against a heretical Power, and then, five years later, against her own rebels, heretics too.

We observe that both the treaty with England and the truce with the Dutch were made by the same Spanish Government, that of Philip III, and by the same Minister, Lerma. We observe too that before the end of his reign Philip III parted with this Minister, to whom he had allowed a sort of omnipotence, that he did so mainly because he was convinced of the sinfulness of that policy of peace with heretics which Lerma had introduced, and that at the expiration of the truce Spain recommenced hostilities against the Dutch. And if we look at the history of the Spanish Habsburgs since the accession of Philip II as a whole, we see that Lerma's truce of twelve years is quite exceptional and unique. From 1567 to 1648, that is under Philip II, under Philip III for eleven years and again in his last year, and under Philip IV for twenty-seven years this war continued, and that it came to a final end only when the Spanish empire was threatened with utter dissolution.

So immoveably fixed was the Spanish mind under the

influence of that stiff orthodoxy which is peculiar to it. It is impossible to judge the Spanish statesmanship of the seventeenth century by ordinary standards, as we see by the simple fact that though Philip II himself had been reduced to a repudiation of the public debt, yet after this repudiation a ruinous war was waged by Spain for half a century, with only the intermission of those twelve years, and was terminated even then only because a war more ruinous still had commenced. No amount of impoverishment or depopulation, nothing short of the dissolution of the Monarchy, could induce the Spaniard to admit the idea of peace with heretics. When we consider all this, and find that by a rare exception Spain had in the days of Philip III a Minister who could admit this idea into his mind, we are led to think that the Peace-maker was more probably Lerma than James I, since certainly it was not James I who afterwards brought about the truce, however he may have assisted in bringing it about. What Lerma's motive may have been, whether purely selfish, as has often been maintained, whether he thought the money required for the war would be better spent upon himself and his family, or, as Ranke holds, revived the peace policy advocated in Philip II's time by the Eboli family, it is perhaps not necessary here to discuss. But even Lerma introduces the new policy under a sort of disguise. Peace with England might be regarded as a necessary step towards the subjugation of the Dutch, as indeed in Elizabeth's time it had been recognised that they could never be subdued so long as they had the support of England. In that age indeed it had been perceived that this support would always be given them either openly or secretly, and in consequence Spain had made open war with England rather than be exposed to her secret attacks. But

this view was naturally reconsidered on the accession of James. His throne was so much more secure than that of Elizabeth that he might seem not to need the Dutch. It was not necessary to him, as it had been to Elizabeth, that the Dutch rebellion should succeed. He represented strict legitimism, and therefore might be induced, it was hoped, actually to take the side of Spain against her rebels. He could probably well afford to do this, and if he did it, his intervention, as he still had Brill and Flushing in his hands, might well be decisive. But after all, was he not a heretic? Even this was not quite clear. At least he was not a heretic by fatal necessity, as the daughter of Anne Boleyn had been. He for his part was the son of Mary Stuart, a martyr of Catholicism. He was known to hate Puritanism; he was a learned student of Church history, and in the days of Baronius and Bellarmine such students were commonly caught in the current of the Counter-Reformation. Moreover in paving the way to his accession to the throne of England he had been lavish of hints and assurances intended to avert the opposition of the Catholic Powers. His queen too inclined to Catholicism. All these facts taken together formed a foundation upon which Lerma and Philip III might build a hope that James I intended to imitate the stroke of policy of which the fame was still recent, that he would establish the Stuart dynasty, as Henry IV had established the House of Bourbon, upon a recantation. How impossible this was in the state of English and Scotch public opinion, could not be realised in Spain.

As far as the Dutch rebellion was concerned, these calculations might have proved correct but for one circumstance. The Dutch had all along had another string to their bow. England indeed had often been of great use



to their cause, when France was unable or unwilling to help them. But they could commonly dispense with English aid, because they could commonly obtain sufficient aid from France. This was the case after 1604. Henry IV at this time was revolving great schemes of resistance to the House of Habsburg. Having restored internal tranquillity to France, he was now restoring her European precedence. His diplomacy was everywhere, in Italy, in Savoy, in the Grisons, defeating that of Spain. Even in England he made a great attempt by that mission of Sully, upon which Sully himself has built such a romance, to prevent the conclusion of the Treaty of 1604. Naturally at such a time the Dutch rebels were most necessary to him, and he supplied the place which Elizabeth had left vacant and which James had declined to occupy.

In 1609 too as well as in 1604 some disguise is used. Lerma does not even then actually make peace with heretics. It is true that he covered Spain with humiliation. 'The Spaniards,' wrote Pope Paul V in September of that year, 'have lost their old knack. They are universally despised, and what has utterly ruined their reputation is the Truce in Flanders, by which they have themselves admitted their helplessness.' Still it was a truce, it was not a peace. No principle was actually abandoned. The Dutch were not declared to be independent, but were to be treated for twelve years *as if* they were independent, and for the same time they were not to be disturbed in their trade with the Indies. The distinction might appear at the time purely illusory, but it proved after all to be substantial. For when the twelve years were expired that did not happen which might perhaps have been expected. It was not found impossible

to renew the war. On the contrary the war was renewed and was waged for twenty-seven years.

This pacification, which occupies the earlier years of James I, and which is the principal achievement of the second Cecil, is mainly memorable as having established England and the Netherlands in the possession of their Oceanic trade. From this time they begin to be the Sea Powers. Spain is forced tacitly to countenance the infringement of her maritime monopoly. The two Protestant Powers have torn up the Bull of Alexander VI, and take open possession of their share in the New World. The treaties indeed establish no new principle; only by omissions and ambiguous phrases does Spain acknowledge and acquiesce in a new state of things. And this is the place to note a new maritime developement, which was of capital importance to England in all later times. We have traced the maritime progress of England. A little later, at the close of the sixteenth and in the first years of the seventeenth century, the Dutch enter with still greater energy upon the same course.

Now that we see the two Sea Powers set out almost simultaneously upon their career our attention is caught by the striking difference between them. In the war with Spain their position is quite different. England at that time (otherwise now!) is unassailable except by direct invasion. She is to Philip what Russia was to Napoleon, a distant Power difficult to reach and protected by Nature. She has as yet no colonies, no trade on every sea exposed to attack. She is self-supporting. Her people live on the produce of her soil. In the naval war she takes for the most part the offensive. Spain by a great effort essays two or three times to strike her, and every time fails. She on the contrary preys without intermission on the

wealth of Spain, which is at her mercy either in silver fleets near the Azores or in unprotected towns in the Gulf of Mexico. The conflict thus is unequal, as the Spaniards themselves felt, and expressed in their rhyme

Con todos guerra  
Y paz con Inglaterra.

‘Let us have war with all the world but peace with England.’ It is when we have noted this that we become aware of the strangeness of the conditions under which the Dutch conquered their independence from Spain. It is easy to admire the obstinacy of their resistance, the victories of Maurice, the patriotism which enabled so small a population to resist the great Power of the age. But the most notable feature of the struggle is that the rebel population were not in the least self-supporting, that they were throughout entirely dependent on foreign trade. When we remember that, being such, they had to resist the Power which professed to control the sea, we begin to form a conception of the novel and memorable character of this successful resistance, and also of the hollowness of the pretension which Spain made to maritime supremacy. This population, which resisted a series of great commanders attacking it by land, from Alva and Don John to Spinola, must have succumbed almost at once to a commercial blockade, had Spain possessed the intelligence or the power to form it. Only by maintaining its foreign trade could it live, only by increasing and extending its trade could it support the expense of a long war. Under this pressure the Dutch far outstripped the English in the energy of their attacks upon the Spanish monopoly in the New World. Thus when England made peace with Spain in 1604 she had as yet made no settlement, acquired no footing, in the New

World, except indeed some share in the Newfoundland or Newland fisheries. We understand the name Newfoundland when we perceive how for a series of years the only practical interest our nation had in the world discovered by Columbus was confined to that spot of territory. For England was under no pressure of necessity. It was not till the very year of the Truce, 1609, that the foundation of Virginia, our first great colony, was successfully laid, and it was laid in a territory remote from all Spanish settlements. But even before 1604 the Dutch had boldly attacked the Spanish settlements themselves, that is, those Portuguese settlements in the Eastern Archipelago which by the revolution of 1580 had become part of the Spanish Monarchy. Here they founded their trade-empire, avowedly at the expense of Spain, and in this actual loss of territory and of trade the Spanish government acquiesced by the Truce of Antwerp.

Having once founded their trade-empire the Dutch proceeded, under the same pressure of necessity, to devise the institutions necessary for maintaining it. A whole system of policy and finance was invented, and the world saw a wholly new political phenomenon. There had been little real prosperity or vitality in the colonial institutions of Spain. But the trade-empire now founded by Protestantism had quite another sort of success. More slowly the English now entered upon the work of colonisation, and one of the great features of the seventeenth century is the rivalry of these two maritime Powers, and the gradual adoption by England of the principles of trade and colonisation first devised in Holland.

The first period of James is filled with the Pacification, in other words, with the harvest of the seed sown by Elizabeth. It is the time of Salisbury's Ministry; the

present is prosperous for England, and Henry, Prince of Wales, with his sister Elizabeth, offer a good prospect for the future. While England withdraws from continental affairs to plant her first colony, Henry IV of France, now indisputably the first man in the world, keeps vigilant watch over the House of Habsburg, and prevents the loss of the great Queen from being felt. These persons make their exit soon after the Pacification has been accomplished, Henry IV in 1610, Salisbury and Prince Henry in 1612. In 1613 Elizabeth Stuart leaves England to make her home at Heidelberg, and to become the stock from which the Brunswick dynasty should spring. An age is over, a long struggle has been brought to an end. What shall come next?

There was no reason why the great causes which had brought into existence the Habsburg Power should not continue to operate as in the sixteenth century. It had been founded on marriages with the help of the Counter-Reformation. There was no reason why new marriages should not be made, and the Counter-Reformation was by no means dead; on the contrary it was in greater vigour than ever.

But in fact it was found that the Spanish House of Habsburg had lost the trick of those marriages by which kingdoms were absorbed. The family furnishes brides, but no longer such conquering bridegrooms as Philip the Handsome or Charles V or Philip II. One reason for this may be discerned. It was out of the question for the Catholic King to marry a heretic, and Philip II himself had ceased to crave the hand of Elizabeth as soon as he saw her dallying with heresy. In the time of the great marriages royal houses were scarcely yet infected with heresy, so that this difficulty did not yet arise. But in

the seventeenth century a king of Spain could no longer marry an English princess, as appeared in 1612 when Philip III conceived for a moment the idea of marrying Elizabeth Stuart. A French princess he might and did marry, but the Salic law barred the way to the French succession against foreign claimants whether of the Habsburg or of another house. Accordingly the old Habsburg method ceased to be practised outside the family itself. Intermarriage between the two branches of the Habsburg House is henceforth usual, and we even find the Spanish branch hoping by this means to tear territory away from the Austrian branch. And thus while the Spanish Government occupies itself as much as ever with pushing hereditary claims, yet it scarcely succeeds in establishing new ones. Meanwhile other Houses learn the trick which the Habsburgs have forgotten, and in the end the Bourbons avenge themselves on the descendants of Philip II by swallowing up the greater part of his inheritance.

But if not by bridegrooms the Spanish House can still push its interests by means of brides. England is no longer ruled by a Virgin Queen, who not only does not herself marry, but has no royal relatives to give in marriage. The long period is over when this question of marriage, in those days the most momentous of all international questions, was in abeyance for England, first because all negotiations about it ended in disappointment, and afterwards because for some twenty years they entirely ceased to be carried on. We had now a king and queen who had sons and daughters. And marriage negotiations soon begin which are not intended to lead, and do not lead, to nothing.

In recent times royal Houses seem on the whole to

have avoided such intermarriages as might establish great territorial pretensions. Louis Philippe's imitation of the famous masterpiece of Mazarin provoked disgust rather than admiration. The Brunswick dynasty has usually by preference sought brides in the lesser sovereign houses. The Stuart dynasty was more ambitious. It is a capital point in its history, especially in the earlier period, that it desires to ally itself either with the Spanish or with the French House. And indeed Elizabeth herself writes as if a marriage with any prince of secondary rank would be a degradation to her. To James, who was always in want of money, it was also a leading object to secure a handsome marriage-portion, since in proportion to his annual revenue the sum he might expect was more important than can easily be realised in the present age. James, whose boast it was to have made peace with Spain, early set his mind upon cementing this peace by a marriage-alliance. And by allowing this to appear he gave the Spanish Government a hold upon his policy.

The devotion to Roman Catholicism was an absolutely fixed feature in the Spanish House. It would be difficult to conceive a greater bigot than Philip II, but Philip III was at least more exclusively, if not more strongly, influenced by his religion than Philip II. There was therefore from the beginning no real likelihood that a Spanish princess could be obtained either for Prince Henry or, later, for Prince Charles, unless the bridegroom would consent to become a Roman Catholic. The Spanish Government in its ignorance of English affairs might hope to impose this condition, but at least the negotiations, even if they led to no marriage, might be used so as greatly to affect English policy. And thus Spain begins to exert a new sort of influence over England, and con-

ceives the hope of obtaining in peace results which hitherto she had vainly sought by war.

We saw Philip II, as the Habsburg bridegroom, almost conquering England in the time of Mary Tudor. We now see a Habsburg bride, who however remains in the background, swaying the mind of James Stuart.

Through the greater part of Elizabeth's reign it had remained doubtful whether the English people was at heart Catholic or Protestant. And those were the days of the Counter-Reformation. The tendency all over Europe was more and more towards it. When Elizabeth first came to the throne it had seemed possible that France would declare for the Reformation. All was changed now. France had chosen the Counter-Reformation and had actually converted the leader of the Huguenot party. In the Low Countries the larger number of provinces had returned to orthodoxy. It was not unreasonable therefore to suppose that the same tendency was secretly at work in England, and that if only English opinion could find free utterance it would pronounce in favour of Catholicism. But it was silenced by law. Legally there was no such toleration in England as the Religious Peace had given to Germany and the Edict of Nantes to France. Thus there was in England a feeling dangerously suppressed, of which the intensity could not be measured, a bitter grievance, a party hostile to the reigning system, of unknown numerical force, but the very party which forty years before had made a great rebellion and fifty years before, in the reign of Mary, had ruled the country. All through the period of war Spain had counted on this party, and now that war had given place to marriage negotiations she did so still. Did James desire the honour of a Habsburg daughter-in-law? The grandiose Spanish pride, which vastly exaggerated the



greatness, real as it still was, of Philip III and his family, and was impenetrably blind to the decay of the Spanish state, made James keenly feel how great the honour was. Was he tempted by the substantial advantages of the match? These too were of indefinite magnitude. They included not only a great sum of money, but also an immense possibility. The prince who married a Spanish Infanta, whether Henry or Charles, might prove a new Philip the Handsome. He might prove, as indeed Louis XIV, by marrying an Infanta, did prove, the founder of a House which should rule the Spanish Empire and his own kingdom too.

This possibility, as Ranke shows, was openly discussed in Spain with reference to Prince Henry, and Spanish public opinion looked forward with perfect complacency to the rule of a Stuart dynasty. But if James hoped to obtain all this, what was he disposed to give for it? It would be only reasonable that the bridegroom should become a Roman Catholic, but if this could not be asked, it was at least essential that the bride should not find her religion persecuted, her worship forbidden by law, and prepare herself to see her children taken from her by a heretical church, in the country of her adoption. This demand seemed the more moderate as there was by this time nothing new in the idea of toleration. Two religions were already legal, under certain conditions, in France and in the Empire. Why not then in England too?

Thus the pressure of Spain upon England does not cease with the peace of 1604. It has now been felt continuously in one form or another since the reign of Mary. This is its latest shape, and the agent who applies it with most success is the ambassador sent by Spain in 1613, Sarmiento, afterwards Conde de Gondomar.

The grand diplomatic scheme, as we know, led to nothing. While it was under discussion great changes were taking place in central Europe, and a new prospect of a wholly different kind opened for Spain. But the discussion occupied and gave a character to the whole middle period of James I. The scheme was characteristic of the age, quite in accordance not only with Spanish notions, but with the notions of international policy that prevailed almost everywhere. Everything in the intercourse of states turned on marriage, and the greatest affairs, war and peace, union or separation of kingdoms, rise and fall of religions, waited on the convenience of a bridegroom and a bride. In England too this system seemed more natural under James than it had seemed under Elizabeth. The queen's time had been a kind of interregnum in which a person without hereditary title, and kinless, had ruled the country with regard to its interest. James occupied no such strange lonely position, but belonged more undeniably to the royal caste. It was natural for him to fall back into the ordinary groove of monarchical policy, and to occupy himself with marrying his sons and daughters. Gondomar met him on this ground, and used arguments founded entirely on the interest of the royal family. The Recusancy Laws are to be abolished, the children of the Prince of Wales are to be brought up as Catholics, in other words, England is in future to be ruled by a Catholic, not because the interest of England requires or even permits this, but because these are the terms upon which Philip III is prepared to give his daughter.

Had Gondomar been successful it is worth while to consider what results would have followed. It was not indeed to be imagined that in the face of Parliament it

would be possible for Spain to dictate in a marriage treaty, and thus to guarantee, a sort of Edict of Nantes for the benefit of the English Catholics. Had this been done the Spanish Princess and the Spanish Ambassador would have become leaders of a great political party in England, who would have leaned on foreign aid, as the French League had leaned on Philip II. But short of this, if we suppose Gondomar only half successful, that is, if we suppose only that the Catholics had found their condition considerably improved, and that the royal House of England had taken a tinge of Spanish ideas and in the next generation an infusion of Spanish blood, the consequences would probably have been very serious. We can measure them roughly by considering what actually happened. In fact, as we know, Charles took his wife not from the House of Habsburg but from the House of Bourbon. And what was the result? It appeared most strikingly in the next generation. The sons of Charles I are half Frenchmen. Charles II and James II look up to Louis XIV as to the head of their House. They take subsidies from him; they attach themselves to his policy; in the end the Stuart king, driven from England, takes refuge in France while French fleets and armies aid him against his rebels. In like manner had the sons of Charles I been Spaniards, we can imagine that they would have been alienated from the nation over which they reigned, and as much more completely as the Spanish character was haughtier, more inflexible and more bigoted than the French.

Gondomar was persuaded that the party upon which he counted, that is the Catholics and those who were open to conversion to Catholicism, was immensely numerous. But, strong as was the tide of the Counter-Reformation everywhere else, it seems evident that he underrated the

force of the religious movement which in England ran in the opposite direction. Both Puritanism and Anglicanism had a vitality of which he had no conception. And the Gunpowder Plot had recently exhibited English Catholicism as a cause which derived its energy rather from despair than from hope, and also as a cause which the nation would not easily be tempted to adopt.

But this middle period offers only barren tentatives until the new movement in Germany begins to sweep across the expiring movements of the Elizabethan age and the feeble impulses that proceed from the court of James. Before proceeding to consider the German movement it is only necessary to mark how meanwhile the marriage question, which had arisen between the courts of Spain and England, was regarded outside the court by the English people.

For thirty years Spain had been the enemy. The country was still full of people who could remember the Armada, and almost the whole nation felt as a nation feels which has lately passed through a mortal struggle. James could have no share in this feeling and no comprehension of it. The student of Shakspeare feels that the epic period of England came to an end with Elizabeth, and that the happy union of the kingdoms had the drawback that it placed England under the rule of princes who had had no part in its recent probation and its recent glory. It was 'a lame and impotent conclusion' of the national drama, this humiliating bargain for a Spanish princess who should come dictating terms. And clear-sighted men could see, as Henry IV saw, that the struggle was by no means over, and that the House of Habsburg would give more trouble yet. There was a strong Anti-Spanish party, which consisted in part of those who looked mainly forward

and apprehended new encroachments of the Counter-Reformation, in part of those who retained the feelings of the Elizabethan age. There were such men as the diplomatist Winwood, who had long watched international politics from the Hague, or Abbot, the Archbishop, inclined to Puritanism, and there was Raleigh, the prisoner of Elizabethanism.

And the middle period of the reign of James shows a policy which is a series of oscillations between this anti-Spanish tendency and the contrary tendency set in motion by the scheme of a Spanish marriage. That scheme begins to be discussed almost as soon as the pacification is complete; in its first phase the object of it is Prince Henry, and it is considered by Salisbury. On the other hand in its final phase it loses itself in the first tremendous events of the Thirty Years' War. But there is an intermediate period, which may be said to commence in 1613, after Prince Henry and Salisbury are gone, with the arrival of Gondomar in England, and to close in 1618 with the Revolution in Bohemia. This is what has been called above the middle period of the reign of James. The characteristic of it is that it is dominated by the one question of the relations of England and Spain, as determined mainly by the marriage scheme. It is the period of Gondomar.

In this period English policy is extremely indistinct, not having even the distinctness which arises in the last period of James from deplorable failure. We become aware that it is guided by a ruler who wants the fixed purpose which we were able to trace in the policy of Elizabeth, even when the detail of it exhibited most vacillation. The views of James are rather speculative than practical, and he is not schooled, as Elizabeth was, by the

pressure of a peremptory necessity, of a mortal danger. The facts before us, out of which we have to infer his system of foreign policy, are principally these—the marriage of Elizabeth Stuart to the Elector Palatine, the negotiation for a marriage of Prince Charles to a Spanish Infanta, the expedition of Raleigh and the execution of Raleigh.

There is a certain apparent resemblance between the position which James assumes towards the Catholic and Protestant Powers and that of Elizabeth. Elizabeth had laboured persistently for peace with Spain and had aided the Protestant cause without identifying herself with it. James takes up a similar middle position. But Elizabeth had been able to hold both parties at arm's length because she enjoyed the singular advantage of having no marriages to make. As a modern statesman has said, it is easy to govern with a state of siege, so might it be said in those times that foreign policy was a simple matter so long as there were no marriages to make. It was the ambition of James not merely to stand as a blessed peace-maker between the two confessions but also to make marriages indifferently with Catholic and Protestant Houses. This was in itself a difficult problem, but it might perhaps have been solved by a careful selection of such Houses as were moderate in their religious views or such Houses as he might be able to dictate terms to. Perhaps when he gave his daughter to the Elector Palatine he but half understood what he did, for Frederick had not yet revealed his character to the world. And yet he knew that Frederick was a grandson of William the Silent and a leader of the Calvinist party in Germany. The great peace-maker, the elderly monarch who desired above all things a quiet life, had deliberately planned, at a moment when, as any intelligent man could have told him, a universal religious

war was about to commence, to ally himself at the same time with the greatest bigot in the Catholic world, Philip III of Spain, and the greatest bigot in the Protestant world, the Elector Palatine. It is indeed difficult to picture the wild confusion that would have arisen had the Infanta been already established in England as Princess of Wales at the time when Frederick's troubles began in Germany. On the one side a powerful Catholic party depending on Spain would have come into existence by that time in England; on the other side the Protestant feeling of the country would have been, as it was, stirred to its depths, and both parties would have had their leader in the royal family. Nothing less than a civil war, in which the poor old king would have disappeared like a second Henry VI, must have been the result!

It is easy to form a judgment of policy when it leads either to great success or to signal failure, but when, owing to accidental circumstances, it leads to nothing, but is effaced by some change in the whole aspect of affairs, then we have a blurred illegible page of history. Such is this middle period of James. The marriage scheme led to no great disaster in foreign affairs. Spain was, as we can now see, in decline; no Spanish statesman after Gondomar was ever in a condition to treat an English Government with haughty superiority. Accordingly we may be tempted, judging by the result, to imagine that the inclination of James to a Spanish alliance was not unreasonable, and that the animosity of Parliament and of men like Winwood and Raleigh towards Spain was a prejudice, a survival of the feelings of a past age. Even while the war lasted Spain had been unable for ten years before 1604 to inflict any serious blow on England. Why then should we fear her in time of peace?

But it was not unlikely that she might prove much more dangerous in peace than in war. In peace the arts by which the House had originally thriven, marriage and the Counter-Reformation, would operate far more effectively than in war. A Princess might land where the Armada had failed to land, and she would bring with her priests, Jesuits, and the new literature and learning of the Counter-Reformation. There were also other arts, which had been used repeatedly in the days of Philip II, and now began to be applied again.

Let us consider the state of Europe at the time when Gondomar arrived. About 1609, it is true, the credit of Spain had sunk to a low point. The pacification had been made on terms certainly unfavourable to her. Her concessions to the Dutch had surprised the world. Everywhere she was held in check by the diplomacy of Henry IV, who put himself eagerly forward as the leader of European resistance to the House of Austria. Spain was beginning to be eclipsed by France. Such was the aspect of Europe in 1609. But it was far different in 1613. For Henry had fallen in the moment when he exalted himself against the House of Austria. The question whether Ravallac had accomplices, has recently been much discussed. Undoubtedly Henry was not murdered, as we may say William the Silent was murdered, by the Spanish Government, but if, as appears, Ravallac was only a fanatic, his act was perhaps only the more impressive as a proof of the power of the House. Ravallac had listened to sermons, he understood that Henry 'intended to wage war against the Pope, that is, against God himself.' In other words, the influences of the Counter-Reformation propagated the belief that resistance to the ascendancy of the House was impiety. If we enter into the ideas of



that time we may easily understand the triumphant commentary on the murder which was made in the Spanish Council by the Cardinal of Toledo: If God be for us who can be against us?

Providence seemed to have said to the enemies of Spain: Thus far and no further! They had lost their leader; and who should supply his place? It is a capital fact in the age about to open that the Protestant party is without a head.

When the critical moment came in 1618 France was in confusion, the South-German Protestants were led by the Elector Palatine Frederick, England was directed by James I. Under such leaders what resistance could be made to the House? This was the work of Ravailiac. But the more immediate result of his deed was that France from being the chief antagonist of Spain became her dependent ally. A period began similar to that which had followed the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. It was announced that Europe was henceforth to be guided by a brotherly alliance of the Kings of Spain and France. Accordingly a double marriage was arranged, and the treaty was concluded in 1612. The eldest Infanta, Anne, was to marry Louis XIII, Elizabeth of France was to marry the Prince of Spain, Don Philip. It was under the fresh impression of this marriage-treaty, which seemed to make a revolution in the system of Europe and to restore the ascendancy of Spain, that the middle period of James begins and Gondomar arrives in England.

In such circumstances the English people, which for so long a time had regarded Spain as the enemy, was not likely to forget its hostility and its fear. It would not easily learn to regard the peace of 1604 as the final end of a long national struggle; rather it would look forward to

a speedy renewal of the war. And this view of the public would be shared by such as knew most of foreign affairs, for these would have their eyes fixed on the cloud that was gathering in Germany and round the Low Countries, these would be already aware of the approach of the Thirty Years' War. Such was the temper of English public opinion at the moment when James set his heart upon the Spanish match and showed himself ready almost to restore Roman Catholicism in England in order to obtain it.

The story of Raleigh's last adventure and death is principally instructive from our point of view as illustrating the wildness, the incredible confusion of English foreign policy at this time. We need not perhaps feel any great difficulty in understanding the conduct of Raleigh himself. He had never been famous for moderation; he had lain in prison for twelve years; he was of the temper to prefer a desperate adventure to inaction. His reckless audacity seems indeed out of keeping with the age of James, but we explain it by reflecting that it is quite in keeping with the age to which Raleigh belonged, the age of the War of Elizabeth. We have seen how a sort of covert war with Spain had prevailed more or less through the greater part of Elizabeth's reign, how from 1585 onward it had ceased to be covert, and after the failure of the Armada had been waged by England with national enthusiasm. Raleigh, we know, had been the representative of the extreme war-party, who had not been content with Elizabeth's policy even when it was most energetic, and had urged the feasibility and the advisableness of actually overthrowing the Spanish maritime empire. Such a man was quite accustomed to the idea of war without formalities, and would not perhaps regard the treaty of 1604 as barring his right to seize the silver fleet if fortune should

throw it in his way. So much we can understand, but there is much more than this in his adventure of 1617. We are to consider first that it was not the free enterprise of a private man such as Drake had been in his first expeditions, or Raleigh himself more than once in his earlier days. Raleigh now sailed under a commission from Government. Secondly it was undertaken not at a time when we were only technically but not really at peace with Spain, but in the very years when the English and Spanish royal houses were meditating intermarriage.

We may say that at this time the policy of James towards Spain varied through all gradations from intimate obsequious alliance, through manly independence and firm resistance, to deadly and treacherous hostility. In his first acceptance of Raleigh's proposal he shows himself independent of Spain. Raleigh will discover a gold-mine in Guiana, from which the king shall draw treasure enough to pay his debts. Guiana is territory to which the King of Spain lays claim under the Bull of Alexander VI. But James firmly refuses to recognise this claim, as he has done already in 1609 when he granted a charter to Virginia. The reasonable claims of Spain, however, he is anxious to respect, and therefore requires from Raleigh a distinct assurance that the territory in question is far removed from all Spanish settlements and that he has no intention of injuring any Spanish interest. So far the position of James seems honourable. Only we are tempted to ask whether it was consistent with a real regard for Spanish interests to send the great enemy of Spain, a desperate man too with a sentence of death hanging over him, into the very heart of the Spanish world, and to depend simply on his word for the assurance that Spain should suffer no injury. That he would pay with his head

for any breach of his engagement was a very insufficient guarantee. Was it certain that the daring adventurer would ever return at all? But it was credible that he would hold it a good deed if in any way he could succeed in reviving the war with Spain. It would appear then that James at least sets no great store by the friendship of Spain. But there is much more. Raleigh before he set out talked openly of seizing the Mexico fleet. In other words after twelve years of peace, during which time, or at least since the Truce of 1609, all hostilities not only between the Governments but between the peoples had ceased, Raleigh proposes to plunge them headlong into a new war by an act which even in those times must have been felt to be monstrous. But perhaps this was but a reckless conversational flight. Nay, he spoke of it to Sir Francis Bacon, who was Attorney-General at the time, and he professed himself sure that such an act would be forgiven if only he could bring home two or three millions worth of treasure, that is, a sum several times as great as the marriage-portion which James could expect to obtain with the Infanta. This at least is the story, which however even those who take the severer view of this passage in Raleigh's life find it difficult to believe, while his latest biographer, Mr Stebbing, dismisses it summarily as apocryphal. Thus he was not afraid of allowing the Attorney-General to know what he had in his mind. But, more than this, the Venetian reports actually tell us that Winwood himself, the Secretary, that is the representative of the Government in foreign affairs, not only knew of, but strongly favoured, the monstrous scheme. So far it would appear that while James himself regarded Spain with friendly eyes, for it was at this very time that he laid the marriage scheme before his Council, his Ministers, or some

of them, regarded her as an enemy. But even if we suppose that he was betrayed by these Ministers and had no knowledge of their secret wishes, we detect in James himself passing fits of hostility to Spain, which seem to alternate with his desire for a Spanish alliance. The impulse which Henry IV in his last years had given to the European opposition to the great House was still stirring both in Germany and Italy, and in Italy there was actual war between the Duke of Savoy and Spain. This war ceased for a moment in 1615 but broke out again in the autumn of 1616. James does not hold it inconsistent with his Spanish policy to send a subsidy in 1615 to this enemy of Spain. And now that Raleigh is let loose, what do we see? Instead of fixing his attention, as might be expected, on the Orinoco, Raleigh allows his mind to wander in the most suspicious manner over the whole field of European policy. What is stranger, he does not care to conceal his dangerous combinations from James himself. It would seem as if at this very moment James were ambitious of taking the place that Henry IV had left vacant. A grand scheme of an attack on Genoa, a city which, though independent, was at that time a most useful ally and, as it were, a financial agent, of the King of Spain, is actually taken into consideration by James himself, and is not dropped till it has reached an advanced stage. Then Raleigh enters into relations with the French Huguenots. In short before he sets sail for the West it must have become as clear to James as to the rest of the world that there was scarcely any wild adventure for which he was not prepared, and that his favourite idea was to kindle a war with Spain, buying his pardon in the old fashion of Drake with the treasures he expected to bring home.

These plans were not properly Elizabethan, for if Eliza-

both had connived at the spoiling of Spain it was in self-defence and at a time when she was in extreme danger from Spain. They were in fact the plans which Elizabeth had always rejected. But what is most observable is not that James occasionally dallied with them, but that he did so at a time when he meditated a marriage alliance with the Spanish House, for which he was not unwilling to pay in religious concessions of the most dangerous kind. Just as he saw nothing incongruous in giving his daughter to the Elector Palatine while he obtained an Infanta for his son, so it seems to him not inadmissible to seize the Mexico fleet at the same time that out of obsequiousness to Spain he relaxes the Recusancy Laws and engages that the children of the Prince of Wales shall be left in Catholic hands till the age of twelve.

English foreign policy has in later times often been rendered vacillating by the opposition of Parliament to the plans of the Government. The plan of Charles II in 1672, the policy of Marlborough's Government in 1710, that of the elder Pitt in 1762, were frustrated by a sudden revulsion of popular feeling. The wild vacillations of the middle period of James are of another kind. No Parliament sat between 1614 and 1621, and at the latter date this middle period was over and Europe was already convulsed by the German question. The conflicting impulses came from the King and the members of his Council, and if the result is confusion this apparently is because the King is incapable of pursuing any uniform plan. He displayed the same incapacity still more signally later in dealing with the German question. But in both cases we have to remark the new position of insular security into which England has drifted. Under Elizabeth such aberrations would have been fatal, but in the reign of James

they cause no particular disaster to the country. We remark indeed that they sowed the seed which came up in the Great Rebellion. By his trifling with Spain and his concessions to Popery James forfeited for his House the confidence of the people; he seems to rehearse the policy of Charles II and James II when in despair of getting money from his Parliament he looks for aid, in the shape of a marriage portion, to a foreign Power. But the mismanagement of foreign affairs by James led to no disaster in the foreign department. No Armadas, no attacks from France through Scotland, are any longer to be feared. For we are more completely insular than we had been in earlier times, more so even than we found ourselves in the eighteenth century, when our connexion with Hannover had been formed.

The end of Raleigh's adventure furnishes an additional illustration of the confusion of English policy. It is impossible to argue that Raleigh would not in a time when international affairs were conducted in an orderly manner have deserved his fate. His whole behaviour betrayed that he was ready to disregard his instructions and to violate his own solemn engagements for the sake of obtaining success at all hazards, and this at the cost of hurrying his master into a war with Spain. What may be said in his excuse is that it was doubtful whether the peace between the two countries had been solid, or whether Raleigh had had reason to believe that the English Government seriously wished to maintain it. But what James' Government wished no one could say. The Secretary wished for war with Spain, and James himself seemed at times to agree with him, though at other times he favoured a close alliance with Spain. At any rate with the enemies of Spain all over Europe James was at this very moment

in close concert, and Raleigh's whole scheme and his bearing indicated hostility to Spain so clearly that he might fairly infer that had not the Government itself been hostile to Spain they would never have favoured him or granted him his commission. This very view was presented to James himself with trenchant severity by Gondomar.

Raleigh's fate, if it illustrates the mismanagement of English policy at this period, marks also the direction which English enterprise was taking. He had always been a great Path-finder, and he died in his vocation. He must also have had the satisfaction of observing that his ideas had taken root. The Virginia which had been his vision, and which for so long a time had refused to take a solid shape, was now fairly realised; it had received the royal charter in 1609; and, as we may say, continental, as distinguished from insular, England had begun to exist. In the reign of James, as in that of Elizabeth, the nation showed a vigorous vitality, and achieved great things, even while the Government either remained inactive or acted unwisely. In the growth of the Empire the reign of James is a capital epoch, when the seed sown in the Elizabethan age yielded its harvest.

In the matter of colonisation Elizabeth's reign had witnessed chiefly failures. One body of settlers on the American Continent had been brought back by Drake, another had disappeared without leaving a trace. Nevertheless the necessary foundation had been laid. The way had been paved to a colonial empire, though no actual settlements had been founded. The only durable creation had been the East India Company. In that last period of Elizabeth when, as we have seen, her persistent effort to live at peace with Spain appeared to have finally failed, and she seemed at last to have become really warlike, she



had granted a charter to this Company. Quite recently the Dutch had shown the way to render war with Spain profitable by annexing Spanish colonies. They had presented themselves to the native populations of the Spice Islands as deliverers from the tyranny exercised by the Portuguese, who were merged since 1580 in the Spanish Monarchy, and by the help of the natives they had supplanted the Portuguese. About the same time Raleigh had appealed for the first time to the native population of Guiana against the Spaniards themselves. Elizabeth's Government profited by the hints thus given, and in 1600 adopted the method of making war which Raleigh had tried and the Dutch had practised with so much success. Before that time England had seemed to avoid the territory already occupied by Spain, and had directed her enterprise first towards the extreme north, then towards Russia and the Caspian, later towards the unoccupied coast of North America. In founding the East India Company the English Government for the first time made a direct attack upon the colonial empire of Spain.

What mighty results followed at a much later date from this step does not concern us here. The immediate result was not so much to damage Spain as to involve England in disputes with the Dutch, and so to create a maritime rivalry between the two Protestant Powers.

England did not ultimately adhere to the plan then adopted of annexing Spanish colonies and tearing to pieces, as Raleigh proposed, the Spanish colonial empire. Cromwell does indeed seize Jamaica; in the eighteenth century Florida is annexed, and the colony of Georgia founded in the immediate neighbourhood of the Spaniards. But this is all. The bulk of her colonies was left to Spain, though probably there were many moments when Central

and Southern America might have been torn from her. We preferred on the whole the other course of establishing settlements in the more northerly territory unoccupied by Spain.

The settlement of Virginia in 1609 is perhaps chiefly memorable as first showing the peculiar character which English colonisation was henceforth to maintain. The early Spanish colonisation had been directed to mines of gold and silver, and had therefore been controlled with the most imperious jealousy by Government, which saw in them an all-important source of revenue. The Dutch enterprises had been mainly commercial, a means of procuring wealth for a country which was in no degree self-supporting. They were not much controlled by Government, but fell into the hands of private companies. These companies however did not want territory, but only trade. They prospered best when they were able to establish simple factories in the neighbourhood of organised native states. In such circumstances they were able to devote themselves to their trade, obtaining their subsistence and the necessities of life from the natives. And such was the course we ourselves took in the East where we followed most closely the example set by the Dutch. But in Virginia the conditions were different.

Perhaps at the outset the object of the settlers there had been gold and silver, and their disappointment may account for the return of that first colony which was brought home by Drake. A settlement of the Spanish kind, it soon appeared, was not to be thought of. But the settlement of 1606—1609 was also unlike the Dutch model. For there were in the territory upon which the settlers landed, no organised states but only Indian tribes, nomad, rude, and hostile. Accordingly the great and

difficult question for the settlers was to escape starvation. They could not live as guests in the territory, but were forced to make for themselves a home there. They were forced to lay for themselves the solid foundations of a new state, and the natives, far from being their hosts, soon became enemies against whom they had to organise defence. Trade was secondary, nay, until the cultivation of tobacco was introduced, almost wanting. Colonisation pure and simple, that is the occupation by private persons of a new part of the earth's surface for the purpose of establishing new homes, new cities and states, was now witnessed almost for the first time. The territory was on the one hand not appropriated for a merely temporary purpose, on the other hand it was appropriated completely, for there was no mixture of races, the natives being pushed back into the interior of the Continent. The result was neither a Government preserve, maintained for the purpose of revenue, like the Spanish colonies, nor a factory where a few traders enriched themselves, but a new home for Englishmen, hallowed by birth and death, and into which English institutions could be transplanted; in short the settlement was, as the northern part of it began soon after to be named, a New England.

It has seldom happened in the history of the world that human beings have been able entirely to fling aside tradition and, as it were, to make a new beginning. No such effect was produced merely by crossing the Atlantic and settling in America, for it was observable that in the vast Spanish colonisation the peculiar institutions of the mother country instead of being cast off in the New World became there doubly oppressive. In Old Spain the King, the noblesse and the clergy had great power, but they acquired much greater power in New Spain. Such effect

however *was* produced in the English colonies, partly because Government, seeing no prospect of obtaining revenue from them, regarded them on the whole with indifference. A new circumstance was now added, which helped to produce the same effect. We have remarked that at this time England was somewhat behind the leading continental countries in respect of religious toleration. In France there was an Edict of Nantes, in Germany there was a Religious Peace. In Holland the interest of the country made toleration imperative. In England there was no legal toleration, but at the utmost a certain degree of connivance. And at the beginning of the reign of James I, though hopes of indulgence were held out to the Catholics, they were refused at the Hampton Court Conference to the Puritans. Meanwhile Protestant thought, fed by the picture of primitive Christianity in the New Testament, was dreaming over a kind of Church which, just because it was so old, would be startlingly new. It would be a congregation separate from the world, separate above all from the state, a congregation which would regard the Powers of the world, Christian though they proclaimed themselves, precisely as the first Christians had regarded the Pagan Empire. Accordingly at the very time when James frowned on Puritanism, Puritanism was passing in many instances into actual separatism. A certain number of Englishmen began to feel themselves as strangers and pilgrims in the midst of the English world. In this condition, impelled by conscience actually to separate from the national Church, they could not be let alone, they could not escape the law of the land. Naturally therefore they began to look abroad, and to inquire for some new home where they might live as they desired to live, separate. The same impulse was

upon them which drove the children of Israel into the wilderness and thence into the promised land. They 'sought a country.'

It was a great coincidence which furnished at the same time on the West of the Atlantic Ocean territory which could only be used by settlers prepared to break with their old ties and to found a community radically new, and on the East of the Atlantic a 'little flock' ready and eager to do this very thing.

The charter had been granted to Virginia in 1609, eight years before Raleigh's last adventure. In 1620 the Mayflower set sail.

These are the events of the reign of James I which are really great, though to contemporaries no doubt they seemed insignificant in comparison with the Spanish match or the question of the Palatinate. In a very few years it came to light how radically the English state had been modified when English citizens made their home and English Assemblies met on the other side of the Atlantic, and when Puritanism at the same time received, as it were, an endowment in land. And not the English state only. For in the eighteenth century this fundamental new beginning, which the human race seemed to have made on the other side of the Atlantic, had an incalculable effect upon the thoughts and speculations of Europe. When the incubus of ancient institutions, feudal monarchies, hereditary privileges, a persecuting Church, seemed intolerable, it was perhaps mainly the spectacle of America that encouraged the Europeans to make a fundamental change. Equality, toleration, and republican liberty, were brought out of the sphere of speculation into that of practical politics by the example of the English colonies in America.

But we must leave watching the current of events which, though all-important, were little noticed at the time. We must leave behind us the middle period of the reign of James, and study that final phase which had already commenced when the Mayflower set sail. James, the peace-maker, lived to see Europe once more plunged in a universal war. He himself and England with him played a very important, though by no means a successful, part in the affairs which led to this catastrophe. And the Thirty Years' War arose out of a transformation of the European system, so that England, though not much involved in the war directly, was profoundly affected by the causes and consequences of it.

## CHAPTER III.

### JAMES I AND THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

WE might perhaps afford to treat very briefly the Continental occurrences of the age now before us, the German War of Thirty Years and the second war between Spain and the Netherlands, if we considered only the direct share taken in them by England. But in these occurrences lie the roots of two great developments which in a later age were of infinite importance to England. These developments are the modern Great Power which we call Austria, and the prominence which this new Great Power begins almost immediately to assume in international politics.

There is something strangely featureless and obscure in the history of the German branch of the House of Habsburg in the period after the abdication of Charles V. Ferdinand, Maximilian II, Rudolph and Matthias are Emperors of whom mankind has been able to preserve but a very faint memory. And if the same may be said not less truly of several of their successors, yet at least since the accession of Ferdinand II in 1619 the Austrian state itself has never ceased to be one of the most influential Powers in Europe, whereas under his predecessors even this is scarcely the case.

We are to remember that their dominion was a mere

miscellaneous aggregate. They were kings of Bohemia, with which went Silesia, Lusatia, Moravia, and also of Hungary; but Hungary at that time, it has been said, was rather a battlefield than a kingdom, the greater part of it being in the hands of the Turk. They also ruled under various titles much scattered German territory. And along with all this they bore the imperial title. It was for a long time doubtful whether this loose aggregate could be welded into anything like a whole. And if we fancy that the imperial dignity would produce this effect, let us remember that if the utter nullity of the imperial institutions began somewhat later than this period (being an effect of the Thirty Years' War) the imperial function itself had fallen into pretty complete abeyance as early as the fourteenth century. None of the four insignificant emperors above-named was at all more insignificant than Frederick III had been long before.

The truth then is that after the abdication of Charles V the Empire returned to the insignificance from which it had been raised by him. A Rudolph, insignificant as he may be, is not unlike Frederick III, or perhaps, as he resides at Prag and puts Vienna under the government of an Archduke, we may rather compare him to one of the Luxemburg Emperors, a Wenzel or a Charles IV. And it appears that for a considerable time these princes did not think it possible to form a great Power out of the scattered dominions to which they succeeded by inheritance. They had indeed the materials out of which the Great Power called Austria has been composed, but the Great Power itself was not called into existence till the time of Ferdinand II.

How little the first Ferdinand thought of establishing a great Power appears from the fact that he divided his



dominions by testament among his three sons. Accordingly Maximilian II and after him Rudolf II did not even possess the whole Austrian inheritance. There were two other independent Austrian courts, one in Tirol, the other in Styria<sup>1</sup>. Hence in Rudolf's time the aggregate called Austria had its centre of gravity rather in the Slavonic than in the German world, and this Emperor, like some of the old Luxemburg Emperors, resides at Prag.

It may be thought that the close connexion of the Austrian state with that of Philip II, the dominant state of Europe, could not but give it prominence and raise it to power. And in the time of Ferdinand II Austria did owe much to the kindred Power of Spain. But we are to remember that the division of the imperial family which first created two distinct Powers was of the nature of a quarrel. Maximilian II had the feelings of a personal rival towards Philip II, feelings so bitter that, we are told, nothing but opportunity was wanting to produce a war between them (*odio grandissimo ch' egli portava a' spagnuoli ed al re, in modo tale che pareva che non gli mancasse altro a moversi contra di lui che occasione e facoltà di farlo*)<sup>2</sup>. Moreover Maximilian at the opening of his reign appeared rather a Protestant than a Catholic, and the immense prevalence of Protestantism in his dominions made it at least impossible for him to enter actively into the policy of Philip.

Thus it is that in sketching the history of the wars of Philip II we have scarcely had occasion even to mention Austria or the Emperor.

But the alienation between the two Houses did not

<sup>1</sup> Gindely, *Rudolf II und seine Zeit*, Vol. I. p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Tiepolo, year 1563, quoted by Gindely, *Rudolf II und seine Zeit*, Vol. I. p. 25.

last very long, and another change took place which enabled the Emperor Ferdinand II, after a violent and for a time almost desperate struggle, to give a sort of moral unity to his scattered dominions, and so by the help of Spain to establish, as we have before expressed it, the modern great Power of Austria.

Even before the death of Maximilian II the tendency towards reunion between the two branches of the House becomes perceptible. At the time when Philip II had no son but Don Carlos, who did not seem destined to a long life, Maximilian might hope that the succession in Spain would fall to his family. His sons, Rudolf and Ernst, were sent to live in Spain, where any bias towards the Reformation which they might have received from their father would be effectually corrected. Maximilian himself too shared the change of disposition which was passing over the world. His leaning towards Protestantism diminished rather than increased in his later years. Whereas about the time when he succeeded his father (1565) the Reformation reigned in South Germany almost as irresistibly as in the North and seemed like a national or German religion, he lived to see a turn of the tide and to turn with it. As in France, as in Poland, as even in the Low Countries, so in Germany, the impression began to gain ground soon after 1570 that the Reformation after all was a failure and was doomed to disappearance. Among the many momentous results of this change in the tendency of public opinion was the removal of the deepest cause which had produced alienation between the two branches of the dominant House. No later Emperor or Archduke ever regarded a King of Spain, while the Habsburg family ruled there, as Maximilian in his earlier days had regarded Philip II.

There followed several intermarriages between the two families. Of these the most important was that which was arranged by Philip II on the eve of his departure from the world. His daughter Clara Isabella was married to the Archduke Albert, and the pair were placed together on the throne of the Low Countries, which was actually made independent of Spain. That this anticipation of the modern kingdom of Belgium, which lasted from 1598 to 1621, passed away again, and that the Catholic Low Countries were reannexed to the Spanish Monarchy, was caused simply by the fact that the Archdukes (so they were called) remained childless. But during this period the reunion of the two families was embodied in the most visible manner by this independent state ruled by a German Habsburg and a Spanish Habsburg united in marriage. For some years at the beginning of the seventeenth century the plan was discussed of causing the Archduke Albert to succeed Rudolf in the imperial dignity. It was for a time favoured by Spain, and was only abandoned when it was perceived to involve practically a surrender of the Low Countries to Austria.

But this reunion of the House, accompanied and caused by the decided adhesion of the Austrian royal House to the Counter-Reformation, evidently paved the way to a religious war in Germany similar to those which had devastated France and the Low Countries in the latter part of the sixteenth century. On the surface of the history of Europe it appears an anomaly that the great religious war of Germany does not begin till the other great religious wars have come to an end and till, as we might think, the age of religious war was over. The explanation of this is that, as the Reformation was originally a German movement and dominated Germany

with Scandinavia far more completely than it dominated any other country until later it acquired in the very teeth of the Counter-Reformation the two kingdoms of Britain and the Seven Provinces of the Netherlands, the Counter-Reformation necessarily began later and had a far greater work to achieve in Germany than elsewhere. For a long time it seemed a settled thing that the greater part of Germany would for ever belong to the Reformation. Such was the aspect of affairs between 1555 and 1570, that is, in the years when England oscillated doubtfully between Romanism and Anglicanism, and France after a moment's hesitation decided with fanatical vehemence for Catholicism. And when in the seventies the Counter-Reformation began effectively to take hold of Germany it had actually to reconquer the southern part of the country from Protestantism and not merely, as in France, to defend Romanism from its attacks.

In one word the Counter-Reformation in France arrived in time to save Romanism from defeat; in Germany it had to attack a dominant Protestantism and to reconquer a large part of the country for Romanism.

The two countries offer an instructive parallel, which it is desirable to keep constantly in view, in respect of the manner in which they dealt with the religious question. In neither country was it found possible, as in England, to maintain a single national religion or establish, as was said above, a nation-church. In both countries two religions stood side by side, and the question at issue was the terms of the arrangement which might be concluded between them. In Germany this arrangement was the Religious Peace, concluded in 1555; in France after thirty-five terrible years of war a settlement was made by the Edict of Nantes.

The main difference between these two settlements was that the Religious Peace was practically a victory for Protestantism, and the Edict of Nantes a victory for Romanism. Both alike were but temporary halting-places; but Germany after the Religious Peace grew for some time more and more Protestant, France after the Edict of Nantes more and more Catholic.

In France however the tendency met with no interruption and ended in the fall of Protestantism; in Germany the tendency was suddenly arrested by the advance of the Counter-Reformation. Accordingly in Germany all early anticipations were disappointed, and about 1625 Romanism seemed likely to obtain a final victory. This was averted, but the South of Germany was definitively lost to the Reformation, and on the whole when the struggle was over victory remained in Germany as in France with Rome. It was by taking the principal part in this victory of the Counter-Reformation in Central Europe that Austria raised itself to the position of a great Power.

In an earlier chapter we examined the Counter-Reformation sufficiently to discern the causes of its success in Western Europe. These causes operated also in Germany, but if we would fully understand the surprising reaction it caused there we must take note of a circumstance which hitherto we have disregarded. In the middle of the sixteenth century the Reformation had taken possession of Germany like a mighty national religion, and it might well seem that the Council of Trent, whatever influence it might have elsewhere, came too late for Germany. And yet in twenty years from the conclusion of the Council by some means or other the Counter-Reformation had invaded Germany too and there too it eventually took the upper hand.

We noted it as a characteristic of that period, which

corresponds to the Elizabethan age, that it is not so much busy with religion itself as with the problem of the relation of religion to civil government. Thus the decided rejection of the Reformation by France was evidently caused in a great degree by the sense that it would lead in France to anarchy and disintegration. Now the danger of disintegration was much greater in Germany than even in France. Before the Reformation began France had established for herself a strong government, and all she had now to do was to hold fast what she had enjoyed for the best part of a century. But in Germany disintegration was an evil of long standing. At the very moment when some faint prospect of overcoming it was offered under Maximilian and Charles V, the Reformation introduced a new cause of disunion.

But the Lutheran Reformation, we have remarked, had politically a strong dash of conservatism, and was even, in a certain sense, carried into effect mainly by the agency of government. If it led in the last years of Charles V to a civil war in Germany we may perhaps say that the Revolutionist was rather the Emperor than the Schmalkaldic League. The settlement in which Ferdinand I took the lead and which actually gave a long peace to Germany was made by mutual agreement, and was maintained by an understanding between the head of the Catholic party, Ferdinand himself, and the leader of the Protestants, August, Elector of Saxony. Hence when the Lutheran Reformation was, as it were, concluded by the Religious Peace, it left Germany tolerably free from disunion, and modern German historians regret that the state of things introduced by the Religious Peace, when Germany seemed for a time to enjoy national and religious harmony, could not last.

It was no doubt a precarious equilibrium. The machinery of national government was extremely delicate. The Emperor had little power, but the Electoral College had a certain authority, and so long as the Confessions were evenly balanced there, Germany had as much organisation as it was accustomed to.

But the religious change had an aspect which was painfully secular. In all countries alike the Reformation, so far as it was successful, involved a vast confiscation of ecclesiastical property. Such a confiscation, accomplished regularly by a strong Government, might be harmless, but where government was weak and the change was made in a lawless revolutionary manner it was of the worst possible example. The Lutheran Reformation in one aspect was the purification of religion and the opening of the Bible to the people; but in another aspect it was the appropriation of a vast amount of property by a number of German princes. It raised these princes to a higher level of power and independence, and so far it enfeebled still further the central German Government, atoning perhaps for this by increasing the efficiency of provincial Government. At the same time it created a ruinous precedent. It gave all secular princes or landowners, great and small, an unappeasable appetite for church property, and a hankering after the anarchical independence which they might acquire by favouring the Reformation.

There was a kind of family likeness between the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire and the institutions of the Slavonic countries adjacent to it, such as Poland and the kingdoms of the Bohemian Crown. Both alike had a turbulent aristocracy and a feeble monarchy. The Austrian Habsburg was at this time the feeble

monarch in Bohemia as also in Hungary, and in these kingdoms he had to contend against much such a turbulent aristocracy leaning on the Reformation, as he had to withstand in Germany in his capacity of Emperor.

It was thus that in the latter part of the sixteenth century the Reformation began to be regarded in many parts of Germany, and with some considerable excuse, as a mere cloak for aristocratic anarchy. The religious side of it in many parts disappeared and nothing was left of it but that painfully secular side. The anarchy appeared in many different degrees. In a Hungarian or Bohemian landowner it might appear as mere lawlessness and robbery. In a great German prince it might take the form of political ambition and issue in a scheme for breaking up Germany into a group of independent principalities.

And now grew up German Calvinism. The Reformation guided by Calvin was politically much more radical than the Lutheran Reformation. It issued commonly in rebellion. If such rebellion proved successful, it might in the end work well, as in Scotland or in Holland. But if not, it necessarily alienated the governing class; it commonly led to civil war.

In Germany Calvinism soon gained one of the seven Electors, the Elector Palatine. This new ingredient thrown into the caldron could not but embitter the religious politics of the country. This prince's position was necessarily revolutionary. As a Calvinist, he was not protected by the Religious Peace. He was hemmed in by Catholic principalities, the ecclesiastical electorates, the kindred House of Bavaria, the Spanish Low Countries. Meanwhile he had France within call.

And thus as the influence of Romanism revived in



the world, Protestantism in Germany, while it felt the influence of the Reaction, was at once secularised by the prospect of spoliation and embittered by the admixture of Calvinism. This occurred at a time when the German branch of the House of Austria was weak, and imperial institutions were almost paralysed.

At the opening of the seventeenth century it was safe to predict that a revolution was at hand in Germany. But the revolution which took place proved quite different from that which then seemed probable. No one would have predicted that the House of Habsburg was about to strengthen and consolidate itself and to take in some respects a firmer hold of Germany, or that the decrepit Holy Roman Empire would linger on for two more centuries. What seemed certainly at hand was something widely different. The Empire seemed about to be dissolved into a number of independent states, and the German branch of the House of Austria seemed about to be dethroned.

The person who would take the leading share in this transformation seemed also designated. The King of France, Henry IV, would step forward, as his predecessor Henry II had done in the days of Charles V, as, long after, one of his successors, Napoleon, did in the nineteenth century.

Between 1606 and 1610, that is, in the first years of the Great Truce, this movement was secretly advancing in Germany. The Union was organised under the leadership of the Elector Palatine, Frederick IV, but by the agency principally of Christian of Anhalt. These and other leaders put themselves in close communication with Henry. They formed a plan for breaking up the Diet and destroying what remained of effective machinery

in the Empire. Their conduct at the Diet held at Ratisbon in 1608, where they frankly denied the right of the majority to bind the minority, and where the members of the Union seceded in a body, was plainly calculated and intended to bring on a Revolution.

The death of Henry IV for the moment frustrated these schemes, but when we compare the events which began in 1618 and the share taken in them by the Elector Palatine Frederick V with these earlier events in which his father Frederick IV took the lead, we cannot but recognise the continuity of the policy of the Palatine party.

What has now been said of the new greatness and prominence of the Austrian Power, which may be held to begin with the succession in 1619 of the Emperor Ferdinand II to the Emperor Matthias, enables us to describe in outline English policy as it shaped itself in the later years of James I. The principal features of the Elizabethan period had disappeared earlier, but that change was chiefly negative; new Powers now appear and the Counter-Reformation carries on its struggle with the Reformation by new agencies.

The system which had disappeared was that which turned exclusively on the resistance of the Low Countries to Spain. This resistance had been supported by aid fitfully rendered to the rebels by England and France. But in the earlier years of James not only had Spain herself been led to take up a less aggressive attitude, for she had made peace with England, but in 1609 she had consented to suspend the original war itself, the war with heresy, the war with the Low Countries, for twelve years. This occurrence of 1609 was like the true conclusion of the Elizabethan age. After taking note of it we ask

ourselves whether James having disentangled himself from the Continental politics of his predecessor, will form new Continental relations for himself, and whether some new question will take the place of that insoluble Dutch question which seemed now to have been at least shelved for some years. And at least we find that he is influenced by considerations which had not troubled the counsellors of Queen Elizabeth. He has sons and daughters to marry, and they must be married preferably into a branch of the House of Austria or into the House of Bourbon. He seeks a Spanish match for the Prince of Wales, but at the same time he finds a husband for his daughter Elizabeth, and by this latter marriage he calls into existence a new international system for Western Europe and creates almost a new Dutch question. What the Dutch had been to Elizabeth, that in a great degree was the Palatinate for this generation, and the chief concern or interest that the English people had in the Palatinate lay in the fact that the ruler of it, the Elector Palatine, was the husband whom James had secured for his daughter Elizabeth.

But the reason why this particular marriage had such serious and such various consequences was that the Elector Palatine by his position in Europe was closely connected with those occurrences which gave so much greatness and prominence to the Austrian House, and which now appear in history as the occurrences in which the Thirty Years' War took its rise.

The Thirty Years' War is held to begin in 1618 by the marvellous 'defenestration,' at Prag, of Martinitz, Slavata and the Secretary Fabricius. But the next year to this, 1619, is almost more important in the revival of the Austrian branch of the House of Austria, for in this

year Matthias was succeeded by the Emperor Ferdinand II, one of the most energetic and characteristic representatives of the Counter-Reformation which that age produced. But other occurrences followed by which the prominence of Austria was still further enhanced. A revolution in the institutions of the Empire was suggested when it was proposed to declare the Bohemian crown elective, and this revolution was pointed directly at England when it was proposed that the Elector Palatine, the son-in-law of James, should become a candidate for it. When this revolution was actually accomplished in August 1619 by the election of Frederick by the Bohemian Estates and by Frederick's acceptance of the election, England seemed to stand on the threshold of a new foreign policy wholly unlike that of the Elizabethan age, for it was one in which neither the Spanish Monarchy nor the Low Countries had any concern, and it was founded entirely on the condition of Germany. Nevertheless we can scarcely understand the change that had occurred without looking forward a little beyond 1619. At the end of October 1620 the new Austrian Power crushed the new Bohemian Power, the elective Bohemian Monarchy, at the battle of the White Mountain outside Prag. A blow was struck at the Reformation which might well seem serious wherever, as in England, a strong national feeling in favour of the Reformation existed.

So far the active offensive Power which James finds always in his path is Austria. Austria has become reunited and vigorous, Austria is an efficient representative of the Counter-Reformation, Austria has crushed her Protestant enemy and won the great victory of the age. But in the new form which the great struggle of the Confessions is now assuming will the Spanish Monarchy

find no place at all? The Truce has removed her from the list of belligerents for twelve years. But now it is to be observed that the twelve years were fast running out. In fact they expired in 1621, so that in that year the old interminable struggle of the Spanish Monarchy with the Dutch began again. Henceforth there was not merely a Thirty Years' War, but two wars were waged side by side, one for thirty years in Germany, the other, only three years shorter, between the Spanish Monarchy and the United Provinces, and by the Treaties of Westphalia not one of these wars but both of them alike were brought to an end in 1648. c

Thus both branches of the House of Austria take some part together in the international drama which began in the latter years of James I. It is indeed the characteristic feature of the age that the two branches of the House act in concert. It was now to be tried whether thirty years after the Spanish Monarchy had threatened to overwhelm all Western Europe in Philip II's time, Spain and Austria might not be equally menacing in concert about the time when Philip III was succeeded by Philip IV, and Matthias by the Emperor Ferdinand II. In the year 1620, a little earlier than the battle of the White Mountain at Prag, this new alarming concert of the Spanish and Austrian branches of the House of Austria was placed in an imposing manner upon the European stage. A question of the Palatinate was growing up behind the Bohemian question. It was contemplated, after the Elector Palatine should be driven from his revolutionary throne at Prag, to attack him in his hereditary dominions of the Palatinate, and already the scheme was in the air of depriving him of these territories and transferring them to his cousin the Duke of Bavaria. Such unceremonious manipulation of the Electoral College

might alter the religious balance of the Empire and constitute a political and a religious Revolution that would convulse Europe. Nevertheless in 1620 Spinola, a general of Spain, invaded the Palatinate, that is, a German Electorate. The catastrophe of Prag followed in the same year. But 1621 brought occurrences of the same kind and almost more momentous as affecting the position of the two branches of the House of Austria. First, king Philip III was succeeded by Philip IV, in whose long reign the Spanish Monarchy underwent the great losses which may be considered as equivalent to the fall of Spain—the Spain, that is, of Philip II. Secondly, the Twelve Years' Truce expired, and the war, which for thirty years in the sixteenth century had been a kind of pivot for international affairs, began again. In other words, the great religious war which before had been waged between one great Counter-Reformation Power, Spain, and one great Reformation Power, the Low Countries, was now to be revived as one of two religious wars, for besides the revival of the old war there was now a second religious war in Germany, the Emperor himself representing the Austrian branch of the House of Austria and appearing for the Counter-Reformation while the Elector Palatine appeared as the champion of the Reformation.

In what way was England concerned with these threatening relations of Europe thus transformed? Under Elizabeth she had feared in the unsettled state of her succession and of her religion to be invaded by the Spanish Monarchy. She was now less timid, having defeated the Armada and settled the succession question and having lived through several years of peace. She could not however regard with simple indifference the double religious war which was now about to break out.

In the first place the leader of the Reformation party in the Germanic war was a son-in-law of our Stuart king, and so long as he should remain the most prominent figure on the Protestant side of that struggle we could not but feel interested in it. But, moreover, popular feeling in England was other than it had been in Elizabeth's time. Then it had been perhaps doubtful whether the English were at heart a Romanist or a Protestant people, and even now Gondomar could persuade himself that almost all persons of cultivation or property in England were at least secretly Catholic. But he seems to have been mistaken. At least there was much religion in England which was both Protestant and fervent. Protestant religion both in England and Scotland was a thing alive and capable of self-sacrifice. The Reformation, it appeared, had taken strong root in the two insular kingdoms. And now that on the Continent two religious wars were breaking out at once, England was likely to show herself less indifferent than in Elizabeth's reign. Public opinion was likely to clamour to be led somewhat in advance of political prudence in defence of Protestantism assailed whether in the Low Countries or the Palatinate or even Bohemia by the united House of Austria.

For, having taken note of the altered features of Europe which exhibit the portentous approach of a new or rather of two new religious wars, we are now to remark that the problem is not to be dealt with by Elizabeth and a people long accustomed to their virgin queen, but by the first Stuart now at the end of his work of pacification and declining in years. It must be decided somehow between him and his Parliament, and it is to be seen whether new Drakes will arise or the English soldier penetrate into the heart of Germany, or on the other

hand whether diplomacy shall achieve a peace; and further, if a land army is required, whether the Stuart monarchy and the Parliament between them will know how to find the money. Long before the diplomatic and the foreign question were fully discussed the domestic question superseded both of them. After all, little war took place, but there took place a good deal of revolution. We took no prominent part in the Thirty Years' War nor in the second war of the Low Countries, but about the same time that the Continent was elaborating its treaties of Westphalia we made the experiment of abolishing monarchy in England.

Thus a short formula for this period is, rise of Austria and approach of a great double religious war on the Continent; this regarded by the Stuart House from the dynastic point of view, but chiefly from the religious point of view by public opinion; and the whole foreign question gradually overwhelmed and superseded by the growth of a domestic revolution.

In short, our policy arrives just here at a parting of the roads. A vista opens on the Continent, where two religious wars are beginning at the same time, wars to which the Stuart kings are called by their dynastic connexions and their people by religious feeling. But at the same time another vista equally extensive opens at home, where the divisions, the topics and the personages that afterwards furnished out the Great Rebellion are about to appear. More and more the national vigour was drawn off to this domestic movement, and England assuming an active decisive policy in the Thirty Years' War was lost in the great Might Have Been. Yet we can mark pretty exactly the point at which the ways parted. Look at that year 1621. On the Continent it was the year when



in Spain Philip III was succeeded by Philip IV, and also the year when the war of the Spanish Monarchy with the Low Countries began again. In England in the same year Parliament was summoned, the Parliament which among other things made the famous protest in favour of liberty of speech. In the four years which still remained to James I, Parliament was summoned once again (in 1624), and both questions, the question of religious war abroad and the parliamentary question at home, moved forward. But another question, to James himself more fundamental than either, the Spanish match, was prosecuted eagerly during this closing period of the reign, and we are able to perceive what after all lies at the bottom of the policy of James I. His reign is sharply contrasted with that of Elizabeth because it is given up to royal marriage. The marriage of Elizabeth Stuart has involved England in those questions of Bohemia and the Palatinate which threaten the whole Continent with confusion, and forces James to press on another royal marriage, more important still, the Spanish match which he prepares for the Prince of Wales.

If 1621 marks one of the greatest international turning-points for England, and for both branches of the House of Austria, the short period extending from 1621 to the death of James I includes a turning-point equally memorable in the history of the House of Bourbon. For 1624 may be taken as the commencement of the period of Richelieu. Fourteen years after the death of the founder Henry IV, appeared the most original and powerful minister that ever served the House of Bourbon, a minister who gave a character to the Bourbon Monarchy which decided the position it was to hold in Europe and ultimately also the relation it was to bear to England.

Of the Thirty Years' War itself we need here only to remark the transition from the Bohemian phase to the phase of the Palatinate. The Protestant invasion of Bohemia having failed was followed by an invasion of Frederick's electoral dominion of the Palatinate by the House of Habsburg. In other words, the war was transferred from the Slavonic world into the heart of the German Empire, and questions were raised which touched the very constitution of the Empire and therefore interested almost every leading state. The Bohemian question was soon forgotten; the question of the Palatinate took its place, and this could not so soon be forgotten.

What may be called the Balance of Germany depended mainly on the equal number of Catholic and Protestant Electorates. On the Catholic side were the three ecclesiastical Electorates (Köln, Trier, and Mainz); on the Protestant side the Palatinate, Saxony and Brandenburg. The seventh Electorate, Bohemia, belonged to the House of Austria itself. Here was indeed a nice balance! When it was now proposed to take the electoral rank from Frederick and to transfer it to his Catholic cousin of Bavaria, it was proposed to make a revolution in Germany in favour of Catholicism.

But all this was but dimly conceived in England, which hitherto had had but little concern in the intricate politics of the Empire. What came home at once to the English and to the French mind was that the Palatinate was invaded not by the Austrian troops of the Emperor but by Spanish troops marching from the Low Countries. The Power whose movements ever since the sixteenth century England, France, and the Netherlands had been in the habit of watching with anxious vigilance was Spain. The King of Spain and the Austrian sovereign were kinsmen,

but they had not hitherto been seen acting in concert. About 1588, when the Spanish Power by itself had overshadowed the world, the Austrian Power had not been seen aiding it. It was therefore an alarming innovation that on the outbreak of a civil war in Germany, Spain promptly interfered and moved her troops into a German province to render aid to the kindred Power. It was the more alarming because at this very time that kindred Power began to display such unwonted vigour.

But these continental movements did not directly threaten England. We may safely say that Elizabeth would have troubled herself very little about them. She who had kept England at peace in a much more threatening condition of Europe would scarcely have gone to war for the Palatinate. But Elizabeth had neither sons, nor daughters, nor sons-in-law. It was otherwise with James, who had the ordinary interests and feelings of a member of the royal caste. He had indeed resisted the appeals of his children when they urged him to support their Bohemian claim. But when they were threatened in their own Palatinate James held it a family duty to interfere.

Both James and Charles regard the Thirty Years' War in a manner in which Elizabeth had never regarded the continental movements of her time. For Elizabeth had been married to her people, but James was only married to Anne of Denmark and Charles to Henrietta Maria. The Stuart kings see little more than the danger of a relative; for them the appalling convulsion in which the German nation and the German Reformation seemed likely to perish together is summed up in the question of the Palatinate, which is like a lawsuit in which their

family is interested. In taking this view, in proposing to involve England in war for a mere family interest, they but followed the usual practice of European Monarchies in their time; it was Elizabeth who, owing to special circumstances, had been able to rise to a higher point of view.

And English public opinion was disposed on the whole, though vaguely and uncertainly, to go with them. To it too the rights of the royal family were something, but besides these rights the nation was alive to the interest of the Protestant religion. James and Charles might not be quite insensible to this too, had not the Catholic match, first with Spain, afterwards with France, clouded their views. But what the English people saw in Germany was an alarming series of disasters befalling their religion. They understood indeed little in detail. The merits of the Bohemian question or of the electoral question were beyond their knowledge, but they could see the cause of the Reformation sinking as low as it had ever fallen in the darkest years of the sixteenth century. Bohemia hopelessly lost, all South Germany overflowed by the Counter-Reformation, the Palatinate lost at least temporarily, and an alliance formed between the two branches of the House of Austria which might revive the ascendancy which Spain alone had had in the reign of Elizabeth—all this they could see. And thus the Stuart kings, though sympathising but little with their people, yet were in a kind of vague general agreement with their people on the policy demanded by the time.

But the public mind was embarrassed, as we have frequently seen it embarrassed since, but as it had not been embarrassed in the Elizabethan age. In that age the danger which threatened England, and therefore

the close interest of England in continental affairs, was indisputable; for a long time it seemed barely possible that England could escape. For this reason we aided the Huguenots and the insurgents of the Low Countries, and on this direct and undeniable interest our whole foreign policy was founded. The German disturbance of 1618 did not concern us at all in the same unquestionable manner. It was most serious for Germany, most serious for Continental Protestantism, but in the most unfavourable contingency it could scarcely be shown to endanger England. The Protestantism of England did not depend on that of Germany, as it had really seemed to depend, in Elizabeth's time, on that of the Low Countries.

Perhaps if we had been able to consider this German question, as we should consider it now, purely from the point of view of the national interest and duty, we should have held that England was not called to put herself prominently forward.

It was right indeed that we should exert ourselves to prevent the fall of Protestantism in Germany, but we were not so situated that the principal responsibility should fall on us. Those who were most bound to act were the Lutheran princes of Germany, after these the Dutch, and then the kings of Denmark and Sweden. All these had the same interest as ourselves in the cause of the Reformation, and they were nearer than ourselves to the scene of action. And when the concert of Spain with the Emperor was revealed to the world by Spinola's invasion of the Palatinate, another Power, not Protestant, might be thought to have a closer interest than England, if not in saving German Protestantism, at least in resisting Habsburg ascendancy. We are to remember

that already in Henry IV's time France had felt herself most dangerously hemmed in by Habsburg power. The Catholic Low Countries, Franche Comté and Alsace, were in Habsburg hands. And now the Palatinate passed into the same hands at the same time that Austria, a neighbour of France in Alsace and Suabia, became much more powerful than formerly. France then might be expected to bestir herself.

In these circumstances a Grand Alliance for the purpose of watching over the interests of the Reformation in Germany was needed. England would be a member of it, and would supply aid in money, perhaps at need in ships and men. But England would not be expected to take any leading part.

This simple view of the matter was obscured by the family relation between James and Charles and the Elector Palatine. To assert his rights, to recover for him his hereditary possessions, was regarded as a family duty by the King of England. The English people were on the one hand not prepared to say bluntly that these family interests did not concern them; on the other hand they too wished to see the Elector righted, because the cause of the Reformation was involved in his. Accordingly England found herself taking a more prominent part in the question than was reasonable. Frederick himself and the whole Protestant world looked to the King of England for the solution of a question in which England was not primarily concerned. Nor was England able to meet this unreasonable expectation by announcing a firm and consistent policy.

This phase of our Policy may be taken to end in 1629, in which year the domestic dispute in England begins to paralyse her action abroad. We must however distinguish

between the phase of it which belongs to James and that which belongs to Charles. Only it is to be observed that the division does not fall at the moment of the death of James but a year earlier, at the return of Prince Charles from Spain. At this time the reins fall out of the hands of James, and pass into those, not so much of Charles as of Buckingham. And with the peace with France and Spain in 1629-30 we may say that the second phase ends.

We have found the policy of James I tolerably confused in every part of his reign. It had however one redeeming feature which saved him from disaster, namely, that it was always peaceful. England had reached that secure position that if she chose to hold aloof from foreign complications, or even to trifle with them and then dishonourably to withdraw, she could do so without suffering much for it. It marks therefore the first of the two phases that England undertakes a great deal and accomplishes nothing. Had James been left alone he would probably have put up with his failure and sunk into inactivity. But by this time the national feeling has been aroused, and the question is taken out of his hands by those who by no means share his passion for peace. Now begins the second phase, not less confused than the first but infinitely more dangerous. England in her bewilderment finds herself dragged into wars which she neither understands nor approves, but to which she sees no end. For England herself means one thing by the war, but the English Monarchy means another. Hence in the end a breach between the nation and the Monarchy, a revolution.

But one strange characteristic belongs to both phases alike. The real enemy who threatens Protestantism is the Emperor wielding the power of Austria. He is indeed assisted by Spain, but Spain is by this time much enfeebled,

far advanced in an incurable decline. We remark, however, that the English mind, whether we look at James, Charles and Buckingham, or at the popular party so suspicious of their policy, seems unable to see any enemy but Spain. The Palatinate is to be saved, so the King judges at one time, by a marriage alliance with Spain, at another time by war with Spain. And yet throughout the decision really lay with the Emperor. On the other hand the popular party when they are in their most warlike mood pay little regard to the Palatinate, but meditate a grand maritime war with Spain. It is evident that the impressions left behind by the Elizabethan war still hold their minds. They remember Drake, Essex and Raleigh, and are unable to grasp the new development which is really all-important, or to understand that Germany, not the Sea and the New World, is the scene of the new struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation.

The episode of Raleigh, standing midway near the commencement of the Thirty Years' War, explains this universal misconception, for it shows how much alive the animosity towards Spain and the wish for war with Spain continued to be more than twelve years after the conclusion of peace and almost at the moment when the new danger from Austria was beginning. The misconception was favoured by the action of Spain in occupying the Palatinate. This step, taken really with reluctance and in mere self-defence by the Spanish Government, was interpreted as if Philip II had been still on the throne. It was taken as an act of tyrannous ascendancy. Spain still appeared alarmingly great and Austria comparatively weak after the relative position had been reversed, after Spain had fallen into languor and Austria had become the tyrant of Germany.



Accordingly throughout this period English policy makes the mistake of trying to settle the German question at Madrid instead of at Vienna. It adopts first a peaceful, then a warlike method. At first the Elector is to be rescued, and his territory restored to him, by an article in a marriage-treaty, afterwards by military operations. But both the marriage-treaty and the military operations are directed to Spain, with whom the settlement of the question did not really lie, and not to the Emperor, with whom it did.

We have seen the Spanish marriage already under negotiation before the German question broke out. At the outset the plan had been favoured by James, partly because it promised him a sum of money, partly because of the splendour of the match. Spain had favoured, if not the plan itself, yet the discussion of it, as furnishing a lever by which she could at least strongly influence English policy and might hope to undermine English Protestantism by procuring a toleration for the Catholics. Now came the German question, and modified the character and object of the negotiation. Henceforward, while the King of Spain regarded it much as before, James and Charles came to regard it chiefly as a means of procuring relief for their relative in Germany. The Infanta was to give in return for the position of Queen of England and for large concessions to her Church in England, no longer merely a sum of money, but also the Palatinate to the son-in-law and daughter of James.

This is the grand scheme upon which James staked his reputation, and he had at the outset the advantage that if his conciliatory advances failed he could at any time fall back upon war, in which he would be supported with enthusiasm by his Parliament and people. But besides

the misconception that lurked in the plan itself he was thwarted by his inability to maintain a popular course and by the good-natured indolence which made the thought of war intolerable to him. In 1621 he stumbled into a quarrel with his Parliament, which, as he depended for money either upon Parliament or upon the Spanish match, threw him against his will into dependence upon Spain. Hence between 1621 and 1623 the marriage-negotiation enters upon its intense phase, and in the latter year occurs the wild visit of Prince Charles and Buckingham to Madrid.

• The course of this long negotiation presents many small points, which for the moment seemed of intense interest. It filled months and years with fussy excitement, and gave occasion to infinite diplomatic fencing, to misunderstandings and explanations, to ambiguous promises now given, now revoked. This kind of thing is precisely what an essay like this avoids. For the question at issue was after all simple, and when the whispering was over the time necessarily arrived for deciding this simple question, whether Spain would, or indeed whether she could, restore the Palatinate to the Elector.

Had the Elector conducted himself in the meanwhile honourably and discreetly, he might have obtained restitution, not so much from Spain as from the Emperor himself. But he had behaved with such perverseness, and had created such confusion in Germany by letting loose military adventurers such as Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick upon the country, that he had made it impossible for the Emperor to treat him with indulgence. Accordingly the demand of England practically came to this, that Spain should put force upon the Emperor, should go to war with him in the cause of the Elector

Palatine. And this on the ground that the royal House of Spain was henceforth to be connected by marriage with that of England.

But the royal House of Spain was connected much more closely, not only by many marriages, but by a common origin, with the Emperor himself. Accordingly the time came when it was necessary to explain to James and Charles that by a fundamental maxim of the Spanish House war between it and the Emperor was inadmissible.

In the course of his stay at Madrid, Charles after making incredible concessions came at last to perceive that no concessions could purchase that which he had most at heart. Hitherto he had been the agent of his father's policy, but after his return in 1624 the policy of James stood condemned. The only alternative, since it occurred to no one that not Spain but the Emperor really held the fate of the Elector in his hands, was war with Spain. The reign of the Peace-maker in foreign policy is at an end. Charles and Buckingham put themselves at the head of the popular movement which presses for war.

The period which follows stands alone in the history of the early Stuarts as exhibiting a Stuart prince acting in unison with public opinion. The agreement did not indeed last long; as a leader of public opinion Charles failed almost as disastrously as he failed later when he put himself in opposition to it. If he did not fail quite at once, and if he failed partly through ill-luck and not entirely through perversity, this was due to the influence of Buckingham, who has a right to give his name to this phase of our policy.

Buckingham in these years resembles not so much his immediate predecessor Carr as those favourites of Queen

Elizabeth, Leicester and Essex, who like him had dealt with foreign affairs in a time of war. Between 1624 and 1628 the Elizabethan age might seem in some respects to be revived. What Raleigh had clamoured for was now at last seen. The peace with Spain came to an end, and the nation might look forward to a renewal of those lucrative triumphs which in the last years of Elizabeth had been found so easy to win. The Netherlands since 1621 were again at war with Spain, and now that England joined them, as she had done in the former war, the interval of peace might seem a mere pause, and the old struggle to have recommenced by a sort of necessity. England sees again, for the first time under the Stuarts, a spirited, nay momentarily a popular foreign policy, and for this she is indebted to Buckingham. The favourite is no doubt a favourite, that is a spoiled and demoralised politician, but he is less helpless than either of his two masters, and seems by no means devoid either of the instinct of statesmanship or of energy or of patriotism.

But the new policy is in reality as far as possible from being Elizabethan, and in a few years it involves the country in greater difficulties than had ever resulted from the feebleness of James. Elizabethan policy, as we have seen, had never been in the slightest degree adventurous. When it was most warlike it had been justified by absolute necessity, and it had been economical in the extreme. The marked peculiarity of it had been that it had always lagged somewhat in the rear of public opinion. What triumphs it had won had been forced upon it, and there had never been the slightest uncertainty about the object or the justification of its warlike proceedings. It had never lost sight of peace; it had steadily resisted the urgency or the war-party represented by Raleigh. The

program of Buckingham is wholly unlike this. His war with Spain is for a moment popular, but it could not for a moment be represented as undertaken in pure self-defence. England was not now threatened by Spain; no Armada was now preparing in the harbours of Cadiz or Lisbon. Nor could the object of it be distinctly stated or justified. It was not clear that Spain could, if she would, restore the Palatinate and the Electorate to Frederick, or that there was any reason why England should take the burden of the Elector's cause so prominently upon herself.

At the outset the policy seemed not only popular, but even parliamentary. Parliament was summoned more frequently in this Buckingham period than it had been in the peaceful years of James or in the warlike period of Elizabeth. For Parliament committed itself in 1624 to a warlike policy, and accordingly when Charles succeeded to the throne a prospect appeared of a grand war to be conducted by King and Parliament in close union. And yet this very Buckingham period created a more fatal and irreparable division between King and Parliament than had ever been witnessed before.

We see the powerful reaction of foreign policy upon domestic government. It has been too common to explain our civil troubles sole'y by internal insular causes. The long peace and security had no doubt allowed the constitutional question to come under discussion, and even now the somewhat unnecessary character of the war enhanced the discontent. But a foreign war, with all its exigencies and excitements, was needful to create our civil troubles, which probably would not have taken place but for the war with Spain which began in 1625 and the war with France which speedily followed it.

These wars belong to the reign of Charles not to that of

James. James witnessed but the commencement of the active policy. He lived to see his peace maxims pass out of date and his own son and the favourite whom he had raised from insignificance unite with the Parliament in destroying the work which was his pride, the settlement of 1604.

At his arrival in England he had brought in his hand peace with Spain. He had had a considerable share in extending the pacification to the Low Countries. He had been able in spite of his feebleness and indolence to hold in check the wild impulse, half heroic, half lawless, which still impelled the nation against Spain. He had put to death Raleigh, the prophet and leader of that crusade.

So far as his reign has unity it is in this peace policy. But it seemed as if the tide was against him, and through his last year he drifted helplessly into war. The grand marriage which was to crown the edifice could not be arranged. Spain had again threatened the Reformation by occupying the Palatinate. The spirit of Raleigh, 'ranging for revenge,' took possession of the Parliament, of Buckingham and of Prince Charles. The strongest conviction of James was not strong enough to resist such opposition in his own family. He seemed to see the country fall back into Elizabethan times, and he acquiesced.

He had always wanted the vigour to stamp his own mind upon events. But when he was allowed to close his eyes before war actually began, a sort of unity, a faint distinctness of character, was given to his reign.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE POLICY OF CHARLES I.

THE new time, which promised to be Elizabethan, proved, we have seen why, less Elizabethan than even the reign of James. Between the reigns of James and Elizabeth there were large resemblances in the midst of great difference. Both Elizabeth and James loved peace, both gave prosperity to their country and maintained for a long time her influence abroad. Charles, opening his reign with unnecessary war, alienated his people, ruined his credit in Europe, and came at last to be regarded with contemptuous indifference by the great statesmen of the Continent, by Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus, and Frederick Henry.

The part of his reign which preceded the Great Rebellion, that is, the thirteen years between his accession in 1625, and the rising in Scotland in 1638, falls into two well-marked divisions. There is first the age of Buckingham, in which the Minister impresses his energy upon the proceedings of Government, an age of wars, in the midst of which falls a kind of rehearsal of the Great Rebellion, the age of the Petition of Right. Secondly

there is the period which is marked in constitutional history by the abeyance of Parliaments. In the history of Policy its characteristic feature is that Charles is his own foreign Minister, but at the same time is debarred by want of supplies from doing anything decisive. In the former period our policy is certainly ill-advised and disastrous, but energetic, and at least not contemptible. In the latter, which is the stormy period of the victories of Gustavus Adolphus, of the murder of Wallenstein, of the battle of Nördlingen, and of the intervention of France in the German war, our policy is painfully confused and ineffective.

Buckingham's was the only strong influence which was brought to bear on the foreign policy of the Stuarts at this period, partly because, their policy being mainly occupied with marriage questions or family questions, it could only be influenced by a Minister who stood in a most intimate confidential relation to the royal family. It may strike us as strange that Buckingham should have been in an equal degree a favourite to two kings in succession, but he had been in Spain with Charles, and Charles needed a minister who might stand in a peculiarly intimate personal relation to him. So two generations of Hydes served the later Stuarts, being personally connected with James II by marriage.

The events of this age were in themselves great, and might, but for accidental circumstances, have had a profound effect upon our policy. They were in one word the breaking of the Spanish match, and the marriage of Charles a few months after his accession to Henrietta Maria, daughter of Henry IV of France. Once more a royal marriage! But when the Spanish match was broken war with Spain followed. This is the second in the series



of our wars with Spain, and, since in war with Spain our empire has mainly grown up, it might have led to vast changes in the colonial world. In like manner the marriage alliance with France, formed at the very time when the reunion of the House of Austria alarmed both France and England, might have led to a concerted intervention of the two states in the Thirty Years' War. But Buckingham's policy, if it had energy, had no clearness. Instead of concert the marriage was followed by war. We found ourselves at war with Spain and France at the same time. Again such energetic intervention in the affairs of the Continent, favoured as it was at the outset by Parliament, might have restored that internal union which had been seen under Elizabeth and which James had in a great degree trifled away. Constitutional bickerings spring up in peace, but in the midst of a great national peril they may be expected to subside again.

All these possibilities withered away. The great enterprises failed and were abandoned. Peace was made with France at Susa in the year 1629; peace was made with Spain at Madrid early in the year 1630. Nothing was gained for England in either war. Instead of national union the energetic foreign policy produced a discord more alarming than the country had witnessed since the accession of Henry VII. On the one side Parliament presented to the King a solemn Petition of Right; on the other side the King, offended by the violent conduct of Parliament, dissolved it, and began a serious and persistent attempt to make the Monarchy independent of parliamentary support.

What was the cause of so much failure?

We have traced the gradual unexpected rise of English maritime power in conflict with Spain. We saw Spain in

the days of Lepanto taking the lead of all maritime States and scarcely thinking of England as even a possible rival. Twenty years later we saw the relation almost reversed, Spanish ships not safe in their own harbours against English attack, while Spanish Armadas are wholly unable to inflict any damage upon England. Thus ended in 1604 the first war of England and Spain. England has conquered her place upon the Ocean, Spain meanwhile has recovered nothing of her lost reputation. Twenty years of peace between the two nations succeeded, but in this period too Spain has no revival in naval or military reputation, whatever successes she may have in the field of diplomacy. Accordingly now that the war broke out again the nation may naturally have expected to see Buckingham take up the work of Drake, Essex and Raleigh where it was left, inflict more defeats upon Spain, bring home more spoils. But somehow the spell has been snapped, the talisman lost. The expedition of Sir Edward Cecil against Cadiz in October 1625 does not remind us by any feature of those expeditions of the Elizabethan age. The history of it tells of little but mismanagement, disorder, indiscipline, cowardice and failure. The naval glory of England would seem to have passed away again like a dream.

But let us call to mind how it had grown up. The open war of England and Spain had been preceded in Elizabeth's time by a long unavowed war. For twenty years before the Armada, Hawkins and Drake had been plundering Spanish ships and Spanish towns; in short, the nations had been at war, while the Governments were nominally at peace. This had been a period of apprenticeship to maritime affairs for England. Without this Elizabeth and her Government would have found themselves

powerless, when the crisis arrived, to resist the naval power of Spain.

Buckingham had not the advantage of his predecessor in the office of Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham. He could fall back upon no school of adventurers who, under the mask of peace, had become veterans of naval war. For there had been peace, real peace, not covert war, with Spain now for twenty years. He had therefore only the resources of government, the official machinery, and how rotten this became in time of peace, not only in the reign of James I but even a century later in the ministry of Walpole, it is not difficult to discover. There is little reason to suppose that Buckingham had any great power of organisation, any qualification in fact but a certain energy, but he had to use an instrument which would probably have broken in a much more skilful hand.

This may be said of the expedition to Cadiz, which otherwise was hopeful, being directed against Spain, in that age regarded as the national enemy, and at a time when the war was still popular in England. If two years later Buckingham's policy and Buckingham in person suffered a much more disastrous defeat at the Isle of Rhé, the explanation of this is different. The enemy here was France, and the nation could hardly just then understand a war with France. They felt the recklessness of a policy which had made an enemy of the state which in Elizabeth's time had been our ally against Spain at the very time when we were at war with Spain herself. Buckingham's short-lived popularity was already at an end. He had been impeached by the Commons and thus branded as a public enemy. Accordingly, not to speak of unavoidable misfortunes, such as the contrary wind which deprived him of his reinforcements, he had to deal with a force which was in great part mutinous.

Thus we had no success in these wars, and at Rhé we suffered terrible loss. But this has happened to us again and again at the opening of a war, and it has usually had the effect of rousing and uniting us until we arrive at victory through the discipline of disaster. Why had it no such effect in the case before us?

The answer is that the policy of these wars was essentially unsound, and would not bear the examination to which it was subjected. Unfortunately it had met for a moment with popular support, and thus the war had been allowed to begin. But no sooner had it begun than signs of discontent and misgiving showed themselves. In particular it was not clear who was the enemy nor in what way the war should be conducted. By a kind of accident the Court and the Parliament were both for a moment disposed to war, but they could scarcely agree in any warlike measures.

The popular feeling was simply that Protestantism was in danger and ought to receive aid from England. The enemy, it seemed evident, must be Spain, and the way to attack him had been pointed out by the naval heroes of the last war.

But what was the view of Charles? It was this, that he was bound by family duty to recover the Palatinate for his brother-in-law. To him Spain was only the enemy so far as Spanish troops had occupied the Palatinate, and so far as he felt himself aggrieved by the treatment he had received in Spain. His Government would be prepared to meet the wishes of the people, to send ships to Cadiz and lie in wait, as in old times, for the silver fleet. But what in the popular view would be the whole war seemed to the Government of Charles the lesser half of it. Naval victories over Spain would be unprofitable if they did

not procure the cession of the Palatinate. And this they could only do, if at all, by an indirect process. It was necessary to bring pressure to bear not only upon Spain but upon the Emperor. What after all was most urgent was either to send troops to Germany or at least to assist by subsidies the Protestant princes who commanded troops in Germany.

Accordingly when Charles at his accession tried to represent the war as one which Parliament had already sanctioned in the last year of James and which therefore Parliament was bound to support by subsidies, it soon appeared that he had in view a war far more extensive than Parliament had contemplated. They were prepared to support a naval war against Spain, but he asked them also to support a war in Germany. His family politics led him not only to stand by his brother-in-law the Elector, but also to cooperate with his uncle the King of Denmark, who in this phase of the German war took the lead of the Protestant party. Thus Parliament found itself in danger of being tempted to make immense and unheard-of grants for a war which it only approved in part. Leading members, for example Sir Francis Seymour, protested that in the debates of 1624 no such war was contemplated as the Government was now undertaking.

And as the plan so the spirit of the Government was wholly different from that of Parliament. For a while there seemed to be sympathy between them in hatred to Spain, the Parliament hating Spain as the great Catholic Power, Charles as the Power that had insulted him. But the difference of feeling appeared almost immediately; it appeared before the first Parliament of Charles met. The nation had always eagerly prayed that Charles might take a Protestant wife. But no sooner were they relieved from

the prospect of seeing a Spanish Queen than Charles married the Catholic Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France. No sooner was he liberated from all those humiliating engagements to allow Catholic worship, and to relax the Laws of Recusancy, which he had taken at Madrid, than he entered into the same engagements with France. Like most royal marriages in that age the marriage of Charles and Henrietta Maria was intended to have a political meaning. It was to involve an alliance between England and France for the purpose of waging war against Spain and recovering the Palatinate. But again this French alliance had not been contemplated by the Parliament of 1624 when the foundation of the war-policy had been laid.

Thus it may be said that Charles and his Parliament found themselves at cross purposes. A certain general agreement in anti-Spanish feeling was being misconstrued and misrepresented so as to involve the Parliament in a policy of boundless adventure and expense. A dangerous ambiguity weighed on English politics and seemed embodied in the person of Buckingham. The discontent of the nation fixed on him. The mention of his name broke the first Parliament. His impeachment disturbed and finally broke the second. And when in the third the struggle came to a height, and a decision was reached which for a long time appeared to close the constitutional question, though now it is seen to have only opened it, Buckingham still seemed, more than Charles, to be the enemy with whom the Pym's and the Eliot's had to contend. Then came his assassination.

If we regard foreign policy, neither party can be thought to have taken a rational view. There was no ground for reviving the maritime war with Spain, still

support, by means of the King of Denmark or otherwise, of the Elector Palatine in Germany. If we take Elizabethan policy as our standard, we shall say that England ought at this time to have remained at peace, though she might fairly have supported the Protestant cause with diplomacy and with money.

Much has been written about the apostasy of Wentworth, who in the third Parliament is found playing a prominent part among the patriots, whereas later he contends and dies for the King. But if we regard Wentworth simply as an Elizabethan statesman, such conduct requires no explanation, least of all the explanation of apostasy. A politician might very fairly oppose Buckingham, and yet not oppose Charles after Buckingham's disappearance. Foreign policy was the question of Buckingham's time, but after his fall there followed a period of peace with foreign Powers. Miserable as was the diplomacy of Charles between 1629 and 1638, it was at least peaceful, and being at the time little known to the public, might wear a superficial resemblance to the delaying, 'peddling,' negative policy, which had served Elizabeth so well. Buckingham's policy of adventure had something portentous and ruinous about it, which a statesman fed on Elizabethan ideas filtered through the mind of Bacon might well think it a patriotic duty to resist to the utmost. But the course taken by Charles after the death of Buckingham stood, as we shall see, on quite a different footing.

Instead of a certain modest assistance steadily rendered to the Protestant cause in Germany, a grand war with Spain had been planned, which was probably quite unnecessary and at least required to be supplemented by

operations or expenses in Germany. This was the first blunder, committed by King and Parliament alike. By itself it opened a serious prospect. But the aberration became portentous when a quarrel with France also grew up, so that in 1627 we were at war with Spain and France at once, and Spain and France enter into an alliance against us. Wentworth, who, like Bacon before him, took the comprehensive view of a statesman rather than the partial view of an ordinary politician, may well have asked himself whether the Government was going mad.

Taken by itself, the war with France was not without rational, nay, what is rare in Stuart policy, popular, grounds. In the last year of James, the Huguenots rose in rebellion against Louis XIII. It was traditional in English policy to render help to the Huguenot cause, but in the first months of Charles, at a moment when the royal marriage and the grand schemes connected with it brought the English and French Governments into very close alliance, Charles was induced to promise naval help against the rebel Huguenots. This put him in a false position, not only because he himself was sincerely Protestant, but because at this time he depended very much upon the Protestant feeling of the country. He adopted many expedients to avoid actually rendering the help he had promised, but in the end a ship of war and six merchantmen were handed over to the French, though without their crews. It was believed when this was done that peace was already assured between the Huguenots and the French Government, but the war broke out again, so that Charles found himself aiding a Catholic king against his Protestant subjects. In these circumstances it appeared to him a point of honour to see at



least that the Huguenots suffered no injustice at the hands of Louis.

There was little real reason to be anxious on this point, for the government of Louis was directed by a great statesman, Richelieu, who thoroughly entered into the system which Henry IV had founded when he issued the Edict of Nantes, and had no intention whatever of reopening the era of religious wars. Charles however persuaded himself that the Huguenots were threatened with destruction. Meanwhile there was another ground of quarrel between Charles and Louis. Henrietta Maria, it had been promised, would bring with her considerable relief to the English Catholics, but in this very peculiar phase of Stuart policy the promise could not be kept. Charles at this moment was a staunch champion of Protestantism. Accordingly a pretext was invented for breaking the engagement. It was represented as having been a mere formality arranged between the two Governments for the purpose of obtaining the Pope's dispensation for the marriage.

Thus Charles interfered between Louis and his Protestant subjects, while Louis on his side interfered between Charles and his Catholic subjects. The relation of the two countries was evidently unsatisfactory, but it was one which might easily be mended, as appeared in the sequel. An exchange might be made which would cost nothing to either religion and remove the grievance of either Government. Let Charles leave the Huguenots to their Government, which was pledged to toleration. Let Louis leave his sister to her husband. In this way after the Buckingham age was past the difference was actually arranged by the treaty of Susa in 1629, and no arrangement was ever more satisfactory. France gained the free

hand in European affairs, by which she achieved her greatness. On the other hand, Charles, who in his whole reign scarcely succeeded in any undertaking, did really in this one matter of his Queen's position achieve a solid success. Ever since the beginning of the negociation of the Spanish match the Counter-Reformation had reckoned upon undermining English Protestantism by means of a Catholic Queen. It seemed impossible that the English Recusancy Laws could resist the influence of a Catholic Queen backed by the condition of a marriage-treaty concluded with a great Catholic Government.

'By the treaty of Susa Charles succeeded once for all in averting this danger. Henrietta Maria herself declared herself satisfied with her position, France resigned the position of patron to the English Catholics, and a considerable step was taken in securing England against the machinations of the Counter-Reformation. It is however not to be forgotten that, after all, the sons of this marriage, who afterwards became Charles II and James II of England, both became Catholics.

But this happy arrangement was made after a disastrous war with France, though perhaps it might have been made without any war. When we look not at the termination, but at the commencement and the course, of the controversy, we see one of the wildest aberrations to be found in the whole history of English policy.

War with France had passed by this time almost out of the traditions of English policy. Since the rise of the Spanish Power under Philip II, England and France had passed, as it were, into the same system and felt themselves in the presence of this enemy natural allies. At no time was an alliance between them more necessary than in 1627, when England was already at war with Spain,

and France was looking with dismay upon the Habsburg Alliance and upon the victorious progress it was making in Germany. It seemed indeed that England was aware of this, and had on that account planned with France one of these more solid unions which were cemented by marriage. Thus at the opening of the reign of Charles there reappeared for a moment against the House of Austria that formidable combination which had held it in check before. What Elizabeth, Henry IV and Prince Maurice had done for Europe at the end of the sixteenth century, seemed about to be done again now by Richelieu, Frederick Henry and Buckingham. Here, in spite of all the errors which the English Government had already made, might be seen the outline of a statesmanlike system which would prove sufficient for the needs of the day.

Just at this moment to commence a war with France after so many years of friendship, and to drive France into the arms of Spain, was monstrous and preposterous policy. It was the more dangerous because it had a certain popular tinge so far as it professed to have in view the interest of Protestantism. But while the Huguenots of France, who in reality needed no protection, were protected by England, the Protestants of Germany were neglected, and the King of Denmark, who had come forward in reliance upon English subsidies, bitterly cursed the faithlessness of Charles and made peace at Lübeck with the Emperor. The one good feature of Buckingham's excessively active foreign policy had been the chance it gave of saving Protestantism in Germany, but now if Protestantism was more endangered than ever, if the Imperial army of Wallenstein appeared on the Baltic and actually threatened not only North Germany but the Scandinavian

kingdoms, this was due in a great degree to the wild confusion introduced by the war of England with France.

This chapter of our policy ends with the Petition of Right, the stormy scenes which accompanied the dissolution of the third Parliament of Charles, and the assassination of Buckingham.

A period followed which was sharply contrasted with the age of Buckingham, a period of peace. This second division of the reign of Charles perhaps gave to contemporaries an impression very different from that which it gives to us. To us it seems a mere interval between two tremendous struggles, and we imagine it overshadowed by the coming revolution. It hardly seemed so to contemporaries, who saw England enjoying peace in the thirties, while Germany was ruined and Holland and France were disturbed by war. It was no doubt unsatisfactory that Charles had conceived a dislike to Parliaments; nevertheless the special dangers which his third Parliament had struggled to avert, namely, the wild foreign policy of Buckingham, had really passed away with Buckingham himself. The stormy time of the Petition of Right receded into the past, Sir John Eliot and Sir Edward Coke followed Buckingham into the grave, England had peace and prosperity. Court-poets at least proclaimed a golden age, and perhaps few foresaw a revolution which, though it came so soon, was produced by causes materially different from those which had operated in the time of Buckingham.

In the singular character of Charles no one can fail to remark a certain blind obstinacy. It is not however true that he absolutely refused to be taught by experience. Once or twice in his reign we may perceive him changing his mode of action in such a manner as to show that he recognises himself to have erred. His

foreign policy after the death of Buckingham undergoes a complete change. The wild energy that has characterised it not only since his accession but since his return from Spain disappears at this time. Hitherto he has caused uneasiness to his subjects by large indefinite warlike plans which he carries into effect with reckless vigour. Hitherto his parliamentary difficulties have mainly arisen from this recklessness. Eliot refers in dismay to the confusion reigning in foreign affairs, the failure at Cadiz, the failure at the Isle of Rhé, the infinite expense incurred, the ruin of Protestantism in Germany. What Eliot thinks Wentworth thinks also. If we studied only this particular phase of Charles, we might be led to think that if he could only adopt a different system of foreign affairs, if he could only reconcile himself to non-intervention, he might escape all his difficulties.

Now Charles actually does this. In the second period of his reign his foreign policy is indeed open to criticism but to criticism of the very opposite kind. Henceforth he involves himself in no foreign wars. He does indeed negotiate ceaselessly, he involves himself in a labyrinth of negotiation, but his mistake is now not that into which Buckingham had led him but that of his father, the mistake which in 1624 he had so impatiently opposed. Henceforth he will negotiate, but he will not act, and gradually he becomes an object of contempt to foreign statesmen, who have discovered that his schemes and proposals have no force to support them. His policy is now that of his father, whereas before it had been suggested by a strong reaction against the policy of his father. Henceforth no Elizabethan expeditions against Spain, no championship of the Huguenots! All such large ideas are now discarded, and the foreign policy of Charles is reduced

to pertinacious indefatigable negotiation in behalf of his brother-in-law the Elector Frederick and, after Frederick's death, of the Elector Charles Louis, but negotiation which is necessarily fruitless, because not backed by action.

The Treaty of Susa closed the French war in 1629 and the Treaty of Madrid closed the Spanish war early in 1630. Now begins the Peace of Charles I, which is not again broken. Like the Peace of Elizabeth it covers a period which for the Continent was most stormy. When England woke up again to the affairs of Europe she found a new world which had formed itself during her trance of insularity.

What we call the Thirty Years' War is a series of wars which, though distinct, are not clearly divided by any intervals of peace. To call it a great final struggle of the rival confessions is to give to the whole series a name which is appropriate only to one of these wars. The war in Bohemia (1618—1620) was but a partial disturbance, from which all Lutheran Germany stood aloof, and which the English Government regarded without sympathy. It led to the war of the Palatinate, which indeed created alarm in the Protestant world by threatening to destroy the balance of the Electoral College, yet again did not bring into the field the united forces of Protestantism. This was followed by a straggling war in North Germany, in which Catholicism pursued its advantage in an alarming manner, but the war which may absolutely be called religious, was brought on by the Edict of Restitution issued in 1629. This revolutionary Edict, striking at the whole settlement of property, especially in North Germany, drove Saxony and Brandenburg, the chief Lutheran States, into union with the Calvinistic Powers. The period which followed is the most intense and decisive passage of the

Thirty Years' War, but it is short. The Treaty of Prague, signed in 1635, brought it to an end by withdrawing these Powers again, so that out of thirty years of war scarcely seven saw the rival Confessions openly arrayed against each other. This intense struggle commenced about the time when Charles I resigned himself to an insular policy. It would scarcely have taken place had he acted more wisely in those earlier years when he had shown himself warlike. If instead of undertaking a maritime war against Spain, and following this up with a war against France, he had helped to organise, and had steadily supported, an alliance of the Protestant Powers against the Emperor, perhaps the Edict of Restitution would never have been issued. The obvious course was to put Gustavus Adolphus, whose great qualities had long been known to the world, at the head of the Protestant forces and to support him with subsidies, leaving it to the English and Scotch nations to support him with volunteers. But the strong family feeling of the Stuarts seems from the outset to have alienated them from Gustavus, who had been the enemy of their relative, the King of Denmark. For this reason, many years earlier, James had refused to Gustavus the hand of his daughter Elizabeth, and now Charles prefers to lean not on him but on the King of Denmark. And great results might have followed had Charles but steadily and effectively supported this leader of his choice. But he could not do this and wage war against Spain and France at the same time. The King of Denmark was deserted, the subsidies promised to him were not paid. He was defeated at Lutter and in the end withdrew from the war by making the Treaty of Lübeck with the Emperor.

Charles now retires from the European contest, in

which henceforth he sees only the Palatinate and his brother-in-law's claim; and this he asserts only by negotiation. Hitherto England had been regarded as the natural leader of the Protestant cause, for it is to be remarked that at the opening of the 'Thirty Years' War France, under the influence of Marie de Medicis, had quite lost the position which had been given her by Henry IV.

It is a great event in general history that England now retired from this leadership. For the natural result of it was the age of Richelieu and the foundation of French ascendancy in Europe. Already in the age of Buckingham Richelieu is Minister, but he is still embarrassed by the Huguenot opposition and the intrigues of the Queen Mother. His great period begins in 1630 and extends to his death in 1643. During this time he transforms the whole aspect of Europe. And it is precisely the time when Charles I has renounced foreign policy, at first from conviction, afterwards from the embarrassment of the civil troubles.

We may go further and lay it down as a striking characteristic of the whole period which includes the reign of Charles I and the Interregnum, that the English and French Monarchies, though drawn together in an unusual manner by the marriage of Charles and Henrietta Maria, are yet prevented by circumstances from acting in concert or rendering aid to each other. First comes the war between them, then the retirement of Charles from foreign affairs, which causes France to act alone and leads to cool relations between the two Powers, then the civil troubles in England, in which France might have been expected to interpose in behalf of the Queen, but has her hands too full of German affairs. The same fatality operates even later than this. The English Monarchy falls, Henrietta



Maria, the aunt of Louis XIV, becomes an exile, Prince Charles, his cousin, is debarred from his succession to the English throne. Yet France does not interfere, though we know with what haughty decision forty years later Louis XIV took up the cause of his younger cousin, James II. The reason is that at the very moment of the catastrophe of Charles I the disturbances of the Fronde began to embarrass the French Government. Just when Revolution triumphs in England it begins to threaten France. Accordingly the English Commonwealth is safe from French intervention; Mazarin is forced even to seek its alliance; and at last men saw with astonishment Louis XIV forming a close alliance with the Regicide Government, and actually crushing with its help at the Battle of the Dunes his own cousins the English princes.

We return to the second period of Charles, which, when looked at from the English point of view, need not detain us long.

Under the pressure of the Edict of Restitution German Protestantism adopts the system which from the outset had appeared the best. Gustavus Adolphus takes the lead and receives the support of Saxony and Brandenburg, but France takes the position which has been left vacant by England. At Bärnwalde Richelieu and Gustavus arrange the concert which forms the foundation of a new international system. Hitherto in the struggle against the House of Austria we have always seen a union more or less avowed between England, France and the Netherlands, but England now drops out of the Coalition and her place is taken by Sweden. This change is not altogether unnatural, since the danger now comes not from Spain but from Austria, and is less felt by maritime England than by Sweden threatened on the Baltic.

Accordingly the Alliance of France and Sweden dominates the middle period of the seventeenth century, dictates the Treaties of Westphalia and outlasts the age of Oliver.

The violent changes produced by this new combination, the meteoric career of Gustavus, the anarchy which followed in the Empire, the revolutionary designs and sudden catastrophe of Wallenstein, the restoration of Austrian power in South Germany by the battle of Nördlingen, finally the arrangement of a new Balance of Germany by the Treaty of Prag; all this can only be noted, and must not be examined or estimated in a review of the reign of Charles I, since he took no interest and no share in it. We must find a later opportunity of considering it. Charles, who has renounced all foreign schemes that are far-reaching, schools himself to see, after the fashion of his father, in all these great affairs simply the interest of his brother-in-law and to pursue this in his father's way by peaceful negociation. Shall he lean on the help of Spain, or of Sweden, or of France? His whole policy turns on this question, and consists in endless hesitation. The history of it is a labyrinth, to which we need not here seek a clue.

It was an abrupt transition from a policy of adventurous activity to one of utter inaction. This must have been felt all the more as the age became more stormy and the war more universal. The Elizabethan tradition had not yet died out, and it had been in some degree revived by Buckingham. Once more the English fleet had threatened the coast first of Spain and then of France. Now that Charles had reconciled himself to non-intervention, it became important at least to maintain in some degree the naval reputation of England. And this was the more difficult because the Dutch, since 1621 again at

war with Spain, were daily winning fresh laurels in naval war. They had long since outstripped us in commerce and colonisation, and now the names of Tromp and of Piet Hein, who in 1628 succeeded in taking the silver fleet, filled the trumpet of fame while England rested in peace. And their war was waged, and many of their victories won, in our own seas, on the very waves over which Drake and Howard had pursued the Armada.

Accordingly Charles, while he pursues his pertinacious negotiation for the Palatinate, feels himself obliged to have also a maritime policy. He asserts the old pretension of England to naval supremacy in the narrow seas. Selden writes *Mare Clausum*, and Charles devotes himself to maintaining a navy which shall correspond to this high ambition. Hence the writs of ship money.

We can imagine that by his careful abstinence from foreign intervention Charles might have ultimately won the victory over the parliamentary party but for a new difficulty, comparatively unknown to the age of Buckingham, in which he involved himself. In that age it had been proved that a king of England could not influence the affairs of Europe in a commanding manner without the support of Parliament. It was not so clear that he could not reign peacefully and maintain the dignity of his insular throne without much help from Parliament. But he was led during this second period to undertake a wholly different task, of which, as it proved, the Monarchy unsupported by Parliament was just as incapable as of an energetic foreign policy. It was by an attempt to unite, and give a sort of uniformity to, his three kingdoms that he raised an excitement with which he was utterly unable, without popular support, to cope. He might have dealt with England alone; he might have succeeded had he been in

the position of Elizabeth. But Laud stirred up Scotland, and Strafford put Ireland in a position from which it was capable, as never before, of exerting an influence on England. Here was an alarming novelty. It was not indeed in itself undesirable that the three kingdoms should draw closer together. What seemed dangerous was that the consolidation should be effected by a government in which the people had no confidence. In the age of Buckingham perhaps the loyalty of the people towards Charles had not been much impaired, since they threw the blame of misgovernment far more than was just upon Buckingham himself. But the consolidation of the three kingdoms opened fundamental questions, questions of religion. And in the thirties Charles, influenced by Laud, forfeited the confidence of his people in religious matters. He threw the weight of government on the side of a doctrine which ran counter to the prevailing Calvinism, a doctrine which seemed, and to those who saw a Catholic Queen at Whitehall could scarcely but seem, intended to lead the country back to Popery.

We must not linger on the causes of the Great Rebellion. But even in international history it is all-important to remark that in the thirties of the seventeenth century the foundations were shaken upon which our state had hitherto rested. Two or three events of capital importance had happened since the time of Elizabeth, and it now appeared that by these events the stability of government was for a time at least destroyed.

First, England and Scotland had been brought together in personal union. This change had been quietly made, and the permanence of it was guaranteed by the general agreement of the two nations in religion.

But England had held aloof from the Protestantism of

the Continent. Scotland on the other hand had adopted Calvinism with more decision and more national conviction than any Continental State. Calvinism, as the most systematic form of Protestantism, had also become the religion of the most zealous religious party in England. Here was a position of unstable equilibrium. As Scotland and England drew nearer together it seemed likely that Anglicanism, which wore the appearance of a compromise, would give way before the energetic Calvinism of Scotland.

Secondly, Ireland had been pacified, and the grasp of the English Government upon it had been tightened, in the reign of Elizabeth. But the mass of the people remained Catholic. Accordingly the Catholics of England became aware that they had, as it were, a reserve in the Irish population. As England and Ireland drew together the Catholic cause in England was likely to be strengthened, and in the same degree Catholicising tendencies within the English Church would be strengthened.

Thus England was assailed at the same time on opposite sides by her two yoke-fellows, Scotland and Ireland. The great religious struggle of the age, which in England had been so successfully evaded by the government of Elizabeth, now entered England by way of Scotland and Ireland. It is a leading feature of our civil troubles that the parliamentary party has always its reserve in Scotland and the royalist party its reserve in Ireland. Of this feature a visible trace remains to this day in the fact that the word Whig comes to us from Scotland and the word Tory from Ireland.

The third great event which had taken place was the colonisation of North America. This too had taken place quietly and gradually. But from America too there now came a reaction unfavourable to the stability of govern-

ment. Since the voyage of the *Mayflower* the colonisation had had a Puritan character. In 1630 a second swarm went out, numbering not less than fifteen hundred colonists, and in this case too the emigration had a religious motive.

It has often been remarked that these emigrants admitted no principle of religious toleration, and that at least at the outset they were by disposition less tolerant than other Christians. But it was the peculiarity of their religious position that they depended upon toleration in the Home Government. Anglicanism in England was not tolerant any more than Calvinism in Scotland, but in its relation to New England Anglicanism was tolerant. Thus first crept into England the idea of toleration in a form similar to that which had been given to it in France. A sort of unwritten Edict of Nantes protected the settlers of New England, and the imitation of the French model is still more visible in the colonisation of Maryland by Calvert, Lord Baltimore. For here the founder was himself Catholic, and he introduces toleration frankly, and his colony is named after Henrietta Maria, herself a Catholic and the daughter of him by whom the Edict of Nantes was issued.

In the thirties while English Calvinism groaned under the yoke of Laud it looked wistfully towards America as a land of refuge, in which men might worship God according to their conscience. Henry Vane lived for a time in Massachusetts; Cromwell said that had the Grand Remonstrance failed to pass he would have fled to America. Thus in a strange way English Calvinism became associated in many minds with the idea of toleration. And there sprang up gradually that third religious party which complicates the history of the war of King and Parliament,

and which with Oliver came to the head of affairs and played a great part on the stage of Europe.

Thus as the elements which were to compose the British Empire began to combine the State was shaken and for a time suffered revolution. But at the very same time changes equally great were proceeding even more rapidly in some of the continental states. In England the thirties are years of incubation, during which great events are prepared, but do not take place; on the Continent the thirties witness tremendous events and the careers of great men. The greatness and abrupt fall of Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein in Germany are contemporaneous with the achievement by which Richelieu in France raised himself from the rank of capable Ministers into that of great creative Statesmen, and in the few years between 1630 and 1636 two states, Austria and France, had assumed a new position, the position on the whole which they have maintained since.

The capital event of this crowded period is the transformation of France. Hitherto in this review we have seen France occupying on the whole a secondary position in Europe. She has been on the defensive against the Spanish Monarchy almost since the accession of Philip II. Her triumphs have been great but transient, momentary, as under Henry II, who humbled Charles V, but soon afterwards had to sign the unfavourable peace of Catcau-Cambresis, or under Henry IV, who in his last years held the whole House of Austria in check but then suddenly perished and left his throne to a Regent who capitulated with Spain. This chapter of French history now comes to an end. France now, under the guidance of Richelieu, moves irresistibly forward and becomes in a very few years the first Power in the world. And her development

is so strong and vital that, when Richelieu himself disappears and all the circumstances are changed, it continues through the whole period of Mazarin until under Louis XIV's personal government the commanding greatness of France becomes a fixed feature of the European system. If in the eighteenth century this greatness was not always maintained at the same level, this was evidently due to temporary causes, and later on it rose to a higher level still.

The transformation of France, so rapidly effected in the thirties, while it raises her to the first place, leads almost immediately to the disastrous decline of the Spanish Monarchy. Hitherto from its foundation in 1555 we have seen that Monarchy, whether in good or evil fortune, always the greatest of Christian Powers. It now declines so rapidly that Richelieu himself lives to see it on the verge of total dissolution; and this decline, though afterwards retarded, is never suspended, much less repaired.

Thus France, Spain, Austria and England are all alike on the eve of a great transformation. But the transformation of England is of such a nature that while it takes place the foreign policy of England is, as it were, in abeyance. Charles in his second period has no foreign policy worthy of the name. In his third period, that of our civil troubles, he is indeed closely watched by Richelieu and then by Mazarin. The internal convulsions of England might well have led to an active foreign policy, whether of intervention in continental affairs or of resistance to foreign intervention in English affairs. And indeed Charles was convinced that he could discern the hand of Richelieu in the Scotch disturbances which began in 1638. We are to remember that there was an old alliance between France and Scotland. And Charles,



though closely connected with the royal family of France through his marriage, regarded Richelieu as an enemy because Richelieu's system had been established, as we shall soon see, in spite of the French royal family and by actual war with the mother of Henrietta Maria and with her brother Gaston. Accordingly in the Short Parliament Charles produces evidence of the complicity of the French Government with the Scotch rebellion.

It does not however appear that Richelieu took any very active part in our domestic troubles. He was at this particular time too busy in continental affairs, for he was meditating the schemes by which shortly afterwards he almost dissolved the Spanish Monarchy and paved the way to the conquest of Alsace. And though at later stages of our civil war, for instance when Charles after his defeat put himself into the hands of the Scots, we find French diplomacy active, yet on the whole, as was said above, the Great Rebellion worked itself out with surprisingly little help or hindrance from France.

If then we would understand the transformation of the Continental States which took place at this time—and we must do so if we would understand the foreign policy of England in the next age—we must leave England for a while and study Continental affairs directly. For England was then in one of her insular phases, when her affairs were so much dissociated from the affairs of the Continent that the latter cannot be understood by studying the former. And therefore, as we introduced our review of the reign of Elizabeth by a chapter on the growth of the House of Habsburg, we must preface our examination of the policy of the Commonwealth and of the later Stuarts by a chapter on Richelieu.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRANCE.

THE events which took place in France from 1630 to 1632 ought to be called a revolution, if by revolution we mean a profound alteration in the spirit and machinery of government accompanied by violent disturbance, and yet, perhaps because no king was deposed, the name of revolution is not usually given to them. At least let us understand that no revolution ever produced a change more momentous or more durable in the character of a state than these disturbances.

What makes them specially important to us is that they produced so profound an effect upon international relations. This is recognised in the current conception of them which represents Richelieu as establishing despotism at home in order to enable France to become a conquering state abroad. And yet when we examine the facts we find this description scarcely true, or at least crude. The foreign conquests followed indeed very speedily upon the domestic reforms and may very probably have been foreseen by the reformer, but they were scarcely the object which he had originally in view. Nor can we divide the reforms from the conquests, as though the former distinctly

preceded and caused the latter. On the contrary, they were entangled together, foreign war being used as an instrument to produce domestic reform not less than reform to facilitate foreign aggression.

The condition of France about 1629 continued to be in the main such as we left it in the last period of Henry IV, only that the great king was gone and the disintegrating forces which he had held in check had gained head again. It was not a condition in which the ruler would naturally dream of undertaking foreign conquest. It was a feeble precarious condition in which safety and defence must be the first objects of the Government. Not only was France feeble within, but she was always in danger of falling into dependence upon a foreign Power. The Spanish Monarchy, which we shall soon see made a passive prey to France, was at this time the tyrant which France feared. Let us call to mind the situation of 1590, when Henry IV, the rightful king, had been reduced almost to the condition of an outlaw within his own dominions, and Philip II, supported by the League, had almost conquered the country. There had since been improvement, but the causes of the evil had not been eradicated. The unpatriotic spirit of the League remained among the nobility. Nay, even twenty years later than 1630 Condé, a member of the royal House, fights without scruple under the King of Spain against France. For a moment Henry IV had reduced this chaos to a kind of order; he had even shown how short was the way for France from such miserable dependence to a commanding position in Europe; but this had been a transient phase, and after his death the dependence of France on Spain had been sealed by a double marriage.

Henry IV himself had shown what kind of reform was

needed when he sent Biron to the scaffold. The reform needed was to teach the nobles not to commit high treason. Richelieu now bettered the instruction he had received from Henry IV. But it is certainly not reasonable to suppose that he had foreign conquest directly in view, though foreign conquest so speedily followed. It was quite as necessary for the purpose of self-defence as for the purpose of conquest that France should not lie at the mercy of noble traitors, conspirators with the King of Spain. We are further to remark that the Thirty Years' War had greatly increased her embarrassment and danger. She felt herself far more intolerably hemmed in by the House of Habsburg when Austria, so close a neighbour, suddenly became a great Power, while Spain occupied the Palatinate and resumed hostilities against the Dutch.

The plan which Richelieu formed was no ingenious idea, no happy inspiration which could only occur to an original mind, but a plan forced upon him by the necessity of self-defence. He was threatened by two enemies, at home the turbulent nobility, abroad the House of Habsburg, especially the Spanish branch of it, and these domestic and foreign enemies acted still, as they had acted during the reign of Philip II, in the closest concert. He dealt his blows at each in turn, now crushed some great noble for conspiring with Spain, now attacked Spain for supporting the rebellious nobles. As he met with success, in the end the French Government suddenly found itself absolute at home and superior to its enemies abroad. Accordingly it drifted into foreign conquest, but the cause of this was not precisely that it desired conquest. It desired such an augmentation of strength as might make it equal to its enemies, but it obtained an augmentation which made it vastly superior.

England and France entered about the same time upon opposite courses. In England royal power was reduced, in France it was made absolute. This strong divergency was no doubt rooted in the whole history of the two countries, but if it appeared now so suddenly and decisively this was due mainly to the fact that in insular England, party-conflicts were isolated and so moderated, whereas in continental France the domestic parties were in close and dangerous concert with the foreign enemy. And for the same reason the French movement guided by Richelieu is in international history far more important than the contemporaneous English movement. The latter, though all-important for ourselves, had but a gradual and indirect influence upon Europe; the former, while it transformed France within, transformed just as completely the system of Europe.

Richelieu is the dictator of international history in this period; he dominates the early seventeenth century as Charles V had dominated the first half of the sixteenth. The next great European dictator is Louis XIV.

Richelieu had a surprising immediate success, and yet the developement which took its first impulse from him continued long after his death. It also suffered more than one reaction so serious that his work for the time seemed almost cancelled. It was not fully completed till the time when Louis XIV commenced his personal government. Thus a period of thirty-one years between 1630 and 1661 stands out in French history as the period of transformation. It is the age of the Cardinals. The unity of it consists in this, that throughout its whole course the Government has to contend with an opposition consisting, as in the days of the League, of traitorous nobles and princes of the blood acting in concert with Spain. What

the Guises had been in the time of Philip II, that are Gaston Duke of Orleans and Montmorency at the beginning of this period, Soissons and Cinquars ten years later. And again, what these were in the lifetime of Richelieu, that were the great Frondeurs headed by Condé in the time of Mazarin. All alike had an understanding with Spain against their own Government. Accordingly through the whole period the French Government is forced into an aggressive policy against Spain and into a despotic policy against the malcontents at home. And through the whole period gleams of success which cause France to stand out as the tyrant of all Europe alternate with gloomy moments of failure when the Spaniard and the rebel threaten Paris itself. But through all these vicissitudes the idea of Richelieu takes root and steadily grows, until France, hitherto the home of disorder, the seat of the most disintegrating feudalism and the wildest civil discord, becomes an example to all states for unity and therefore in its foreign relations the most powerful of all states. And as a consequence Spain, hitherto the tyrant of France through its understanding with French feudalism, passes at once into the contrary position and becomes the prey and victim of French military superiority.

As we cannot treat in any detail a developement which is not English, we must regard the whole transformation together, survey at once thirty years of French history, and content ourselves with noting large outlines. The struggle is between the French Government on the one side and an alliance of the Spanish Monarchy and the noblesse on the other. Accordingly the constitutional struggle at home and the foreign war are inseparable, they proceed simultaneously and come to an end together. But for a considerable part of this time France is also at

war with the Emperor. The Thirty Years' War in its last phase is indeed in the main a contest between France and Sweden on the one side and Austria and Bavaria on the other. This great foreign war of France, in which she acquires Alsace, naturally attracts the attention of history. But her other war, closely connected with this, but of much longer duration, her war with the Spanish Monarchy, taxed her energies much more, left much deeper traces in her organisation, and had much greater historical results even than the great war in Germany. The latter came to an end in 1648, but the former lasted on till 1659. The latter gave Alsace to France and profoundly modified the whole condition of Germany. But the former both established the throne of Louis XIV, raising France once for all to the commanding position she held for two centuries, and also, we may fairly say, dissolved the Spanish Empire. The two wars were no doubt so closely connected that it scarcely occurs to us to distinguish them; nevertheless from our point of view it is natural, and in the general history of Europe it is instructive, to contemplate the struggle of France with the Spanish Monarchy by itself, dismissing for a time her simultaneous struggle with Austria.

For here is the last act of a drama which has been presented in this book. We have followed the complex Spanish Monarchy from its foundation at the retirement of Charles V. We have seen it confronting France from the time of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. We have remarked that in relation to France it represents Burgundy, and that its princes trace themselves back through Charles the Bold to the House of Valois. Accordingly throughout the reign of Philip II we saw that its wars with France had something of the nature of civil wars, that it was able

to rally to its side a strong party of adherents from the French noblesse, and at times to set up the ruler of Spain as rightful King of France. Now it may be said that this peculiar relation of the two states lasted a whole century, and that if it began before the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis it did not absolutely come to an end till the Peace of the Pyrenees. From the time when the House of Guise looked up to the King of Spain to the time when the great Condé fought in his armies and made terms for himself in the treaty of peace between France and Spain, France is involved with Spain so as to be incapable of developing its full power. Henry IV set it free but for a moment. Then came Richelieu with his powerful idea of the state, and a movement began which in thirty years created the modern France. But during those years France almost fell back into the old entanglement. When she was at the height of her new developement, a great reaction set in. The League was, as it were, revived in the Fronde. Spain once more headed a domestic party in the heart of France. The consummation came in 1659 by the Treaty of the Pyrenees, when the relation was not so much destroyed as reversed. Hitherto Spain had had claims on France; now France establishes a claim on Spain, and with such success that at the end of the seventeenth century a Bourbon prince ascends the Spanish throne.

But two unexpected consequences followed. The first was that absolutism was established in France, all institutions that might have been vehicles of liberty being, as it were, tainted by connexion with Spain. Accordingly from the moment of the Treaty of the Pyrenees the turbulence of French parties is seen to subside, and Louis acquires an unbounded authority, which lasts through his long life and is handed down to his successor.



The second consequence was the dissolution of the Spanish Monarchy.

We may venture to use this phrase, since by the Spanish Monarchy is not meant simply the kingdom of Spain. It is the name we give to an immense aggregate, of which the nucleus is not Spain, but united Iberia, or Spain and Portugal together. The greatness of Philip II had been founded on the annexation of Portugal and of the vast Portuguese colonies.

Now in the course of the struggle with France, Portugal with her colonies recovered her independence. And during the same time the United Netherlands, now also a great New World Power, definitively acquired the independence for which they had contended through eighty years. Such mighty changes were caused indirectly by the struggle of France and Spain. Hence at the time when France entered upon her new greatness the rival state was left a wreck. Spain after 1659 was no longer the Great Power of Philip II. There was still a kingdom of Spain, sunk indeed in bankruptcy and decay, but this was no longer the Spanish Monarchy which had overawed the world in the Elizabethan age or even in the days of James I and Marie de Medicis. Thus too in the time of Charles II or William III English policy has to deal with a changed world. The Spanish Monarchy is gone and France has come. The Power that sent the Armada, against which Drake and Raleigh contended, has disappeared. We begin to fear another Power, France, the Power which in later times, under Napoleon, was to assail us yet more formidably.

But there is an intermediate period, the thirty years of the transformation of France. During the greater part of this period English policy is in a sort of abeyance in consequence of our civil troubles. But after the military

revolution and the death of Charles, England acquires again an active policy. This is the age of Oliver. We can see beforehand what question such a policy must take up. Oliver has to consider what side he will take in the decisive and final struggle now taking place between the Spanish Monarchy and the rising French Power. He decides for France, he helps to give the *coup de grace* to Spain and procures for England a certain share in her spoils. The position assumed by Oliver is in the main accepted by Charles II at his restoration. The age of Oliver may therefore be taken for our purpose to include the first part of the reign of Charles II.

Such in largest outline was the international change initiated by Richelieu. But we ask, What was the basis which he found for French power and which proved so solid that France was able to rest securely upon it for centuries? To explain the power of the House of Austria we have found the formula, royal marriage and the Counter-Reformation. In particular we have had frequent occasions of remarking that in Habsburg times the mere marriage of a prince and princess had an almost inconceivable effect in uniting kingdoms, as though in fact kingdoms were neither more nor less than territorial estates. To our generation this seems scarcely conceivable, because we are accustomed to the opposite idea of nationality, which puts the interest of a living organic community infinitely above any family or dynastic interest. But this idea of nationality is of recent growth; it belongs to the age of the French Revolution; it was not an idea of which Richelieu could make use. This is so true, that in that very France regenerated by Richelieu a Louis XIV reigned, who so arrogantly identified the state with his own person and family and who so successfully turned the weapon of royal

marriage against the Habsburgs themselves, when he established his grandson on the throne of Spain.

We do however find that before the idea of nationality was distinctly expressed and began at the end of the eighteenth century actually to inspire the minds of men it had had a perceptible influence in some states even where the dynastic or feudal view of monarchy prevailed. Thus in Elizabethan England we have remarked that the Queen's personal isolation, and her want of royal connexions and affinities, all this concurring with the loss of continental possessions and the gradual fusion of England and Scotland under the influence of religion, had produced a strong sense of national interest and a strong glow of patriotism, even though the word 'nationality' might be unknown to Shakspeare. In like manner we remark that Richelieu now sets himself in a determined spirit against the family view of politics, opposing to it an idea, not precisely of nationality, but of the state or the public good. This is the more striking as the Bourbon family in the person of Henry IV had asserted hereditary right more successfully than it had ever been asserted before. But Richelieu now, aided by the son of Henry IV, just as successfully resists family influence and expels it from French politics.

Spain since the death of Henry IV had turned its old weapon against France. An Infanta was queen of Louis XIII, a French princess was queen of Philip IV. A family policy united the two states, and Marie de Medicis, assisted by her second son Gaston, directed it. It was the extraordinary achievement of Richelieu to thwart and crush this policy. Though himself the servant of an absolute hereditary king, he boldly defied the royal family. He expelled the Queen-Mother from the country, and

when Gaston, who, it is to be remembered, was before 1638, when Louis XIV was born, not merely brother of the king but his presumptive heir, aided by Spain, raised rebellion and drew to his side one of the greatest nobles of France, Montmorency, son of Montmorency Danville, and grandson of Constable Montmorency, he crushed the movement by military force and brought this great rebel to the scaffold. Not only so, but in his foreign policy he seems to take no account whatever of family relationships. Under his guidance Louis XIII wages war at one time with England, at another time with Savoy, and persistently with Spain. Now a sister of Louis XIII, Henrietta Maria, is Queen of England, another, Christina, is Duchess of Savoy, and another, Elizabeth, is Queen of Spain. The King of France, complains one of these princesses, will not be content until he is at war with all his three sisters. How novel this system was may be judged from the fact that when Prince Charles at Madrid was pressing the claims of his brother-in-law, the Elector Palatine, and urging that in case of need Spain should use military force against the Emperor, he was told that by a fundamental principle of the Spanish Monarchy it could not make war on the Emperor, as he was a kindred prince.

It is extraordinary that Richelieu should have been able to procure acceptance for this system. But perhaps it is more extraordinary that it should take such root as to flourish long after his death. It might be thought that, when both he and the master over whom he had so much influence were no more, reaction must set in irresistibly. And who succeeded to the Government of France when in 1643 Louis XIII followed Richelieu into the grave? The Queen Anne, that is, an Infanta of Spain. And what was the task committed to her? It

was the task of crushing and overwhelming the Spanish Monarchy. This task however the Infanta of Spain resolutely and most effectually performed. We think of Mazarin as the statesman who directed the armies which crushed the military reputation of Spain at Rocroi and elsewhere, who later made the alliance with Cromwell by which the Spanish Monarchy was finally overwhelmed. But Mazarin held his power at the pleasure of another, and this other was a Spaniard and the sister of Philip IV of Spain.

As the Bourbon is henceforth to take precedence of the Habsburg, let us note what new ideas and forces he sets in motion. He does not once for all abjure family politics, nor does he go so far as to assert the principle of nationality. But he takes up a sort of middle position. He is not, like the Habsburg, ruler of a great polyglott aggregate held together only by his person; he is ruler of France, a homogeneous population with strongly marked character and genius. He is able therefore to speak of the state and the public good, and under that great standard he can put down family intrigue. On the other hand he can also appeal to the family and make use, when it suits him, of the weapon of royal marriage. It is the great difference between the age of the Cardinals and the age, properly so called, of Louis XIV, that in the former the family element almost disappears, the personal king being at one time at war with his family and at another time a minor, but in the latter, the monarch being now his own Minister, it reappears, and a certain retrogression takes place. The really great age is that of the Cardinals; the age of Louis XIV is rather triumphant and brilliant than great.

Monarchy of the medieval type required in all coun-

tries a certain amount of correction before it could become consistent with intelligent statesmanship. In England, as we have seen, the good kings had frequently a weak title. In France the periods of good government were, like the *quinquennium Neronis*, periods of minority or quasi-minority. French kings attained their majority on entering their fourteenth year. Not only before reaching this age, but even more for some years, at times for many years after, there was room for a great statesman to govern with almost absolute sway. And such periods were frequent under the House of Bourbon. In the eighteenth century we may say there was practically a minority of almost thirty years (1715—1743), and in this period falls the prosperous time of Fleury. But in the age now before us we may almost say that the Monarchy was in abeyance for fifty years (1610—1661). For Louis XIII, having once found Richelieu, remained in permanent tutelage to him, and thus the whole reign of Louis XIII may be reckoned as a minority. Nor did Louis XIV adopt the questionable resolution of being his own Minister until Mazarin was dead. Mazarin ruled France till his death, although technically the minority was at an end nine years earlier.

The Government of Richelieu or Mazarin was as monarchical, as absolute, as that of Louis XIV himself, but it was Monarchy free from the family element. In foreign affairs, where the family element was apt to have an almost exclusive influence, this correction of Monarchy was most beneficial. To it in the age of the Cardinals France owed almost all her greatness. Liberty indeed was wanting, but the public good was considered with an earnestness and an insight of which the House of Austria had given no example. For half a century, from the Day

of Dupes till the death of Colbert, France witnessed a reign of intelligence in public affairs which was wholly without precedent. After Richelieu had laid deep the foundations of government he began to establish the economic and maritime greatness of France, and this part of his work was taken up in the next age by Colbert. He began also to found a school of diplomacy, which afterwards thrived still more under Mazarin. He saw but the commencement of the redoubtable army of modern France, but in Mazarin's time this rapidly took shape, nurtured and tended for many years by Turenne. This great development proceeded during the time of England's civil troubles, but it struggled for a long time with reaction. In the days of Oliver, though Richelieu had long been in his grave, France was still in an embarrassed, at times in a depressed condition, and it was only in the days of Charles II that England, having leisure to take up again the thread of foreign policy, found the aspect of the Continent definitively altered, the Spanish Monarchy lying there a helpless wreck and France dominating Europe with an immense ascendancy.

So much of the period in general. Let us approach nearer to it, so as to be able to distinguish the phases of which it is composed.

We begin at the death of Henry IV in 1610, when the influence he had held in check, that of the concert between Spain and the noblesse, is suddenly restored. Internationally France, which had acquired an actual ascendancy, now sinks into an insignificance, which lasts about fourteen years. The double marriage seals her dependence upon Spain. But in 1624 the rule of Richelieu commences, and his energetic intervention in the Valtellin opens the long period of French precedence in Europe.

When we have noted the fundamental fact, that the developement of modern France is a reaction against the concert between Spain and the noblesse, a second fact, only less fundamental and more curious, claims our attention. That concert had been arranged in the days of the League as a means of opposing heresy or Huguenotism. It was natural therefore to expect that the French kings in resisting it would seek the help of the Huguenots. Thus we have seen Coligny advising Charles IX to lean on the Huguenots in a great policy of opposition to Spain. Since that time the leader of the Huguenots had founded the Bourbon dynasty. It is true that he had been forced to abjure his creed; but he had procured for the Huguenots toleration. He had in a manner realised the system of Coligny by founding the Bourbon throne upon a recognition of the Huguenots and even a certain amount of resistance to Rome. Such was the model Richelieu had before him. Would not he then, as soon as he undertook to assert the national independence against the concert of Spain and the noblesse, see the necessity of conciliating the Huguenots? Would not the Edict of Nantes become the corner-stone of Bourbon policy? Would not Richelieu be led to declare himself a sort of Liberal in religion? We find indeed that he does so in the most resolute manner in forming foreign alliances.

It was the great religious scandal of the age of Richelieu that the Most Christian King, advised by a Cardinal of the Roman Church, who again was advised by a Capucin monk, puts himself at the head of the Protestant Powers of the Continent and with the help of Protestant Sweden saves the Protestantism of North Germany from the Emperor and the Protestantism of the Netherlands from Spain. In this period Protestantism was saved from de-



struction by the intervention of Catholic France. This is the complication which gives a plot to modern history. But it becomes much more curious when we remark that at home Richelieu is opposed to Protestantism as decidedly as he is favourable to it abroad. It is visible from the very commencement of his rule that he does not mean to seek the support of the Huguenots, and that the Edict of Nantes, so far from being a germ out of which Liberalism will grow, is destined to be, in Napoleon's phrase, a vaccine of Protestantism.

The first phase after the death of Henry IV shows the Huguenot party in rebellion. But its rebellion is rather the effect of despondency than of hope. It is defeated once and again, even though it receives at one time the help of England. And not till Protestantism at home has been effectually tamed does Richelieu enter upon his audacious support of Protestantism abroad. It is startling to find that in this respect there is throughout the seventeenth century a total want of correspondence between the domestic and the foreign policy of France. Huguenot influence counts for nothing in Richelieu's foreign policy, though that is such as Huguenots might approve. On the other hand a foreign policy favourable to Protestantism has no reaction upon Protestantism at home, for the French Government having saved Protestantism in Germany proceeds later to destroy it with the most ruthless violence in France itself.

In truth that decided aversion to Protestantism which the French displayed so early does not waver for a moment after the Edict of Nantes has been given, in spite of the modern commonplace that religious toleration once given is certain to take root and can never be withdrawn again. The catastrophe of Henry IV was a lesson which Richelieu

could not neglect. It showed that the king's abjuration had not sufficed for French public opinion, that a man not free from the suspicion of heresy could not venture to stand out before France as an opponent of the House of Habsburg. It was fortunate for Richelieu that he was a bishop and a cardinal. Even so he could scarcely have succeeded in his resolute attack on the House of Austria had he not first given a pledge of Catholic orthodoxy by the capture of Rochelle from the Huguenots. Only because Huguenotism was perceived to be a lost cause, could France allow a foreign policy which after all was a revival of that of Coligny.

But what positive reason was there for reviving this policy?

When the Thirty Years' War broke out France was powerless in Europe, preoccupied with the domestic troubles which accompanied what we have called a quasi-minority. We have remarked that in England the troubles in Germany were somewhat unreasonably interpreted as indicating a revival of the ascendancy of Spain. The same impression could not but be produced in France, where Spanish influence was much closer and more dangerous than in England. Accordingly in the twenties the pressure of Spain began to be regarded by the Government of Louis XIII as intolerable. Spain had occupied the Palatinate, and she had renewed her war with the Netherlands. Both these acts seemed most dangerous, while a Spanish Queen sat by the side of Louis XIII and half the great provincial governments were in the hands of nobles who had either themselves been members, or were the sons of members, of the League. The rise of Austrian power, and of the Catholic party in Germany, which was indeed startling, struck the French chiefly by the augmen-

tation which it brought to the power of Spain. From Holland all down the French frontier, and along the frontier of their allies to Venice, the French saw the Spanish Monarchy grow suddenly more irresistible than ever. Between the Low Countries and the Palatinate they saw the ecclesiastical electorates, between the Palatinate and Switzerland they saw Alsace, between Switzerland and Milan they saw the Valtellin, and in all these regions the power of Spain seemed to have been increased by the growth of Austria and of German Catholicism.

Here was reason enough why a strong Minister should feel the necessity of taking measures of resistance to Spain. And thus at the outset Richelieu's policy was adopted in self-defence.

With Austria indeed he had at the outset no quarrel. But in this phase Austria was inextricably involved with Spain. The immense growth of Austrian power alarmed him, because Austrian power was available for Spanish purposes. And thus Richelieu is soon led to give assistance to the Protestant party of Germany against the Emperor, and in this way France drifts gradually into the great German war. In the last ten years of the Thirty Years' War France and Sweden are the leading belligerents against the Emperor, and yet it is not very apparent what concern, except as a rapacious conqueror, France has in this German quarrel. In fact here too France has but drifted gradually from a policy of self-defence into one of conquest.

After the phase of confusion and dependence on Spain which extends from 1610 to 1624 comes the first phase of the Richelieu policy. This may be said to last till 1629. It is also somewhat confused, and exhibits the new system in the making.

That system consists, as we have seen, in opposition to the Spanish Monarchy abroad (and in this is included opposition to the Emperor in Germany) and to the noblesse, who are in concert with Spain, at home. But before 1629 the issue is confused. Among the noblesse there is beside the party of Spain, which is the residue of the League, also the Huguenot party who in the main look to England. Richelieu therefore has to oppose both combinations in turn or at times both together. Thus in 1629 we see the Huguenots under Rohan taking subsidies from Spain.

• In this phase it was by no means clear what form Richelieu's policy would ultimately take. Instead of siding with the Protestant Powers of Europe against the House of Habsburg it was on the cards about 1628 that he would form an alliance with the Spanish Monarchy against England and the Huguenot party, and that he would revoke the Edict of Nantes. Such a course seemed conformable to the spirit of the time, when the Counter-Reformation was more than ever triumphant; such a course was recommended by the example of the Emperor, who at this very time was purging his hereditary dominions of heresy. About 1628 indeed there were omens everywhere of the final catastrophe of Protestantism.

But at this crisis European Protestantism was saved by blows struck at French Protestantism. The failure of England at Rochelle, the fall of Rochelle, and then the failure of Rohan in the south, introduced a modification of the religious settlement of France, which is a further stage in that process which ended by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Edict itself was maintained, but, as the Huguenots now lost their strongholds, they had henceforth no security but the honour of the Govern-

ment, and honour in the long run can hardly maintain itself against religion. After 1629 Richelieu could feel that he had done enough for orthodoxy. As the conqueror of the Huguenots, who were now disabled materially, and also morally discredited by their concert with Spain, he could proceed to ally himself with Protestant Powers without provoking the dagger of a Ravallac.

Already the war against the House of Austria had begun, for it is characteristic of Richelieu to advance against the foreign enemy without waiting to disarm domestic treason. Let us again remark that the foreign enemy is the Spanish Monarchy, not Austria. Since the Treaty of Catcau-Cambresis Italy has been almost at the mercy of Spain. France has been excluded from it, and her Italian policy has been confined to lending occasional relief to some Italian Powers who were stifled in the Spanish atmosphere, especially to Venice and Savoy and occasionally to the Pope. A change now comes in the way in which change was possible in the monarchical seventeenth century. The House of Gonzaga at Mantua dies out, and a French prince, Nevers, succeeds by relationship to Mantua and Montferrat. Spain resists the succession and calls in the help of the Emperor as feudal suzerain. Again the two branches of the House of Austria act in conjunction, but the aggressive Power is Spain, the Emperor appearing, as it were, only in the background. From the Duchy of Milan Spanish troops advance to besiege Casale. The feeling prevails in Italy that the servitude of the country to Spain is about to be established for ever.

It may be regarded as the commencement of the great European career of modern France that Richelieu, fresh from his victory at Rochelle and disregarding the move-

ments of the Huguenot party in the South, leads Louis XIII. across the Alps in the winter of 1628 and successfully relieves Casale. Here too practically begins the war with Spain which was only closed thirty-one years later by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. Immediately after his return Louis XIII put the last hand to the suppression of the Huguenot rebellion.

And thus we arrive at the second phase of Richelieu, which I have described as a great revolution. His task is now simplified, but it is a task of immense difficulty. He has henceforth but one enemy, viz., the concert between the Spanish Monarchy and the French noblesse. For the thirteen years which remain to him he wages this war and then he bequeaths it to Mazarin. By this war is effected what we call the Transformation of France.

It is effected by purging out the old poison of the League. The nobles in whom feudalism still survives as an anarchical instinct, who covet the sovereign position of German princes and would break up France into a loose federation of independent states, must be overawed by Government. The scaffold must come into play. But the traitorous faction is not isolated. It has an old understanding with the Spanish Monarchy. Over an immense region of French-speaking people the House of Austria exerts a ruling influence, in Franche Comté and Artois, in the Three Bishoprics, which are still reckoned to the Empire, in the Walloon Country. And then there is Lorraine, still independent under its sovereign family; and of this family one branch is called Guise, a name identified with the League. How slight is the difference between the Guise of this time who passes for a French noble and holds the great government of Provence, in which like the other French governors he affects in-

dependence, and his cousin the Duke of Lorraine, who is really independent and whose descendant was to become Roman Emperor! Accordingly the traitorous noblesse must be attacked in their patron and ally the King of Spain as well as in themselves. War with Spain must go hand in hand with judgment upon traitors. And the secure throne of Louis XIV is built upon the ruin at once of the aristocratic faction and of the Spanish Monarchy.

But as the Spanish Monarchy supports the noblesse, so Austria supports the Spanish Monarchy. This is the new and peculiar feature of the age of Richelieu. In the early days of Henry IV the enemy was simply Spain, but now Spain cannot be attacked without attacking Austria at the same time. And in this second phase of Richelieu his relation to Austria is so important and leads to results so striking that for the time it draws attention away from his relation to Spain. The sudden growth of Austria and its tyrannous ascendancy in Germany, marked by the Edict of Restitution, were alarming to France not so much in themselves as for the reinforcement they brought to the power of Spain.

Richelieu did not at first interfere directly in the German question, but acted as Charles I had done when he proposed to aid the King of Denmark with a subsidy. He called in the King of Sweden in order, as he says himself, to prevent the Emperor from interfering in Italy or in France itself, that is, from aiding Spain. It was the decisive step, by which France placed herself at the head of the Protestant cause, but in taking it she had in view neither the Protestant interest itself nor her own aggrandisement on the side of Germany. Her struggle was with Spain, and at that particular

moment the scene of it was Italy. If she called in Gustavus it was to detain the force of Austria, and to prevent it from crossing the Alpine passes to the help of Spain.

But Gustavus, when he came, inflicted such a wound on Austria and on the whole Germanic system that a wholly new prospect for France opened on the side of Germany. Gradually France herself was drawn into the Thirty Years' War, she became in time a principal belligerent, and ended by making the conquest of Alsace. Nevertheless her war in Germany, great and memorable as it was, is but an incident in her war with the Spanish Monarchy. This, as it may be said to have begun long before—for it is in fact the old war which had come down from the age of Philip II—so continued twelve years after the German war had been brought to an end by the Treaties of Westphalia.

We must not wander too far away from English policy. We are concerned with these mighty events only so far as they explain to us the new aspect which France, Austria, and the Spanish Monarchy are found to wear when England, resting from her civil troubles, finds again leisure to look at them.

The arrival of Gustavus in Pomerania opens a German Revolution which extends beyond his own short career and beyond the death of Wallenstein, until a new equilibrium is established by the Treaty of Prague and the Battle of Nördlingen. During this time it had seemed probable that the Germanic system would be entirely dissolved, that the House of Habsburg would lose the imperial dignity, and perhaps that Germany would be partitioned among a number of independent princes. What Gustavus himself meant to take for his share no



one knew; Wallenstein dreamed of becoming King of Bohemia; Bernard of Saxe Weimar would be Duke of Franconia. But the Battle of Nördlingen, won by the King of Rome, afterwards the Emperor Ferdinand III, caused the disturbance to subside which had been raised by Gustavus' great victory of Breitenfeld. It saved the imperial dignity for the House of Habsburg, saved South Germany for the Catholic Church, and, conjoined with the Treaty of Prague, brought the Germanic system to the shape which it maintained on the whole till the wars of the French Revolution. What this was we may inquire later; meanwhile we are to note what effect these revolutions had upon the policy of France.

Richelieu was probably himself surprised at the result of his policy of calling in Gustavus. Not only was the victory of Breitenfeld far more crushing than he could have expected, but it was followed up by Gustavus in an unexpected manner. It might have seemed natural for the conqueror to advance upon Prague and Vienna, in which case he would perhaps have dissolved and destroyed the Austrian State. Such a result would have been a revolution for Germany, but not necessarily or immediately very important for France. Gustavus however turned westward. In the last months of 1631 he made the conquest of Franconia. At the end of the year he entered Mainz, where he passed a triumphal winter, which may remind us of Alexander at Babylon or Napoleon at Dresden.

Now here he was in the neighbourhood of the Palatinate, and he soon found himself, contrary to his original intention, engaged in hostilities with Spain as well as with Austria. He had in fact by his sudden entrance broken the sort of blockade in which Spain held France from the

North Sea to the Alps<sup>1</sup>. And in the first months of 1632 he continued to give trouble to the Spaniards.

There was much in his conduct which might alarm Richelieu, but his appearance on the Rhine proved in the end to have given a decisive advantage to France in her struggle with the Spanish Monarchy. It was at this moment that the noblesse, headed by the Queen-Mother and Gaston of Orleans the presumptive heir, made their great rising in concert with Spain. They were put down with a high hand. Guise was driven into exile, the duchy of Lorraine was occupied, Montmorency was brought to the scaffold. But all this was possible to Richelieu because Spain was now paralysed by the Swedish power on the Rhine.

Such relief from the incubus on the eastern frontier, joined to his success in Italy, might have contented Richelieu but for a new danger which arose in the fluctuations of that stormy time. Gustavus passed away in 1632, leaving the Swedish power in Germany still helpful but no longer very alarming to France. Wallenstein began to take, with respect to the Emperor, almost the place of Gustavus, for he had a commanding army in the heart of the Empire and into which scale he would throw this weight no one could tell. Then came his downfall. About the same time a new Habsburg prince, Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV (called the Cardinal-Infant), took the government of the Low Countries, and then the army of Wallenstein, now commanded by the King of Rome, after effecting a junction with the Spanish army under the Cardinal-Infant, won the great victory of Nördlingen.

<sup>1</sup> Er sprengte die ganze Verbindung der spanisch-kaiserlich-katholischen Interessen, die den Franzosen so widerwärtig war, aus einander. **RANKE.**

It was a kind of new birth for the House of Habsburg. Naturally therefore it revived at once all the anxiety of Richelieu.

And thus the year 1635 opens a new phase in the career of Richelieu. He must again make war in self-defence. The work of Gustavus has been undone in Bavaria and Franconia. Saxony and Brandenburg have reconciled themselves to the Emperor by the Treaty of Prague. The Alliance of Spain and Austria is stronger than ever. France is compelled to resist it more openly than ever. In her alliance with Sweden she must now become the active, the leading partner.

In May 1635, formal war was declared between France and the Spanish Monarchy. At this date openly commences the struggle in which the Spanish Monarchy, in the sense which we have explained, fell, and France established her European ascendancy.

Seven years of Richelieu's life were yet to run, and within that time the Spanish Monarchy was brought to the verge of ruin. And yet we are to remark that at this time France had no great military reputation, was held wholly inferior as a military state to Spain, and that the victory which reversed this relation, that of Rocroi, was not won till Richelieu and Richelieu's master had both passed away. It was not by war that the Spanish Monarchy was brought to the verge of ruin. What means then did Richelieu use?

When once domestic treason was scotched, if not killed, and Richelieu faced directly the problem not of resisting at some one point but of overthrowing the Spanish Monarchy, he discovered that without actual superiority in the field he had the means of inflicting great injuries upon it.

In the first place he could feed the war in Germany

and take part in it so far as to prevent Austria from rendering much aid to Spain.

Feuquières had been sent to Heilbronn to represent France when Oxenstierna organised the great Coalition of Sweden and the Protestant princes. This is the beginning of the final phase of the Thirty Years' War. From this time France becomes more and more a principal belligerent against the Emperor and Bavaria. It is chiefly by means of Bernard of Saxe Weimar that she is led into this position. At first she subsidises him, and after his death in 1639 she takes over his army. This becomes a kind of nucleus round which, chiefly under the direction of Turenne, the great French army of the age of Louis XIV forms itself.

Secondly he could form a close league with the United Netherlands.

The renewed war of Spain and the Netherlands had been proceeding since 1621. The Stadtholder Frederick Henry showed himself a worthy successor of his father William and his brother Maurice. In 1628 the Admiral known as Piet Hein achieved what Spain had long apprehended, yet fondly hoped the God of Catholics would never suffer to be done, he captured the silver fleet. From this time the Dutch, no longer as in the former war a community of rebels in whom despair became heroism, but a great Power and the richest nation in the world, showed themselves superior to their enemy. When Richelieu in 1635 brought them the aid of France he trusted that the two allies would be easily able to partition between them the Spanish Low Countries.

This hope was disappointed, but it soon began to appear that the Spanish Monarchy laboured under certain serious strategical weaknesses. It consisted of three masses

of territory between which there was but a precarious communication, the Iberian and Italian peninsulas and what still remained of Burgundy. Under Richelieu the naval power of France began to be considerable, and this naval power threatened the communications of Spain and Italy, and of Spain and the Low Countries at once. How could Spain support the war with Holland when the sea began to be closed to her by the united force of Holland and France? Only by the resources of Italy and Franche Comté, which must be brought to bear by way of the valley of the Rhine. And now began to be felt the consequences of Gustavus' march to the Rhine and of his occupation of Mainz. Gustavus had severed the connexion between the northern and southern parts of the Spanish Monarchy.

In an unexpected way France reaped the benefit of what had been done by Sweden. It was the most Catholic part of Germany, it was Priest-street itself, that had thus been occupied by the Protestant Swedes. As the power of Sweden somewhat declined and that of France began to rise after the death of Gustavus the princes and populations of this region put themselves eagerly under the protection of France, which was at least Catholic. Thus the Elector of Trier gladly handed over to the French the two great fortresses he had founded, Philipsburg and Ehrenbreitstein. And without calculation, by a natural process of developement, France began to find herself in possession of Alsace. As it were the spinal cord of the Spanish Monarchy was cut, but henceforth France, not Sweden, took the government from its fainting hand.

But it was possible, still without military superiority, to strike even more deadly blows at Spanish power. For the moral union of the vast mass was almost more pre-

carious than the material. It was so especially in the Iberian peninsula itself, where no organic union had ever taken place between the provinces, where no true Spain existed, but only a sovereign Castille surrounded by states which had been not so much reconciled as neutralised.

On the one side Olivarez provoked, and on the other Richelieu fomented, first a rebellion in Catalonia, then much more than a rebellion, a national war of liberation, in Portugal. The latter is the decisive event; it took place in December 1640. What we have called United Iberia was now after sixty years dissolved again. There is a curious contrast between this union, so suddenly made and so short-lived, and the gradual consolidation of England and Scotland. It is especially curious to observe that whereas Scotland gained by the union a share in a great and growing colonial empire, Portugal on the contrary by her union with Spain lost a great colonial empire. It was the sense of this injury that caused the noble families of Portugal, which sixty years before had favoured the cause of Philip II, now to rally resolutely round the native House of Bragança. They could perceive that their union with Spain had exposed their vast colonial possessions to the attack of Spain's enemy, the Netherlands, that at their expense the Dutch colonial empire had been founded. At this very moment they had bitter occasion to feel what price they paid for their connexion with Spain, for Brazil, their greatest colonial possession, was now passing rapidly into the hands of the Dutch.

Thus a new war, not less great than the war with the Netherlands, began for Spain. It lasted more than twenty years, and we shall have other opportunities of studying the events of it. It ended in the secession not only of Portugal but of all her vast colonies. But the mere

outbreak of it, following those changes on the Rhine, completely reversed the old relation between the Spanish Monarchy and France. Hampered with two civil wars at once, in Catalonia and in Portugal, the Spanish Monarchy as a European Power suffers paralysis. It seems to be on the verge of a catastrophe.

And now Richelieu himself and his defeated antagonist Olivarez quit the scene almost at the same moment. Richelieu lived long enough to see the commencement of the civil war in England. A new English policy, which we must soon examine, begins when the Parliament takes the place of the King in the direction of affairs. But before we return to English policy it is convenient to mark the principal phases through which the transformation of France passed after the death of Richelieu.

First there was a period of five years (1643—1648) during which the mighty impetus which France had received from him carries her forward unchecked. Her military glory begins at Rocroi, and the names of Condé and Turenne are soon bruited abroad. The Treaties of Westphalia are made.

This settlement is triumphant for France. But we are to remark that it does not affect her great struggle with the Spanish Monarchy. She makes peace with the Emperor, but not with the King of Spain. She conquers Alsace, but this is a German not a Spanish territory. As against Spain she gains nothing but an assurance that Spain for the rest of the war will have no assistance from the Emperor.

Spain however gains a corresponding advantage. For another treaty was made in 1648 beside those which the Emperor made with France and her allies and Sweden and her allies. This was the Treaty between Spain and

the United Netherlands, by which their dispute after eighty years was finally wound up. For the Spanish Government was conscious of inability to reconquer both the Netherlands and Portugal; it sacrificed the former for the sake of the latter—vainly, as the sequel proved. But at the outset in 1635 France had undertaken her struggle with Spain in firm dependence on the Dutch alliance, and her position was seriously altered when this alliance failed her.

Thus after 1648 the war from being a confused medley becomes a simple duel between France and Spain, the former being deserted by the Dutch and the latter by the Emperor. But we remember that Spain has all along counted on another ally, the faction of nobles in France. Richelieu had quelled this for a time, and in the triumphant *quinquennium* which followed his death by an unexpected good fortune it had not raised its head again. But in 1648 the concert of Spain and the noblesse breaks out again almost as violently as in the times of the League.

The disturbances of the Fronde make a chapter of history which is perplexing if we study it by itself, because they are caused by the meeting of several currents, and we may doubt which is the main-current. On the surface we see a struggle between King and Parliament, somewhat similar to, and perhaps imitated from, that which had just taken place in England. But if we look at the whole development of France from Henry IV to Louis XIV in his manhood, we become aware that the main-current is not this but a movement towards national union under the Crown in resistance to the concert between the noblesse and the Spanish Monarchy. Behind the surface of the Fronde, the parade of Parliament and liberty, we may see



a dispute strikingly similar to that of the regency of Marie de Medicis. Again there is a regent, Anne of Austria, and she has her Concini, her Italian favourite, Mazarin, and the princes of the blood become mutinous under the leadership of Condé, and Mazarin imprisons Condé, as Concini had imprisoned Condé's father, and civil war breaks out fomented by Spain. Finally Condé openly joins the Spanish side and serves as a general of Philip IV. In the hands of these turbulent nobles, the Parliament of Paris and the Parisian populace are but puppets. And the great principle sown by Richelieu, the principle of the State, of the public good, continues to grow and develope. It subdues in time the great Condé itself. It establishes the union and the greatness of France. It crushes down all that makes for disintegration, including those very Parliaments and those popular principles which have discredited themselves by cooperation with the party of treason.

It subdues also in the end the Spanish Monarchy, but not without new international combinations, in particular not without the aid of England.

And it is now time to inquire what England has been doing during the years of the Transformation of France.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENGLAND.

ENGLAND as well as France suffered transformation in this period. It may even be said that the change began in the two countries about the same time, in France on the Day of Dupes, in England with the dissolution of the Third Parliament and with the resolution of Charles to make himself independent of Parliament. But as in France the Government had success and in England opposition to the Government triumphed, the actual transformation began in England later than in France. The decisive event in England as much in foreign as in domestic affairs is the outbreak of civil war.

In England, as we know, the civil war began in 1642, but in Scotland it had begun four years earlier, and rebellion had begun as early as 1637. As Richelieu died at the end of 1642, we see that he witnessed but the commencement of the English Great Rebellion, but on the other hand that he lived through the whole of that stormy period which was introductory to it, that he saw the two Bishops' Wars, the Short Parliament, the meeting of the Long Parliament, the fall of Strafford, the Irish

Rebellion, and then the fatal breach between King and Parliament.

But the grand epoch of transformation for England is the moment of the outbreak of civil war. For we are to observe that, though at that moment the Parliament had no great military superiority, yet by getting possession of the fleet it acquired at once the main control of foreign affairs. Hence the year 1642 marks in some sense the close of the reign of Charles as far as foreign policy is concerned; at least in a history of policy he falls in that year almost from the position of a King to that of a Pretender. But before 1642 foreign policy is still in his hands: and as by the commencement of war between the Spanish Monarchy and France in alliance with Holland a new chapter of European affairs, most interesting to England, had begun in 1635, that is about two years before the outbreak of disturbance in Scotland, we may see that the period of seven years between 1635 and 1642 may be called the last phase of the policy of Charles I, as it is also of Richelieu, and at the same time the last phase of the old *régime* of England. Before 1642 our state was still in most of its large features what it had been in the Elizabethan age, but the discord which broke out in that year transformed it, so that it has never been the same since.

In 1635 Charles has but one foreign object, to procure the restoration of the Elector Palatine, and but one personal ambition, to maintain the naval supremacy of England in the narrow seas.

How does he regard the great struggle of Bourbon and Habsburg, which in that year entered upon an acute phase?

We saw him at the beginning of his reign break off a

marriage negotiation with the King of Spain and soon after marry a sister of the King of France. When we remember how much in that age depended upon royal marriage this may seem to involve a complete change of policy, as though he had passed over from one side to the other in the European controversy. For when we look back from such a distance upon the France of that age we may easily imagine it represented solely at this time by Richelieu and before him by Henry IV, and conceive it therefore as the steadfast determined foe of the Spanish Monarchy. As a matter of fact however Henry IV had died in 1610 and Richelieu's system was not made clearly manifest to the world till 1630, and in the intervening twenty years the rivalry of France and Spain did not merely slumber, but gave way at least in intention to a close union and family alliance. The Queen of France was a sister of the King of Spain; the Queen of Spain was a sister of the King of France. If this family union did not carry with it a union of policy, that was the work of Richelieu, and a work not yet accomplished or visible to the world.

Now it is to be observed that Richelieu met with opposition not merely in the French nation but especially in the royal family. To establish it he had to push aside the Queen Mother and the presumptive heir; he had also severely to hold in check the Queen herself. If then Charles entered by marriage into the French royal family, this by no means implies that he entered into the ideas of Richelieu or into antagonism to Spain, but rather the contrary, for the French royal family was in the main opposed to those ideas and to that antagonism. Henrietta Maria sympathised with her mother, the victim of Richelieu's persecution and the foundress of the alliance with

Spain; she associated too with the Duchesse de Chevreuse, who was not only Richelieu's opponent but actually a Guise by her second marriage. We are also not quite to forget that Charles himself was descended from a Queen of France, whose mother had been a Guise.

Mme de Chevreuse, who had fled from Richelieu across the Spanish frontier, came to England from Spain in 1638; the Queen Mother herself came to England in the same year; about this time Henrietta Maria's influence over Charles began visibly to increase. The English Court was assuming already something of that French complexion which became so marked after the Restoration; the effects of the French marriage were becoming visible. But those effects were not at this time such as might have been expected, for, as we have remarked, Richelieu had introduced a new thing into politics. He had dictated to Louis XIII a policy which was not that of his family. He had disregarded marriage and blood-relationship. There was an Opposition in France, and the nucleus of this opposition was in the Royal Family. Henrietta Maria belonged to it. Accordingly the growth of French influence at the English Court did not incline the English Government towards the French Government, but towards the French Opposition, and in the struggle which had commenced in 1635 it inclined England to favour Spain rather than France.

The Spanish Monarchy had not yet lost its ascendancy though it was on the point of doing so. In this last phase the European opposition to it takes a somewhat new form. England is now an indifferent spectator. France enters in 1635 upon a new struggle with it, in which she is assisted by Holland. There is a more direct and equal duel between France and Spain than has been witnessed

before, and after 1648, when Holland withdraws, these two Powers are left alone in the arena. After 1635 therefore it begins to be the grand question of English policy whether England shall side with France or with Spain, and twenty years later the energetic decision of this question by Cromwell led European history into a new course. About 1638 we see Charles watching the two combatants with a very indifferent eye. His connexion with the French royal family and the influence of his queen do not, for the reason just given, incline him towards France, but rather towards Spain. On the whole however he is prepared to receive offers from both sides, and to weigh what Spain can undertake against what France can undertake for the benefit of the Elector Palatine.

About the time when the disturbances began in Scotland, when the Covenant was signed and the Bishops' War broke out, a crisis occurred in the foreign policy of Charles. Two of those disastrous and ignominious failures which are characteristic of the reign of Charles I overtook him nearly at the same time, and produced a sort of catastrophe in which his direction of foreign affairs comes to an end. One of them relates to the war of the Low Countries, the other to the German war.

In the duel of France and Spain which began in 1635 and which was to end in so complete a victory for France, Spain had at the outset much success and even appeared likely to be victorious. The attempt of France and Holland to effect a partition of the Catholic Low Countries was energetically resisted, and the tide of invasion was rolled back on France. The fortresses of Picardy fell into the hands of the Cardinal-Infant, and Richelieu trembled in Paris itself. But in 1638 fortune began to declare for France at the very moment when the child was born who

was to be Louis XIV. His birth was indeed in itself a very substantial gift of fortune, for it gave a future to the conquering system of Richelieu, which hitherto had seemed to depend absolutely upon the frail life of Louis XIII. As later in 1729, so now in 1638 the birth of a dauphin changed the aspect of politics. But in the same year a great military event occurred. We have seen how Gustavus had, as it were, raised the siege of France by breaking through the Spanish lines in the Palatinate and on the Rhine. In 1638 Bernhard of Saxe Weimar completed the process which his master Gustavus had begun by the capture of Breisach. The establishment of a great Protestant prince with an important army at this place broke the connexion between two great limbs of the Spanish monarchy, the Spanish Low Countries and the Spanish possessions in Italy. It also opened a gate for French armies into Germany.

Hitherto Charles has pursued his confused system, in which the end and the means are almost equally unjustifiable and inexplicable. Why the restoration of the Elector Palatine should be a matter of such paramount importance to English policy Strafford himself acknowledges that he cannot comprehend. As in the age of Buckingham, so now he abides by the Elizabethan view. 'It affects me very much,' he writes (March 21, 1637), 'to hear the peace and prosperity of your affairs at home disquieted by entering again into action upon any foreign hopes or engagements abroad until the Crown were discharged of debts, the coffers filled, and your Majesty's profits and sovereignties set upon their right foot throughout your three kingdoms.' He hates war as much as Queen Elizabeth had done. And he goes on to question whether the Elector Palatine had any claim upon England.

Charles however seems at moments prepared to give ships and money in this cause and to allow the levy of volunteers, in fact to take steps which might speedily involve him in the European war. To which side he will attach himself seems a matter of indifference. He negotiates with France and Spain at the same time, and his aid is at the service of whichever Power will most freely promise the restoration of his nephew. Yet it had from the beginning of the reign of Charles been most doubtful whether Spain had the power of effecting that restoration, and Strafford freely questions now whether France has either the power or the will to effect it.

In 1639 all the world was admitted to watch the turnings and windings of this tortuous system. The capture of Breisach had forced Spain to fall back upon her fleet in conducting the war of the Low Countries. A great Armada under Oquendo appeared in the Channel. It was the last of the great Spanish Armadas. Not again did the Spanish maritime Power display itself on at all the same scale in these northern seas until in quite other conditions the allied fleets of France and Spain swept the Channel in the days of Lord North. In this enterprise the Spanish Government applied for the countenance of Charles, and a negociation began in which Charles, as usual, stipulated for the restoration of the Palatine Prince. In September the fleet appeared, and was speedily forced by Tromp to seek shelter on the English coast. Then began a curious bargain. Oquendo and Tromp had to wait while Charles set his aid up to auction. Cardénas, the Spanish Ambassador, on one side, Bellièvre, the French Ambassador, on the other, were required to state how much their respective Governments were pre-



pared to do for the Prince Palatine. If France should bid highest, Tromp was to be allowed to destroy the Spanish fleet. On the other hand if Spain should make a satisfactory offer, and also pay a large sum of money, Charles would interfere to save it. The auction was open for about a month, until on October 21st Tromp took the decision into his own hands, attacked the Spanish fleet, sank some ships, burned others, and captured about eleven. The English Admiral, Pennington, having no orders, did not interfere. Oquendo himself with a considerable part of his armament made his escape into Dunkirk harbour.

Meanwhile Charles had been busy with another scheme. A crisis in the German war had occurred in July when Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, at the moment the most conspicuous military figure, a sort of minor Gustavus Adolphus, died suddenly, leaving the best army in Europe to seek a new commander. Could but the Palatine Prince fill the vacancy thus made? So thought Charles. But in fact it was natural for France to desire to get possession of this army. Charles however frankly communicated his idea to Bellièvre, professing to wait upon the decision of the French Government. But without any delay the Prince was to set out for the army, which he was to join as a volunteer, and he was to travel through France incognito, as Charles and Buckingham had done twenty years before. On October 15th, while the Spanish and Dutch fleets still watched each other in the Channel, the Prince crossed to Boulogne and proceeded to execute this scheme. It had not been concealed from Bellièvre, and yet the French Government were thought likely to be deceived by a disguise of which they had had notice, though it was intended to bring about a result extremely

disagreeable to them. The scheme perhaps, had it been executed with real secrecy and suddenness, might have had great results. Charles had taken in hand to steal a march upon Richelieu, and yet he seemed not to feel the necessity of using any extraordinary energy or promptitude. It is almost needless to say that the prince was not allowed to reach the camp. He was detained at Moulins and brought under arrest to Vincennes. In the end the army of Bernhard, instead of recovering the Palatinate for Prince Charles Louis, passed into the service of France and became the nucleus of the victorious host of Louis XIV.

These two mishaps befel Charles almost at the same moment. They left him in a position among the European Powers than which nothing can be imagined more pitiable, though probably it never came home to his dim consciousness. He had long been regarded by continental politicians as a Sovereign whose alliance was of no value, but their slight regard now became bitter dislike. He had given disgust to all at once, to Spain whose fleet he had given up to destruction, to France and Holland, since he had in no way aided Tromp and had made a clumsy attempt to deceive the French Government, while he had shown how utterly indifferent he was to that which in his negotiations with Richelieu was called the 'common cause.' In the great European struggle he appeared perfectly ready to take either side and at the same time perfectly useless to both sides. Louis XIII expresses this disgust in a memoir to Bellièvre written on October 29th of this year, 1639. Bellièvre is charged to conjure the King of England to consider that to remain on his present terms is to ruin his nephew's states and to lose the opportunity of acquiring much reputation. His Majesty is quite ready to bring all his

allies to enter conjointly with himself into a league offensive and defensive with the King of England and to bind himself not to make peace without the restoration of the Palatinate....If the King of England says that he has had a great share in the defeat of the Spanish fleet, M. de Bellièvre is to answer that so far from having had any share he has permitted the Spaniards, who have spoiled his nephew, to receive much help from his states, where they have been supplied with victuals, powder, rigging, and, what is more, several ships, which have carried two or three thousand of them to Dunkirk. He is to add that the Spaniards boast on all sides that they are on the point of making a treaty with the King of England to be furnished with 10,000 Irishmen in return for a round sum which they offer to lend him, a thing so contrary to the design he professes to have of re-establishing his nephew in his States that if the treaty were real it would be impossible to make one with him for the advantage of the common cause. M. de Bellièvre is to speak of all this to the Queen and to make her understand what a disgrace it would be to the King of England that for a money loan he should furnish the Spaniards with an army to be used against himself.

With such impatient contempt had Louis and Richelieu come to regard the policy of Charles! The rebellion had already begun in Scotland, and we may see from Mme de Motteville's account of English affairs, which was derived from Queen Henrietta Maria, that to the English Court it wore the appearance of a rebellion fomented by Richelieu. 'The Cardinal de Richelieu,' she writes, 'who governed in France, hated the King of England because his heart was Spanish...he thought it absolutely necessary for the weal of France, that that prince should have

trouble in his country.' It is no doubt true that Richelieu's policy required at the moment when he was pressing the Spanish Monarchy so hard that England should not be free to interfere, and we see with what feelings he regarded Charles. Modern inquiry however leads to the conclusion that his influence was not very active in fomenting our civil troubles, because in fact it was superfluous. Charles might be trusted to do Richelieu's work for him, and to provide those troubles in Great Britain which his vast European schemes demanded.

These events of 1639 may be said to close a period in our foreign policy. The civil war was now at hand which was to transform England as the administration of Richelieu transformed France. In domestic affairs and particularly in respect of the relation between the three kingdoms the Stuart Monarchy had strayed into a false position. The convulsion which now took place was the consequence. It led to a change which modified our foreign policy as much as our constitution.

These proceedings of 1639 are of a piece with all the foreign measures of James I and Charles I, and exhibit the foreign system of these kings in a particularly naked form. In one word, they regard foreign affairs purely from the point of view of the family. They are allied by marriage to the Palatine House, to the Danish House and to the House of Bourbon. But they enter the House of Bourbon only after having failed to enter the Spanish House, and at a time when the Houses of Bourbon and Spain were closely interwoven. These simple facts furnish the clue to their policy from the outbreak of the great twofold European war. They see but one object, the Palatinate, and even this they do not see in the same light as their subjects. To the English people also in the

age of Buckingham the question of the Palatinate was interesting, because they saw in it the cause of the Reformation. To James and Charles it is a family question, and they have at the same time a family attachment to Spain, one of the great enemies of the Palatinate, mainly because Charles courts an Infanta. Hence he pursues the restoration of the Palatine Prince at first through alliance with his Danish relative, and, when that has failed, through his Catholic relatives of France and Spain, inclining to Spain rather than to France. He will lend help to his Protestant nephew, but as he is a nephew, not as he is a Protestant, and in such a way as to render the slightest possible service to Protestantism.

It was time that the Monarchy in England should be reformed not less in the interest of foreign than of domestic policy. And now a transformation took place which did in the end cure this particular evil.

We regard this transformation purely from the international point of view, from which of course only the lesser half of it is visible. Monarchy and Commonwealth, Prelacy and Presbytery, these are matters which do not concern us. What we see is the fall, and after a time the restoration, and then again at a later time the second fall, or partial fall, of a *dynasty*, and involved in this the fall, restoration and second fall of a dynastic system of foreign policy. But lest we should stray where so many attractive paths, which nevertheless are misleading, offer themselves at every step, it is necessary to obtain a chart of the journey that now lies before us, that is, to begin by taking a general view.

We set out then from a system of foreign policy which is founded almost solely upon the family relationships of the king. But in 1642 the royal family is for the purposes

of foreign policy dispossessed. Henceforth the Government in possession is the Parliament, and from this time to the rise of the Protectorate the Parliament, not the King, represents England before the states of Europe.

This new Government is for some years much hampered by the opposition of the King and his party. But in 1651 it succeeds in crushing this opposition, and then for nearly nine years the state is guided securely in foreign affairs on a system wholly uninfluenced by family relationships. The system is indeed not wholly national, it is in some degree partisan. But the Long Parliament, the Council of State, and the Protector alike were not guided in their policy by the interests of a brother-in-law in France, or a nephew in the Palatinate, or an uncle in Denmark.

The dynasty is restored in 1660. But it is not brought back by any effort of its own or by the aid of its foreign connexions, but by the very party which in 1642 had raised rebellion against it. In 1642 King and Parliament had been at war; they had represented opposite principles. But in 1660 these two opposite parties absolutely melt into one. They combine to resist the third party which in the years 1648—1651 had overpowered both. They are so completely merged that in the first months of 1660 'Parliament' was the watchword of those who wished to bring back Charles Stuart. At that crisis he who said Parliament said King.

Charles II therefore inherited, as it were, the undynastic policy that had grown up during his exile. Meanwhile in his own mind the dynastic system had been strengthened and hardened by that very exile. He had dreamed during years of suspense of winning his restoration by the same methods by which his father had hoped to obtain the restoration of the Palatine Prince,

that is, by the armies and subsidies of his foreign relatives, his French nephew, his Dutch brother-in-law, his Danish uncle. Necessarily therefore in his policy there is a struggle between the dynastic system in which he had been bred and the more national system which had developed itself under the Commonwealth. In this struggle is the clue to the reign of Charles II.

In the simple soldier-like mind of his brother James there is no struggle. He adopts the dynastic system once for all, and tries to found his throne upon Catholicism and the family alliance with his cousin Louis XIV.

But these two brothers adopted the dynastic system in its extreme form. They were the sons of a Frenchwoman who was a bigoted Catholic, while Catholicism was odious to the English people and anything like a close alliance with France scarcely less so. They placed themselves therefore in a false position with respect to their subjects.

Now the dynastic system was not necessarily inconsistent with the national system of policy. It was conceivable that they might be brought into harmony, as it was conceivable that monarchy and liberty might be reconciled. The same man was born to effect both reconciliations. What the Revolution of 1688 means in constitutional history we all know. Its aspect in international history is not less important. William, as well as Charles or James, belonged to the royal caste. He was the first member of the House of Orange of whom this could be said. His mother was a Stuart and so was his wife. But he was a Protestant and he came from a country which, so far from being the ancient enemy, had always been felt to be a close relative, a cousin or almost a brother, of England.

Accordingly his accession in England finally reconciled the dynastic with the national system and introduced an era of English policy in which the Monarchy appeared free from the defect which we have remarked under James I and Charles I.

This glimpse of the road which lies before us, joined to our knowledge of the road we have already travelled, may enable us to understand the progress which England made in the whole period treated in this book. The 'growth of our policy' consisted in throwing off the dynastic system and adopting instead a national system. We now see the principal stages of the process. At the accession of Elizabeth the dynastic system prevailed so much that we were on the point of being swallowed up in the Habsburg Estate. By her disputed title, by her purely English descent, and by her want of all royal connexions, Elizabeth was thrown back upon the national system, or, in her own words, found herself 'married to her people.' In the forty-four years of her reign, this system was enabled to take a certain root, and meanwhile the dynastic influence in its better form counteracted the same influence in its worse form, when it brought together England and Scotland. Under the first Stuarts the dynastic system is restored, but somewhat slowly, the Stuart family being also poor in royal connexions at the time of its entrance into England. But by the time of the outbreak of the Great Rebellion, English policy, as we have seen, has become again thoroughly and coldly dynastic. By the Rebellion the national system is violently revived. The age of Oliver in respect of foreign policy is evidently similar to that of Elizabeth. It is also a kind of anticipation, though premature and precarious, of the national British policy of the eighteenth century. With the Restoration



begins a struggle between the two systems. At the Revolution this struggle is brought to an end by a reconciliation between the national system and the dynastic system in its better form represented by William of Orange.

We may add that this reconciliation proved lasting, though William himself had but a short reign. The dynastic system might easily have revived, even without the restoration of James or of the Pretender. Had Anne been married to a Bourbon or a Habsburg or to any Catholic prince and had she left heirs of such a marriage, the struggle might have recommenced. But her Danish marriage created no difficulty, and after her death that old connexion with the Palatine House, which under the earlier Stuarts had caused so much trouble, helped us to maintain the reconciliation of the national and dynastic systems introduced by William. A sister of that very Palatine Prince whose distresses and mishaps in the year 1639 we have just contemplated, and who in 1642 accompanied Charles in his attempt to arrest the Five Members, stood before the world in 1714, that is, more than seventy years later, as heiress to the throne of England. Between these two dates lies almost the whole immense reign of Louis XIV, and some years beside. Had she lived half a year longer this princess, then called the Electress Sophia, would have been proclaimed Queen in London. As it was, her son succeeded Queen Anne and founded the dynasty which has lasted to this day.

Enough for the present of large surveys and distant prospects. When we return to the period of Richelieu and look again at Charles I just entering the civil war we find that we have learnt from our anticipatory survey

to understand the importance of an event which took place in 1641. This event again is a marriage.

James I, we remarked, gave a daughter to the leading Protestant prince of his time, while he offered his son to a leading Catholic princess. But the marriage of Elizabeth Stuart to the Elector Palatine might seem to have been unfortunate, and no one could yet foresee that a great English dynasty, for which the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were reserved, was to issue from it. Charles I however follows his father's example. Though himself standing a degree nearer than his father to Catholicism, though his children were half Bourbons as he himself was partly a Guise, he too decides to give a daughter to the great representative of the Protestant cause. The Princess Mary is married in 1641, that is, about the time of Strafford's trial, to William, son and heir of the Stadtholder Frederick Henry. This is the first of the two great marriages of William and Mary by which the House of Stuart was united to the House of Orange, and which led to one of the greatest reigns in English History and also to an alliance of the Sea Powers upon which depended the international relations of Europe through a great part of the eighteenth century.

The second William and Mary and their marriage are known to all of us; the first William and Mary, who had but a short married life and passed that in Holland, have indeed a place in Dutch history, but are almost forgotten in England. And yet we shall find that the alliance which was created by their marriage between the Houses of Stuart and Orange was scarcely less important from its very beginning than the alliance of the Houses of Stuart and Bourbon, which is represented by the marriage of Charles I and Henrietta Maria. It was a new military

resource for the Stuart Monarchy, the importance of which was felt early in the English civil war. And if between the marriage of William and Mary in 1640 and the marriage of William and Mary in 1675 England waged three Dutch wars it will be found that this too was in a great degree a consequence of the connexion between the two Houses, as later the same connexion united the two states in a firm alliance.

As the occurrences of 1639 seemed to mark the close of the old policy, so if we watch the confused tumult of English affairs in 1641 about the time of the King's return from Scotland, we may note the commencement of several new systems of policy which one after another were to prevail in England in the second half of the seventeenth century. The Parliament was making itself independent and laying the foundation of a republican policy. On the other hand a party in the Parliament was beginning to lean towards the King, the party of Falkland and Hyde. But by the side of these Anglican Royalists there was already clearly discernible another type of Royalism. This had at once a French tinge and a Catholic tinge. It also looked towards the army. It was the party of the Queen, who was already seeking money from the Pope and debating whether it would be possible to induce the King to declare himself a Catholic, while at other times she meditated retiring to France and applied for help to Louis XIII. In this system of Henrietta Maria we cannot mistake the germ of that policy which was characteristic of the later Stuarts, which broke out under Charles II with the Treaty of Dover, under the auspices of another French Henrietta, and was at last fully revealed under James II. But moreover a marriage of William and Mary has newly taken place. Already the Queen, repulsed by Richelieu, begins

to look for aid to the Stadtholder. The royal family has formed a new connexion, which, though less brilliant than its connexion with France, has advantages of its own. This germ too will develop, there will be another William and Mary, who will sit side by side upon the throne of England.

And now the transformation of England began in earnest. One great movement was over. The Scotch disturbances had led in the first months of 1641 to the fall of the system of Charles in England and of those who directed it and to the restoration of Parliament in more than its old power. But now occurred the rising in Ireland, and the reaction of this upon England produced a new convulsion more serious still. It led to the Grand Remonstrance, which was the prelude not to one of those short spasms of revolution such as had just happened and had happened several times in the sixteenth century, but to a long and desperate discord comparable only to the Wars of the Roses, to a Civil War.

This second movement could not but have an immediate effect upon foreign policy. Henceforth there were two Englands instead of one, England represented by the Parliament and England represented by the King. The former had its foreign relations still to make. At the outset of the Civil War Parliament rests mainly on its own resources, as it obtains possession of almost all the whole machinery of Government and well-nigh succeeds in putting the King himself into the position of a rebel. It does not therefore at the outset look abroad for help, as the Scotch insurgents in 1638 had applied, though with no great success, to Richelieu. The King on the other hand depends in a very great degree upon foreign aid, since the foreign department has been all along in his own

hands. The surprising effect with which the Parliament launches its rebellion, carrying the greater part of the nation with it, throws the King back upon his continental connexions and, as it were, makes him a foreigner. He had already sought to obtain Spanish troops for his Scotch war. He now hopes to get a Spanish loan, while Henrietta Maria applies for a contribution to the Pope. It is also thought possible to obtain a Danish force. This Continental basis of operations is brought to light at the very commencement of the Civil War by the King's attempt to get possession of Hull and Portsmouth, posts important not merely in themselves but as securing a communication with the Continent. It appears still more clearly soon after by the conduct of the Queen.

The dynastic system, as it turned on marriage and the family, had naturally its centre in the Queen. It is worth remarking that from the accession of the Stuart family to the Revolution of 1688 the Queen of England is invariably a Catholic, though the creed of Anne of Denmark was not publicly avowed. In Henrietta Maria especially all that was *unnational* in the Stuart Monarchy was embodied. It was her presence and the Court that surrounded her that brought the King himself and the Anglican Church under so much unjust suspicion of Catholicising. It was she who alienated more and more the dynasty from the nation, so that the later Stuarts, resembling her and not their father, are French in disposition, morals and political affinity, and are also Catholic. From the outset of the Civil War she sways the royal party in the direction of Catholicism. The rising in Ireland was commonly called the Queen's rebellion. Could she have had her way she would probably have so arranged matters that

her husband would have suffered immediate expulsion, and her son would have had no hope of restoration. The Revolution of 1642 would have anticipated that of 1688. The dynasty would have called in the aid of France and of the Catholic world, and the party of Falkland and Hyde would have been driven by patriotism to adhere to the cause of the Parliament.

Had France in 1642 been what it was in 1688, profoundly tranquil within and serenely preeminent in Europe, it might have been tempted, and had it been ruled by a Louis XIV instead of a Richelieu, it might have resolved, to gratify Henrietta Maria, and thus to turn the civil war of King and Parliament into a national war of England and France. But Richelieu desired nothing better, at that critical moment when both branches of the House of Habsburg were beginning to give way before the arms of France, than that England should be paralysed for some considerable time by civil troubles, and Louis XIII had been taught by Richelieu sternly to thwart his nearest relatives. To refuse all help to his sister cost little to the king who had driven his mother into exile and was that moment overthrowing the monarchy in which another of his sisters was queen.

And thus, fortunately for the Stuart family, it could get no serious help in 1642 from the Bourbon. It was therefore driven to apply to another family, with which it had so recently formed a connexion, the House of Orange. A political combination begins precisely at this point, which soon became highly important, even though no one could foresee the vast importance it was to have in the next generation. The marriage of Mary, Princess Royal, with William, eldest son of the Stadtholder, had taken place on May 2nd, 1641; but now on Feb. 3rd,

1642, the Queen set sail, carrying the Princess to her husband and at the same time the Crown jewels, with which she hoped from the friendly shelter of the Hague to purchase an army, while at the same time she sought assistance and mustered all the resources of the dynasty. At the Hague she remained for a year and executed her design with considerable success. It illustrates the composite nature of the Royalist party that while Charles gathered round him a national army and a national party inspired by Anglican principles, the Queen formed another army abroad and thus consolidated the unnational element of the party.

These two facts, that France declined to interfere, and that the Stadtholder was from the first disposed to interfere, in behalf of Charles, are of the highest importance.

After 1688 France intervened promptly, and the Revolution of that year led to a great war, the greatest war we had waged since the sixteenth century, and the first of a series of great wars with France. It is therefore the more remarkable that the Rebellion of 1642 was followed by no similar intervention, although it affected the French royal House much more directly, a daughter of France being on the English throne and being most pointedly attacked and endangered by the rebellion. And the non-intervention of France, which in 1642 was due to Richelieu, was maintained after his time through the whole period of our civil troubles. The remarkable characteristic of our Great Rebellion, that France had no share in it, appears again not less remarkably in our Restoration eighteen years later.

Richelieu himself died a few months after Charles raised his standard at Nottingham, in the last days of 1642. Louis XIII followed him in April 1643 in a crowd

of notable men—Hampden, Falkland, Pym—who took their leave about the same time, and Louis XIV became king of France. The unparalleled reign of seventy-two years began. There was every reason to expect at this moment a sudden change in French policy. The great statesman with his austere system of opposition to family interests made way for the principal victim of that very policy, the natural head of the Spanish party in France. A Spanish Infanta would surely refuse to overthrow the Spanish Monarchy; a woman, beautiful and indolent, long persecuted by Richelieu, an old friend of Mme de Cleveuse, would surely decline Richelieu's task. From her surely Queen Henrietta Maria might expect the sympathy and aid which Richelieu had so coldly refused.

But the change was so sudden and complete that in any case France could not be expected to intervene at once. Some months passed, while Louis XIII reigned on without Richelieu, and again some months during which Anne of Austria was fully occupied in settling her government, in breaking her husband's will and establishing her own unrestricted regency. Meanwhile the great victory of Rocroi was won by the heir of the House of Condé, and the war of France with the Spanish Monarchy entered upon a wholly new stage. France stood forth as a great military Power, the new reign had a splendid opening, and the Regency too was covered with glory. But by this very success Anne was, as it were, caught in the tide of the Richelieu system, she was hurried along the career of victory over Spain, her policy became identified with that of the young hero, whose house was closely connected with that of Richelieu. To pursue the war with Spain became her absorbing task, and thus intervention in England became more unadvisable than



war. The party called the Importants, who were preparing to seize the reins and to cancel Richelieu's work, found their endeavours frustrated, and Mazarin, adroit and unassuming, presented himself as a sort of lady's Richelieu.

Thus France remained almost as insensible as ever to the distresses of the daughter of France.

But it was otherwise with the Stadtholder, Frederick Henry. The Dutch state had had from the outset a peculiar, double character. It had become a Republic almost in its own despite, because it had not been able to find a monarch. Elizabeth had declined to become its ruler, the French prince of Anjou had betrayed it. But out of its own bosom a kind of Monarchy had been developed. The House of Orange stood in the midst of the United Provinces, an object of popular loyalty, and furnished regularly in each generation a defender and patron to the free state which William the Silent had called into existence. In succession these princes held certain public offices, that of General, that of Admiral, and that of Stadtholder in some of the provinces. As in so many states we see the name of Monarchy without the thing, so here in the first ages of the Dutch state we see not less clearly the thing without the name. These princes were of great rank—they boasted of an ancestor who had been Roman Emperor—and of vast wealth. But they were not considered to be of royal rank, as we may see by their marriages. William the Silent had been several times married, and the mother of the third Stadtholder, Frederick Henry, who held the office in 1642, was a daughter of Coligny. The second Stadtholder, Maurice, had remained single; Frederick Henry married Amalia van Solms.

In these peculiar circumstances it was a great event for the House of Orange that the son of Frederick Henry was allowed to marry the Princess Royal of England. It raised the House out of the rank of noble, into that of royal Houses. In the standing controversy of the Dutch state between the Orange party and the republicans of the Province of Holland, the party formerly led by Oldenbarneveltdt and now led by De Witt, it gave a new advantage to the former. And as a natural consequence it gave to the Stuart family a new ally, powerful, and yet not too powerful, an ally that might prove more serviceable than the House of Bourbon, being in some degree dependent and also Protestant. From the Stadtholder therefore the King and Queen received a certain amount of aid immediately, and by the residence of the Queen for a whole year at the Hague, and afterwards by the presence of an English princess in the midst of a republican people, the Dutch state was drawn, as it were, into the eddy of the English civil war. Ten years later we shall find a war breaking out between the Dutch and the English Commonwealth, and we shall perceive that it has something of the nature of a continuation of the English civil war.

Such in outline are the foreign relations of Royalist England. If the King who in the winter of 1641 seemed almost without support, as helpless as John at Runnymede, found himself in the summer of 1643 greatly superior in his struggle with the Parliament, so that he might look forward to victory, this was indeed due in great part to the growth in England of a powerful Royalist party, which had not existed before the Grand Remonstrance; but in great part also it was due to the aid which the Queen had been able to bring from the Continent.

Throughout we see Royalism woven out of two distinct threads; there is national royalism, which is that of Falkland and Hyde, and there is dynastic royalism, which is Catholic and Continental, the royalism of the Queen.

At this period Parliamentary England had comparatively slight foreign relations. And yet it was in a certain sense by the aid of a foreign ally that the Parliament succeeded in 1644 in turning the scale against the King.

At the opening of Queen Elizabeth's reign we saw England threatened, as we see her threatened now, by a French princess residing on the Continent. Mary Stuart was then Queen of France, and she laid claim to the throne of England. For a moment Elizabeth's position seemed scarcely tenable. She saved herself by an alliance with the party of the Reformation in Scotland, and we remarked that Elizabethan England rested thenceforward amid the storms of the age of the Counter-Reformation upon the agreement in religion of the English and Scotch nations. Now in a similar extremity this foundation proved again firm and sufficient. The rebellion in England joins hands with the rebellion in Scotland. The Solemn League between the two nations which was made on the basis of the Covenant signed in Scotland in 1638 restored the balance between the warring parties.

Our Civil War is by no means a simple struggle between a king and his people; it is rather, as we have already remarked, a disturbance caused by the mutual action of three kingdoms with three distinct Churches, which happen to be united under one king. It is an effort to establish a *modus vivendi* between Anglicanism,

Scotch Presbyterianism and Irish Catholicism. England, we see, has foreign relations of two radically different kinds. Those relations with the Continent which we have lately examined are at this epoch comparatively unimportant. The relations of England with Scotland and Ireland are so important in our Civil War that almost everything turns on them. We must take note of this, but we must recognize at the same time that there is not room in this book for even an outline of relations which are only foreign in a secondary sense.

We remark only how each stage of the Civil War is introduced by some new contact between England and Scotland or Ireland. The Bishops' Wars of Scotland led to what we may call the first Revolution, that is, to the fall of Strafford and his system. Next, the rising in Ireland led to a second convulsion, to the Grand Remonstrance and the Civil War. Thirdly, when the Royal Party is seen to have the advantage Scotland comes to the help of the Parliament and restores the balance. Next, we find the King labouring to meet this move by a counter-move of the same kind. The Irish Cessation is arranged, which sets free some regiments for the King's service in England. Afterwards the Glamorgan negotiations take place, the object of which is to oppose to the alliance between the Parliament and the Scots an alliance between the King and the Irish Catholics. This mutual action of the Three Kingdoms upon each other does not stop at this point, but continues to the end to characterise the Stuart period. Charles after his defeat in England throws himself into the hands of the Scots. From Scotland comes the second civil war of 1648. By negotiating with the Scots Charles II attempts to recover his throne; he establishes himself in Scotland; thence he invades

England, and it is a Scotch army that is defeated at Worcester. From Scotland the Restoration is at last brought to us by George Monk. And when a quarter of a century later the struggle begins again, James II, driven from England, maintains the war in Ireland. In Ireland are fought the decisive battles. Finally, in the eighteenth century the Stuart cause lives on in Scotland, and gives rise to new invasions of England in 1715 and 1745.

The period in which England was so absorbed in her domestic struggle as to be almost without a foreign policy extends from 1642 to the earlier part of 1646, when by the surrender of Astley at Stow-on-the-Wold the victory of the Parliament may be said to be decided. Now these are the years during which France by the victories of Condé and Turenne was taking her position as the great military Power of Europe. Scarcely any period witnessed so momentous an alteration in the military balance of the Continent. To the superiority of statesmanship which Richelieu had given to France was now added a military superiority almost more imposing still. After the first great stroke at Rocroi, by which France (under the government of a Spanish Infanta) crushed the great army of the Netherlands, which since the days of Alexander of Parma had been the pride and stay of the Spanish Monarchy, there opened a period of grand strategical combinations. Distant armies are brought together and produce great results by surprising junctions. First, Condé leaves his war with Spain on the frontier of the Low Countries, and carries his army to the help of Turenne against Austria and Bavaria. The great battles of Freiburg and Nördlingen are fought. This is followed by the still more comprehensive and decisive operation of 1646,

by which France and Sweden, entering Germany from the West and North, unite their armies, and together force their way into Bavaria. It seems the original of which the Blenheim campaign is a somewhat close copy. Hitherto the main belligerents on one side, Austria and Bavaria, had had the advantage of close communication, while on the other side France and Sweden had waged the war successfully indeed yet far apart. The consequence was that while the rest of Germany had long been abandoned to unrestrained pillage and desolation, Bavaria, whose Elector, more than almost any other man, was responsible for the war, enjoyed a happy exemption. It was therefore a deadly and decisive stroke when Turenne, the Frenchman, and Wrangel, the Swede, joined their armies on the Lahn and, instead of giving battle to the Austro-Bavarian army near Frankfurt, left it behind them, and crossing the Main made their way to the Danube, where they occupied all the posts from Ulm to Donauwerth. The way into Bavaria was now open, and this country too soon shared the dismal fate of the rest of Germany.

Thus the obstinate knot which for nearly thirty years had refused to yield to war after war was at last cut by the sword of Turenne and Wrangel. The close union of Austria and Bavaria was dissolved. France reaped the benefit of being a Catholic Power while she fought on the Protestant side. To yield Alsace to her seemed not inadmissible, since she was Catholic, and by the expedient of creating a new Electorate, Bavaria was satisfied, while at the same time the Catholic majority in the Electoral College, and so the Catholic character of the Holy Roman Empire, was preserved. Bavaria being satisfied, the German Powers in their exhaustion and despair were able to force the Emperor to separate the interest of Germany

from that of the Spanish Monarchy, and so to abandon that Family Alliance of the House of Habsburg which had originally caused the intervention of France and Sweden. The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, followed by the Treaty of Westphalia, brought peace to Central Europe, while the war of France with the Spanish Monarchy still continued to rage.

While this mighty change took place our islands remained a prey to civil war, and the principal events took place even before the first Civil War could be said to be altogether at an end. The King was indeed conquered in 1646, but the victorious Parliament could not for a moment feel at ease, and in 1648 a new Civil War broke out. It is a fact of great importance that the French Government was thus completely preoccupied at the time when changes took place in England which might otherwise have tempted it to interfere. Had France been at leisure we may suppose that she would have felt bound in honour to come to the aid of Henrietta Maria. On the other hand, had England been at leisure she would perhaps not have looked on indifferently while such a revolution was made in the system of Europe.

But early in 1646 foreign politicians became aware that an event had happened in England which was of prodigious magnitude. The English Monarchy had been completely and hopelessly beaten in its struggle with the Parliament. This event is historically perhaps greater than the more thrilling event of January 1649, and moreover it must have seemed at the time even more momentous than it really was. Many kings in many European countries had been defeated before, but they had given place to other kings, as Richard III to Henry VII or Mary of Scotland to James. In this case the Monarchy

itself seemed to have received a mortal wound, and to Mazarin looking on England must have seemed to be undergoing a transformation which would assimilate her to the Netherlands. Already in 1646 he may have foreseen the English Commonwealth. What he could not then have foreseen was that the English Monarchy would revive, and in such power that late in the eighteenth century its influence would still be held excessive, and that it would still subsist in the closing years of the nineteenth. For what hope could remain to the English Monarchy after a struggle in which it had put forth its utmost resources, and had been slowly, gradually, completely defeated? It might indeed be nominally reinstated after due submission, but, deprived of the military power and schooled by a Presbyterian Church, the English Monarch could only be for the future a ceremonial functionary, who would disappear in the first fit of economy that might seize the victorious Parliament.

Such a prospect was most serious for Mazarin. Hitherto he had had to deal in England simply with a family, and a family half French, half Catholic, half Bourbon. For nearly twenty years English policy had given the French Government no serious trouble, only occasional cause for irritation. Yet England was rich and great, 'an old and haughty nation, proud in arms.' What if she should put forth her power and announce her will? A new Government practically republican, and now too in possession of a veteran army, might cause her to do this.

But instead of conjecturing what Mazarin must have felt, let us read in his Instructions to Bellièvre (July 1646) what he actually did feel.

'The invariable object of the Embassy of M. de Bellièvre, the centre to which all his efforts must tend,



is this. He is to try to promote and foment the discord between the Independents and the Presbyterians and Scots in such sort that they may never be able to agree or unite to abolish the Monarchy and constitute themselves as a Republic. That would be to us a mischief beyond all comparison. It would be far less prejudicial to us that the King of Great Britain should be restored to his former authority, even if we were certain that he would be an enemy to us, than that there should arise a Republic of England and Scotland, though it were uncertain if it would be friendly or hostile to his crown.

The reasons of this difference are very easy to understand.

First, the revenue of the King is so restricted that it can barely suffice for his ordinary expenditure, and consequently if he wanted to make war he would have to make it without money, which is impossible, or else he would have to levy it from his subjects, and in this he would either meet with complete resistance or would obtain but very moderate subsidies.

As to that, we cannot be surprised that those populations who have some right in certain matters to resist the views and wishes of the Prince should almost always resist if only to make use of their right, since they are extremely tenacious of the use of it. Whereas in a free state such as a Republic is, the money grants being voluntary and given by consent and by the concurrence of all to a design unanimously adopted, they make such grants without murmur or reluctance, and to the amount needful for the success of the design.

Add to the above what consideration and power such a new Republic would acquire by alliance with that of Holland; which alliance for several reasons would assuredly

become indissoluble, if only the empire of the sea were to be in their hands, and by this it would be easy for them to cause annoyance to any one at pleasure, whether in the Old or New World.

For these reasons M. de Bellièvre is to bring into play every sort of contrivance and adopt every kind of expedient, whether by courtesy and civility, by presents and promises, or by fears and threats, and apply all the friendships and familiarities he has contracted in that country to avert so great a calamity.

We have here the key-note of French policy towards the transformed England, which already in 1646 begins to appear. It is the more striking because this very Mazarin afterwards did more than any man to support the so-called Republic by the alliance which he formed with Cromwell. It is also striking because it points to further consequences which in the end did not fail to follow, but yet did not follow so speedily as Mazarin expected. Such was that union with Holland. In fact the immediate consequence of the establishment of a Republic in England was war with Holland. And yet after a long course of time, and when certain obstacles had been removed, the new England did unite with Holland in that powerful alliance which humbled the pride of Louis XIV.

Mazarin vainly hoped to prevent the Revolution which he apprehended. But he perceives clearly what causes are at work to retard it. Bellièvre is to 'foment the discord between the Independents and the Presbyterians and Scots.' And thus this same document, while it opens a long vista, marks at the same time the new struggle which is immediately at hand. An act in the drama is at an end, that which began in 1642, the Civil War between King and Parliament, in which the King has

had some help from the Stadtholder, but very little from France, and the Parliament has had very effective help from Scotland. Another act now begins, which will end in 1651 with the battle of Worcester. This also is a period of Civil War, though intermittent. But the Royalist Party has fallen into an inferior position, the main disputants being at first the two branches of the Parliamentary Party. The Monarch himself, divorced from his personal following, falls back upon a series of negotiations, not unlike those negotiations with France and Spain about the Palatinate which had occupied so many of his more prosperous days. He palters in turn with the Presbyterians, with the Scots, and with the Independents, and irritates Cromwell now as he had irritated Richelieu before.

If we recognise in general that one of the great questions throughout our civil troubles was to establish a satisfactory relation between England, Scotland, and Ireland, we shall readily understand the nature of the new struggle which began in 1646. At the outset England had offered to absorb Scotland in ecclesiastical uniformity by means of Laud's Service-book. Disturbances had then arisen, and in course of time Scotland had found an opportunity of retaliating. By means of the League and Covenant Scotland had, as it were, imposed a Service-book upon England. Scotland now took the lead in the alliance between the two countries; England was in some sort conquered by Scotland. And to France, as the Civil War itself, which bound the hands of her old rival, was extremely convenient, so it was convenient that Scotland, her ancient ally, should give the tone to British policy in general. But now began a new fluctuation. England was uneasy under Scottish influence. The Scottish religious system was as intolerable in the South as Laud's

Service-book had been in the North. When Anglicanism or Prelacy had been routed, a reserve of opposition came into view. The Triarians of the religious war between the two countries were found in the most Puritan of English Puritans, in the Ironsides themselves. Baxter, when he visited the Parliamentary camp about the time of the battle of Naseby, heard those godly warriors practising their wit upon the *Priestbiters*, and the *Dryvines* of the Westminster *Dissembly*. The wit of this new party was not its sharpest weapon. And it had a leader in the man who had played the most striking part in that great effort of the Parliamentary party which in 1644 and 1645 had turned the balance of fortune against the King. Oliver Cromwell was already the most impressive person on the public stage, and he represented more than any other man the national, the anti-Scottish, feeling which now began to gain ground.

It was this latest developement which inspired the keen apprehension expressed in the above observations of Mazarin. Hitherto France has not found it necessary to interfere very actively in British affairs, since they have taken of themselves a course highly agreeable to her. But we see her now girding herself up for intervention. We see too that Mazarin's apprehensions are by no means unfounded. The increase of British power which he foresaw was soon realised; the alliance of Great Britain with Holland was realised in the end. He had other anticipations, which were equally just. In his Instructions to Bellièvre he speaks of 'the bad example which will be offered by the insurrection of the English and Scots against their king to the subjects of other princes, whose interest accordingly it is not to suffer an evil which can easily be checked to run its course and be completely successful.' A

remarkable prophecy of those troubles of the Fronde which were to follow so speedily upon the rise of Cromwell's party in England, and were for a time almost to overwhelm Mazarin himself! He also fears, we can plainly see, a revival of the Huguenot party. 'The condition of the Catholic religion,' he writes, 'cannot but suffer in England from this change of Government, where those who have brought it about will seek to justify it in part by the rigour with which they will try to expel Catholicism entirely and not to suffer it there even concealed, and where the ministers of religion, who have always more credit in republics than in monarchies, will neglect no means of causing it to be persecuted in that realm, and of causing the interests of those who are of the same religion in the states of other princes to be embraced there.'

All this leads us to anticipate that the phase which begins in 1646 will be marked, among other features, by French intervention. In the war of King and Parliament France has been on the whole a spectator; in the second struggle which now begins, and which may be called the War of England, Scotland, and Ireland, we see France preparing to take an active part.

Mazarin, as we know, was prevented ultimately from pursuing the course he laid down for himself in 1646. When the so-called Republic was actually set up in England, we find it after a time most effectively supported by Mazarin. None the less important is this rough sketch of a policy which he lays down under the influence of a first impression. For the French Government returned to it after Mazarin had passed away.

It is one of the grand differences between the later and the earlier part of the Stuart period that the later

Stuarts lean very much upon French aid in their struggle with their subjects, whereas before 1646 France has either looked on indifferently or has inclined to the side of the Parliament.

Another transition is also observable in the combination sketched by Mazarin. Hitherto the Stuart King has been rather more estranged from his Scotch than from his English subjects. In Scotland the rebellion took its rise, and afterward it prospered by Scotch help. But, once fairly defeated in England, the Stuart finds a refuge among his original subjects. In 1646 Charles takes up a position which reminds us of that of Mary Stuart. At Newark and Newcastle he reminds us, as Ranke has remarked, of his grandmother at Fotheringay. This too is a characteristic of the later phase. The Stuart is once more a Scotch King in the days of Preston, Dunbar, and Worcester, as again later in the time of Sheriffmuir, Preston Pans, and Culloden. In the eighteenth century indeed the very combination sketched by Mazarin reappears when Scotland and France are united in the cause of the Stuart against the English Government.

But in 1646 the Stuart Prince, nay the Monarchy itself, was but a secondary matter of consideration in English politics. The English Monarchy is at its *nadir*, and those who fancy that by observing main currents they can predict at least in outline the future of a state, might have held it certain that, whatever might happen, at least the monarchy and the Episcopal Church were sunk beyond the possibility of a resurrection. The struggle was now between two parties, the Presbyterians and the Scots on the one side, and the Independents on the other, who were agreed in wishing to reduce royal power to a nullity. All that remained to Charles was the power of selling a

certain traditional influence which still belonged to the Crown to one or other of these two parties at the price of some concessions, and so contributing to decide the victory.

The phases between 1646 and 1648, so profoundly interesting in the internal history of Great Britain,—when the two parties consolidated themselves and ranged themselves in order of battle, while the Monarchy passed backwards and forwards between the two camps,—must not detain us here. We cannot speak of the flight of the King to the Scots, of the negotiations at Newcastle, of the surrender of the King by the Scots to the English Commissioners, of his residence at Holmby, of his seizure by Cornet Joyce in the name of the army and his transference to Hampton Court, of his negotiation with Fairfax and Cromwell, of the Agitators and the division in the military party, of the King's flight to the Isle of Wight and his residence at Carisbrooke Castle, of the reunion of the military party and their agreement in a policy hostile to the Monarchy, of the ascendancy acquired by the military party over the Parliament. Nor can we speak of the reaction among the Scots after their surrender of the King, of the growth of a Royalist Presbyterianism, having its headquarters in Scotland, but at the same time strongly influential in the City of London, and how this was provoked by the growth of Independency and its ascendancy in the army. The result was seen in 1648 when a second Civil War broke out, a Civil War widely different from the first. The event of 1648 resembles in some of its larger features those of 1715 and 1745; it may even be compared with the old Rising of the North under Queen Elizabeth. It consists in an invasion of England from the North in the cause of a Stuart prince supposed to have a hereditary right, which is not sufficiently

recognised by the English Parliament. The main bulk of the party which takes up arms is in this case Presbyterian, but Anglicans and Cavaliers appear also in the background. It resembles those other events in another feature which concerns us here more closely, namely, that aid from France might have been hoped for, but was not given.

But this second Civil War, though so strikingly different from the first, is blended with it in the prevalent view, because that view is rather biographical than historical, and contemplates the person of Charles rather than the English state. It is the last act in the tragedy of the Fall of Charles I, and as such seems naturally connected with the earlier acts, with the first Civil War, and beyond that with the fall of Strafford, and even the initial stages of the constitutional struggle. In a historical view of the growth of Policy, the second Civil War, with its consequences till 1651, is separated from the first, as being a war between the dominant parties in England and Scotland, whereas in the first war the dominant parties in England and Scotland had acted for the most part in union. This point of view at the same time presents a new aspect of the events of 1648 by exhibiting the connexion of Continental with British affairs.

The death of the King in January 1649 is a catastrophe so thrilling that it makes us more indifferent even than we usually are to the Continental history of the time. Yet on the Continent too mighty events were taking place, events worth consideration not only on their own account but also by their influence upon English history.

I. On January 30th, 1648, peace was signed at Münster between the King of Spain and the States-General.

This is one of the greatest events. It is the settle-



ment of that dispute which for eighty years had troubled Western Europe, which had occupied more than any foreign question the minds of Queen Elizabeth and Henry IV, which had given rise to a new European state, now the richest in the world, and to a new Colonial empire. This dispute was now at length closed for ever, and the Dutch question ceased henceforth to trouble international politics.

II. Since 1644, when a Pope of anti-French leanings, Innocent X, had succeeded the Barberini, Mazarin had studied to carry the war against Spain into Italy. Of the three great masses which composed the Spanish Monarchy, the Peninsula, the Low Countries and Italy, the two former had been invaded in Richelieu's time, and French troops had long given aid to the rebels in Portugal and Catalonia. Mazarin followed the example of Richelieu; in particular he fomented rebellion in Naples. Masaniello's rising commenced in July 1647; his death took place before the end of the same month. Here was an opportunity for Mazarin, who at once conceived the idea of sending Condé to detach Naples from the Spanish Monarchy and rewarding him with the crown for himself. This scheme had to be abandoned, but a Guise presented himself to play the part which Condé declined. The French Government did not indeed authorise the attempt of this adventurer, but a French fleet arrived before Naples in December, and a naval battle was fought off Castellamare. The fleet however withdrew soon afterwards. Guise failed in his military operations, and in April 1648 fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

III. On October 24th, 1648, peace was signed at Münster between France and the Emperor and the Empire, and at Osnabrück between Sweden and the Emperor and

the Empire. Thus in the same year in which what we may call the Eighty Years' War came to an end the Thirty Years' War also, the most disastrous and destructive war of modern history, was terminated.

IV. In the course of the same year 1648 discord steadily grew between the French Government, directed by Mazarin, and the Parliament of Paris. It is the commencement of what is known as the troubles of the Fronde. Because this movement proved abortive, and ended only in confirming the absolutism founded in France by Richelieu, we are not to conclude that the symptoms which appeared in 1648 were not in the highest degree alarming. Monarchy, which had almost disappeared in England, was now threatened in France also. Mazarin had predicted two years earlier that the English contagion would spread, and already the Parliament of Paris was emulating that of Westminster. Republicanism at the same time was assuming a militant form in the Netherlands, and there seemed reason to think that the ancient Monarchical system was crumbling away in Western Europe.

These vast perturbations must have pressed more heavily upon Mazarin than upon any other man. In France he already began to feel his authority undermined, and the conclusion of peace between the Dutch and the Spaniards created a new difficulty for his Government.

The war in Italy did not prosper with him, nor yet since 1646 the war in the Catholic Low Countries. The negotiations in Westphalia proved more difficult than he had anticipated. And that the States-General entered in 1647 upon a separate negotiation, and in 1648 actually concluded a separate peace with the King of Spain, was to Mazarin nothing less than a great calamity.

We may say that the year 1646, when he actually contemplated intervention in Britain, was the zenith of that great age of French history which may be called the age of the Cardinals. It has been too much effaced by the more conventional brilliancy of the period which followed. In 1646 the Italian who shortened his name to Mazarin had a position before Europe similar to that of the other Italian who when he came to rule France shortened his name to Napoleon. His armies fought at once in Spain, Italy, Davaria, and Flanders, and they were commanded by Condé, Turenne and Harcourt. Meanwhile he negotiated at Munster, through Longueville, D'Avaux and Servien. At home he appeared as the great patron of letters. Descartes and Corneille were his pensioners. Scholars, including Grotius, studied in the library which his munificence had thrown open to them. And while Virgil's line, *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento*, was pointedly applied to himself, his nieces began to give the law to the world of French society. But it is an important fact in English as well as in French history that the decline of his fortune, and a temporary decline in the fortune of France, began in 1647.

France had waged war since 1635 with both branches of the House of Habsburg at once, and in both wars she had met with equal success. In both wars likewise she had had a most efficient ally. Sweden had aided her against the Emperor, the Netherlands against Spain. She had pressed on towards a consummation which had seemed well within her reach, and which would have placed the boy Louis XIV on a throne of well-nigh universal dominion. But in 1647 it began to appear that this utmost good fortune would not be granted to her.

She was indeed successful in the Westphalian nego-

ciations, where she herself at Münster and Sweden at Osnabrück exacted so much from the Emperor that Germany might be said to be partitioned between Austria, Sweden and France. Louis XIV obtained Alsace by way of 'satisfaction' for the French crown, and as guarantor of the new settlement of the Empire he took up a position within Germany which was little inferior to that of the Emperor. There was even some reason to think that, on the death of Ferdinand III, Louis XIV would become Roman Emperor.

But in her war with Spain, which was more important to her, and in which hitherto she had been equally successful, France now met with a misfortune. Everything here depended upon her alliance with the Netherlands, as in Germany on the alliance with Sweden. But here Spain had a grand diplomatic triumph. She brought the States-General to conclude a separate peace.

What was the consequence? Relieved at last of the burden which had weighed upon it for eighty years the Spanish Monarchy was now set free for war with France. And this happened at a moment when other internal difficulties, in which Spain was closely concerned, were growing up for the French Government. It has been pointed out that from the outset the French war with Spain had been more than half a civil war. Spain had been all along in concert with the turbulent noblesse, the turbulent princes of the blood, and the House of Lorraine. And so at the very moment when the French Government seemed to have surmounted all ancient difficulties and to have overcome all enemies, the old evil broke out again, the old concert between Spain and the turbulent noblesse. The League itself seemed to revive in the Fronde.

It is necessary to attend to this sudden change in

French affairs if we would understand why at the critical moment of the transformation of England Mazarin, who watched it with so much anxiety and with such a resolute purpose of intervening, after all allowed it to run its course. In October 1646 Henrietta Maria writes to Charles: 'Mazarin has assured me that the general peace will be made before Christmas, and when that happens you will be powerfully aided.' Mazarin himself writes to the same effect to Bellièvre as late as December 10th. His diplomacy through Bellièvre and Montreuil is very active during the time of the King's stay at Newcastle.

This is not the place for a discussion of the decisive step taken at this time by Charles. He disappointed at once his Queen and Mazarin, and made French intervention impossible for the moment. We remark again the double character of English Royalism, that there is a royalism of the King, which is essentially Anglican, and also a royalism of the Queen, which is Continental and Catholic. The King will not sacrifice the Bishops, but the Queen remarks that, whereas the King has hitherto held firm on this point, at present '*il faut de nécessité que ce pas-là se franchisse gaillardement et que Sa Majesté se déclare hautement pour le Presbitère Escossois*' (Memoir by the Queen accompanying the Instructions to Bellièvre). This is not the place to point out how by his firmness on this occasion Charles on the one hand sacrificed his own life, but on the other made his cause respectable and paved the way to its ultimate triumph. We are concerned with the immediate result, which was to alienate the Scots and so to frustrate the scheme of Mazarin, since that was founded on a concert between the Scots and the French Government in favour of Charles.

Mazarin lost his opportunity, and it never returned.

His unfortunate year, 1647, now overtook him, a year in which he declares himself convinced that some astral influence, adverse to his fortune, prevails. There is indeed a great contrast between his position when the King was at Newcastle and when the King was before his judges, two years later. In 1646 the position and prospects of France were better than at any time in Louis XIV's reign, if we except a few months in 1701. Indeed Louis throughout the second half of the seventeenth century is mainly occupied in climbing laboriously back to the eminence from which his government had descended in 1647. In 1646 France had possession of Lorraine, and of half the Catholic Low Countries, while within the Iberian peninsula itself and in Italy her position was such that Mazarin could calculate upon exacting from Spain at the peace the Low Countries, Franche Comté and Lorraine, that is, more than Louis XIV could ever acquire. In such a position he could afford to meditate intervention in England.

In 1648 all was changed. His ally, the States-General, had deserted him, and at the same time society in France was undergoing all the perturbations which naturally follow the conclusion of a great war. For the Thirty Years' War was over, and Alsace was conquered. The abuses and oppressions that had accumulated in a long period of war, fiscal grievances, the misery of the people,—all this was now to be overhauled; now at last it was called to mind that France had once had something in the nature of a constitution, which had perished in the war now ended and by the hands of the Cardinal whose place had since been taken by Cardinal Mazarin. Probably the example of England had already produced its effect, as Mazarin had foreseen.

At least in 1648 the moment was passed when Franco

could prevent revolution in England; the time seemed to be come for England to arouse revolution in France. The French constitutional movement of 1648 corresponded in a striking manner to the English movement of 1641. It was a rising of Parliament against Royal Power, all the more startling because the Parliament of Paris was an assembly so different from the English Parliament, and the attack upon Mazarin brought to mind that which had been made in England upon Strafford. Very different, no doubt, was the French movement from the English in its result, but the superficial correspondence lasted a good while, and at a later stage Condé might seem for a time to answer to Cromwell. One resemblance at least it had which concerns us here. We have seen England paralysed by her civil troubles while France established her ascendancy in Europe. The civil troubles which now arose in France paralysed her in turn for several years, so as to give room for revolution and for the growth of Cromwell's power in Britain.

Thus when the second Civil War occurred the aid of France had to be omitted from the calculation of the composite party of Presbyterians, English and Scotch, and old Royalists who took up arms for Charles I.

Hitherto since the commencement of the troubles the Monarchy had not been directly assailed. Its powers had indeed been relentlessly curtailed, but the opponents of it had kept in view everything rather than foreign policy. Their grievances had been mainly religious; they had scarcely since the age of Buckingham been seriously disquieted about any foreign interests or relations. Nor had they yet been driven to have a foreign policy of their own by any success of the King's party in procuring foreign alliances. Much help had been obtained by the

Queen on the Continent, but no foreign Power had openly intervened, and the aid of France could now, as we have seen, no longer be expected.

A profound innovation, the most profound innovation we have yet had to record in foreign policy, could not but be produced when in the course of the second Civil War the dominant party, that is, the parliamentary Independents combined with the army, broke with the Monarchy itself. In 1647, we know, it had seemed possible for a time that this party should reconcile itself with the King, but in 1648 when the King's name had drawn together so mighty a resistance to its ascendancy it naturally enough became republican. For the first time in our history a revolution, in the full sense of the word, was consciously made. The Army which had been formed during the first Civil War took violent possession of the Government. England passed under an Imperialism, which in a short time assumed, as was natural, a monarchical form, and Oliver Cromwell rose to the head of affairs.

For us this means that the connexion by ties of family and marriage between the Government of England and foreign Governments was absolutely dissolved. In Elizabeth's time, as we have seen, that connexion had become, at least in the latter part of her reign, very slight. When at last it became apparent that Elizabeth herself would not marry, a period began in which a national policy took the place of a dynastic, and the Queen became a sort of embodied Britannia. This result was reached approximately and, as it were, accidentally. By the violent revolution and catastrophe of 1649 the same result was brought about absolutely and deliberately. All questions of dynasty, marriage, and succession lapsed at once. Foreign policy began to concern itself with questions of



another kind, with the relations and dealings of the community itself with foreign Governments and communities.

This transformation was peculiarly abrupt because, as we have seen, the dynastic system of policy, almost evanescent under Elizabeth, had returned upon us with the arrival of the Stuart, and had grown stronger and stronger as their family connexions had multiplied. They had woven a web which united us with the Houses of Denmark, of the Palatinate, of France, and of Orange. In this respect we had passed through a long period of reaction.

The new system, introduced so suddenly, was not indeed destined to last long. Imperialism had but a short day, and when the ancient Monarchy was restored it brought in its train all the old dynastic connexions. But the brighter side of Oliver's government, his foreign policy, could not be forgotten, nor could the nation unlearn again the new idea of policy. Under the later Stuarts we witness a struggle between dynastic and national policy, until the great reconciler, William III, effects a satisfactory compromise in foreign as in domestic policy.

END OF VOL. I.









